-
by kapil
24 October 2026 8:41 AM
"The principle underlying Section 13 is that a Civil Court cannot assume jurisdiction over a matter, which the statute has expressly entrusted to the authorities constituted under the Act. It cannot, however, be invoked mechanically to oust the ordinary jurisdiction of the Civil Court in a dispute between private parties, where the relief sought does not require adjudication of a statutory question falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue authorities." Punjab and Haryana High Court has ruled that the statutory exclusion of jurisdiction under Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 cannot be invoked mechanically to bar a civil court from entertaining a suit between private parties where the dispute does not require an adjudication on title or vesting of land in the Gram Panchayat.
Dismissing a regular second appeal, Justice Deepak Gupta held that the mere assertion that a property is public or common does not by itself attract the statutory bar, clarifying that the civil court retains full jurisdiction to adjudicate a simpliciter suit for permanent injunction seeking to restrain the obstruction of a public amenity.
The dispute originated from a suit for permanent injunction instituted by village residents against the appellant-defendant to restrain him from blocking or encroaching upon a well situated in the Abadi deh of village Tundla, which had long been used by community members for domestic, bathing, and festive purposes. The appellant resisted the suit by asserting that the well was constructed by his ancestors on private land for exclusive domestic use. Both the trial court and the first appellate court concurrently decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs after holding the site to be public in character, leading to the regular second appeal before the High Court.
The primary question before the court was whether the jurisdiction of the civil court was ousted under Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 in a suit for permanent injunction between private parties concerning an Abadi deh well. The court was also called upon to determine whether concurrent findings of fact holding the disputed well to be a public facility could be interfered with in a regular second appeal.
Scope Of Statutory Bar Under Section 13 Of 1961 Act
The High Court began by examining the scope of Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, which excludes civil court jurisdiction over matters exclusively assigned to statutory authorities under the Act, including questions regarding whether a property is shamlat deh or vests in a Panchayat. The bench observed that the applicability of this provision turns squarely on the nature of the controversy and the exact relief claimed in the plaint.
The court noted that the plaintiffs had filed a suit against private defendants seeking solely to restrain them from obstructing the use of the well and encroaching upon its surrounding precincts. Because no declaration of title in favour of the Gram Panchayat was sought, nor was any statutory order of the Collector, Commissioner, or Panchayat assailed, the subject matter remained well within the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court.
"The mere assertion that a property is public or common property does not, by itself, render every suit concerning such property one falling within the statutory bar."
No Competing Title Adjudication Between Private Party And Panchayat
Addressing the jurisdictional challenge further, the bench highlighted that neither court below was called upon to resolve a competing claim of title between the appellant and the Gram Panchayat. The dispute was strictly confined to whether the appellant had any legal entitlement to treat the well as his exclusive private property and obstruct villagers from utilizing it.
The court reiterated that the principle behind Section 13 is to prevent the civil court from usurping matters specifically committed to statutory revenue forums. This statutory shield, however, cannot be stretched to defeat ordinary civil remedies in private disputes where no statutory question under the 1961 Act requires determination.
Precedent In Lachman Singh Distinguished
The court distinguished the judgment in Lachman Singh v. Gulzari (1984 PLR 121) relied upon by the appellant, observing that the precedent dealt with the substantive determination of rights under village common lands legislation. Since the present litigation involved no declaration of ownership or statutory vesting in the Gram Panchayat, the cited authority had no application.
Turning to the merits, the bench observed that the plaintiffs had successfully discharged their initial evidentiary burden through consistent oral testimonies, including that of the village Lambardar, alongside site plans, photographs, the Local Commissioner's report, and the Jamabandi describing the land as Abadi deh.
Concurrent Findings Of Fact Cannot Be Reopened In Regular Second Appeal
The court underscored that concurrent findings arrived at by two lower courts cannot be re-examined in a regular second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure unless demonstrated to be perverse, devoid of evidence, or premised on an erroneous legal standard.
The bench noted that the appellant's defence was an affirmative assertion of ancestral ownership, which necessarily required strong rebuttal evidence that was thoroughly evaluated and rejected by the courts below, especially given the established presence of a long-standing electricity transformer and a public street adjacent to the well.
The High Court held that neither the jurisdictional objection under Section 13 of the 1961 Act nor the challenge to concurrent factual findings raised any substantial question of law. Accordingly, the regular second appeal was dismissed, confirming the decree of permanent injunction against the appellant.
Date of Decision: 24 September 2026