Industrial Land Allotment – Cancellation and Resumption of Unutilised Portion – SIPCOT – Clause 14(i) of Lease Deed – Appellant allotted an industrial plot on 05.12.2005 for manufacture of Forged/Machined Auto Components and a Lease Deed executed on 02.03.2006 – SIPCOT found 3.70 acres of allotted land lying unutilised – Appellant declined to surrender the unutilised portion upon notice – SIPCOT invoked Clause 14(i) and cancelled allotment of unutilised land and ordered resumption – Single Judge upheld the cancellation and directed refund of deposit – Writ Appeal dismissed – Order of Single Judge confirmed [Paras 1–7].

"Unutilised Industrial Land — Clause 14(i) — Right of SIPCOT to Cancel and Resume"

Industrial Plot – Lease Deed – Clause 14(i) – Cancellation – Clause 14(i) of the Lease Deed unequivocally confers upon SIPCOT the right to cancel the allotment and resume land, at any time, if the allotted land is not put to use for the purpose for which it was allotted or is found to be in excess of actual requirements – Upon resumption of excess land, allottee is entitled only to refund of plot deposit – Development charges, additional development charges, lease rent, interest and enhanced interest paid or due are not refundable – Appellant having agreed to the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed is bound by Clause 14(i) [Paras 3–4].

"Installation of Solar Panel Does Not Constitute Industrial Use — Purpose of Allotment Must Be Fulfilled"

Industrial Allotment – Purpose of Allotment – Utilisation – Appellant contended that a Solar Panel had been installed on the subject portion of land and produced a photograph in support – Held: A Solar Panel is not an industrial structure – Installation of a Solar Panel does not amount to utilisation of allotted land for the purpose of setting up a unit for manufacture of Forged/Machined Auto Components as stipulated in the Lease Deed and Project Report – Clause 14(i) mandates utilisation of allotted land strictly for the purpose for which it was allotted – Authorities rightly found that the land had not been utilised for any industrial purpose – Photograph produced is of no avail [Paras 5–6].

"Writ Court's Findings on Facts and Scope of Clause 14(i) — No Infirmity Found"

Writ Appeal – Scope of Interference – Single Judge elaborately considered the admitted facts between the parties in the context of the Lease Deed and Clause 14(i) – Writ Court directed refund of deposit amount as stipulated under Clause 14(i) – Division Bench found no infirmity in the Writ order – Impugned order confirmed – SIPCOT bound to refund the deposit amount as directed [Paras 5–7].

Decision: Writ Appeal dismissed – Order of the Single Judge dated 22.07.2022 in W.P. No. 13565 of 2012 confirmed – No costs – Connected Miscellaneous Petition closed.

Criminal Law – Rash and Negligent Driving – Acquittal – Appeal Against Acquittal – Accused alleged to have driven a truck at high speed causing it to hit an auto resulting in it falling into a gorge and causing injuries to a passenger — Trial Court acquitted the accused finding material contradictions in prosecution evidence and non-establishment of identity of the driver — High Court on appeal finds no perversity in the view taken by the Trial Court — appeal dismissed [Paras 6–31].

"Appeal Against Acquittal – Parameters of Interference – Double Presumption of Innocence"

Interference with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court is warranted only if the judgment is patently perverse, is based on misreading or omission to consider material evidence on record, and no two reasonable views are possible — after acquittal, the accused is entitled to a reinforced or double presumption of innocence — if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed — Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing — relying on Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433; P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291 [Paras 12–14].

"High Speed – Relative Term – Insufficient to Prove Rash and Negligent Driving – Section 279 IPC"

Mere use of the expression "high speed" by a witness is not sufficient to establish rash and negligent driving unless the approximate speed of the vehicle is also stated — high speed is a relative term and what one person understands by high speed may differ from another — prosecution must bring on record material to establish what is meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case — negligence and rashness cannot be presumed and criminality is not to be inferred — speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence; the deciding factor is the situation in which the accident occurs — relying on Mohanta Lal v. State of West Bengal, 1968 ACJ 124; State of Karnataka v. Satish, (1998) 8 SCC 493; State of H.P. v. Madan Lal, 2003 Latest HLJ (2) 925; State of H.P. v. Parmodh Singh, 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 [Paras 22–26].

"Witness Cannot Depose on Negligence – Opinion on Negligence Not Relevant Evidence"

A witness can only depose about facts which occurred in his presence and is not permitted to draw inferences or express opinions thereon — it is for the court to draw inferences from proved facts — a witness's opinion that an accident occurred due to the negligence of a driver is not relevant evidence — the issue whether a vehicle was driven rashly and negligently is a conclusion to be drawn by the court on the basis of evidence led — statement of witnesses that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused cannot, by itself, advance the prosecution's case — relying on Hollington v. Hawthorn, 1943 KB 507; State of H.P. v. Niti Raj, 2009 Cr.LJ 1922 (HP) [Paras 27–29].

"Corroboration by Mechanical Report and Photographs – Absence of Damage to Truck and Rear of Auto – Prosecution Version Doubtful"

Prosecution case was that the truck hit the auto from the rear causing it to fall into a gorge — mechanical inspection report does not mention any damage to the rear of the auto — photographs also do not show any damage to the rear of the auto or the front of the truck — site plan prepared on the date of the accident records that the front tyres of the truck were punctured at the spot, casting doubt on whether the truck was moving at the time — oral testimony of eyewitnesses that the truck hit the auto from behind not corroborated by documentary evidence — prosecution version rendered doubtful [Paras 18–21].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — acquittal of the respondent under Sections 279, 337 and 201 IPC upheld — Trial Court's view held to be a reasonable view warranting no interference — respondent directed to furnish bail bonds of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety under Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (Section 481 BNSS) effective for six months [Paras 30–32].

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Allegation of Multiple FIRs – Petition under Section 528 BNSS read with Article 227 of the Constitution seeking quashing of FIR registered at Kohima North Police Station on ground that earlier FIR on same transaction had already been registered at Hare Street Police Station, Kolkata – Petitioners contended that continuation of second FIR violates “test of sameness” and amounts to abuse of process – Held: Second FIR permissible where allegations arise from different perspectives and disclose additional offences including forgery of official logo, forging signature of Director of Nagaland State Lotteries and misuse of confidential government documents – FIR lodged by Director of Nagaland State Lotteries revealed wider factual matrix and distinct offences causing financial loss to State – Petitioners failed to make out case for exercise of inherent jurisdiction – Petition dismissed [Paras 15–29].

Multiple FIRs – Test of Sameness – Applicability of principles laid down in T.T. Anthony and Babubhai – Court examined whether the FIR registered at Kohima North P.S and the FIR registered at Hare Street P.S Kolkata related to identical occurrence – Held: Test of sameness not satisfied as complainants, allegations and scope of offences were different – Second FIR disclosed offences relating to forging official logo of Nagaland State Lottery, forging signature of Director and causing loss to State revenue – Such allegations formed a broader factual matrix and were not merely repetition of earlier FIR – Therefore registration of second FIR legally sustainable [Paras 21–25].

Criminal Law – Rival Versions of Same Transaction – Permissibility of multiple FIRs – Court relied on Supreme Court rulings holding that rival versions or different perspectives of same incident may lead to separate FIRs – When FIR is lodged by a different aggrieved person disclosing additional offences and wider conspiracy, second FIR does not violate criminal procedure jurisprudence – Investigation cannot be curtailed merely because earlier FIR exists if new facts and victims are disclosed [Paras 16–20, 24–25].

Forgery and Fraud – Lottery Tickets – Allegations of forging official logo and signature of Director of Nagaland State Lotteries – Charge sheet and witness statements under Section 161 CrPC disclosed prima facie involvement of accused in manufacturing fake lottery tickets and evading GST and TDS causing financial loss to Government of Nagaland – Such allegations constitute distinct offences warranting investigation and trial – Court declined to interfere at preliminary stage [Para 23].

Quashing of FIR – Scope of High Court’s Inherent Powers – Reliance on Bhajan Lal principles – Power to quash criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly and only where allegations are inherently improbable, malicious or fail to disclose any offence – In present case allegations disclosed prima facie offences and did not fall within categories warranting quashing – High Court refused to exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS read with Article 227 of the Constitution [Paras 27–28].

Non-Cognizable Offence – Defamation under Section 500 IPC – Effect of Section 155(4) CrPC – Even though Section 500 IPC is non-cognizable, when combined with other cognizable offences the entire case is treated as cognizable – Issue regarding applicability or dropping of Section 500 IPC to be considered by Trial Court at appropriate stage [Para 26].

Decision: Criminal Petition dismissed – Prayer for quashing FIR in Kohima North P.S Case No. 009/2023 rejected – Investigation and trial proceedings permitted to continue.

Criminal Procedure – Cancellation of Bail – POCSO Offences – Bail granted after filing of chargesheet without considering gravity and prima facie materials – Trial Court earlier rejected bail noting incriminating materials but granted bail within 10 days solely on ground of submission of chargesheet – Held: Order granting bail suffered from non-application of mind and was vitiated by serious infirmity – Bail liable to be cancelled under Section 439(2) CrPC [Paras 12.3, 12.5, 16].

Cancellation of Bail – Maintainability – Whether High Court can examine perversity in original bail order despite non-challenge to subsequent order refusing cancellation on ground of misconduct – Distinction between cancellation on supervening circumstances and setting aside a perverse bail order explained – Held: High Court competent to examine legality and propriety of original bail order under Section 439(2) CrPC even if order rejecting cancellation on misconduct not challenged – Application maintainable [Paras 8–11].

POCSO Act – Gravity of Offence – Statement under Section 164 CrPC – Minor victim aged 14 alleged repeated penetrative sexual assault, blackmail through obscene photographs and suicide attempt – Medical report corroborated sexual intercourse – Trial Court failed to advert to gravity, severity of punishment and impact on victim – Held: Grant of bail as a matter of course in serious POCSO offence defeats object of special legislation and reflects improper exercise of discretion [Paras 12.1–12.6].

Bail Jurisprudence – Parameters for Grant of Bail – Court must consider prima facie case, nature and gravity of charge, severity of punishment, possibility of tampering, threat to witnesses and societal impact – Mere filing of chargesheet not determinative – Order devoid of reasons and ignoring settled parameters is unsustainable [Paras 12.4–12.5].

Section 29 POCSO Act – Presumption – Whether applicable at stage of bail – Presumption arises upon proof of foundational facts and operates at trial – Not automatically triggered upon registration of FIR – Held: Argument that presumption under Section 29 vitiated bail order not accepted – However, infirmity in bail order established on other grounds [Para 15–15.1].

Supervening Circumstances – Misuse of Liberty – Though intimidation alleged post-bail, present challenge primarily on ground of perversity in original bail order – Principles requiring special or supervening circumstances not attracted where bail granted on irrelevant considerations – Bail can be cancelled if order granting bail itself is illegal or perverse [Paras 13–14].

Decision: Application allowed – Impugned order dated 20.07.2024 granting bail set aside – Bail granted to accused-opposite party No.2 cancelled – Accused directed to surrender within 10 days failing which coercive steps to be taken – C.R.M. (M) 1069 of 2025 disposed of.

Service Law – Pay Anomaly – Drivers vis-à-vis Clerks/Patwaris – Mid-term Pay Revision 2011 – Petitioners sought pay band of Rs.10,300-34,800/- + Grade Pay Rs.3,200/- w.e.f. 01.12.2011 alleging anomaly – Claim earlier rejected vide order dated 23.03.2020 – Petition filed after more than five years – Held: Inordinate and unexplained delay disentitles petitioners to discretionary relief under Article 226 – Petition dismissed on ground of delay and laches [Paras 6, 12, 13].

Writ Jurisdiction – Delay and Laches – Stale Claims – Cause of action arose on rejection of claim on 23.03.2020 – Petitioners approached Court after lapse of over five years – No satisfactory explanation for delay – Held: High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction where petitioner is negligent in asserting rights – Equity aids the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights [Paras 6, 12].

Service Benefits – Repeated Representations – Effect on Limitation – Mere representations or reliance on subsequent Pay Commission observations do not revive stale claims – Issue of delay to be examined with reference to original cause of action – Belated invocation of writ jurisdiction cannot unsettle settled matters [Paras 8, 9, 12].

Precedents – Supreme Court on Delay – Court relied upon Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar, State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and other judgments holding that delay and laches are relevant factors in exercise of writ jurisdiction – Discretionary relief may be denied even where claim otherwise appears arguable on merits [Paras 7, 8].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed on ground of gross delay and laches – No relief granted – Parties left to bear their own costs [Paras 12, 13].

Execution Proceedings – Arbitral Award – Judgment Debtor a Company – Arrest Warrant Against Director – Executing Court issued warrant under Order XXI Rule 37(2) and invoked Order XXI Rule 41(3) CPC for non-disclosure of assets – Petitioner contended he was not party to award or execution – Held: Where judgment debtor is a corporation, officers can be examined and directed to file affidavit of assets under Order XXI Rule 41(1) & (2) CPC – However opportunity to comply must be afforded before coercive steps – Arrest warrant set aside with liberty to proceed afresh [Paras 2–4, 9–12].

Order XXI Rule 41 CPC – Scope and Consequences of Non-Compliance – Sub-rule (1) permits examination of officer of corporation – Sub-rule (2) enables Court to direct filing of affidavit of assets – Sub-rule (3) provides detention for disobedience – Invocation of sub-rule (3) permissible only upon established disobedience – Procedural safeguards must be adhered to [Paras 9–11].

Refusal of Notice – Due Process – Notice to petitioner returned as refused – Executing Court proceeded further – High Court held that as petitioner has now appeared and is willing to subject himself to jurisdiction, he must be granted opportunity to show cause and file affidavit of assets of judgment debtor company [Paras 2, 12].

Corporate Liability in Execution – Director/Shareholder – Though not party to arbitral award, officer of judgment debtor company amenable to examination regarding assets of company – Execution Court empowered to secure disclosure of assets to satisfy decree – No opinion expressed on merits of liability [Paras 10, 12].

Relief Granted – Impugned order dated 27.01.2026 insofar as issuance of arrest warrant against petitioner set aside – Petitioner directed to appear before executing Court and comply with Order XXI Rule 41(2) CPC – One week’s time granted to file affidavit of assets – Executing Court to proceed in accordance with law [Order portion].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Arrest warrant against petitioner set aside – Petitioner directed to appear before executing Court on 03.03.2026 and file affidavit of assets within one week, if so advised – Executing Court to proceed in accordance with law – No opinion expressed on merits.

Criminal Law – Grievous Hurt – Dangerous Weapon – Scope of Section 326 IPC – Petitioners convicted under Section 326/34 IPC for assaulting victim with bamboo stick and iron rod resulting in fracture at right elbow – Courts below held fracture proved by medical evidence and X-ray report – High Court held that though fracture attracts “grievous hurt” under Section 320 Seventhly and Eighthly IPC, bamboo stick/rod used at elbow cannot by its very nature be termed an instrument “likely to cause death” within meaning of Section 326 IPC – Conviction altered to Section 325 IPC [Paras 13–18, 19].

Evidence – Injured Witness – Minor Contradictions – Effect – FIR lodged within 55 minutes naming all accused – Testimony of injured (PW1) corroborated by PW2 and PW3, who were also present and sustained injuries – Minor discrepancies regarding time and place of occurrence not material – Concurrent findings of fact not perverse – No ground for interference in revision on factual appreciation [Paras 10–12].

Medical Evidence – Proof of Fracture – Exhibit Marked Without Objection – Injury report prepared on date of occurrence noted fracture in X-ray – Doctor examined as PW4 and report marked as Exhibit 4 without objection – Victim underwent surgery and remained hospitalized beyond 20 days – Held: Injury squarely falls within clauses Seventhly and Eighthly of Section 320 IPC – Grievous hurt established [Paras 14].

Common Intention – Section 34 IPC – Assault in Furtherance of Common Intention – Evidence showed accused persons jointly dragged victim out and assaulted him – Presence and participation proved by ocular testimony – Even if specific blow not attributed individually, liability under Section 34 attracted – Conviction sustainable for causing grievous hurt in furtherance of common intention [Paras 11, 12].

Revisional Jurisdiction – Interference with Concurrent Findings – High Court reiterated that interference permissible only in exceptional cases of perversity or compelling circumstances – Where two courts concurrently appreciated evidence and found guilt, re-appreciation not warranted merely because another view possible [Para 12].

Sentence – Alteration of Conviction – Since grievous hurt not caused by dangerous weapon as contemplated under Section 326 IPC, conviction modified to Section 325 IPC – Sentence reduced to simple imprisonment for six months with fine of Rs. 5,000/- each, in default simple imprisonment for two months – Petitioners directed to surrender within four weeks [Paras 19–20].

Decision: Revision partly allowed – Conviction under Section 326/34 IPC set aside – Altered to Section 325/34 IPC – Sentence modified to six months’ simple imprisonment with fine – Petitioners directed to surrender within four weeks.

Trade Mark Infringement – Interim Injunction – Pharmaceutical Products – Plaintiffs proprietors of registered mark ‘NOVARTIS’ since 1996 – Defendants using ‘NOVIETS’ for identical pharmaceutical and veterinary goods – Marks held visually, phonetically and structurally deceptively similar – Replacement of letters ‘AR’ with ‘IE’ and omission of ‘I’ insufficient to distinguish – Triple identity established as marks, goods and trade channels identical – Prima facie dishonest adoption inferred – Interim injunction granted restraining use as trade mark and trade name [Paras 14-16, 29-31].

Territorial Jurisdiction – Online Presence – IndiaMart Listing – Defendants contended business confined to Bihar and website merely passive – Plaintiffs pleaded accessibility in Delhi and ‘Contact Us’ page showing place of business as Delhi – At demurrer stage averments in plaint to be presumed true – Functionality and interactivity of website mixed question of law and fact to be examined at trial – Prima facie jurisdiction made out – Objection rejected at interim stage [Paras 5-11].

Deceptive Similarity – Pharmaceutical Sector – Stricter Test – Average consumer with imperfect recollection test applied – In medicinal products lesser degree of proof of confusion sufficient in public interest – High likelihood of confusion and injurious association – Initial interest confusion doctrine applicable – Even transient diversion of consumer attention actionable under Section 29 of the Act [Paras 19-22].

Trade Name Use – Defence – Defendants’ plea that ‘NOVIETS’ used only as trade name and not product brand rejected – Use as trade name in identical line of business amounts to infringement and passing off – Injunction must ordinarily follow in cases of infringement and passing off [Paras 15-16].

Generic/Common to Trade – Prefix ‘NOV’ – Defendants contended prefix common to trade and derived from ‘Nova’ – Having sought registration of impugned mark, defendants cannot approbate and reprobate – Plaintiffs’ mark ‘NOVARTIS’ held distinctive and exclusively associated with plaintiffs in pharmaceutical field – Defence rejected [Paras 24-25].

Dominant Feature Test – Prefix ‘NOV’ common dominant element – Overall impression of competing marks deceptively similar – Prima facie case of infringement established [Paras 26-27].

Passing Off – Goodwill and Reputation – Plaintiffs demonstrated substantial sales and longstanding presence in India – Likelihood of confusion and damage to reputation established – Balance of convenience in favour of plaintiffs – Irreparable injury likely if injunction not granted [Paras 17-20, 28-30].

Decision: Application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC allowed – Defendants restrained from using ‘NOVIETS’ and impugned device mark as trade mark or trade name in relation to pharmaceutical and veterinary products – Application disposed of.

Education Law – Fee Regulation – Removal of Difficulties Order – Interim Stay – Petitioners challenged Notification dated 01.02.2026 advancing timelines for constitution of SLFRC and approval of fee for block commencing 2026-27 – Held: Prima facie timelines unworkable and entire statutory process, including reference to District Fee Appellate Committee, cannot be concluded before 01.04.2026 – Operation of Clause 3(1) and 3(2) of Notification kept in abeyance pending final hearing [Paras 16–22, 28].

Section 3 of 2025 Act – Prohibition on collection of excess fee – Scope – Held: Section 3 does not impose blanket prohibition on collection of fee – Schools entitled to collect fee of previous academic year during pendency of reference before District Fee Appellate Committee under Section 5(7) – Hence, no immediate statutory vacuum necessitating accelerated timelines [Paras 19–22].

Removal of Difficulties Clause – Section 21 of 2025 Act – Limited Scope – Though detailed examination deferred to final hearing – Court observed prima facie that no “difficulty” requiring urgent removal under Section 3 was demonstrated, particularly when Act itself permits collection of previous year’s fee pending approval [Paras 22–23].

SLFRC – Requirement of Unanimous Approval – Challenge Pending – Petitioners contended that requirement of unanimous agreement under Section 5(4) is unconstitutional and unworkable – Court noted that if unanimity not achieved, matter must be referred to District Fee Appellate Committee – Notification did not provide revised timelines for such reference – Process unlikely to conclude before commencement of academic year [Paras 17–20].

Balance of Convenience – Irreparable Injury – Held: No irreparable loss to students if Notification stayed, as any excess fee charged would be subject to refund/adjustment in accordance with final outcome – Practical difficulties including ongoing examinations and non-availability of audited financial statements for FY 2025-26 weigh in favour of interim protection to Petitioners [Paras 24, 27].

Academic Year – Previous Year Concept – Court rejected contention that Notification sought to fix fee in same academic year – Held: Since Academic Year 2026-27 begins on 01.04.2026, fixation prior thereto would relate to previous academic year 2025-26 [Para 25].

Participation of Parents in SLFRC – Argument that newly admitted parents would be excluded – Rejected – Act contemplates fixation of fee for block of three academic years and parents admitted in second and third years would, in any case, not participate in constitution of SLFRC [Para 26].

Decision: Operation and implementation of Clause 3(1) and 3(2) of Delhi School Education (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2026 kept in abeyance during pendency of writ petitions – Petitioners permitted to collect same fee for Academic Year 2026-27 as collected in previous academic year, subject to final outcome of petitions and adjustment/refund mechanism – Applications disposed of – Final hearing fixed from 12.03.2026.