Welfare Scheme – Mukhymantri Kisan Evam Sarvhit Bima Yojna – Accidental Death – Scope of Eligibility – Petitioner's wife died on 06.10.2016 due to knife wound inflicted by unknown assailants while cutting grass in the field – Claim rejected on the ground that petitioner did not fall within the eligibility criteria of the Scheme – Held: The eligibility clause of the Mukhymantri Yojna specifically enumerates the events covered and benefit is available only if the deceased falls within the said enumerated criteria – Death by murder cannot be extended to fall within the definition of accidental death as envisaged under the Scheme – Petition dismissed [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10].

Ejusdem Generis – Interpretation of Welfare Scheme – The Mukhymantri Yojna covers accidental deaths arising from railways, roadways, air travel and other enumerated events – Application of the principle of ejusdem generis indicates that events not specifically enumerated but sought to be included must be of the same genus as those expressly listed – Murder or homicidal assault by unknown persons is not of the same genus as the accidents enumerated and cannot be treated as an accident under the Scheme – The object of the Scheme is to provide relief for uncertain and unfortunate events of the nature specifically described therein [Para 8].

Precedent – Distinguishability – Division Bench judgment in Smt. Bindu Devi vs. State of U.P. and 2 Others (WRIT-C No. 35148 of 2017, decided 15.02.2019) relied upon by petitioner, wherein a death caused by knife wound was allowed under the Samajwadi Kisan and Sarvhit Bima Yojana – Held: The present Mukhymantri Yojna is a distinct scheme from the Samajwadi Yojana interpreted in Smt. Bindu Devi – The said Co-ordinate Bench judgment does not come to the aid of the petitioner [Para 7].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – Claim under Mukhymantri Kisan Evam Sarvhit Bima Yojna not maintainable – Petitioner at liberty to avail any other Government scheme applicable on the date of death of the deceased in accordance with law [Paras 10, 11].

Civil Law – Territorial Jurisdiction – Return of Plaint – Order VII Rule 10 CPC – Section 20 CPC – Appeal Dismissed – Appellant filed suit for recovery of Rs. 3,49,70,864/- before Delhi High Court for non-lifting of goods and non-payment under purchase orders for supply of PLB duct pipes – Single Judge returned the plaint holding that no part of the cause of action arose within Delhi – On appeal, Division Bench holds that purchase orders were issued from Noida, goods were manufactured and required to be delivered at Jalgaon, and the alleged breach occurred entirely outside Delhi – Preliminary discussions in Delhi and techno-commercial offer issued from Delhi are merely incidental and do not constitute material or essential parts of the cause of action – Appeal dismissed [Paras 14–29, 31].

Section 20 CPC – Explanation – Corporate Defendant – Principal Office vs. Subordinate Office – Where a cause of action arises at a place where a corporation has a subordinate office, the corporation is deemed to carry on business only at that subordinate office for purposes of the suit, to the exclusion of its principal office – Respondent's registered office in Delhi is a mere formality; its operational office and place of business is at Noida from where purchase orders were issued – Jurisdiction held to lie at Noida/Jalgaon, not Delhi; following Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Co., 1992 AIR 1514 [Paras 21–23, 25].

Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause – Contractual Stipulation – Limits – Parties cannot by agreement confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise lacks territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC – An exclusive jurisdiction clause is enforceable only where two or more courts otherwise possess jurisdiction and the parties intend to restrict themselves to one – Where no part of the cause of action arises within the chosen forum, the clause is rendered ineffectual [Para 18].

Cause of Action – Breach of Contract – Making of Offer – Mere issuance of a techno-commercial offer from a place does not confer territorial jurisdiction on courts at that place, as a contract is concluded only on acceptance of the offer and not on its making – Purchase orders were placed from Noida in response to the offer; Delhi plays no role in formation or performance of the contract; following A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, (1989) 2 SCC 163 [Para 19.2].

Order VII Rule 10 CPC – Scope – Holistic Reading of Plaint – Real Cause of Action – Court while adjudicating an application under Order VII Rule 10 must adopt a pragmatic and realistic approach to ascertain where the real cause of action arose – Test is not to be applied mechanically by isolating stray averments, but by discerning the bundle of essential facts and their nexus to a territorial jurisdiction – Jurisdiction cannot be founded on casual or incidental facts lacking direct nexus with the lis [Paras 14, 27].

Suppression of Material Facts – Costs – Appellant failed to disclose in its plaint that its own application for return of plaint in the prior suit pending in Noida (C.S. No. 9 of 2020) had been dismissed on identical grounds – Pendency of challenge before Allahabad High Court does not absolve the Appellant of the duty of full disclosure – Costs of Rs. 10,000/- imposed by Single Judge upheld [Paras 9, 28].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Impugned order returning plaint upheld – Pending application closed [Para 31].

POCSO Act – Aggravated Sexual Assault – Attempt – Charge – Conviction – Sentence Modified – Appellant convicted by trial court under Section 9(m) punishable under Section 10 of the POCSO Act for aggravated sexual assault on a minor girl aged 4½ years – Trial court sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment of 5 years – On appeal, High Court holds that the charge was framed only for attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault under Section 18 read with Section 9(m) and was never amended to commission of the offence – Though materials on record establish commission of aggravated sexual assault, accused cannot be convicted for an offence for which he was not charged – Conviction modified to attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault under Section 18 read with Section 9(m) punishable under Section 10 – Sentence modified to rigorous imprisonment of 3½ years, being half of the maximum term of 7 years under Section 10 – Appeal partly allowed [Paras 20–22].

Victim Testimony – Child Witness – Sole Testimony – Credibility – PW12, the victim aged approximately 4½ years, consistently narrated the incident in her Section 164 statement and before the trial court – Her version corroborated by PW11 (mother) in FIR lodged on the day of the incident and by PW9 (father) in examination – Defence plea of tutoring rejected; child denied tutoring and her testimony was found credible and reliable – Absence of bruises or abrasions in MLC held irrelevant as charge was not of penetrative sexual assault – Held: Sole testimony of victim, if credible, requires no corroboration and is sufficient to sustain conviction; following Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 [Paras 15–18].

False Implication – Inconsistent Defence – Accused's plea of false implication on account of financial dispute was found inconsistent: suggestion to PW11 was that her husband owed money to the accused's father, whereas suggestion to PW9 was that accused was implicated to extort money, and in his Section 313 statement the accused simply denied involvement – Such contradictory defence versions not borne out by materials on record and hence rejected [Para 18].

Charge – Amendment – Section 232 CrPC – Non-compliance – Non-compliance of Section 232 CrPC by trial court does not ipso facto vitiate proceedings unless omission causes serious and substantial prejudice to the accused – No such prejudice alleged or shown in the present case [Para 7].

Section 7 POCSO Act – Sexual Assault – Act of undressing the child, climbing on top of her and lying over her with sexual intent and ejaculating constitutes "any other act with sexual intent involving physical contact without penetration" within the meaning of Section 7 – When committed upon a child below 12 years, the offence falls under Section 9(m) as aggravated sexual assault – However, as charge was only for attempt, conviction is confined to attempt under Section 18 read with Section 9(m) [Para 20].

Sentence – Section 18 POCSO Act – For attempt to commit an offence, punishment shall not exceed one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence – Maximum imprisonment under Section 10 for aggravated sexual assault is 7 years; half thereof being 3½ years – Trial court's sentence of 5 years for an attempt offence was in excess of the statutory limit under Section 18 and is accordingly modified [Para 21].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Conviction modified to attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault under Section 18 read with Section 9(m) punishable under Section 10 of the POCSO Act – Sentence modified to rigorous imprisonment of 3½ years – Fine of ₹5,000/- maintained [Para 22].

Criminal Law – Unlawful Assembly – Common Object – Conviction Upheld – Six accused including sole surviving appellant Chhotoo barged into informant's house at night armed with weapons — informant suffered gunshot injuries; wife and children suffered multiple injuries by sharp and blunt objects — Chhotoo assigned role of wielding lathi/danda — injured eye witnesses P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 and independent witness P.W.-3 consistently deposed about accused's presence and weapons — suggestion of dacoity rejected as no valuables taken — medico-legal reports of five injured fully corroborated the ocular testimony — Held: Prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt; conviction under Sections 147, 323, 452, 324/149 and 307/149 IPC affirmed [Paras 14–28].

Sentence – Modification on Account of Passage of Time and Age – Reformative Theory of Punishment – Appeal pending for 40 years; five co-accused died during pendency; sole surviving appellant now 64 years of age with no criminal antecedents; was the youngest among the accused and assigned the role of lathi/danda only — Trial court had rightly sentenced him in 1986; bail granted by High Court on 30.01.1986 and maintained since — Sending appellant to serve remaining sentence after 42 years would not serve reformative purpose of punishment — Held: Sentence reduced to period already undergone; fine of Rs. 75,000/- imposed, to be disbursed as compensation equally to surviving injured; default in payment to result in serving remaining sentence [Paras 35–37].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Conviction affirmed — Sentence modified — Sole surviving appellant Chhotoo directed to deposit Rs. 75,000/- as compensation within 60 days to be disbursed equally to surviving injured; bail bonds and sureties discharged.

Environmental Law – Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act – Vicarious Liability of Directors – Summoning Order – Quashing Refused – Applicants/Directors of M/s Simplex Infrastructures Limited were impleaded in complaint filed by U.P. Pollution Control Board for operating construction activities at Panki Thermal Power Plant without obtaining consent under the Air Act — applicants contended they had ceased to be Directors w.e.f. 15.03.2014 and 20.09.2016 respectively, i.e. prior to commencement of project — Board had verified directorship through Ministry of Corporate Affairs website at time of filing complaint in 2021, which showed applicants as Directors — complaint contained specific averments that applicants were in-charge and responsible for day-to-day business — Held: Whether applicants were in-charge at relevant time is a disputed question of fact that cannot be decided in Section 482 proceedings; no illegality or infirmity in summoning order; applications rejected [Paras 5–6, 17–21].

Section 40 of Air Act – Liability of Board of Directors – Collective Responsibility – Obtaining consent under pollution control legislation is not an individual act but a collective function of the Board of Directors — entire Board is responsible for running the unit without consent; it cannot be said that one or two Directors had no knowledge of or connection with non-compliance — Directors are duty-bound to set up treatment plants and obtain consent; deliberate violation renders the entire Board vicariously liable — case of Sunita Palita (pertaining to Sections 138/141 NI Act) held inapplicable to pollution law offences [Paras 12–15, 17–20].

Section 482 CrPC – Scope – No Mini Trial – At the stage of summoning, court is only required to form a prima facie opinion that the case is fit to be committed for trial — defence of cessation of directorship or absence of day-to-day control raises disputed questions of fact that must be decided by the trial court — applicants are at liberty to seek discharge before the trial court — this Court cannot weigh evidence or conduct a mini trial in Section 482 proceedings [Paras 16, 19–20].

Decision: Both applications rejected — Summoning order dated 14.03.2022 upheld — Interim order, if any, vacated.

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Unsoundness of Mind – Medical Examination – Order XXXII Rule 15 CPC – Section 13(1)(iii) Hindu Marriage Act – Respondent-husband filed for divorce alleging petitioner-wife's abnormal behaviour, refusal of physical relationship, secret medication, and suppression of mental illness by her parents – Trial Court allowed application directing petitioner to undergo psychiatric examination at Civil Hospital, Dhule – Held: While matrimonial courts possess power to direct medical examination in proceedings under Section 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, such power cannot be exercised casually without prima facie material on record establishing the necessity for such reference – Impugned order set aside [Paras 7-8].

Judicial Discretion – Application of Mind – Requirement of Prima Facie Case – Court's power to order medical examination is discretionary and must be exercised only where applicant has a strong prima facie case and sufficient material is placed before the Court – If such order is passed without any prima facie material, it amounts to abuse of discretionary power – Impugned order was bereft of sufficient reasons and failed to reflect application of mind to pleadings and material on record [Paras 7-8].

Liberty Reserved – Respondent at liberty to reiterate prayer for medical examination after leading necessary evidence to establish prima facie case – Trial Court directed to reconsider fresh application, if filed, and pass a well-reasoned order [Paras 9-10].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned order dated 02.08.2025 set aside – Respondent granted liberty to file fresh application supported by necessary material – Rule made absolute.

Service Law – Dismissal from Service – Discrepancy in Date of Birth – Fraud Not Established – Petitioner appointed as Assistant Teacher in 2014 on the basis of Purva Madhyama certificate (2001) reflecting date of birth as 07.07.1987 – Dismissed vide order dated 27.06.2019 on the ground that High School certificate of 1998 reflected date of birth as 02.07.1984 – Neither the foundational certificates were alleged to be forged nor was it shown that any undue advantage was derived – Held: Mere discrepancy in date of birth across certificates, without proof of deliberate concealment or resultant benefit, does not constitute fraud or misconduct warranting cancellation of appointment – Impugned order quashed – Petitioner directed to be reinstated, without back wages for the intervening period [Paras 44–78].

Fraud – Essential Ingredients – Proof Required – Fraud cannot be presumed and must be established by cogent and unimpeachable evidence – Non-disclosure of earlier certificates reflecting a different date of birth must be shown to be purposeful, calculated and actuated by intent to deceive – Where the certificate relied upon for appointment is genuine, issued by a competent authority, and no allegation of fabrication is raised, mere omission does not amount to fraud – Held: Absence of mens rea and absence of undue advantage are decisive factors – Charge of fraud unsustainable on facts [Paras 45–46, 62–63].

Misconduct – Non-Disclosure of Earlier Certificate – Proportionality – Suppression of a material fact vitiates appointment only where it is deliberate and results in conferment of an undue advantage – Where the discrepancy is neither calculated to secure unfair benefit nor distorts the selection process, cancellation of appointment would be wholly disproportionate – Doctrine of proportionality must guide exercise of power [Paras 54–55].

Eligibility – Date of Birth – No Advantage Derived – Even accepting the date of birth as reflected in the High School certificate (02.07.1984), the petitioner remained within the bounds of eligibility – In absence of any consequential gain in terms of age relaxation or eligibility, the foundational element of fraud is wholly absent – Non-disclosure, in such circumstances, remains, at best, an irregularity [Para 47].

Precedent – Applicability – Division Bench Ruling – Reliance placed on Division Bench decision in Special Appeal No. 987 of 2024 (arising from Ashok Kumar Singh vs. State of U.P.) to the effect that mere possession or disclosure of an additional qualification, not relied upon by the selection committee and conferring no tangible advantage, does not ipso facto establish fraud – Sine qua non for sustaining fraud is a deliberate design to secure an advantage materially impacting selection [Paras 64–69].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned order dated 27.06.2019 passed by Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Mau quashed – Respondents directed to permit petitioner to resume duties forthwith – No salary for intervening period on the principle of "no work, no pay" – Liberty reserved to respondents to initiate proceedings if documents subsequently found to be false or fabricated [Paras 77–81].

Income Tax – Search and Seizure – Section 153C Proceedings – Agricultural Land – Capital Asset – Appeal Allowed – Appellant company's income for A.Y. 2007-08 reassessed by AO under Section 153C following search of a third party (Kamdhenu Group), on the basis of Partnership Deed, Dissolution Deed and miscellaneous papers found belonging to appellant – AO treated profit on sale of agricultural land of Rs. 18,63,34,965/- as business income – CIT(A) and ITAT upheld the assessment – On appeal, Division Bench finds that the satisfaction note did not disclose any incriminating material relatable to A.Y. 2007-08 and the documents did not prima facie suggest concealment of income – Held: Initiation of proceedings under Section 153C without incriminating material is without jurisdiction and vitiated in law; all three orders quashed [Paras 1–4, 27–33, 37].

Section 153C – Prerequisite of Incriminating Material – Satisfaction Note – The satisfaction note merely referred to Partnership Deed, Dissolution Deed and miscellaneous papers belonging to the appellant, without identifying any incriminating material relatable to the relevant assessment year or disclosing prima facie concealment of income – The word "incriminating" must be understood to mean material which creates a prima facie doubt of involvement of the assessee in concealment of income – Mere possession of documents belonging to another person during search does not satisfy the jurisdictional precondition under Section 153C – Satisfaction being vitiated, entire proceedings are vitiated [Paras 27–30, 32–33].

Section 153C vs. Section 153A – Jurisdiction – AO cannot assume jurisdiction under Section 153C over completed/unabated assessments in the absence of incriminating material unearthed during search – Re-examination of an agricultural land transaction already within the AO's knowledge at the time of original assessment through Section 153C is impermissible; if income escaped assessment, remedy lies under Sections 147/148 – Relying on Abhisar Buildwell (SC) and Misty Meadows (P&H HC, upheld by SC) [Paras 26–29].

Agricultural Land – Capital Asset – Section 2(14)(iii) – Adventure in the Nature of Trade – Land situated beyond 8 km from municipal limits, used for agricultural operations – AO's finding that single transaction of sale of agricultural land constituted "adventure in the nature of trade" held to be misconceived – Frequent purchase and sale is the hallmark of trading; a solitary transaction does not qualify – Profit from such sale does not constitute income from business – Land outside prescribed municipal limits qualifies as rural agricultural land exempt from capital gains tax under Section 2(14)(iii) – Subsequent non-agricultural use of land by purchaser cannot be a reason to include capital gains qua seller [Paras 10–11, 14, 31, 34–36].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Questions of law answered in favour of appellant – Orders dated 21.07.2010 (AO), 27.02.2013 (CIT(A)) and 06.12.2018 (ITAT) quashed and set aside [Para 37].

Matrimonial Law – Cruelty – Section 13(1)(ia) HMA – Divorce Decree Set Aside – Marriage solemnized on 11.11.1997; parties separated from 11.04.2004; husband filed for divorce in January 2006 alleging cruelty; wife filed for restitution of conjugal rights in August 2008 – Family Court allowed the divorce petition and dismissed the restitution petition by judgment dated 28.11.2011 – On appeal, the Division Bench finds that none of the three primary incidents of cruelty alleged by the respondent-husband (dated 11.05.2003, 11.04.2004 and 05.07.2005) were established by cogent, corroborated evidence – Held: Divorce decree set aside; respondent's subsequent remarriage does not deter the Court from passing the order [Paras 1–53].

Cruelty – Proof – Cumulative Effect – Burden of Proof on Petitioner – Cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA must be of such gravity that it makes it reasonably impossible for the aggrieved spouse to live with the other – Instances of cruelty are to be considered in their cumulative effect and not in isolation – Mere trivial irritations and ordinary wear and tear of married life do not constitute cruelty – The burden of proving cruelty lies on the petitioner who alleges it; the standard of proof is preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt – Held: Family Court erroneously shifted the burden of proof onto the appellant-wife and drew adverse inferences against her without compelling reasons [Paras 26–47, 51].

Section 73 Evidence Act – Handwriting Comparison – Procedural Fairness – Natural Justice – The Family Court invoked Section 73 of the Evidence Act at the conclusion of final arguments, asking the parties to write lines for comparison purposes without informing them of the purpose or the provision being invoked – Adverse inference was then drawn against the appellant for her hesitance in providing her handwriting – Held: Exercise of power under Section 73 requires that parties be informed as a prerequisite of procedural fairness; comparison must be undertaken sparingly and supplemented by expert opinion where the document is of substantial consequence; conducting comparison covertly and drawing adverse inference for resistance, without informing the party that the handwriting will be used for comparison, is against the principles of natural and fair justice and cannot be sustained – Such exercise was an attempt to support the view already taken by the Court rather than a fair procedure to reach the truth [Paras 33–37].

Medical Evidence – Cruelty – Insufficient Proof – The MLC issued by AIIMS in respect of the incident dated 05.07.2005 was silent on the identity of the assailant and the manner of assault – Medical records at best established that the respondent suffered injuries due to an assault, but did not establish that the injuries were inflicted by the appellant or her family members – No police investigation reports, police call records or independent witness supported the respondent's version – Self-serving testimony of the petitioner alone, without corroboration, is insufficient to establish cruelty – Held: Reasoning of the Family Court based solely on the respondent's testimony and medical documents is improper and inadequate [Paras 38–42].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and Decree of Divorce dated 28.11.2011 passed by the Family Court, Rohini Courts, Delhi set aside – No relief sought in respect of the disposal of the restitution petition under Section 9 HMA; findings thereon not disturbed – Pending applications disposed of.