Civil Law – Second Appeal – Scope of Interference – Substantial Question of Law – Appellant/plaintiff challenged concurrent findings of trial court and first appellate court dismissing his suit for declaration of ownership and injunction over suit land comprised in Khasra Nos. 76 and 77, Village Bamta, Bilaspur – Plaintiff alleged that Defendant No. 1, in collusion with revenue authorities, got Mutation No. 287 attested in her name for 0-1 bigha of land wrongly carved out of plaintiff's land, and thereafter illegally sold the same to Defendant No. 2 vide sale deed dated 29.01.2001 – Both Courts below found that plaintiff failed to adduce concrete evidence establishing that the area sold to Defendant No. 2 formed part of Khasra Nos. 76 and 77 – Held: All points raised in the second appeal are purely questions of fact; no substantial question of law is involved; no perversity demonstrated in the impugned judgments – Appeal dismissed [Paras 26–35].

Second Appeal – Concurrent Findings of Fact – Limits of High Court's Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC – High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, can interfere with findings of fact only on limited grounds viz. finding based on inadmissible evidence, ignorance of relevant admissible evidence, misreading of evidence, or perversity – A pure finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal even if appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous – First appellate court is the final court of fact – Held: Concurrent findings by Courts below do not warrant interference in absence of any of the recognised exceptional grounds [Paras 30–35].

Substantial Question of Law – Tests and Principles – A question of law becomes a substantial question of law if it is debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and has a material bearing on the decision of the case – There must be a foundation for the question laid in the pleadings, and it must emerge from sustainable findings of fact – An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter – Held: No substantial question of law arose in the instant appeal; appellant failed to discharge the sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC [Paras 31–35].

Decision: Regular Second Appeal dismissed — Judgments and decrees of the trial court dated 06.12.2007 and of the first appellate court dated 24.12.2024 affirmed — Pending miscellaneous applications disposed of.

Customs Law – Export Incentives – RoDTEP Scheme – Sugar Exports – Denial of Benefit – Petitioners engaged in export of white refined sugar (ITC(HS) Code 17011490) availed duty credit under RoDTEP Scheme – Export policy of sugar amended from "free" to "restricted" by Notification No. 10/2015-20 dated 24 May 2022, with exports permitted under specific permission of Directorate of Sugar – Revenue denied RoDTEP benefit treating such exports as ineligible "restricted" exports under Notification No. 76/2021-Customs (N.T.) – Held: Sugar exported with specific permission under prescribed conditions cannot be treated as a totally restricted or prohibited item so as to deprive petitioners of RoDTEP benefits – Petitioners entitled to duty credit under the Scheme [Paras 3-4, 9, 22].

Export Policy – Restricted vs. Prohibited Exports – RoDTEP Ineligibility – Item No. 1 of Table 1 to Notification No. 76/2021 excludes from RoDTEP duty credit goods "restricted or prohibited for export" – Revenue contended that sugar, post-Notification dated 24 May 2022, became blanketly ineligible – Held: The said notification does not impose a total embargo; it permits export with specific permission and prescribed quota – Characterising quota-permitted exports as "restricted/prohibited" is a misreading of the notification – Revenue's position contrary to the policy conditions set out in the notification itself [Paras 19-22].

Precedent – Finality of High Court Decision – Uniform Policy – Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Shree Renuka Sugars Ltd. and M/s. Satyendra Packaging Ltd. held that RoDTEP benefit cannot be denied to sugar exporters acting under specific Government permission – Department's SLP dismissed by Supreme Court on 26 April 2024 – Department's own communications accepted finality of the Gujarat High Court orders and proceeded to grant benefit to those petitioners – Held: Once an issue has attained finality in view of an authoritative pronouncement by a High Court, the department ought not to re-agitate the same before other High Courts; doing so invites conflicting interpretations and judicial chaos – Principle of inter-High Court comity and uniform policy on Central legislation affirmed following Maneklal Chunilal & Sons Ltd. and Jayantilal Ramanlal & Co. [Paras 23-25].

Relief – Refund with Interest – Petitioners who were not granted RoDTEP benefit directed to be granted the same – Where benefit was already granted but subsequently recovered from petitioners, refund of amount so recovered directed within four weeks along with interest at 6% per annum – No coercive recovery action to be taken where benefit has been granted [Paras 26-27, Order clauses (i)-(iv)].

Decision: Petitions allowed – Petitioners held entitled to RoDTEP benefit – Respondents directed to grant rebate under the Scheme to petitioners who exported sugar under specific permission – Petitioners from whom benefit was recovered directed to be refunded with 6% p.a. interest within four weeks – No coercive action for recovery to be taken – Rule made absolute. No costs.

Hindu Succession – Intestate Succession of Female Hindu – Section 15 HSA – Plaintiff's Entitlement – Interim Relief Refused – Plaintiff-brother filed administration suit claiming sole heirship of his deceased sister who died intestate, contending that the gift deed and Will executed by her were void – Defendant No.1 appointed Executrix under Will dated 10.04.2023, and probate obtained on 07.03.2026 – Held: Under Section 15(1) of the HSA, property of a female Hindu dying intestate devolves first upon sons, daughters and husband, secondly upon heirs of the husband, thirdly upon mother and father, fourthly upon heirs of the father, and lastly upon heirs of the mother – Since deceased had no children, her husband pre-deceased her, but her husband's sister Mrs. Shridevi Ruparel survived, the latter falls in entry 'b' (heirs of husband) under Section 15(1) and, by virtue of Section 16, excludes the plaintiff who falls in entry 'd' (heirs of father) – Plaintiff therefore has no entitlement to the estate of the deceased under intestate succession [Paras 57–69].

Constitutionality of Section 15(1) HSA – Single Judge Finding Not Binding – The plaintiff relied upon Mamta Dinesh Vakil v. Bansi S. Wadhwa (2012 SCC OnLine Bom 1685) wherein a Single Judge declared Section 15(1) unconstitutional – Held: The Single Judge had directed that the issue of constitutionality be referred to the Division Bench; the Division Bench declined to decide the constitutional question on the ground that it was unnecessary on the facts of that case and gave no finding of unconstitutionality – Section 15(1) has not been declared unconstitutional and continues to be applied by the Supreme Court – Law Commission's 207th Report recommending modification of Section 15 has not been legislatively implemented and cannot carry the plaintiff's case further [Paras 62–71].

Probate – Effect on Interim Relief – Probate as Authenticated Evidence of Will – Defendant No.1 obtained probate of the Will dated 10.04.2023 on 07.03.2026 – Plaintiff failed to file a caveat in the probate proceedings, which amounts to an admission of absence of caveatable interest – By virtue of the probate, the property of the deceased vested in Defendant No.1 from the date of the deceased's death – Unless and until the probate is revoked, interim reliefs in the administration suit cannot be granted – Plaintiff's petition for revocation of probate to be decided by the Testamentary Court on its own merits [Paras 77–79].

Interim Relief – Prima Facie Case – Maintainability – Principles Reiterated – Following Asma Lateef and Anr. v. Shabbir Ahmad and Ors. (2024) 4 SCC 696, a court hearing an interim application must record at least a prima facie satisfaction on maintainability before granting relief – Where, at the interim stage, the plaintiff fails to establish even prima facie interest in the estate of the deceased, interim reliefs are liable to be refused [Paras 82–85].

Decision: Interim Application (L) No.26854 of 2025 rejected – No order as to costs.

Election Law – Misjoinder of Parties – Election Petition – Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 82 – Petitioner impleaded not only contesting candidates but also Respondents No. 1 to 9, who are officers/officials against whom allegations of impropriety were levelled – Respondent No. 10 raised preliminary objection of misjoinder contending that only contesting candidates can be parties under Section 82 – Petitioner countered that Section 87 makes CPC applicable to election petitions and thus all necessary and proper parties must be impleaded – Held: Under Section 82 of the Act, only contesting candidates and returned candidates, or candidates against whom allegations of corrupt practice are made, can be impleaded as respondents to an election petition; concept of 'proper parties' as understood under CPC is alien to an election dispute; Respondents No. 1 to 9 ought not to have been impleaded; preliminary issue of misjoinder proved [Paras 6–16].

Election Law – Applicability of CPC to Election Petitions – Section 87, Representation of the People Act, 1951 – CPC applies to trial of election petitions only subject to the provisions of the Act of 1951 – Anything contained in CPC contrary to the Act cannot be invoked to implead a person who cannot otherwise be impleaded under Section 82 – Held: The ring of an election petition contest is closed to all except the petitioner and the candidates at the election; provisions of CPC cannot be used to expand the class of respondents beyond what Section 82 permits [Paras 11–12].

Election Law – Section 99, Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Corrupt Practice – Naming of Non-Candidates – Stage of Impleadment – Persons found guilty of corrupt practice after trial may be named under Section 99(1)(a)(ii), but such impleadment can only occur after conclusion of trial upon notice to show cause – The right given to such persons is limited to showing cause against being 'named' and does not entitle them to participate at all stages of the trial as a regular party – Held: Section 99 does not permit joining non-candidates as parties to an election petition at the stage of filing; it is only at the concluding stage of trial that the Court may issue notice under Section 99 [Paras 13–15].

Effect of Misjoinder – Non-Fatal to Election Petition – Although misjoinder of parties established, the election petition is not liable to be dismissed on this ground – Improperly impleaded respondents are to be struck off the array of parties by amendment – Held: Respondents No. 1 to 9 directed to be deleted from the array of parties; petitioner directed to file amended petition/memo of parties [Paras 17–19].

Decision: Preliminary Issue No. 1 decided in favour of Respondent No. 10 — Misjoinder of parties established — Respondents No. 1 to 9 directed to be struck off from the array of parties — Petitioner to file amended petition/memo of parties by next date of hearing — Matter listed for further proceedings on 11.05.2026.

"No Caste No Religion" Certificate – Writ of Mandamus – Disposal of Pending Application – Petitioner, described as an eminent actor and film maker professing no religion or caste affiliation, submitted an application on 20.03.2026 to the Tahsildar, Velachery for issuance of a "No Caste No Religion" Certificate – Application transferred to the Tahsildar, Sholinganallur on jurisdictional grounds under Na.Ka. No.A1/626/2026 dated 23.03.2026 – Application not considered till date – Petitioner invoked the precedent of the Division Bench order dated 10.06.2025 in W.A. No. 401 of 2025 directing issuance of such certificate within one month – Government Advocate submitted that a similar certificate was already issued by the Tahsildar, Tirupattur on 05.02.2019 and undertook to pass an appropriate order by 29.04.2026 – Held: Direction issued to the 3rd Respondent to issue "No Caste No Religion" Certificate to the petitioner on or before 29.04.2026, in terms of the Division Bench order in W.A. No. 401 of 2025 – Matter listed for reporting compliance on 29.04.2026 – Writ petition disposed of with no order as to costs [Paras 3–6].

Criminal Law — Murder — Transfer of Malice — Section 301 IPC — Doctrine of Transmigration of Motive — Bail Pending Appeal Rejected — Appellant convicted under Sections 302, 307, 506(2) IPC and 3/25 Arms Act for shooting dead Shakir, who was a bystander, while intending to shoot the informant — Appellant's plea that offence cannot travel beyond Section 304 IPC as he had no intention to kill the deceased rejected — Held: Under Section 301 IPC, if a person does an act intending to cause death of one person but causes death of another, the culpable homicide is of the same description as it would have been had the intended victim died — Intention to kill stands transferred — Bail application rejected [Paras 7–10].

Bail — Suspension of Sentence — Section 389 CrPC — Criminal Antecedents — Appellant claimed no criminal history but State placed on record 27 criminal cases against him including cases of murder, attempt to murder, dacoity with murder and Arms Act offences — Supplementary affidavit failed to satisfactorily explain the criminal history — Held: Appellant is a man of criminal character — No case made out for bail [Paras 9–10].

Decision: Bail application under Section 389 CrPC rejected — Appeal listed for hearing on 06.07.2026.

Criminal Law — Murder — Common Intention — Section 34 IPC — Conviction Upheld — Appellants Raj Narain, Kamlesh and Rajendra Prasad came to the field armed with gun, lathi and spade on 09.06.1984 and forcibly diverted the deceased's water course — On being confronted, appellants 2 and 3 exhorted to kill, whereupon appellant 1 fired at the deceased causing his death — Trial court convicted appellant 1 under Section 302 IPC and appellants 2 and 3 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment — High Court upholds conviction — Held: Prior conduct of arriving armed, exhortation at the time of incident and fleeing together thereafter conclusively establish common intention — Appeal dismissed — Conviction and sentence confirmed [Paras 23, 37–39, 57–58].

Common Intention — Section 34 IPC — Scope and Application — Pre-arranged Plan — Exhortation as Evidence of Meeting of Minds — Section 34 IPC does not create a distinct offence but lays down the principle of constructive liability — Common intention need not be pre-planned from long before; it can be formed on the spot — Exhortation by appellants 2 and 3 to kill the deceased, coupled with their armed arrival and subsequent flight, constitutes sufficient proof of meeting of minds — Separate residence and absence of prior enmity are not grounds of acquittal once common intention is otherwise proved [Paras 30–38].

Ocular Evidence — Credibility — Eye Witnesses P.W.1 and P.W.2 — Cross-Examination Failed to Dislodge Testimony — P.W.1 (son of deceased) and P.W.2 (brother-in-law) are the principal eye witnesses whose testimonies were not shaken in cross-examination on any material aspect including presence of accused, manner of crime and exhortation — Presence of P.W.2 on spot corroborated by P.W.1 and P.W.4 — Cannot be discarded as chance witness [Paras 24–25].

Hostile Witness — P.W.4 — Evidentiary Value — P.W.4 (Kailash Narain) turned hostile but in cross-examination corroborated the time and place of incident, presence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, and identified persons fleeing with a gun and lathi — Further evidence of appellant 2 procuring a false affidavit from P.W.4 to prevent testimony reflects consciousness of guilt — Statement of hostile witness relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act [Paras 27–29].

Medical Evidence — Conflict with Ocular Evidence — Two Injuries from Single Fire — Doctor opined both injuries could have been caused by single fire; opinion of two fires was merely on suggestion and unsubstantiated by evidence — Use of a self-loaded cartridge with non-standard wadding piece explains close-range charring — No irreconcilable conflict between medical and ocular evidence [Paras 26, 44–46].

Ante-Time FIR — 250 C.C. Semi-Digested Food — Contention that the deceased could not have been murdered at 08:00 AM as semi-digested food found in stomach implies he must have eaten much earlier — Held: In rural households, persons going to fields commonly take light food or liquid before leaving — FIR is not ante-time [Para 46].

Criminal Procedure — Section 313 CrPC — Statement Recorded on Old Proforma — Section 364 CrPC 1898 — Vitiating Effect — Statement of accused recorded on proforma prescribed under Section 364 CrPC 1898 though court's own order referred to Section 313 CrPC 1973 — Held: By virtue of Section 484(2)(b) CrPC 1973 and Section 8 of the General Clauses Act 1897, forms prescribed under the old code are deemed prescribed under the corresponding provision of the new code — Mere reference to wrong provision does not vitiate proceedings unless prejudice is shown — No prejudice demonstrated by appellants [Paras 49–52].

Investigation — Tainted Investigation — Non-Recovery of Gun — Defects in Investigation Not Fatal if Charge Otherwise Proved — Non-recovery of the gun and minor investigative lapses do not entitle the accused to acquittal if the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt by reliable ocular evidence [Para 48].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Conviction of Kamlesh (appellant 2) and Rajendra Prasad (appellant 3) under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment confirmed — Appeal on behalf of Raj Narain (appellant 1) had already abated upon his death — Appellants 2 and 3 directed to surrender within two weeks before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pratapgarh.

Adoption Law — Intercountry Relocation — HAMA Adoption — NOC by CARA — Adoption (Amendment) Regulations, 2021 — Adoption Regulations, 2022 — Petitioner no. 1 (minor) adopted by petitioners nos. 2 and 3 under HAMA, 1956 by adoption deed dated 08.02.2021 — Petitioners sought relocation of the child to Canada, a Hague Convention signatory — District Magistrate, Ferozepur furnished a Verification Report under Regulation 22B(1) and Schedule XXXIII — CARA, instead of issuing an NOC, issued merely a 'Support Letter' and marked the application as "rejected" on the portal with the remark "matter cannot be taken up as it is related to HAMA" — Held: Chapter IV-A of the 2021 Regulations is expressly titled to govern adoptions concluded under HAMA, 1956 where parents seek to relocate the child abroad — Upon receipt of verification report, CARA is mandated under Regulations 22B(2) and 22E(1) to ensure compliance with Articles 5 and/or 17 of the Hague Convention — The obligation to pursue and facilitate this compliance rests on CARA, not on the adoptive parents — CARA's abdication of its responsibility by issuing a mere support letter is untenable — Petition disposed of with directions [Paras 17–27, 34–35].

Hague Convention — Articles 5 and 17 — Central Authority's Obligation — Cooperation Between States — CARA and Canadian Authorities — Article 7(1) of the Hague Convention mandates cooperation between Central Authorities of the State of origin and the receiving State for the welfare and protection of the child — CARA proceeded on a misconception that the matter could not be taken up as the adoption was under HAMA — No objection by CARA as to the validity of the adoption — Held: CARA is directed to liaise with Canadian authorities, convey the statutory and regulatory position, and thereafter issue an NOC upon conclusion of the exercise under Articles 5 and/or 17 [Paras 28–35].

Best Interest of Child — Paramount Consideration — Adoption Regulations Cannot Be Construed to Leave Validly Adopted Children Without Relief — A construction that precludes parents who have effected a valid HAMA adoption from obtaining relocation approval under the 2021 Regulations would be contrary to the express wording of those Regulations and the paramount principle of the best interest of the child — Such construction is not acceptable [Paras 14, 25, 30].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of — CARA directed to liaise with Canadian authorities and convey the regulatory and statutory position — CARA further directed to issue NOC to petitioners upon conclusion of the exercise under Articles 5 and/or 17 of the Hague Convention — Pending applications disposed of.

Service Law – EPF – Pension on Higher Wages – Employee's Right vs. Employer's Default – Beneficial Legislation – Multiple writ petitions raising a common question whether eligible employees can be denied pension on higher wages solely because the employer fails to produce requisite documents such as Form 6A and challans – EPFO rejected applications on grounds of non-production of employer records – Held: Employee cannot be made to suffer for defaults of the employer or deficiencies in record maintenance by the authority; where the employee has produced Form 3A, EPF account statements, employer-certified joint option form, and furnished an undertaking for differential contribution, the authority must examine the claim on its substance and cannot reject solely for non-production of one category of document – The scheme being beneficial legislation, compliance with conditions must be assessed in a realistic and not mechanical manner [Paras 18–27].

Employer's Obligation – Statutory Records – Duty to Examine Own Records – Documents such as Form 6A, challans, and contribution filings are within the employer's exclusive custody and control; the employee has no role in their preparation or submission – The EPFO, when the employer claims records were already submitted, is under a duty to examine its own internal records including electronic data, member ledgers, passbook entries, and contribution history before rejecting the claim – The authority must call upon the employer, and if the employer fails to cooperate, must independently verify from all available material and seek corroboration from salary slips, wage records, bank statements, and prior employer communications [Paras 19, 23–25].

Pre-2010 Period – Non-Digitised Records – Workable Approach Required – Particular difficulty arises for periods prior to 2010 when records were maintained manually and electronic filing was not in full operation; in such cases EPFO cannot insist on a perfect set of documents in a particular format – The test is satisfaction based on available material as to whether employment is established, contributions on higher wages were made, and the joint option was exercised in substance – Rejection should be the last resort, only after all avenues of verification are exhausted and a reasoned speaking order is passed [Paras 18, 21, 25–27].

Decision: All writ petitions allowed – Impugned orders dated 8 April 2025, 9 April 2025, and 4 December 2025 quashed and set aside – Matters remanded to EPFO for fresh consideration in accordance with observations in the judgment – EPFO directed not to reject claims solely for non-production of Form 6A or challans for the pre-2010 period; to examine Form 3A, EPF account statements, contribution history, and corroborative material; to independently verify its own records; and if contributions on higher wages and valid joint option are found, to process claims subject to payment of differential contribution with interest – Reconsideration to be completed within twelve weeks – Reasoned speaking order to be passed – No order as to costs.