Criminal Law – Quashing of Complaint – Allegations of Forgery and False Representation in Property Documents – partially allowed - Application under Section 482 of CrPC – Petition filed by Accused Nos. 1 to 13 to quash the complaint in C.C. No. 2/2023 under Sections 465, 468 IPC and Section 82 of the Registration Act, alleging false documentation to depict public pathways and wells as private properties – High Court reviewed whether allegations justified trial for forgery and related charges – Held: Offenses under Sections 465 and 468 IPC not prima facie made out as the requirements for forgery were not met; however, Section 82 of the Registration Act was sufficiently established, warranting trial on that count – Quashing petition partially allowed; charges under IPC quashed, but proceedings under Section 82 of the Registration Act sustained [Paras 1, 4, 16, 24, 30].

Forgery – Elements of a False Document – IPC Sections 465, 468, and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) – Requirement of Intent to Defraud or Deceive – Court analyzed conditions for forgery, noting that false documentation alone does not constitute forgery unless it meets specific criteria, such as intent to impersonate another, unauthorized claims, or deception – Reviewed essentials of forgery under IPC Sections 463, 464 and corresponding BNS provisions, emphasizing that the execution of a document with a false ownership claim, without more, does not amount to forgery – Held: Petitioners’ actions did not meet the conditions for a "false document" under IPC Sections 465, 468, but did meet Section 82 of the Registration Act, which prohibits false statements before registration officials [Paras 18, 19, 23, 24].

Scope of Section 82, Registration Act – False Statements During Registration Process – Applicability in Present Case – Petitioners contended that recitals in a deed do not equate to false statements as defined under Section 82 of the Registration Act – Court examined precedent on what constitutes a "statement" under Section 82, including a Karnataka High Court judgment that excluded false recitals from its ambit – High Court distinguished this reasoning, holding that a false statement in a deed presented to a registrar falls within Section 82’s scope, as it qualifies as an "assertion" or "report of facts" – Held: Allegations of false statements in the registration document were sufficient to proceed under Section 82 of the Registration Act, supporting trial continuation on this count [Paras 25-29, 35-37].

Decision: Petition partially allowed – Quashing granted for offenses under IPC Sections 465 and 468 – Proceedings to continue for alleged offense under Section 82 of the Registration Act – Trial court directed to proceed accordingly – Stay order vacated [Para 30].

Income Tax Law – Reassessment Notice – Assumption of Jurisdiction Beyond Four Years – Reopening of assessment under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for AY 2011-12 was challenged by the petitioner (Discovery Communications India), as the original assessment had already been completed under Section 143(3) – Notice issued after the four-year limitation under the first proviso to Section 147, alleging escapement of income without new tangible material and based on the previous assessment record from AY 2012-13 – Held: Without failure by the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, reopening the assessment constitutes a mere change of opinion, rendering the reassessment notice invalid [Paras 1, 2, 10, 14, 16, 17, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30].

Reassessment Beyond Four Years – Condition for Failure to Disclose – The court observed that reopening under Section 147 beyond the four-year period requires proof of a failure by the assessee to fully and truly disclose material facts necessary for the assessment, which was absent in this case – The notice under Section 148 did not specify any undisclosed facts or evidence of nondisclosure by the petitioner – The reassessment was initiated solely based on the same material available during the original assessment [Paras 16, 17, 24, 26].

Change of Opinion – Invalid Ground for Reopening – The court held that reassessment based on a mere change of opinion by the Assessing Officer (AO) is not permissible – When an assessment order is completed under Section 143(3), the AO cannot reopen it merely because of a shift in opinion on previously verified claims – Citing judgments in CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. and CIT v. Goetze (India) Ltd., the court reiterated that the AO has no authority to review on the same facts under the guise of reassessment [Paras 22, 24, 27].

Absence of Fresh Tangible Material – Reopening Based on AY 2012-13 Records – The reasons provided by the AO for reopening relied on details from the assessment records of AY 2012-13, without any new tangible evidence for AY 2011-12 – The expenses for Discovery Appreciation Plan (DAP) and production and translation costs, which the AO sought to disallow, had already been examined and allowed in subsequent assessments, affirming consistency in the deductions – The court cited A.T. Kearney India Ltd. v. ITO and Ultra Marine Air Aids (P) Ltd. v. IAC to emphasize that reassessment notices lack validity when the foundational reason ceases to exist [Paras 18, 29].

Alternative Remedy – Section 263 Invocation – The court noted that if the AO believed there was an error in the original assessment, the appropriate remedy would have been a revision under Section 263, not reassessment under Section 147 – The AO’s reasoning that the assessment errors were due to mistakes or insufficient verification is insufficient to justify a reassessment [Paras 20, 27].

Decision: Petition allowed – The court quashed the notice issued under Section 148 dated 31.03.2018 and the reassessment proceedings initiated thereunder – No cost order issued [Paras 30, 31].

Service Law – Disability Pension – Entitlement to Service Element – Petitioner, invalided due to disability acquired during military service, was granted only the disability element of pension – Citing Regulation 183, which includes both service and disability elements in disability pensions, petitioner argued entitlement to the service element for life – Held: As per the Pension Regulations, the petitioner is also entitled to the service element from the date of discharge [Paras 2-5, 10].

Rounding-Off of Disability Pension – Applicability of Supreme Court Rulings – Petitioner contended that his disability should be rounded off from 40% to 50% for life starting from 01.01.1996, per the ruling in Ram Avtar and subsequent judgments – Initially granted this benefit from 01.01.2016 only – Held: Entitlement to 50% disability pension for life from 01.01.1996, with arrears payable accordingly, in line with precedents [Paras 6-9].

Decision: The writ petition is allowed. The Armed Forces Tribunal order is modified to grant the petitioner both the service element of his disability pension from 30.07.1978 for life and rounding off of the disability element to 50% for life from 01.01.1996.
 

Civil Law - Ex Parte Decree – Setting Aside due to Substituted Service – Opposite parties argued that summons were not personally served, and the substituted service was insufficient – Held: Substituted service is a valid form of notice; however, it may be set aside if circumstances reveal reasonable grounds for lack of knowledge of the suit, as in the current case due to internal issues within the organization [Paras 10.1-10.4].

Condonation of Delay – Application of Limitation Act in Ex Parte Decree – Petitioner contested the delay in the opposite party’s application to set aside the ex parte decree – Held: Delay condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act; delay was justified due to procedural lapses and absence of intentional negligence [Paras 10.4-10.6].

Substituted Service – Legal Standard under Order V, Rule 20 of CPC – Court examined the substituted service procedure in cases of non-response due to unavailable defendants – Held: Courts must exercise discretion and provide relief liberally where summons were unlikely to reach the defendant in a fair and transparent manner, especially where records show an absence of actual knowledge [Para 10.7].

Final Decision – Civil Revision Petitions dismissed – Ex parte decree set aside, and delay condoned to ensure substantial justice between the parties; trial court order upheld [Conclusion].
 

Hindu Law – Partition and Coparcenary Rights – Appeal – Daughters sought partition of ancestral property allotted to their father under a partition deed (Ex.A1) – Trial Court decreed the suit granting 1/5 share to each daughter – First Appellate Court reversed the decision, holding the property as self-acquired – High Court found the First Appellate Court misconstrued the ancestral nature of the property and failed to consider binding admissions in Ex.A1 – Held: The property is ancestral, and daughters are entitled to coparcenary rights under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 – Judgment of First Appellate Court set aside, and Trial Court's decree restored [Paras 1, 6–8, 36–37].
Evidence – Partition Deed (Ex.A1) – Recital and Estoppel – Partition deed (Ex.A1) explicitly stated the property was ancestral – First defendant, having voluntarily subscribed to the partition deed, was estopped from claiming the property was self-acquired – No evidence provided by the defendants to contradict the recital – High Court relied on binding precedents regarding the effect of admissions in registered documents [Paras 5, 8, 11–12].
Coparcenary and Ancestral Property – Character of Property – Notional Partition – Death of Rangasamy Chettiar in 1962 caused a notional partition under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act – Despite notional partition, the 2/3rd share held by surviving sons remained ancestral property – First defendant blended the share inherited through notional partition with ancestral property, retaining its ancestral nature – Daughters, as coparceners post-2005 amendment, were entitled to their shares [Paras 10–23, 36].
Legal Principles – Doctrine of Estoppel – Coparcenary Rights – Ext.A1 treated the entire property as ancestral – Defendants failed to prove otherwise – Court emphasized principles of estoppel binding parties to declarations in registered documents unless fraud or error is proved – Applied Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) and other precedents on coparcenary rights and notional partition [Paras 12, 19–20, 32].
Settlement Deeds – Invalidity – Defendants relied on settlement deeds (Ex.B1, Ex.B2) executed by the first defendant in favor of his sons – Held: The deeds were invalid as they were executed after the plaintiffs had become coparceners and had demanded partition – Plaintiffs’ rights vested under the 2005 amendment and could not be defeated by subsequent alienations [Paras 33, 36].
Ancestral Nature of Property – High Court held First Appellate Court erred in disregarding the admissions in Ex.A1 – Property was ancestral [Paras 8, 36].
Coparcenary Rights of Daughters – Based on the Vineeta Sharma ratio, the daughters were entitled to shares as coparceners [Paras 19, 36].
Onus of Proof – First defendant failed to discharge the burden of proving Ex.A1 recital was false or mistaken [Para 36].
Misinterpretation of Ancestral Property – High Court clarified the error in treating ancestral property as self-acquired [Para 36].
Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court set aside – Decree of the Trial Court restored – Plaintiffs entitled to partition and 1/5 share each in the property – No costs – Miscellaneous petitions closed [Para 37].
 

Civil Writ -  Temporary Appointments – Procedural Compliance Under MMR Rules – Review applicants argued that their placement in the selection panel, and nomination by the District Registrar, conferred priority for appointment – Held: Appointment of MMR requires adherence to Rule 3(b) of the 1929 Rules, which empowers the IGR to override the District Registrar’s nominee and recommend another candidate, as was done for the writ petitioner, satisfying legal requirements for temporary MMR appointments [Paras 8-12].

Review Grounds – Discovery of New Facts or Error Apparent on the Face of Record – Review applicants claimed new procedural developments warranted review of the court's order favoring the writ petitioner – Held: The facts and materials presented by applicants were available or could not change the outcome; review dismissed on lack of new evidence or apparent error [Paras 15-18].

Nomination Authority – Discretion of Inspector General of Registration (IGR) – Court found that the IGR validly exercised discretion to disapprove the District Registrar’s choice and select the writ petitioner, Mijanur, under Rule 3(b) without requiring further justification; the appointment process was lawfully complied with [Paras 10-12].

Contempt Application – Compliance Verification – Alleged non-compliance with court directions in the original order challenged in contempt proceedings, but court held that procedural due process was duly followed under Rule 3(b); contempt application dismissed, affirming Mijanur’s lawful nomination and appointment [Para 13].

Final Decision – Review applications dismissed – The court affirmed the original order as legally sound and dismissed the review applications, directing issuance of the temporary MMR license to Mijanur per prior court directions [Conclusion].
 

Family Law – Summoning of Witness – Application under Order XVI Rule 1(3) of CPC – Quashing of Family Court Order – Lack of Reasoning in Dismissal – Petitioner filed an application to summon a mediator as a witness in ongoing matrimonial dispute proceedings, asserting the relevance based on prior references to the individual’s mediation role in testimony – Family Court dismissed the application on grounds of delay, stating that the application was “belated” and aimed at filling lacunae, but did not provide specific reasoning – Held: The dismissal order lacked adequate justification for concluding delay or lacuna-filling motives; Family Court directed to reconsider the application with full opportunity for both sides to present arguments [Paras 3-5].

Procedural Fairness – Requirement for Reasoned Orders in Dismissal of Summoning Applications – High Court emphasized the necessity of detailed reasoning in Family Court orders, especially when dismissing applications to summon witnesses – The vague basis of “belatedness” without justification was deemed insufficient, leading to a directive for rehearing – Held: Orders must convey rationale, particularly when procedural rights such as witness examination are involved; remanded for reconsideration [Paras 4, 5].

Decision: Petition allowed – Family Court’s order set aside – Matter remanded to Family Court for reconsideration of witness summoning application (I.A. No. 7 of 2024 in O.P. No. 50 of 2019), with instructions to expedite proceedings – Both parties directed to appear before Family Court on 12/11/2024 [Para 5].
 

Matrimonial Law - Domestic Violence – Maintainability of Second Petition – No Bar Found - Petitioners argued that withdrawal of the first petition barred the respondent from filing a second petition under Section 12 of the DV Act – Court held that the principles of res judicata are inapplicable to domestic violence proceedings, especially when the respondent explained the circumstances leading to withdrawal of the first petition and re-filing of the second – Rejection of the application to drop proceedings affirmed [Paras 20-23].

Domestic Relationship – Definition and Applicability – Continuity Not Required - Petitioners contended absence of domestic relationship as the respondent had left the shared household in 2016 – Court ruled that the definition under Section 2(f) of the DV Act includes relationships where parties lived together at any point in time, satisfying the condition for a domestic relationship [Paras 24-26].

Allegations of Domestic Violence – Specific and Serious Claims Warrant Trial - Respondent’s petition included allegations of dowry demands, physical and verbal abuse, and forcible eviction – Court affirmed concurrent findings of the Magistrate and Appellate Court that allegations were specific and serious, justifying continuation of proceedings under the DV Act [Paras 15-19].

Decision: Petition dismissed. Trial Court and Appellate Court orders upheld. Interim directions vacated [Paras 27-28].

Passport Application – Rejection on Grounds of Family’s Criminal Antecedents – Fundamental Rights Violated - The Court examined the rejection of passport applications on the ground of criminal records of the petitioner’s husband and father-in-law – Held: Criminal antecedents of family members cannot influence assessment of the petitioner’s character or eligibility for issuance of a passport. Respondents directed to reassess the applications based solely on the petitioner’s character [Paras 13-14].

Non-Compliance with Judicial Directions – Fresh Application Ordered in W.P. No. 10154/2021 – Repeated Rejection on Same Grounds - Respondents were previously directed to disregard grounds of earlier rejection in fresh assessments. Non-compliance with this direction led to rejection on identical grounds – Held: Such non-compliance amounts to a cavalier approach, warranting quashing of the impugned orders [Paras 12-13].

Article 21 – Right to Travel Abroad – Fundamental Rights – The petitioner enjoys the same fundamental rights as other citizens, and extraneous considerations based on family connections infringe upon her constitutional rights – Held: Reassessment ordered, and if eligible, the passport must be issued without delay [Para 14].

Decision:

The petitions are allowed. The impugned orders rejecting the passport applications are quashed. Respondents are directed to reassess the applications within four weeks, solely on the petitioner’s character, and issue the passport within six weeks if found eligible.