Criminal Law – Quashment – Section 498-A RPC – Omnibus and Vague Allegations – Matrimonial Dispute – Complainant-wife alleged mental and physical harassment, dowry demand, and illicit relations of husband with co-petitioner Arti Devi – Charges framed under Sections 498-A and 506 RPC – Held: Where allegations of cruelty, harassment, and dowry demand are wholesale, omnibus, and lacking in specific particulars as to time, date, place, or manner of occurrence, continuation of criminal proceedings is not sustainable and amounts to abuse of process of law – FIR, chargesheet, and charge-framing order quashed [Paras 15, 21-26].

Section 498-A RPC – Misuse – Counter-Blast Proceedings – Growing tendency to invoke Section 498-A as a tool for personal vendetta against husband and his family noted – Husband had prior in time filed petition for annulment of marriage under Section 12(1)(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act and a complaint under Sections 420/506 RPC against the complainant-wife – Present criminal proceedings found to be manifestly attended with mala fide and instituted with ulterior motive to wreak vengeance – Such tendency required to be dealt with firmly [Paras 16, 22, 25].

Definition of "Relative" – Section 498-A RPC – Co-Petitioner Arti Devi – Held: A girlfriend or concubine does not fall within the definition of "relative" under Section 498-A RPC – The status of "relative" must be conferred by blood, marriage, or adoption – Arti Devi, who was neither a relative of the husband nor residing in the matrimonial home, could not be charged under Sections 498-A and 506 RPC [Paras 17-20].

Inherent Jurisdiction – Parameters for Quashment – Section 561-A Cr.P.C. – Power under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C.) can be exercised where allegations in the FIR are absurd and inherently improbable, or where criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide and instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance – Both conditions satisfied in the present case [Paras 23-25].

Decision: Petitions allowed – FIR No. 49/2017 dated 15.11.2017, chargesheet dated 02.02.2018, and order dated 14.08.2018 framing charges under Sections 498-A and 506 RPC quashed.

Criminal Law - Personal Liberty — Illegal Arrest — De Facto Custody — 24-Hour Mandate — Section 58 BNSS / Article 22(2) — Petition Allowed — Petitioner, a partner of pharmaceutical firm M/s Digital Vision, was allegedly involved in illegal inter-state diversion of psychotropic medicines — NCB conducted search of petitioner's premises on 31.10.2025 at about 10:45 P.M., served notice under Section 67 NDPS Act, and the petitioner travelled to Chandigarh in the NCB vehicle, remaining continuously with NCB officials from about 10:45 P.M. on 31.10.2025 — Formal arrest recorded only at 9:00 P.M. on 01.11.2025 — Petitioner produced before Magistrate at 2:00 P.M. on 02.11.2025 — Held: Petitioner was in coercive NCB custody from approximately 10:45/11:00 P.M. on 31.10.2025; formal arrest memo was a mere paper transaction; total period of detention exceeded 24 hours; arrest/detention is illegal [Paras 3, 13, 14].

Arrest — Definition and Commencement — De Facto vs. De Jure Arrest — Term 'Arrest' Not Defined in Cr.P.C./BNSS — The term 'arrest' is a term of art denoting a state of apprehension, restraint or total deprivation of liberty — Whether a person is arrested does not depend on the nomenclature assigned by the investigating agency such as "detention for questioning" or "custody for inquiry" but on the factual deprivation of personal liberty to move where he pleases — The moment police surveillance and restriction on the movement of the individual commences, the clock of liberty begins — Entry in the arrest memo is merely declaratory and not conclusive proof of actual time of arrest — Held: The terminus a quo for computing 24-hour period is the moment of actual physical deprivation of liberty, not the time noted in the formal arrest memo [Paras 11, 11.1, 11.2, 12].

Section 57 Cr.P.C. / Section 58 BNSS / Article 22(2) — Constitutional Safeguard — Dual Purpose — Violation Cannot Be Cured by Remand Order — The mandate of producing an arrested person before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours serves a dual sacrosanct purpose: (i) to verify the legality of arrest, and (ii) to subject the necessity of further detention to judicial scrutiny — This constitutional command is not a surplusage of legal prose but a peremptory command — Violation thereof cannot be cured by the subsequent passing of a remand order — Held: Once violation of Articles 21 and 22 is established, the arrest itself stands vitiated and the individual deserves to be enlarged on bail [Paras 11, 11.3].

Magistrate — Duty on Production of Arrestee — Proactive Judicial Scrutiny — The duty of a Magistrate before whom an arrestee is produced is not a mere ministerial act of recording presence but a solemn judicial interrogation of the arresting authority's narrative — The Magistrate must pierce the veil of documentation and identify the actual terminus a quo of detention by examining the factual substratum of arrest, stripping away any administrative curtain the investigating agency may have drawn — The Magistrate is duty-bound to inquire into the where, when and how of the capture so that a twilight zone of illegal detention is not regularized through sanitized police records [Para 11.4].

Investigative Powers — Distinction Between Lawful Summoning and Coercive Detention — A clear distinction must be drawn between coercive subsumption of volition and genuine investigative functions such as summoning for joining investigation, production of documents or recording of statements — Where no palpable fetter exists upon the individual's ambulatory freedom and he retains unhindered access to communicate with the world and is free to depart, the 24-hour clock does not commence — However, where a person is detained overnight in the police/agency office, compelled to eat and sleep there, and restricted from leaving, such restraint constitutes an arrest in law regardless of its label — No universal exhaustive guidelines can be laid down as each case has its own unique factual conspectus [Para 11.2].

Decision: Petition allowed — Petitioner held to have been arrested/detained by NCB beyond the prescribed 24-hour period without requisite judicial order — Petitioner directed to be released from jail, if not required in any other case, upon furnishing requisite bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court/CJM/Duty Magistrate — Observations not to affect merits of the trial.

Murder — Dying Declaration — Conviction Affirmed — Appellant convicted under Section 302 IPC by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Dabra, for setting his wife Priya Dhanuk on fire by pouring kerosene oil on her on 04.12.2013 — Deceased died on 09.12.2013 due to 90% burn injuries — Prosecution relied upon two dying declarations (Ex. P.18C recorded by Dr. Vikrant Singh, PW-15, and Ex. P.11 recorded by Tahsildar Sharda Pathak, PW-8) — Both declarations consistent and identical in implicating the appellant — Parents of the deceased (PW-1 and PW-2) and other witnesses turned hostile — Trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment with fine of ₹500 — Held: Prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt; conviction and sentence affirmed [Paras 2, 6, 54, 58, 60].

Dying Declaration — Admissibility and Reliability — Sole Basis for Conviction — Law Restated — A dying declaration, if found voluntary, truthful and coherent, can form the sole basis for conviction without corroboration — Requirement of doctor's fitness certificate is a rule of caution and not a mandatory condition; satisfaction of the person recording the declaration as to the mental fitness of the declarant is sufficient — Percentage of burn injuries alone is not determinative of credibility; what matters is the degree of burns and whether the declarant's mental faculties remained intact — Both dying declarations in the present case recorded by independent witnesses (doctor and Tahsildar) with medical fitness certificates; no suggestion of tutoring; not challenged effectively in cross-examination — Held: Both dying declarations reliable and trustworthy [Paras 14–33, 37].

Dying Declaration — 90% Burn Injuries — No Bar to Making Statement — Degree vs. Extent of Burns — Relying upon Modi's Medical Jurisprudence, it is clarified that it is the degree of burns (first to sixth degree) and not the mere extent of surface area affected that determines the impact on a patient's state of mind — A person suffering 90%–100% burn injuries is not necessarily reduced to a state of unconsciousness — Held: Deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the declarations and mere extent of burns does not invalidate the same [Para 17].

Accidental Death — Defence Rejected — Kerosene Stove Burst Theory — Appellant contended that the deceased died due to accidental bursting of a kerosene stove — Spot map (Ex. P.5) showed no kerosene oil on floor or walls and burnt pieces of saree and blouse found near bedroom bed; stove found outside kitchen while pump and washer found inside kitchen — FSL report showed no smell of kerosene oil on pump and washer of the stove — Held: Theory of stove bursting not supported by any circumstance found on spot; defence is false and rejected [Paras 34–35, 50].

Conduct of Accused — Abscondence — Post-Incident Conduct — Absence of Injuries — Injured wife taken to hospital by her Jeth (Virendra Dhanuk, DW-2) and not by the appellant/husband — Arrest memo (Ex. P.20) showed no burn injuries on appellant's body — Appellant failed to explain how his wife suffered burn injuries, a fact within his special knowledge under Section 106 of the Evidence Act — Held: Post-incident conduct of the appellant, though not conclusive standing alone, forms an important link in the chain of circumstantial evidence establishing guilt [Paras 44–49].

Section 313 Cr.P.C. — Incriminating Circumstances — FSL Report — No Prejudice — Abscondence Not Put to Accused — The FSL report was not put to the appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and no copy was shown to have been supplied; accordingly, the FSL report excluded from consideration — However, the omission to put the circumstance of abscondence to the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. does not vitiate the trial, as the appellant himself raised the plea of alibi and was not caused any prejudice — Held: Omissions under Section 313 Cr.P.C. will not vitiate trial unless prejudice resulting in miscarriage of justice is established [Paras 47–51].

Section 302 IPC — Culpable Homicide — Contention Rejected — Appellant's contention that his act at most constituted culpable homicide not amounting to murder rejected — The act of pouring kerosene oil over his wife and setting her ablaze, coupled with making no attempt to save her and absconding, demonstrates clear intention and knowledge that death would result — Held: Act falls squarely within the definition of murder under Section 302 IPC; conversion to lesser offence not warranted [Paras 55–57].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Conviction under Section 302 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment with fine of ₹500 affirmed — Appellant to undergo remaining sentence.

Civil Law – Rejection of Plaint – Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Scope – Triable Issues – Appeal Allowed – Appellants filed suit in 2022 for partition and declaration of 1/3rd share each in suit property on the basis of an unregistered Will dated 17.02.2002 allegedly executed by deceased father, superseding an earlier registered Will dated 23.05.1997 – Single Judge rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) finding the suit vexatious, devoid of cause of action and barred by limitation – Division Bench holds that the Single Judge committed grave error by drawing adverse inferences based on the 1997 Will and arriving at premature conclusions beyond the scope of Order VII Rule 11 – Plaint raises triable issues requiring adjudication on evidence – Appeal allowed; suit restored [Paras 22–30].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Principles – At the stage of Order VII Rule 11, the court must assume the averments in the plaint to be true and cannot embark upon an inquiry into their correctness – Court must examine whether a real cause of action has been set out or whether clever drafting has created an illusion of one – No compartmentalisation, dissection or isolation of passages in the plaint is permissible; the plaint must be read as a whole – Following Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510 [Paras 16, 28].

Limitation – Article 58 of the Limitation Act – Fraud – Mixed Question of Law and Facts – Single Judge held the suit barred by limitation as cause of action arose in 2003 upon death of the testator – Division Bench holds that where the plaint specifically pleads lack of knowledge of the earlier Will and fraudulent procurement of Mutation and Conveyance Deed, limitation becomes a mixed question of law and facts requiring evidence – Such question cannot be summarily decided without trial; continuously accruing cause of action also pleaded [Paras 25–29].

Will – Subsequent Will Prevailing Over Earlier Will – Validity of earlier registered Will dated 23.05.1997 becomes immaterial if the later unregistered Will dated 17.02.2002 is held valid, since the latter, being subsequent in time, prevails – Finding of Single Judge that appellants did not dispute the 1997 Will is ex facie contrary to the pleadings in paragraph 32 of the plaint [Paras 23–24].

Cause of Action – Fraud – Knowledge – Where appellants pleaded that they first came to know about the Mutation dated 15.04.2021 and Conveyance Deed dated 26.08.2021 fraudulently obtained by respondent No. 1 on the basis of the 1997 Will only in November 2021 through a local property dealer, the cause of action for the suit is stated to have arisen in 2021 and not in 2003 – This raises a triable issue which cannot be rejected at threshold [Paras 8–9, 26–28].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and decree dated 02.04.2025 rejecting the plaint set aside – Suit restored to its original number – Parties directed to appear before the learned Single Judge (Roster Bench) on 28.04.2026 – No observations to affect the merits of the case [Paras 30–33].

Criminal Law – Transfer of Case – Section 138 NI Act – Cheque Dishonour – Apprehension of Denial of Justice – Petitioner/accused in a cheque dishonour complaint sought transfer of the case from the XXVI Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Egmore, on the ground that the trial court was granting short adjournments, the trial judge personally conducted settlement discussions instead of referring the matter to neutral mediation, and the cross-examination of the complainant was prematurely closed – Sessions Judge dismissed the transfer petition; High Court had simultaneously dismissed the related petition challenging denial of further cross-examination by order dated 07-04-2026 – Held: The petitioner herself had filed a memo seeking settlement and requested referral to Lok Adalat; thereafter she neither appeared before the Lok Adalat nor before the mediation; subsequently she filed a transfer application and a petition to reopen the case — such conduct disentitles the petitioner from claiming apprehension of denial of justice – Trial court's procedures were proper and the impugned order correctly captured all relevant facts – No ground to interfere – Petition dismissed – Impugned order affirmed [Paras 1–8].

Menstrual Leave Policy – Constitutional Foundations – Enforcement – Unorganized Sector – Karnataka – Petitioner, a woman hotel worker engaged in arduous manual labour, sought enforcement of the State's Menstrual Leave Policy enunciated vide Gazette Notification dated 12-11-2025 and Government Order No. LD 466 LET 2023 dated 20-11-2025, and further sought issuance of guidelines for its uniform implementation, particularly across the unorganized sector – State affirmed the policy's progressive intent but projected practical impediments in monitoring the unorganized sector – The Karnataka Menstrual Leave and Hygiene Bill, 2025, placing the policy on a legislative footing, was also tabled before the Legislature – Court placed on record the historical and global evolution of menstrual leave, the constitutional basis of the policy rooted in Articles 15(3), 21, 39(e) and 42, and the affirmative obligation of the State to translate policy into meaningful implementation – Held: State directed to strictly and faithfully implement the existing policy pending enactment of the proposed legislation; upon enactment, Rules to be framed without undue delay; in the interregnum, the State to issue suitable guidelines, circulars and administrative instructions ensuring uniform and rigorous implementation across all sectors including the unorganized sector – Article 14 cannot be invoked to resist such a policy, as acknowledging biological difference between men and women in matters of health, dignity and bodily autonomy gives substantive meaning to equality, not derogates from it [Paras 1–23].

Menstrual Leave – Constitutional Right – Article 21 – Right to Dignity – Right to Health – The Supreme Court in Jaya Thakur (Dr.) v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 133, unequivocally held that the right to dignified menstrual health forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 – Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) is inseparable from the right to live with dignity, bodily autonomy, decisional privacy and reproductive health – State bears a positive obligation not merely to refrain from discrimination but to take affirmative measures to secure MHM for menstruating persons – Denial of adequate MHM facilities compels individuals to manage their bodies in a manner dictated by circumstance rather than choice, violating their autonomy [Paras 10–12].

Menstrual Leave – Policy – Historical and Global Perspective – The Soviet Union (1922/1931), Japan (1947), Indonesia (1948/2003), South Korea (2001), Taiwan (2002), Vietnam (2015) and Zambia (2015) have variously recognized and institutionalized menstrual leave through legislation – In India, Bihar introduced paid menstrual leave for Government employees; the Menstruation Benefits Bill, 2017 did not attain legislative fruition – Supreme Court in Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1694, directed formulation of a model menstrual leave policy at the Union level, clarifying that State Governments remain free independently to act – Taking cue therefrom, Karnataka constituted a Committee, obtained Law Commission recommendations, and formulated the present policy – The Karnataka Government Order of 20-11-2025 grants one day of paid menstrual leave per month (maximum 12 days per year) to all permanent/contract/outsourced women employees aged 18–52 years in establishments registered under specified labour legislations, without requirement of a medical certificate [Paras 7–9, 17–18].

Unorganized Sector – Menstrual Leave – Need for Inclusive Implementation – The existing Government Orders, in their present form, are confined to the organized sector – Unorganized sector comprises broadly: enterprises engaging fewer than 10 workers and daily wage labourers – Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of India v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 402, recognized the importance of extending social security benefits including maternity benefit to women in the unorganized workforce – While organized sectors are amenable to regulatory intervention, the unorganized sector requires a more facilitative and sensitization-oriented mechanism to bring women workers within the ambit of the policy [Paras 19–22].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – State of Karnataka directed to strictly implement the Menstrual Leave Policy pending enactment of the Karnataka Menstrual Leave and Hygiene Bill, 2025 – Upon enactment, Rules to be framed without undue delay – In the interregnum, State to issue guidelines, circulars and administrative instructions for uniform implementation across organized and unorganized sectors.

Civil Law – Territorial Jurisdiction – Return of Plaint – Order VII Rule 10 CPC – Section 20 CPC – Appeal Dismissed – Appellant filed suit for recovery of Rs. 3,49,70,864/- before Delhi High Court for non-lifting of goods and non-payment under purchase orders for supply of PLB duct pipes – Single Judge returned the plaint holding that no part of the cause of action arose within Delhi – On appeal, Division Bench holds that purchase orders were issued from Noida, goods were manufactured and required to be delivered at Jalgaon, and the alleged breach occurred entirely outside Delhi – Preliminary discussions in Delhi and techno-commercial offer issued from Delhi are merely incidental and do not constitute material or essential parts of the cause of action – Appeal dismissed [Paras 14–29, 31].

Section 20 CPC – Explanation – Corporate Defendant – Principal Office vs. Subordinate Office – Where a cause of action arises at a place where a corporation has a subordinate office, the corporation is deemed to carry on business only at that subordinate office for purposes of the suit, to the exclusion of its principal office – Respondent's registered office in Delhi is a mere formality; its operational office and place of business is at Noida from where purchase orders were issued – Jurisdiction held to lie at Noida/Jalgaon, not Delhi; following Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Co., 1992 AIR 1514 [Paras 21–23, 25].

Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause – Contractual Stipulation – Limits – Parties cannot by agreement confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise lacks territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC – An exclusive jurisdiction clause is enforceable only where two or more courts otherwise possess jurisdiction and the parties intend to restrict themselves to one – Where no part of the cause of action arises within the chosen forum, the clause is rendered ineffectual [Para 18].

Cause of Action – Breach of Contract – Making of Offer – Mere issuance of a techno-commercial offer from a place does not confer territorial jurisdiction on courts at that place, as a contract is concluded only on acceptance of the offer and not on its making – Purchase orders were placed from Noida in response to the offer; Delhi plays no role in formation or performance of the contract; following A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, (1989) 2 SCC 163 [Para 19.2].

Order VII Rule 10 CPC – Scope – Holistic Reading of Plaint – Real Cause of Action – Court while adjudicating an application under Order VII Rule 10 must adopt a pragmatic and realistic approach to ascertain where the real cause of action arose – Test is not to be applied mechanically by isolating stray averments, but by discerning the bundle of essential facts and their nexus to a territorial jurisdiction – Jurisdiction cannot be founded on casual or incidental facts lacking direct nexus with the lis [Paras 14, 27].

Suppression of Material Facts – Costs – Appellant failed to disclose in its plaint that its own application for return of plaint in the prior suit pending in Noida (C.S. No. 9 of 2020) had been dismissed on identical grounds – Pendency of challenge before Allahabad High Court does not absolve the Appellant of the duty of full disclosure – Costs of Rs. 10,000/- imposed by Single Judge upheld [Paras 9, 28].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Impugned order returning plaint upheld – Pending application closed [Para 31].

Environmental Law – Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act – Vicarious Liability of Directors – Summoning Order – Quashing Refused – Applicants/Directors of M/s Simplex Infrastructures Limited were impleaded in complaint filed by U.P. Pollution Control Board for operating construction activities at Panki Thermal Power Plant without obtaining consent under the Air Act — applicants contended they had ceased to be Directors w.e.f. 15.03.2014 and 20.09.2016 respectively, i.e. prior to commencement of project — Board had verified directorship through Ministry of Corporate Affairs website at time of filing complaint in 2021, which showed applicants as Directors — complaint contained specific averments that applicants were in-charge and responsible for day-to-day business — Held: Whether applicants were in-charge at relevant time is a disputed question of fact that cannot be decided in Section 482 proceedings; no illegality or infirmity in summoning order; applications rejected [Paras 5–6, 17–21].

Section 40 of Air Act – Liability of Board of Directors – Collective Responsibility – Obtaining consent under pollution control legislation is not an individual act but a collective function of the Board of Directors — entire Board is responsible for running the unit without consent; it cannot be said that one or two Directors had no knowledge of or connection with non-compliance — Directors are duty-bound to set up treatment plants and obtain consent; deliberate violation renders the entire Board vicariously liable — case of Sunita Palita (pertaining to Sections 138/141 NI Act) held inapplicable to pollution law offences [Paras 12–15, 17–20].

Section 482 CrPC – Scope – No Mini Trial – At the stage of summoning, court is only required to form a prima facie opinion that the case is fit to be committed for trial — defence of cessation of directorship or absence of day-to-day control raises disputed questions of fact that must be decided by the trial court — applicants are at liberty to seek discharge before the trial court — this Court cannot weigh evidence or conduct a mini trial in Section 482 proceedings [Paras 16, 19–20].

Decision: Both applications rejected — Summoning order dated 14.03.2022 upheld — Interim order, if any, vacated.

Excise Law – Liquor Licences – E-Auction – Reservation – Forfeiture of Lapsed Licences – Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2025 – Respondents, holders of CL-9 licences (bar and restaurant), challenged the amended Rules 5 and 5-A of the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquor) Rules, 1968 – The impugned amendments introduced e-auction as the mode of grant for CL-2A and CL-9A licences with government-fixed reservation norms, and deemed CL-2, CL-9 and CL-11(C) licences unrenewed as on 03-11-2025 as lapsed and forfeited, to fall into the auction pool – Single Judge stayed the amended Rules 5 and 5-A on a prima facie finding that the reservation-based eligibility and automatic forfeiture travelled beyond the enabling provisions of the Excise Act – On appeal, held: (i) the impugned rules did not exceed rule-making power conferred under Section 71 of the Excise Act, which is wide in scope; (ii) the provision for renewal of licence being a creature of the Rules, the Rules could equally curtail the same; (iii) proviso to Rule 5-A does not effect forfeiture of licence but curtails the right of renewal, which is within the State's competence; (iv) grant of licence through e-auction is not outside the State's domain; (v) adopting the State Government's own reservation policy by reference in the Rules does not constitute impermissible sub-delegation since the delegator and delegate are the same entity; (vi) singling out certain categories of licences does not offend Article 14 as the State is entitled to vary terms and conditions across licence categories; (vii) subordinate legislation carries a presumption of constitutional validity and a strong case of invalidity must be established before its operation is stayed – Appeal allowed – Impugned stay order set aside [Paras 1–77].

Liquor Licence – Nature of Licence – Privilege of State – No Vested Right of Renewal – The manufacture, distribution and sale of intoxicants is an exclusive privilege of the State – No citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to carry on trade in liquor – A licensee has no indefeasible right of renewal beyond the term of the licence; the right to renewal is governed by the Rules as they exist at the time of renewal and not at the time of grant – Applications filed prior to the amendment of Rules do not confer vested rights to be considered under the pre-amendment Rules – The State's power to grant, refuse, curtail or modify renewal is an incident of its exclusive privilege and is within its rule-making power under Section 71 of the Excise Act [Paras 46–65].

Delegated Legislation – Sub-delegation – Reservation Norms – Principle of Delegatus Non Potest Delegare – The proviso to Rule 5 of the Rules enables the State Government to adopt its own policy as to reservation norms for e-auction licences – This does not constitute impermissible sub-delegation since the delegatee (State Government framing the Rules) and the sub-delegatee (State Government fixing reservation norms) are one and the same – Principle of sub-delegation is inapplicable where the delegator and delegatee are identical – Furthermore, the Excise Act's rule-making power under Section 71 being couched in wide terms, the State Government has ample room to determine terms and conditions of the auction including reservation – Learned Advocate General undertook that reservation norms would be specifically incorporated in the Rules to obviate objection [Paras 53–58].

Subordinate Legislation – Presumption of Constitutional Validity – Courts cannot lightly stay delegated legislation – Tests for striking down executive action do not automatically apply to delegated legislation, which requires proof of manifest arbitrariness – Courts must make every effort to uphold constitutional validity, and if two views are possible, the one favouring validity must be preferred – In the present case, the writ petitioners had not surmounted the presumption of constitutionality; the Single Judge's order disregarded these settled principles and was therefore liable to be set aside [Paras 68–74].

Division Bench Precedent – B. Govindraj Hegde – Misapplication – The impugned order relied on the earlier Division Bench decision in State of Karnataka v. B. Govindraj Hegde, WA 3374/2016, which invalidated a relaxation of minimum room-capacity requirements for reserved-category hotel licences – However, that decision expressly held that reserving a quota of licences for reserved categories would be permissible – The impugned Rules introduce e-auction with reservation of a quota and do not relax any restrictive condition imposed in the public interest – Therefore, the said precedent did not support the petitioners' case [Paras 17–19].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Ad interim stay order dated 25-11-2025 passed by the Single Judge in W.P. No. 35227/2025 set aside – Liberty reserved to parties to advance submissions on the challenge to the proviso to Rule 12 of the Rules before the Single Judge in the pending writ petition.