Probate — Will — Suspicious Circumstances — Petition Dismissed — Petitioner (daughter-in-law of testatrix) sought probate of Will dated 08.08.2012, purportedly executed by Late Smt. Suraksha Sud, bequeathing GK Property in equal shares to petitioner and respondent No. 2 (husband), and other properties to granddaughters — Testatrix died on 25.08.2012, a mere seventeen days after the alleged execution — Will allegedly discovered in May 2018, nearly six years after death, from a leatherette bag in the testatrix's room — Sole surviving attesting witness (PW-7) turned hostile and categorically denied ever having met the testatrix or witnessed her sign the Will — Forensic expert (DW-2) opined that testatrix's signatures were forged and deceased attesting witness's signature was traced from his passport — Held: Petitioner failed to prove due and valid execution of the Will; petition dismissed [Paras 24, 34, 35].

Will — Standard of Proof — Suspicious Circumstances — Doctrine Restated — Burden on Propounder — The standard of proof for a Will is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but proof on preponderance of probabilities satisfying the judicial conscience — The propounder must establish testamentary capacity, due execution and attestation in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, and knowledge and approval of contents — Where suspicious circumstances surround the Will, the burden on the propounder becomes heavier and the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicion by cogent, convincing and reliable evidence — Suspicious circumstances must be assessed holistically and not piecemeal; individually explicable circumstances may in totality create an overwhelming cumulative effect disentitling the propounder from probate [Paras 15–18, 22, 23].

Section 63, Indian Succession Act — Attestation — Mandatory Requirement — Hostile Attesting Witness — Section 63(c) requires that the attesting witness must have seen the testator sign the Will — Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act requires examination of at least one attesting witness as a condition precedent to grant of probate — Mere identification by the attesting witness of his own signature on the Will is insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement; what is needed is that he witnessed the testator sign in his presence — Where the sole surviving attesting witness (PW-7) categorically denied ever having met the testatrix or witnessed her sign the Will, and such denial was positive, unequivocal and unshaken, the mandatory requirements of Section 63 are not satisfied — Evidence of Notary Public (PW-4) cannot substitute for evidence of an attesting witness [Paras 16, 19, 21, 30, 31, 32].

Suspicious Circumstances — Five Categories Identified — (I) Execution in proximity to death — Will executed only four days before testatrix fell gravely ill and seventeen days before her death; no medical evidence of sound testamentary capacity on date of execution — (II) Inordinate delay and conspicuous silence — Petitioner instituted at least five proceedings including FIR for forgery of a Will, Settlement Deed, DV complaint and civil suits over six years without a single reference to the alleged Will — conduct wholly inconsistent with a genuine beneficiary — (III) Inherently improbable discovery narrative — Original Will allegedly discovered in a leatherette bag containing daily jewellery, expired passports and debit card, left undisturbed for six years in the testatrix's room in the same premises where the petitioner resided — wholly incredible — (IV) Failure of attesting witness — discussed above — (V) Forensic evidence of forgery — Expert opined signatures of testatrix were forged and deceased attesting witness's signature traced from passport [Paras 25–33].

Hostile Witness — Probate Proceedings — Partial Reliance — While testimony of a hostile witness is not to be entirely discarded, only the credible portions may be relied upon — In the context of probate, portions of hostile attesting witness's testimony that are positive, consistent and unshaken, including categorical denial of having seen the testator sign the Will, are binding on the Court and cannot be ignored in favour of mere formal identification of the witness's own signature [Para 32].

Decision: Petition dismissed — Probate of Will dated 08.08.2012 refused — No order as to costs.

HUF Property – Burden of Proof – Nucleus – Plaintiff children claimed disputed property purchased through sale deed dated 11.04.1966 for Rs. 6,000/- in mother's name (defendant no. 1) was HUF property funded from HUF nucleus of grandfather and father – Father was in government service prior to 1955 and grandfather had wound up business distributing property to sons – Held: There is no presumption that a joint Hindu family possesses joint property merely because it is joint – Initial burden lies on plaintiffs to prove existence of HUF, its members, income, nucleus and sufficient funds to purchase the property – Plaintiffs failed to discharge this burden prima facie – No documentary evidence produced to prove HUF's existence or nucleus – Plaint does not disclose a real cause of action [Paras 43–46].

Government Servant – Membership of HUF Business – Plaintiffs' own plaint discloses father was in government service much before 1955 – A government servant is not permitted to conduct business simultaneously – HUF being a business concern could not have remained in existence while father was in service – Grandfather had also wound up business and distributed property to sons – After dissolution of joint family and distribution, property given to members becomes self-acquired property – Plaintiffs cannot assert ownership in such property [Para 45].

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 14 – Female Hindu – Absolute Owner – Property purchased on 11.04.1966 by defendant no. 1 after commencement of the Act – Sale deed records defendant no. 1 as absolute owner in possession – Consideration stated to have been paid by her – Husband entitled to purchase property in wife's name under Section 3(2) of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 – Even if consideration was provided by husband, defendant no. 1 is absolute owner under Section 14 – Plaintiffs' claim of co-ownership not even prima facie proved [Paras 47–50].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Rejection of Plaint – Limitation – Suit for Declaration – Hopelessly Barred – Plaintiff no. 1 aged about 61 years and plaintiff no. 2 aged about 58 years at time of filing suit in 2025 – Both well aware since birth of mother's claimed absolute ownership – No suit filed within 3 years of attaining majority under Section 8 of Limitation Act to challenge exclusive ownership – Claim of cause of action arising in September 2022 on refusal to share rent held to be artificial pleading to circumvent limitation, unsupported by documentary evidence – Held: When plaint averments disclose that suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC without relegating parties to trial – Limitation though generally a mixed question of fact and law can be decided at threshold stage where bar is glaring [Paras 51–54].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Scope and Purpose – Plaint – Cause of Action – Held: Court is not bound to accept patently untenable claims – If averments on a meaningful reading are manifestly vexatious and meritless, court must exercise power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Power is not merely procedural but substantive, aimed at preventing abuse of judicial process – Where clever drafting creates illusion of a cause of action, it must be nipped in the bud – Court has a duty to lift the veil and expose the bar to suit at threshold [Paras 34–40].

Decision: Appeal dismissed at admission stage under Order XLI Rule 11 CPC with costs throughout – Impugned judgment and decree of trial court dated 10.07.2025 affirmed – Interim order, if any, vacated.

Dowry Death — Section 319 Cr.P.C. — Summoning of Additional Accused — Unmarried Sisters of Husband — Vague Allegations — Revision Allowed — Petitioners-revisionists (petitioner nos. 3 to 5), unmarried sisters of accused Pradeep, were summoned as additional accused by the trial court in a Sessions Trial arising out of a dowry death case under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC — F.I.R. contained no specific allegations of dowry demand against them — Dying declaration of the deceased implicated only accused Munesh (mother-in-law) — Charge sheet filed against Pradeep and Munesh only after investigation exonerated petitioners — Held: Impugned order suffers from grave illegality and is set aside qua petitioner nos. 3 to 5 [Paras 2, 7, 8, 9].

Section 319 Cr.P.C. — Scope and Limitations — Extraordinary Power — Cannot Be Exercised on Pre-Trial Material — Section 319 Cr.P.C. confers extraordinary jurisdiction upon the trial court to summon persons not before it, but such power must be exercised only on the strength of evidence adduced during trial — Trial court erred in relying upon the F.I.R. allegations and statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as the foundation for summoning petitioners — Material so relied upon was already before the court at the time of cognizance and charge framing, yet no order was passed at that stage — Held: Invocation of Section 319 Cr.P.C. on the basis of pre-trial material is a serious error of law [Paras 6, 7, 8].

Evidence — Testimonies of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 — No New Evidence Emerging During Trial — Dowry demand attributed by P.W.-1 (Mainpal, complainant) and P.W.-2 (Neeraj Kumar) to accused Pradeep, who had telephonically demanded cash and a motorcycle — Depositions of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 merely reiterated the version in the F.I.R., which had already been considered by the Investigating Officer while exonerating petitioners — Held: Such testimony cannot constitute new evidence emerging during trial so as to justify exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. against petitioners [Paras 2, 7].

Revision — Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 — Rendered Infructuous — Petitioner nos. 1 and 2 (Rishipal, father-in-law, and another) were directed to associate with the trial during pendency of the revision — Main trial concluded in acquittal of all accused vide judgment dated 29.3.2012 — Revision petition qua petitioner nos. 1 and 2 held infructuous in view of their acquittal [Para 5].

Decision: Revision petition allowed qua petitioner nos. 3 to 5 (Renu, Nidhi @ Chinu, and Ritu) — Impugned order dated 3.3.2011 set aside qua them — Revision petition dismissed as infructuous qua petitioner nos. 1 and 2 in view of acquittal recorded on 29.3.2012.

Criminal Law - Personal Liberty — Illegal Arrest — De Facto Custody — 24-Hour Mandate — Section 58 BNSS / Article 22(2) — Petition Allowed — Petitioner, a partner of pharmaceutical firm M/s Digital Vision, was allegedly involved in illegal inter-state diversion of psychotropic medicines — NCB conducted search of petitioner's premises on 31.10.2025 at about 10:45 P.M., served notice under Section 67 NDPS Act, and the petitioner travelled to Chandigarh in the NCB vehicle, remaining continuously with NCB officials from about 10:45 P.M. on 31.10.2025 — Formal arrest recorded only at 9:00 P.M. on 01.11.2025 — Petitioner produced before Magistrate at 2:00 P.M. on 02.11.2025 — Held: Petitioner was in coercive NCB custody from approximately 10:45/11:00 P.M. on 31.10.2025; formal arrest memo was a mere paper transaction; total period of detention exceeded 24 hours; arrest/detention is illegal [Paras 3, 13, 14].

Arrest — Definition and Commencement — De Facto vs. De Jure Arrest — Term 'Arrest' Not Defined in Cr.P.C./BNSS — The term 'arrest' is a term of art denoting a state of apprehension, restraint or total deprivation of liberty — Whether a person is arrested does not depend on the nomenclature assigned by the investigating agency such as "detention for questioning" or "custody for inquiry" but on the factual deprivation of personal liberty to move where he pleases — The moment police surveillance and restriction on the movement of the individual commences, the clock of liberty begins — Entry in the arrest memo is merely declaratory and not conclusive proof of actual time of arrest — Held: The terminus a quo for computing 24-hour period is the moment of actual physical deprivation of liberty, not the time noted in the formal arrest memo [Paras 11, 11.1, 11.2, 12].

Section 57 Cr.P.C. / Section 58 BNSS / Article 22(2) — Constitutional Safeguard — Dual Purpose — Violation Cannot Be Cured by Remand Order — The mandate of producing an arrested person before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours serves a dual sacrosanct purpose: (i) to verify the legality of arrest, and (ii) to subject the necessity of further detention to judicial scrutiny — This constitutional command is not a surplusage of legal prose but a peremptory command — Violation thereof cannot be cured by the subsequent passing of a remand order — Held: Once violation of Articles 21 and 22 is established, the arrest itself stands vitiated and the individual deserves to be enlarged on bail [Paras 11, 11.3].

Magistrate — Duty on Production of Arrestee — Proactive Judicial Scrutiny — The duty of a Magistrate before whom an arrestee is produced is not a mere ministerial act of recording presence but a solemn judicial interrogation of the arresting authority's narrative — The Magistrate must pierce the veil of documentation and identify the actual terminus a quo of detention by examining the factual substratum of arrest, stripping away any administrative curtain the investigating agency may have drawn — The Magistrate is duty-bound to inquire into the where, when and how of the capture so that a twilight zone of illegal detention is not regularized through sanitized police records [Para 11.4].

Investigative Powers — Distinction Between Lawful Summoning and Coercive Detention — A clear distinction must be drawn between coercive subsumption of volition and genuine investigative functions such as summoning for joining investigation, production of documents or recording of statements — Where no palpable fetter exists upon the individual's ambulatory freedom and he retains unhindered access to communicate with the world and is free to depart, the 24-hour clock does not commence — However, where a person is detained overnight in the police/agency office, compelled to eat and sleep there, and restricted from leaving, such restraint constitutes an arrest in law regardless of its label — No universal exhaustive guidelines can be laid down as each case has its own unique factual conspectus [Para 11.2].

Decision: Petition allowed — Petitioner held to have been arrested/detained by NCB beyond the prescribed 24-hour period without requisite judicial order — Petitioner directed to be released from jail, if not required in any other case, upon furnishing requisite bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court/CJM/Duty Magistrate — Observations not to affect merits of the trial.

Service Law – Notional Seniority – Wrongful Exclusion from Appointment – Same Selection Process – Respondent applied for the post of Junior Engineer (Electrical) Grade-II under RBA Category and secured 59.54 points, more than the last selected candidate who obtained 58.34 points – Despite higher merit, respondent was not selected on erroneous grounds relating to category certificate – Court directed appointment in 2014, while similarly situated candidates were appointed w.e.f. 22.08.2009 – Tribunal directed notional appointment w.e.f. 22.08.2009 with consequential seniority and benefits – Held: A candidate wrongly excluded from appointment due to arbitrary action of the appointing authority in the same selection process is entitled to notional seniority from the date similarly situated persons were appointed – Penalizing such a candidate for the appointing authority's lapse would violate Article 14 of the Constitution [Paras 14-19].

Old Pension Scheme – Notional Appointment – Necessary Consequence – Once the respondent is held entitled to notional appointment w.e.f. 22.08.2009, the necessary corollary is that he would be governed under the Old Pension Scheme which was in vogue at that date, and not under the New Pension Scheme which came into effect w.e.f. 01.01.2010 – Respondent also entitled to refund of monthly deductions of 10% made from his salary [Paras 13, 20].

Equitable Exception to Seniority Rules – Rule 24 of J&K Civil Services Rules – While seniority is ordinarily determined from the date of substantive appointment under Rule 24, notional fixation of seniority is an equitable exception where delay in appointment is attributable solely to the appointing authority, so as to preserve the integrity of the common select list and safeguard the right to equality [Para 18].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Impugned order of the Central Administrative Tribunal upheld – Connected CMPs also dismissed.

Criminal Law – Murder – Acquittal – Section 302 IPC – Appellant convicted by the Trial Court for allegedly pouring kerosene oil on the deceased and pushing her onto a burning stove, causing 90% burns from which she died the following morning – Conviction based on two dying declarations and circumstantial evidence, as all three purported eye witnesses turned hostile – High Court finds dying declarations unreliable, mutually contradictory and not corroborated by circumstantial evidence – Held: Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; appellant entitled to benefit of doubt – Conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted [Paras 39, 54, 59].

Dying Declaration – Reliability – MLC Entry as Dying Declaration – First purported dying declaration contained in MLC (Ex.PW-13/A) recorded by PW-13/Dr. Upender Sharma described appellant as "her new lover" – Expression appears to be personal observation of the doctor and not the deceased's own words – Doctor admitted that the word "kerosene" was written on the basis of smell noticed by him and not on account of the deceased uttering it – Word "Informant" appearing misaligned in the MLC raises doubt whether the narration was given by the deceased or by her neighbour PW-2/Nirmala – Absence of deceased's signature or thumb impression further undermines its evidentiary value – Held: Document cannot be regarded as a reliable dying declaration [Paras 44, 45].

Dying Declaration – Second Declaration – Procedural Infirmities – Second dying declaration (Ex.PW-15/C) recorded by Investigating Officer PW-15/S.I. Vijay Singh contained unusually detailed particulars including precise parentage and address of appellant, rendering it inherently improbable for a person with 90% burns – No cogent evidence of deceased being in fit condition to make the statement; certificate of medical fitness not proved; SDM or doctor not involved during recording – Held: Veracity of the said statement is highly doubtful [Para 46].

Dying Declaration – Mutual Inconsistency – Three Conflicting Versions – MLC records that appellant poured oil from the stove onto the deceased while she was pouring kerosene; Ex.PW-15/C records that appellant poured kerosene from a can and pushed her towards the burning stove; Brief Facts (Ex.PW-15/DA) recorded by the same Investigating Officer states that deceased fell on the stove during a scuffle and appellant got burnt while trying to save her – Three materially inconsistent versions not only cast doubt on the manner of occurrence but also on the veracity of both dying declarations – Third alleged dying declaration before PW-4/Ran Singh not mentioned in his Section 161 statement and held to be hearsay [Paras 47, 48, 50].

Circumstantial Evidence – Incomplete Chain – Presence of Appellant at Spot Insufficient – Defence of appellant attempting to save the deceased corroborated by burn injuries on his person, Brief Facts recorded by the Investigating Officer, statements of eye witnesses who turned hostile, and defence witnesses – Motive attributed not supported by substantive evidence – Unaccounted matchbox found in sealed pullanda not reflected in seizure memo; liquor bottle not mentioned in site plan; hospital documents from Meerut not traced – Held: Circumstances do not form a complete chain consistent only with guilt of the appellant; mere suspicion cannot substitute proof [Paras 51, 52, 53].

Dying Declaration – Legal Principles Restated – Dying declaration if voluntary, truthful and made in fit state of mind can form sole basis of conviction without corroboration – Court must first satisfy itself that the declaration is reliable and truthful – Where dying declaration suffers from inconsistencies, procedural infirmities and improbabilities, Court must exercise caution – Multiple dying declarations: Court to assess which is believable – Physical and mental fitness of declarant to be established from evidence on record; medical certification aids but is not always indispensable – Recording by Judicial Magistrate adds credence but dying declarations recorded by police are not inadmissible per se – Relied upon: Irfan v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar [Paras 41, 42, 55, 56].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Dismissal in Default – Singular Default – Complaint dismissed in default by ACJM, Shimla on 08.04.2025 for non-appearance of complainant and her counsel — Appellant-complainant submitted unavoidable circumstances prevented appearance and counsel was expected to seek adjournment — Matter repeatedly called throughout the day but neither complainant nor counsel appeared — Held: Trial court ought not to have straightway dismissed complaint; a single default in appearance does not justify dismissal with its serious consequence of acquittal — Appeal allowed; complaint restored [Paras 4, 11–13].

"Section 279 BNSS — Discretion Must be Exercised Judicially" – Section 279 of BNSS (erstwhile Section 256 CrPC) confers discretion on Magistrate to either acquit accused or adjourn the matter — Magistrate may also dispense with personal attendance where complainant is represented by advocate — Dismissal and consequent acquittal under Section 279 BNSS becomes final in view of Section 403 BNSS which bars courts from altering signed judgments — Held: Power under Section 279 BNSS must be exercised judicially and fairly; court could have issued fresh notice, adjourned, or proceeded on the basis of evidence already on record [Paras 5–6, 11].

"One Default Not Enough — Complainant's Track Record Relevant" – No prior default in prosecution of complaint shown on record — Held: Where complainant has no history of default, a single absence does not justify axing the complaint; court should adjourn to do substantial justice — Ratio of Associated Cement Co. Ltd., Mohd. Azeem, S. Anand and N.K. Sharma applied [Paras 7–11].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Order dated 08.04.2025 quashed and set aside — Criminal Complaint No.1351/2023 restored to its original number — Trial court directed to proceed from the stage at which complaint was dismissed — Parties directed to appear before trial court on 06.05.2026.

Execution Proceedings – Third-Party Claim – Order XXI Rule 58 CPC – Maintainability – Agreement of Sale – Appellant/third-party claimant filed a claim petition before the Executing Court seeking to raise an attachment dated 03.06.2019 levied over property bearing D.No. 82-6-6, Rajamahendravaram, on the basis of an alleged agreement of sale dated 04.06.2018 entered into with the judgment debtors (Respondents 2 and 3) prior to the attachment – Executing Court entertained and adjudicated the petition on merits and dismissed it – Division Bench holds that maintainability of such an application under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC is not in dispute, as the Executing Court never held it to be not maintainable – Point of maintainability does not arise [Paras 7, 18].

Attachment – Section 64 CPC – Pre-Attachment Agreement of Sale – Registration Requirement – Section 64(1) CPC renders any private transfer of attached property void against claims enforceable under the attachment – Section 64(2) CPC saves transfers made in pursuance of a contract entered into "and registered" before the attachment – Held: To attract the protection of Section 64(2) CPC, the contract must be both entered into and registered prior to the attachment – An unregistered agreement of sale, even if antedating the attachment, does not fulfil the twin conditions of Section 64(2) and cannot defeat the attachment [Paras 15, 16, 22–23].

Evidence – Agreement of Sale Not Produced – Adverse Inference – The alleged agreement of sale dated 04.06.2018 was neither produced before the Executing Court nor before the Division Bench – Appellant and judgment debtors are closely related and the subject property abuts the appellant's property – No explanation offered by either side regarding the existence of the agreement – Lok Adalat award in O.S. No. 58 of 2019 passed between appellant and his vendors (judgment debtors) was not binding on the decree-holder who was not a party to those proceedings – Conduct of the appellant and judgment debtors reflects adversely and indicates an attempt to defeat the decree-holder's legitimate claim [Paras 21, 12].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Order of the Executing Court in E.A. No. 47 of 2024 in E.P. No. 556 of 2019 in A.C. No. 89 of 2009 dated 05.12.2025 confirmed – No order as to costs – Miscellaneous applications, if any, stand closed [Para 25].

Criminal Law – Quashment – Section 498-A RPC – Omnibus and Vague Allegations – Matrimonial Dispute – Complainant-wife alleged mental and physical harassment, dowry demand, and illicit relations of husband with co-petitioner Arti Devi – Charges framed under Sections 498-A and 506 RPC – Held: Where allegations of cruelty, harassment, and dowry demand are wholesale, omnibus, and lacking in specific particulars as to time, date, place, or manner of occurrence, continuation of criminal proceedings is not sustainable and amounts to abuse of process of law – FIR, chargesheet, and charge-framing order quashed [Paras 15, 21-26].

Section 498-A RPC – Misuse – Counter-Blast Proceedings – Growing tendency to invoke Section 498-A as a tool for personal vendetta against husband and his family noted – Husband had prior in time filed petition for annulment of marriage under Section 12(1)(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act and a complaint under Sections 420/506 RPC against the complainant-wife – Present criminal proceedings found to be manifestly attended with mala fide and instituted with ulterior motive to wreak vengeance – Such tendency required to be dealt with firmly [Paras 16, 22, 25].

Definition of "Relative" – Section 498-A RPC – Co-Petitioner Arti Devi – Held: A girlfriend or concubine does not fall within the definition of "relative" under Section 498-A RPC – The status of "relative" must be conferred by blood, marriage, or adoption – Arti Devi, who was neither a relative of the husband nor residing in the matrimonial home, could not be charged under Sections 498-A and 506 RPC [Paras 17-20].

Inherent Jurisdiction – Parameters for Quashment – Section 561-A Cr.P.C. – Power under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C.) can be exercised where allegations in the FIR are absurd and inherently improbable, or where criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide and instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance – Both conditions satisfied in the present case [Paras 23-25].

Decision: Petitions allowed – FIR No. 49/2017 dated 15.11.2017, chargesheet dated 02.02.2018, and order dated 14.08.2018 framing charges under Sections 498-A and 506 RPC quashed.