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by sayum
24 October 2026 1:11 PM
"A mandatory injury-report condition places the victim in an impermissible dilemma: either submit to the particular examination or lose the financial assistance intended for her rehabilitation... A welfare scheme cannot indirectly compel what the governing statute prohibits from being done without consent." Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling dated October 23, 2026, held that making an injury report indicating penetrative sexual assault an indispensable eligibility condition for financial assistance under a victim welfare scheme is manifestly arbitrary and violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Saral Srivastava and Justice Garima Prashad observed that procedural welfare guidelines cannot penalise a sexual assault survivor for exercising the statutorily protected right to withhold consent for invasive medical examinations under Section 164-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 184 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
The petitioner, an eight-year-old child victim acting through her mother, approached the High Court challenging the rejection of financial assistance under the Uttar Pradesh Rani Lakshmi Bai Mahila Evam Bal Samman Kosh Rules, 2015. Following the registration of an FIR and filing of a charge-sheet under Sections 376-AB, 120-B, 504, and 506 IPC alongside Sections 5(m) and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the victim declined consent for the specific internal medical examination. Consequently, the District Steering Committee rejected her claim for three lakh rupees under Entry 7 of Annexure 1 to the Scheme solely due to the non-production of an injury report demonstrating penetrative assault.
The primary question before the court was whether producing an injury report indicating penetrative sexual assault can validly be made an indispensable condition for relief under a welfare scheme, or whether it defeats the scheme's rehabilitative object and violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The court was also called upon to determine whether the exercise of a statutorily protected right to refuse consent for an internal medical examination can justify the denial of compensation, and whether the High Court under Article 226 can strike down such a condition absent an express declaratory prayer in the writ petition.
Welfare Schemes Aim At Immediate Rehabilitation And Operate In Addition To Statutory Remedies
Examining Rule 4(a) of the State Scheme, the bench emphasised that the fund is designed as a social-welfare measure to provide immediate monetary, medical, and educational relief to women and child victims of heinous crimes. The bench noted that this relief exists in addition to compensation awarded by Special Courts under Section 33(8) of the POCSO Act and Rule 9 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules, 2020.
The Court held that every condition governing financial assistance must advance the rehabilitative purpose of the scheme rather than frustrate it. Procedural safeguards designed to identify bona fide claims cannot be transformed into exclusionary barriers that lock out genuine victims on grounds alien to the object of the welfare measure.
Penetrative Assault Under POCSO Act Does Not Mandate Demonstrable Bodily Injury
The Court observed that under Section 3 of the POCSO Act, penetrative sexual assault is not confined to acts that necessarily leave visible bodily marks. The offence encompasses penetration to any extent, insertion of objects, or specific oral acts, which may leave no anatomical lacerations.
Referring to Supreme Court rulings in Dalip Kumar alias Dalli v. State of Uttaranchal and Lok Mal alias Loku v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the bench underlined that bodily injuries are not legally necessary to prove sexual assault even in a full-fledged criminal trial, making it entirely irrational to mandate medical proof as an absolute prerequisite for preliminary welfare compensation.
Evidentiary Value Of Medical Reports Cannot Become Exclusive Gateway To Relief
Analyzing the evidentiary status of the documents prescribed under Entry 7, the Court pointed out that neither the FIR, the charge-sheet, nor the injury report constitutes a final judicial determination of guilt. An accused cannot be acquitted solely because an injury report does not record trauma, as criminal culpability is adjudicated upon the totality of the evidence.
Reiterating the coordinate bench ruling in Victim X in FIR No.048 of 2025 v. State of U.P., the Court observed that the Steering Committee possesses no jurisdiction to hold a parallel trial or reject a claim on the ground that the medical report fails to corroborate penetration through physical trauma.
"Its evidentiary value cannot be enlarged to the point where it becomes the exclusive means of recognising penetrative sexual assault."
Right To Refuse Consent For Medical Examination Is An Indispensable Statutory Safeguard
Turning to the absence of the injury report, the Court highlighted that Section 27(1) of the POCSO Act explicitly imports the procedural safeguards of Section 164-A CrPC, replicated verbatim in Section 184(7) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. These provisions unequivocally prohibit any medical examination without the consent of the victim or a competent person authorized to give consent on their behalf.
The bench invoked the landmark Supreme Court decision in Lillu alias Rajesh v. State of Haryana, affirming that survivors are entitled to medical procedures that respect bodily integrity, dignity, and consent, rather than subjecting them to secondary trauma. The Court also cited the Delhi High Court's decision in Sachindra Priyadarshi v. State of NCT of Delhi, which held that declining an internal medical examination does not impede the framing of charges or the trial.
Victims Cannot Be Forced Into Impermissible Dilemma Sacrificing Bodily Autonomy For Relief
The Court observed that imposing a mandatory injury report forces a child victim into an unconstitutional dilemma of either waiving statutory bodily autonomy or relinquishing financial assistance at their most vulnerable hour. The bench held that the State cannot indirectly coerce a victim into undergoing an intrusive examination that governing penal statutes strictly make optional.
Where the law protects the victim’s right to refuse consent without fatal consequences to the criminal prosecution, an identical refusal cannot be converted by the executive into an absolute ground to deny rehabilitative sustenance under a welfare policy.
Mandatory Requirement Violates Article 14 Equality Code And Is Manifestly Arbitrary
Subjecting the impugned entry to constitutional scrutiny under Article 14, the Court applied the doctrine restated in Kulsum Nisha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, holding that any legislative or executive classification must possess an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus to the statutory object. The bench noted that Entry 7 creates an artificial divide between victims who have medical reports and those who do not, despite both classes suffering identical trauma and requiring identical rehabilitation.
Citing Animal Welfare Board of India v. Union of India, the Court ruled that subordinate conditions defeating the core objective of a welfare regime are manifestly arbitrary. The presence or absence of an injury report bears no rational connection to the victim's need for maintenance, healthcare, and education.
"The condition is consequently manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution."
Impugned Requirement Severed; High Court Entitled To Mould Relief Under Article 226
The Court declared that the requirement of an "injury report indicating penetrative sexual assault" in Entry 7 is severable, leaving the scheme fully functional on the strength of the FIR and the charge-sheet. When an injury report is available, authorities may consider it, but its absence cannot serve as an absolute bar to financial aid.
Addressing the State's technical objection that the petitioner did not specifically pray for striking down the rule, the Court invoked Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer and Nur Islam v. State of Assam. The bench held that powers under Article 226 are wide enough to reach injustice wherever found, affirming that justice cannot be forsaken on the altar of technicalities when the impugned condition formed the sole basis of the rejection.
Allowing the writ petition, the High Court quashed the rejection decision dated January 2, 2025, and directed the State respondents to disburse the full compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 into a protected bank account for the minor victim within ten days.
Date of Decision: October 23, 2026
