Intra-Court Appeals – Maintainability – Orders Passed by the Board of Revenue – Appeals were filed against the common and individual orders passed by the Board of Revenue in its appellate and revisional capacities, challenged through writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution – The core issue was whether intra-court appeals against judgments of Single Judges exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 were maintainable – Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, initially allowed intra-court appeals under Section 18, which was repealed by the Judicial Administration Laws (Repeal) Act, 2001 – Rule 134 of the High Court Rules, substituted in 2005, excluded appeals in supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 – Held: Appeals against orders passed by the Board of Revenue, where petitions were filed under Articles 226 and 227, are maintainable if jurisdiction under Article 226 is invoked [Paras 9-22, 81-84].

Jurisdiction – Articles 226 and 227 Distinction – Article 226 confers original jurisdiction for issuing writs, while Article 227 provides supervisory jurisdiction – Supreme Court in Umaji Keshao Meshram and Radhey Shyam clarified that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to certiorari under Article 226 – Orders under Article 227 do not attract intra-court appeals unless substantial relief under Article 226 is involved – High Court affirmed the distinction, asserting appeals would be maintainable if petitions included relief under Article 226, despite ancillary references to Article 227 [Paras 27-39, 47-49].

Revenue Courts vs. Civil Courts – Revenue courts are constituted under special statutes like the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, and Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, to handle specific revenue matters – They are distinct from civil courts, which exercise plenary jurisdiction and are governed by the CPC – Revenue courts are supervised by the Board of Revenue and do not constitute ordinary civil courts – High Court noted that the Board of Revenue acts as a statutory tribunal, not a civil court of plenary jurisdiction [Paras 54-66, 75-81].

Precedents and Interpretation – The court referenced decisions including Harinagar Sugar Mills and Jaswant Sugar Mills, which distinguished between judicial functions performed by tribunals and civil courts – It held that despite judicial powers, revenue courts and the Board of Revenue do not qualify as civil courts [Paras 75-77].

Decision – Intra-court appeals arising from writ petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 challenging Board of Revenue orders are maintainable – The objection regarding non-maintainability is rejected, and the appeals are to proceed for hearing on merits – Rationale based on the conjoint reading of Rule 134 and Article 226 jurisdiction [Paras 82-84].
 

Criminal Conspiracy – Standard of Proof – Acquittal of Accused – The prosecution’s case alleged a conspiracy to facilitate a jailbreak by smuggling explosive materials into Burail Jail. Witnesses turned hostile, key incriminatory evidence such as communication devices were unrecovered, and contradictions in arrest dates created doubt. Held: Prosecution failed to establish the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, warranting acquittal for multiple co-accused [Paras 16-20, 47].

Burden of Proof – Applicability of Section 106, Evidence Act – Shifting Burden on Accused in Domestic Death Cases – Not Sustained - The trial court invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant, reasoning that he should explain the circumstances surrounding the death of his wife, who was in his custody. The High Court held this improper, noting that Section 106 cannot relieve the prosecution of its fundamental duty to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution must initially prove the appellant’s presence at the scene and last-seen circumstances to justify shifting any burden under Section 106. Here, lacking evidence of the appellant’s presence at the time of death, the High Court ruled Section 106 inapplicable, with no basis to impose a reverse burden on the appellant [Paras 1, 21-24, 29].

Alteration of Charges Post Examination – Section 302 IPC – Prejudicial Conduct – Right to Fair Defense - Initially charged under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC, and Dowry Prohibition Act provisions, the trial court subsequently altered the charge to Section 302 IPC and convicted the appellant of murder without issuing proper notice. The High Court underscored that, while Section 216 CrPC permits charge alteration, it must be exercised without prejudicing the accused’s right to a fair defense. Failure to notify the appellant about the altered charge contravened fair trial principles and caused prejudice. Held: Conviction on an altered charge without due procedural notice was unsustainable and required reversal [Paras 27-31].

Wrongful Prosecution – Compensation for Unjust Incarceration – Lack of Statutory Framework - appellant endured 13 years of incarceration before being granted bail, highlighting the absence of compensatory mechanisms for wrongfully prosecuted individuals. The High Court lamented the lack of statutory provisions in India for compensation in wrongful prosecution cases, despite recommendations in the Law Commission’s 277th report advocating for reparation. While similar frameworks exist in other jurisdictions, India’s lack of such provisions conflicts with Article 21 protections. Observed: Legislative reform is urgently needed to provide statutory relief for victims of wrongful prosecution [Paras 45-51, 56-62].

Decision: The criminal appeal is allowed. The conviction under Sections 302 and 316 IPC is set aside, and the appellant is ordered to be released forthwith. The court emphasizes the urgent need for statutory frameworks to compensate victims of wrongful prosecution, consistent with constitutional safeguards under Articles 14 and 21.

Partition of Self-Acquired Property – Applicability of Rule Against Partial Partition – Partition Suit – Will of Late Smt. Abnash Kaur – Plaintiff sought partition based on the registered Will of late Smt. Abnash Kaur dated 06.02.1973, dividing her estate among six beneficiaries, each receiving a 1/6th share – Suit contested by Defendant No.1, who argued it constituted partial partition, contrary to law, citing Kenchegowda judgment – Held: Rule against partial partition applies primarily to joint family or coparcenary properties – As the suit property was self-acquired by Smt. Abnash Kaur and held by the parties as tenants-in-common, the rule of bar against partial partition was deemed inapplicable – Partition granted with conditions [Paras 69-82, 85-86, 161].

Will Execution – Validity and Proof Requirements – Plaintiff failed to prove the genuineness of Will of late Sh. Ajit Singh dated 21.07.1997 under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, as no issue was framed regarding the genuineness – No evidence led by the plaintiff despite the Court allowing defendants to dispute the will’s validity if evidence arose – Will deemed unproven in suit proceedings [Paras 89-92].

Necessary Parties – Non-impleadment Objections – Defendant Nos.1 and 2 raised objections concerning non-impleadment of other beneficiaries under the Will of late Sh. Ajit Singh – Supreme Court precedent in Shivshankara held that suits do not abate for non-impleadment if estate is substantially represented by other parties – Plaintiff adequately represented deceased Ajit Singh’s interest; objection of non-impleadment overruled [Paras 94-96].

Subrogation Rights – Mortgage Redemption – Defendant No.1 argued possession retention rights due to mortgage redemption as per Compromise Decree dated 20.02.1978 – Plaintiff countered this by claiming redemption was from the estate’s rental income – Held: Defendant No.1 entitled to retain possession until co-sharers pay contribution towards redemption amount; however, mortgage status does not entitle Defendant No.1 to exclusive ownership – Redemption deemed validly done by Defendant No.1 per compromise, with partition rights to plaintiff upon paying share of redemption [Paras 106-111, 121-122].

Termination of Lease – Sham Transaction Allegation – Plaintiff argued that the lease between late Smt. Abnash Kaur and Defendant No.1 was a sham, created to avoid tax liabilities and shield property from claims – Will and subsequent documents acknowledged lease as genuine, binding plaintiff – Plaintiff’s argument of termination based on lease amount was dismissed due to lack of supporting evidence and contradictory pleadings [Paras 144-155].

Limitation for Partition Suit – Plaintiff claimed partition of the suit property not barred by limitation – Citing Supreme Court precedents, Court reiterated that no limitation applies to partition suits, as partition is an incident attached to joint property rights – Plaintiff’s claim for partition sustained [Paras 135-140].

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Plaintiff sought declarations regarding ownership and an injunction against Defendant No.1 – Court held plaintiff entitled to permanent injunction as a co-sharer but denied declaratory reliefs, finding plaintiff’s claims unsubstantiated and contrary to pleadings on record [Paras 171, 173].

Decision: Partition granted with preliminary decree determining shares of parties in the suit property – Defendant No.1’s possession as subrogated mortgagee upheld pending payment by co-sharers of their redemption contributions – Declaratory reliefs denied; plaintiff entitled to injunctive relief as co-sharer – Suit disposed of accordingly [Paras 175-179].
 

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Grounds of Cruelty – Long Separation – Held: Prolonged separation of 24 years with complete absence of reconciliation efforts constitutes mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – The bitterness and irretrievable breakdown of the marriage fulfill the cruelty threshold – Divorce granted [Paras 26-29].

Desertion – Reasonable Cause – Burden of Proof – Held: The wife's claim of justified separation based on allegations of suspicion by the husband lacked corroborative evidence – Desertion by the wife without reasonable cause established – Judgment of trial court set aside [Paras 27-28].

Irretrievable Breakdown – De Facto Termination of Marriage – Held: While irretrievable breakdown is not a standalone ground for divorce under Indian law, it may be considered when coupled with long separation and cruelty – The Court dissolved the marriage recognizing its de facto termination [Paras 20-24].

Mental Cruelty – Evolution of Jurisprudence – Prolonged Separation as Cruelty – Held: Drawing from precedents, prolonged separation with absence of cohabitation and conjugal relations was held as an act of extreme mental cruelty, warranting dissolution of marriage [Paras 21-24].

Procedural Law – Burden of Proof – Preponderance of Probabilities – Held: The petitioner successfully established cruelty and desertion on a preponderance of probabilities – Trial court erred in requiring excessive corroboration [Para 15].

Decision: The appeal was allowed. The judgment of the Senior Civil Judge, Proddatur, dated 16.06.2010, dismissing the petition for divorce was set aside. The Court granted a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the respondent.
 

Civil Law - RERA Registration – Completion Certificate Versus Occupancy Certificate – Legal Interpretation – The appellants, legal heirs of the original promoter, contested the requirement to register a project with K-RERA, citing receipt of an Occupancy Certificate before RERA’s enactment – Held: Under Section 3 of the RERA, a real estate project must be registered if it was ongoing at RERA’s commencement and lacked a Completion Certificate – The Kerala Municipality Building Rules recognize an Occupancy Certificate as indicative of project completion, precluding further registration – The Tribunal’s direction to consider additional evidence was upheld only if the Occupancy Certificate’s issuance date remains unproven [Paras 26-28, 31-34].

Commission and Expert Reports – Use in Assessing Project Status Under RERA – The Tribunal directed K-RERA to consider reports from a Commissioner and Expert Engineer to verify project status, citing lack of clarity in the completion date – Held: The Tribunal’s directive is valid but limited; K-RERA may consider reports only if the Occupancy Certificate’s issuance date remains unproven, ensuring evidence relevance to whether the project was ongoing as of RERA’s enactment [Paras 30, 34-37].

Judicial Deference – Scope of Authority for Evidence Use – Concerns raised over expanded evidentiary scope were addressed, affirming that any misuse of evidence beyond determining project status could be contested before K-RERA, underscoring judicial deference to subordinate authorities for fact-finding [Para 37].

Decision: Appeal allowed in part; Tribunal’s order modified to restrict K-RERA’s use of Commission and Expert Reports to cases where the Occupancy Certificate’s date is unverified.

SARFAESI Act – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies Required - The petitioners, challenging the DRT’s order denying stay on asset possession, argued that procedural lapses warranted court intervention. However, the court highlighted the SARFAESI Act’s self-contained remedy structure, requiring petitioners to exhaust statutory avenues before seeking writ jurisdiction – Held: Given adequate statutory relief available, writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not typically warranted for securitisation matters. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed on the grounds of non-maintainability, respecting judicial precedent favoring alternate remedy adherence [Paras 4-5, 10-11].

Assignment of Debt – Jurisdiction of DRT to Review Assignment Agreements - The petitioners contended that the assignment between the bank and ARCIL was legally flawed. The court reaffirmed that the DRT lacks jurisdiction over the legality of assignment agreements, as they fall outside the scope of Section 17, which limits DRT review to securitisation actions rather than contractual disputes – Reinforced: Jurisdictional limits under the SARFAESI Act bar DRT from addressing assignment legality, focusing instead on enforcement measures [Para 12].

Decision - Both petitions were dismissed due to the availability of statutory alternatives under the SARFAESI Act, and the DRT's lack of jurisdiction to examine assignment agreements was upheld [Para 13].

Service Law - Confidential Reports (CRs) – Standard for Judicial Review – Assessment Validity – The petitioner, an Army Brigadier, challenged adverse CRs that impacted his nomination for the National Defence College (NDC) and promotion to Major General – Held: Judicial review of CRs is permissible where objectivity or procedural fairness is compromised; the Tribunal's findings that assessments were consistent lacked scrutiny regarding evident subjectivity and procedural anomalies in the petitioner’s CRs [Paras 18-20, 34-40].

Confidential Reports – Expunction of Adverse Ratings – Objectivity and Consistency Standards – The petitioner alleged unjust downgrading in CRs from April–August 2009, July 2018–June 2019, and July 2020–February 2021 – Held: The expunction was warranted as the assessments by the Reviewing Officer (RO) in July 2018–June 2019 lacked correlation with recorded achievements, failing objective and consistent assessment standards; similarly, the expunction of the Initiating Officer's (IO) assessment in July 2020–February 2021 was arbitrary given alignment with prior positive assessments [Paras 41-45, 50-59].

Promotion and Nomination Eligibility – Impact of Confidential Report Assessments – Fair Consideration Ordered – Given that expunged adverse CRs had affected the petitioner’s ranking and eligibility for the NDC course and promotion, the Court directed reconsideration of his eligibility for these opportunities based on modified CRs [Paras 59-60].

Decision: The petition is partly allowed, expunging the adverse assessments in CRs for July 2018–June 2019 and July 2020–February 2021, and directing reconsideration of the petitioner’s eligibility for NDC and promotion to Major General.
 

Tenancy Law - Eviction on Grounds of Unauthorized Construction – Permanent Structure Requirement – Section 13(1)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act – Eviction Order Restored - The plaintiff sought eviction based on unauthorized constructions by the tenant, including a toilet, storeroom, and shed, allegedly made without landlord consent. The trial court decreed eviction, but the appellate court reversed, finding insufficient pleadings on alterations. Held: Tenant’s constructions constituted permanent structures under Section 13(1)(b), justifying eviction. The appellate court's findings were perverse, given clear evidence of alterations and tenant's admissions. Writ Petition allowed, reinstating the eviction decree by the Small Causes Court [Paras 3, 16-18, 22, 23, 27].

Interpretation of Rent Agreement – Scope of Permissible Alterations - Defendant claimed the Rent Agreement allowed renovations; however, structures added were temporary. Held: The Rent Agreement permitted only renovations, not construction of a toilet block, storeroom, or shed covering open space. The additions were clearly permanent modifications to the premises. [Paras 12-15, 22].

Use of Court Commissioner’s Report as Evidence - Tenant disputed the validity of the Court Commissioner’s findings, arguing the structures pre-existed the lease. Held: The Court Commissioner’s report confirmed unauthorized structures, and the tenant’s admissions invalidated his defense. The appellate court erred in disregarding this report, which corroborated the plaintiff’s claims of unauthorized additions. [Paras 15-16, 24].

Applicability of High Court’s Supervisory Jurisdiction – Article 227 of the Constitution - Respondent argued the appellate court’s findings should not be interfered with under Articles 226 and 227 absent clear perversity. Held: The appellate court’s reversal was perverse, failing to consider vital evidence, including the Court Commissioner’s report and tenant’s admissions. Intervention under Article 227 was justified to correct a miscarriage of justice. [Paras 7, 26].

Remand of Proceedings – Judicial Economy Considerations - The respondent requested a remand due to limited reasoning in the eviction decree. Held: Due to the case’s lengthy duration and clear evidence of unauthorized construction, remand would serve no purpose. The High Court opted to resolve the matter substantively to avoid prolonging litigation. [Paras 27, 28].

Decision – Writ Petition allowed – Judgment and decree dated 16 February 1999 by the District Court set aside – Eviction decree dated 30 March 1996 restored – Defendant to vacate premises by 31 December 2024 [Para 28].

Criminal Law - Interim Bail on Humanitarian Grounds - Medical Emergency of Family Member – The petitioner sought temporary bail, citing his wife’s critical need for spinal surgery requiring his assistance. The Court held that granting interim bail on such humanitarian grounds aligns with the fundamental rights under Article 21, which includes the right to family dignity and the marital duty of support. Bail was granted for 60 days to allow the petitioner to fulfill his role in her care [Paras 2, 8, 10, 11].

Risk Assessment - Non-flight Risk and Documentary Evidence – The Court found the petitioner to be a non-flight risk, with established family ties. Given that the evidence is mostly documentary and has been secured, there was minimal risk of tampering. These factors supported the decision to grant bail without compromising the prosecution's case [Paras 9, 10].

Article 21 - Right to Life and Dignity Extending to Marital Responsibilities – The Court emphasized that Article 21 extends to the right to live with dignity, which encompasses fulfilling marital vows and duties. The petitioner’s request for interim bail was thus acknowledged as part of his right to act as a supportive spouse in a time of medical need, which the Court deemed integral to human dignity [Para 10].

Decision – Petition Allowed with Conditions – The Court granted interim bail to the petitioner for a period of 60 days from the date of his release, with conditions that the petitioner is to surrender upon completion of the period. The order applies to all pending FIRs, and no insolvency certificate is required as part of the bail bond [Paras 11-14].