Hindu Succession – Intestate Succession of Female Hindu – Section 15 HSA – Plaintiff's Entitlement – Interim Relief Refused – Plaintiff-brother filed administration suit claiming sole heirship of his deceased sister who died intestate, contending that the gift deed and Will executed by her were void – Defendant No.1 appointed Executrix under Will dated 10.04.2023, and probate obtained on 07.03.2026 – Held: Under Section 15(1) of the HSA, property of a female Hindu dying intestate devolves first upon sons, daughters and husband, secondly upon heirs of the husband, thirdly upon mother and father, fourthly upon heirs of the father, and lastly upon heirs of the mother – Since deceased had no children, her husband pre-deceased her, but her husband's sister Mrs. Shridevi Ruparel survived, the latter falls in entry 'b' (heirs of husband) under Section 15(1) and, by virtue of Section 16, excludes the plaintiff who falls in entry 'd' (heirs of father) – Plaintiff therefore has no entitlement to the estate of the deceased under intestate succession [Paras 57–69].

Constitutionality of Section 15(1) HSA – Single Judge Finding Not Binding – The plaintiff relied upon Mamta Dinesh Vakil v. Bansi S. Wadhwa (2012 SCC OnLine Bom 1685) wherein a Single Judge declared Section 15(1) unconstitutional – Held: The Single Judge had directed that the issue of constitutionality be referred to the Division Bench; the Division Bench declined to decide the constitutional question on the ground that it was unnecessary on the facts of that case and gave no finding of unconstitutionality – Section 15(1) has not been declared unconstitutional and continues to be applied by the Supreme Court – Law Commission's 207th Report recommending modification of Section 15 has not been legislatively implemented and cannot carry the plaintiff's case further [Paras 62–71].

Probate – Effect on Interim Relief – Probate as Authenticated Evidence of Will – Defendant No.1 obtained probate of the Will dated 10.04.2023 on 07.03.2026 – Plaintiff failed to file a caveat in the probate proceedings, which amounts to an admission of absence of caveatable interest – By virtue of the probate, the property of the deceased vested in Defendant No.1 from the date of the deceased's death – Unless and until the probate is revoked, interim reliefs in the administration suit cannot be granted – Plaintiff's petition for revocation of probate to be decided by the Testamentary Court on its own merits [Paras 77–79].

Interim Relief – Prima Facie Case – Maintainability – Principles Reiterated – Following Asma Lateef and Anr. v. Shabbir Ahmad and Ors. (2024) 4 SCC 696, a court hearing an interim application must record at least a prima facie satisfaction on maintainability before granting relief – Where, at the interim stage, the plaintiff fails to establish even prima facie interest in the estate of the deceased, interim reliefs are liable to be refused [Paras 82–85].

Decision: Interim Application (L) No.26854 of 2025 rejected – No order as to costs.

Criminal Law — Murder — Transfer of Malice — Section 301 IPC — Doctrine of Transmigration of Motive — Bail Pending Appeal Rejected — Appellant convicted under Sections 302, 307, 506(2) IPC and 3/25 Arms Act for shooting dead Shakir, who was a bystander, while intending to shoot the informant — Appellant's plea that offence cannot travel beyond Section 304 IPC as he had no intention to kill the deceased rejected — Held: Under Section 301 IPC, if a person does an act intending to cause death of one person but causes death of another, the culpable homicide is of the same description as it would have been had the intended victim died — Intention to kill stands transferred — Bail application rejected [Paras 7–10].

Bail — Suspension of Sentence — Section 389 CrPC — Criminal Antecedents — Appellant claimed no criminal history but State placed on record 27 criminal cases against him including cases of murder, attempt to murder, dacoity with murder and Arms Act offences — Supplementary affidavit failed to satisfactorily explain the criminal history — Held: Appellant is a man of criminal character — No case made out for bail [Paras 9–10].

Decision: Bail application under Section 389 CrPC rejected — Appeal listed for hearing on 06.07.2026.

Tenancy Law - Eviction – Default in Payment of Rent – Section 7(2) WBPT Act, 1997 – Non-compliance – Eviction upheld – Tenant/appellant defaulted in payment of rent since July 1990 – During pendency of the suit, Trial Court under Section 7(2) directed payment of arrear rent of Rs. 1,63,372/- with 10% interest within 30 days – High Court in CO No. 967 of 2006 modified the order to the extent of adjusting Rs. 85,000/- against property tax paid by tenant, holding tenant not a defaulter till March 2005, expressly "without prejudice to rights and interests of parties" – Despite adjustment, appellant failed to deposit the balance arrear of Rs. 78,372/- (i.e., Rs. 1,63,372/- minus Rs. 85,000/-) within the statutory period – Further, no rent was deposited from April 2007 to June 2009 – DW-1 admitted non-deposit of balance amount in cross-examination – Held: Appellant failed to comply with statutory mandate of Section 7(2) and is not entitled to protection under Section 7(4); eviction on ground of default affirmed – Concurrent findings of Trial Court and First Appellate Court do not warrant interference in second appeal [Paras 19-31].

Statutory Default – Adjustment and Go-By of Court Order – Appellant also obtained ex parte decree in T.S. No. 7 of 2010 for recovery of Rs. 7,61,272/- paid as municipal tax and put the same in execution; by doing so, appellant gave a go-by to the consent order regarding adjustment of Rs. 85,000/- passed in CO No. 967 of 2006 – Held: Appellant cannot simultaneously claim adjustment towards rent and pursue recovery of the full municipal tax amount through execution; defaults therefore compounded and eviction sustainable [Para 22].

Scope of Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless the decision is contrary to mandatory provisions of law, contrary to law as pronounced by the Supreme Court, or based on inadmissible or no evidence – Default in payment of rent is a question of fact to be decided on appreciation of evidence; not open to re-examination in second appeal – Dictum in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, AIR 2006 SC 1975 and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Sabitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 applied [Paras 24-30].

Eviction – Building and Rebuilding – Section 6(1)(c) WBPT Act, 1997 – Decree set aside – Landlords (partly devattar/trust property of deities represented by shebait, partly secular co-sharers) sought eviction on ground of building and rebuilding for augmentation of income, relying on a development agreement with M/s. Merlin Projects Ltd. – Trial Court refused eviction on this ground finding that genuine requirement for augmentation of deity's income was not established; no evidence of expenditure requirements, present income of deities, or sanctioned plan – First Appellate Court reversed and granted decree on ground that sanctioned plan is not an absolute prerequisite – High Court in second appeal restores Trial Court's view – Held: Word "required" in Section 6(1)(c) still requires landlord to establish genuine need; mere desire for higher income or entering into a development agreement without sanction plan and adequate evidence of necessity is insufficient – Questions regarding capacity of shebait to divest devattar property in favour of an outsider (promoter) and propriety of such divestment for personal augmentation of income rather than welfare of deity also raise serious doubts on genuineness of claim – Decree on ground of building and rebuilding set aside [Paras 33-42].

Decision: Second appeal disposed of – Decree of eviction on ground of default affirmed – Decree on ground of building and rebuilding granted by First Appellate Court set aside.

Adoption Law — Intercountry Relocation — HAMA Adoption — NOC by CARA — Adoption (Amendment) Regulations, 2021 — Adoption Regulations, 2022 — Petitioner no. 1 (minor) adopted by petitioners nos. 2 and 3 under HAMA, 1956 by adoption deed dated 08.02.2021 — Petitioners sought relocation of the child to Canada, a Hague Convention signatory — District Magistrate, Ferozepur furnished a Verification Report under Regulation 22B(1) and Schedule XXXIII — CARA, instead of issuing an NOC, issued merely a 'Support Letter' and marked the application as "rejected" on the portal with the remark "matter cannot be taken up as it is related to HAMA" — Held: Chapter IV-A of the 2021 Regulations is expressly titled to govern adoptions concluded under HAMA, 1956 where parents seek to relocate the child abroad — Upon receipt of verification report, CARA is mandated under Regulations 22B(2) and 22E(1) to ensure compliance with Articles 5 and/or 17 of the Hague Convention — The obligation to pursue and facilitate this compliance rests on CARA, not on the adoptive parents — CARA's abdication of its responsibility by issuing a mere support letter is untenable — Petition disposed of with directions [Paras 17–27, 34–35].

Hague Convention — Articles 5 and 17 — Central Authority's Obligation — Cooperation Between States — CARA and Canadian Authorities — Article 7(1) of the Hague Convention mandates cooperation between Central Authorities of the State of origin and the receiving State for the welfare and protection of the child — CARA proceeded on a misconception that the matter could not be taken up as the adoption was under HAMA — No objection by CARA as to the validity of the adoption — Held: CARA is directed to liaise with Canadian authorities, convey the statutory and regulatory position, and thereafter issue an NOC upon conclusion of the exercise under Articles 5 and/or 17 [Paras 28–35].

Best Interest of Child — Paramount Consideration — Adoption Regulations Cannot Be Construed to Leave Validly Adopted Children Without Relief — A construction that precludes parents who have effected a valid HAMA adoption from obtaining relocation approval under the 2021 Regulations would be contrary to the express wording of those Regulations and the paramount principle of the best interest of the child — Such construction is not acceptable [Paras 14, 25, 30].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of — CARA directed to liaise with Canadian authorities and convey the regulatory and statutory position — CARA further directed to issue NOC to petitioners upon conclusion of the exercise under Articles 5 and/or 17 of the Hague Convention — Pending applications disposed of.

Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Unauthorized Absenteeism – Removal from Service – Writ Petition Dismissed – Petitioner-Senior Assistant remained absent from duty from 22.04.2014 without obtaining leave or intimating the management, accumulating loss of pay for 993 days as on the date of the Charge Memo dated 29.03.2017 under Rules 4(7) and 4(8) of the CDA Rules 2014 – Petitioner neither replied to the Charge Memo nor participated in inquiry proceedings held between 13.07.2017 and 27.07.2017, leading to an ex parte inquiry report – After providing opportunity to respond to the inquiry report, Appointing Authority by order dated 10.01.2018 imposed penalty of removal from service – Appellate Authority and Chairman-cum-Managing Director both upheld the penalty – Held: No violation of principles of natural justice established; Petitioner herself chose to remain absent and not cooperate with inquiry proceedings; all notices and charge memos were duly served; penalty commensurate with prolonged unauthorized absence [Paras 9–11, 16, 31].

Doctrine of Proportionality – Punishment Not Disproportionate – Prolonged Absence for Over Three Years – The petitioner, relying on various precedents, contended that the penalty of removal was disproportionate to the misconduct – Held: The doctrine of proportionality is attracted only when the punishment imposed shocks the conscience of the court – Petitioner's unauthorized absence extended for more than three years without any valid justification, without provision of contemporaneous medical evidence, and without cooperation with inquiry proceedings – Punishment commensurate with the gravity of misconduct and not shockingly disproportionate – Following North-Eastern Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Ashappa, 2006(5) SCC 137 and Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, 2014(4) SCC 108, remaining absent for a long period cannot be treated as a minor misconduct [Paras 14, 28–29, 31].

Medical Ground – No Contemporaneous Evidence – Afterthought – Petitioner claimed prolonged ill-health on account of Polymenorrhagia, fibroid surgery, fissures, piles and anaemia as justification for absence – Held: Medical certificates were produced belatedly, the additional affidavit containing documentary evidence filed in March 2025 appeared to be an afterthought – Petitioner's illness was not of such serious nature as to warrant absence from duty for over three years without keeping the management informed – Petitioner failed to provide medical evidence during inquiry or prior to the Charge Memo [Paras 11, 23, 31].

Decision: Writ Petition dismissed – No costs.

Specific Performance – Agreement of Sale – Binding Effect – Partition Property – Karta – Appeal dismissed confirming Trial Court decree – Appellant entered into agreement of sale dated 06.09.2006 with 1st and 2nd defendants and deceased Rangasamy for purchase of agricultural land, paying total advance of Rs. 32,00,000/- in instalments duly endorsed in the agreement – Trial Court decreed the suit only in respect of shares of the 1st and 2nd defendants and Rangasamy and dismissed it against shares of defendants 3 to 6 on the ground that they were not parties to the agreement and held independent shares under partition decree in O.S. No. 805 of 1992 – High Court affirms – Agreement of sale did not contain any recital that 1st defendant and Rangasamy signed as Kartas of their respective Joint Hindu Families, nor any recital of existing debts or family necessity justifying the agreement – Held: Agreement cannot be enforced against shares of defendants 3 to 6 [Paras 35-43].

Joint Hindu Family – Karta's Power – Post-Partition Property – Properties allotted to parties under partition decree in O.S. No. 805 of 1992 became their self-acquired/independent property – 1st defendant and Rangasamy signed the agreement in their individual capacity and not as Kartas – Defendants 3, 4 and 5 held separate and distinct shares allotted to them under the partition decree and the 5th defendant had an undivided ½ share in A Schedule property while 3rd and 4th defendants held undivided 1/3rd shares each in B Schedule property – Held: Once separate and distinct shares are allotted in a partition, such shares become acquired property and allottees have absolute rights over them; 1st defendant and Rangasamy cannot be deemed Kartas of their respective Joint Hindu Families – Dictum in Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar and Others, 2025 SCC Online SC 877 applied [Paras 38-41].

Subsequent Purchasers – Lis Pendens – Even during pendency of the suit, defendants 3 to 6 sold the suit properties to defendants 10 to 13, who further sold to defendants 16 to 19 – No relief was sought in the plaint to declare these sale deeds null and void and no pleading that they are not binding on the plaintiff – Court declines to interfere with findings of Trial Court – Appeal dismissed – No costs [Paras 35-44].

Decision: Appeal suit dismissed – Judgment and decree of the Trial Court confirmed – Connected miscellaneous petition closed – No costs.

Tender Law – Judicial Review – Scope – Writ petition dismissed – Petitioner, an unsuccessful bidder, challenged acceptance of bid of 2nd opposite party on two grounds: (i) signing as "Rajesh Nayak" instead of full name "Rajesh Kumar Nayak"; and (ii) non-furnishing of details in Schedule-B (Certificate of List of Work in Hand) – Tender Committee, in its meeting dated 18.12.2024, found that the bid was submitted online using Digital Signature Certificate (DSC), which is a secure credential that cannot be used without the owner's knowledge, and that Schedule-B was not a mandatory condition of the TCN – Held: A writ court does not sit as an appellate authority over the Tender Committee; judicial review goes to the decision-making process, not the decision itself – No arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides, or perversity demonstrated by the petitioner [Paras 6-8.17].

Tender Conditions – Mandatory vs. Directory – Schedule-B (work in hand certificate) and Check List under Schedule-E not designated as "mandatory" in the TCN checklist, unlike Schedule-F (Affidavit) which was expressly marked mandatory – Requirements in a tender notice classifiable into two categories: essential conditions requiring strict compliance and ancillary conditions where deviations are permissible – In the instant case, since Schedule-B was not an essential condition and almost all bidders had not submitted it properly, the Tender Committee's acceptance of the bid was not in error – Held: Non-filling of all columns of Schedule-B does not entail rejection of bid [Paras 7.6-8.2].

Digital Signature – Authenticity – Bid submitted online by 2nd opposite party using his DSC; no objection raised by petitioner to that fact – Variation in signature as "Rajesh Nayak" instead of "Rajesh Kumar Nayak" inconsequential in view of verified DSC submission – Tender Committee's decision to obtain an affidavit explaining the discrepancy, while not rejecting the tender, was a reasonable exercise of discretion – Held: Sanctity is attached to online bid submission by DSC; signature variation cannot be used to vitiate such bid [Paras 6-6.4].

Proportionality of Judicial Intervention – Public Interest – Work order was already issued on 22.01.2025 and 2nd opposite party had completed about 50% of work in one item before stay was granted – Court noted principle actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) while vacating interim order – Directed works to be implemented forthwith with suitable modification of duration on mutually agreeable terms – Writ petition dismissed with no order as to costs [Paras 10.1-12].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Interim order vacated – Works to be implemented forthwith on mutually agreeable terms – No costs.

Criminal Law — Murder — Common Intention — Section 34 IPC — Conviction Upheld — Appellants Raj Narain, Kamlesh and Rajendra Prasad came to the field armed with gun, lathi and spade on 09.06.1984 and forcibly diverted the deceased's water course — On being confronted, appellants 2 and 3 exhorted to kill, whereupon appellant 1 fired at the deceased causing his death — Trial court convicted appellant 1 under Section 302 IPC and appellants 2 and 3 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment — High Court upholds conviction — Held: Prior conduct of arriving armed, exhortation at the time of incident and fleeing together thereafter conclusively establish common intention — Appeal dismissed — Conviction and sentence confirmed [Paras 23, 37–39, 57–58].

Common Intention — Section 34 IPC — Scope and Application — Pre-arranged Plan — Exhortation as Evidence of Meeting of Minds — Section 34 IPC does not create a distinct offence but lays down the principle of constructive liability — Common intention need not be pre-planned from long before; it can be formed on the spot — Exhortation by appellants 2 and 3 to kill the deceased, coupled with their armed arrival and subsequent flight, constitutes sufficient proof of meeting of minds — Separate residence and absence of prior enmity are not grounds of acquittal once common intention is otherwise proved [Paras 30–38].

Ocular Evidence — Credibility — Eye Witnesses P.W.1 and P.W.2 — Cross-Examination Failed to Dislodge Testimony — P.W.1 (son of deceased) and P.W.2 (brother-in-law) are the principal eye witnesses whose testimonies were not shaken in cross-examination on any material aspect including presence of accused, manner of crime and exhortation — Presence of P.W.2 on spot corroborated by P.W.1 and P.W.4 — Cannot be discarded as chance witness [Paras 24–25].

Hostile Witness — P.W.4 — Evidentiary Value — P.W.4 (Kailash Narain) turned hostile but in cross-examination corroborated the time and place of incident, presence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, and identified persons fleeing with a gun and lathi — Further evidence of appellant 2 procuring a false affidavit from P.W.4 to prevent testimony reflects consciousness of guilt — Statement of hostile witness relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act [Paras 27–29].

Medical Evidence — Conflict with Ocular Evidence — Two Injuries from Single Fire — Doctor opined both injuries could have been caused by single fire; opinion of two fires was merely on suggestion and unsubstantiated by evidence — Use of a self-loaded cartridge with non-standard wadding piece explains close-range charring — No irreconcilable conflict between medical and ocular evidence [Paras 26, 44–46].

Ante-Time FIR — 250 C.C. Semi-Digested Food — Contention that the deceased could not have been murdered at 08:00 AM as semi-digested food found in stomach implies he must have eaten much earlier — Held: In rural households, persons going to fields commonly take light food or liquid before leaving — FIR is not ante-time [Para 46].

Criminal Procedure — Section 313 CrPC — Statement Recorded on Old Proforma — Section 364 CrPC 1898 — Vitiating Effect — Statement of accused recorded on proforma prescribed under Section 364 CrPC 1898 though court's own order referred to Section 313 CrPC 1973 — Held: By virtue of Section 484(2)(b) CrPC 1973 and Section 8 of the General Clauses Act 1897, forms prescribed under the old code are deemed prescribed under the corresponding provision of the new code — Mere reference to wrong provision does not vitiate proceedings unless prejudice is shown — No prejudice demonstrated by appellants [Paras 49–52].

Investigation — Tainted Investigation — Non-Recovery of Gun — Defects in Investigation Not Fatal if Charge Otherwise Proved — Non-recovery of the gun and minor investigative lapses do not entitle the accused to acquittal if the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt by reliable ocular evidence [Para 48].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Conviction of Kamlesh (appellant 2) and Rajendra Prasad (appellant 3) under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment confirmed — Appeal on behalf of Raj Narain (appellant 1) had already abated upon his death — Appellants 2 and 3 directed to surrender within two weeks before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pratapgarh.

Customs Law – Export Incentives – RoDTEP Scheme – Sugar Exports – Denial of Benefit – Petitioners engaged in export of white refined sugar (ITC(HS) Code 17011490) availed duty credit under RoDTEP Scheme – Export policy of sugar amended from "free" to "restricted" by Notification No. 10/2015-20 dated 24 May 2022, with exports permitted under specific permission of Directorate of Sugar – Revenue denied RoDTEP benefit treating such exports as ineligible "restricted" exports under Notification No. 76/2021-Customs (N.T.) – Held: Sugar exported with specific permission under prescribed conditions cannot be treated as a totally restricted or prohibited item so as to deprive petitioners of RoDTEP benefits – Petitioners entitled to duty credit under the Scheme [Paras 3-4, 9, 22].

Export Policy – Restricted vs. Prohibited Exports – RoDTEP Ineligibility – Item No. 1 of Table 1 to Notification No. 76/2021 excludes from RoDTEP duty credit goods "restricted or prohibited for export" – Revenue contended that sugar, post-Notification dated 24 May 2022, became blanketly ineligible – Held: The said notification does not impose a total embargo; it permits export with specific permission and prescribed quota – Characterising quota-permitted exports as "restricted/prohibited" is a misreading of the notification – Revenue's position contrary to the policy conditions set out in the notification itself [Paras 19-22].

Precedent – Finality of High Court Decision – Uniform Policy – Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Shree Renuka Sugars Ltd. and M/s. Satyendra Packaging Ltd. held that RoDTEP benefit cannot be denied to sugar exporters acting under specific Government permission – Department's SLP dismissed by Supreme Court on 26 April 2024 – Department's own communications accepted finality of the Gujarat High Court orders and proceeded to grant benefit to those petitioners – Held: Once an issue has attained finality in view of an authoritative pronouncement by a High Court, the department ought not to re-agitate the same before other High Courts; doing so invites conflicting interpretations and judicial chaos – Principle of inter-High Court comity and uniform policy on Central legislation affirmed following Maneklal Chunilal & Sons Ltd. and Jayantilal Ramanlal & Co. [Paras 23-25].

Relief – Refund with Interest – Petitioners who were not granted RoDTEP benefit directed to be granted the same – Where benefit was already granted but subsequently recovered from petitioners, refund of amount so recovered directed within four weeks along with interest at 6% per annum – No coercive recovery action to be taken where benefit has been granted [Paras 26-27, Order clauses (i)-(iv)].

Decision: Petitions allowed – Petitioners held entitled to RoDTEP benefit – Respondents directed to grant rebate under the Scheme to petitioners who exported sugar under specific permission – Petitioners from whom benefit was recovered directed to be refunded with 6% p.a. interest within four weeks – No coercive action for recovery to be taken – Rule made absolute. No costs.