Service Law – EPF – Pension on Higher Wages – Employee's Right vs. Employer's Default – Beneficial Legislation – Multiple writ petitions raising a common question whether eligible employees can be denied pension on higher wages solely because the employer fails to produce requisite documents such as Form 6A and challans – EPFO rejected applications on grounds of non-production of employer records – Held: Employee cannot be made to suffer for defaults of the employer or deficiencies in record maintenance by the authority; where the employee has produced Form 3A, EPF account statements, employer-certified joint option form, and furnished an undertaking for differential contribution, the authority must examine the claim on its substance and cannot reject solely for non-production of one category of document – The scheme being beneficial legislation, compliance with conditions must be assessed in a realistic and not mechanical manner [Paras 18–27].

Employer's Obligation – Statutory Records – Duty to Examine Own Records – Documents such as Form 6A, challans, and contribution filings are within the employer's exclusive custody and control; the employee has no role in their preparation or submission – The EPFO, when the employer claims records were already submitted, is under a duty to examine its own internal records including electronic data, member ledgers, passbook entries, and contribution history before rejecting the claim – The authority must call upon the employer, and if the employer fails to cooperate, must independently verify from all available material and seek corroboration from salary slips, wage records, bank statements, and prior employer communications [Paras 19, 23–25].

Pre-2010 Period – Non-Digitised Records – Workable Approach Required – Particular difficulty arises for periods prior to 2010 when records were maintained manually and electronic filing was not in full operation; in such cases EPFO cannot insist on a perfect set of documents in a particular format – The test is satisfaction based on available material as to whether employment is established, contributions on higher wages were made, and the joint option was exercised in substance – Rejection should be the last resort, only after all avenues of verification are exhausted and a reasoned speaking order is passed [Paras 18, 21, 25–27].

Decision: All writ petitions allowed – Impugned orders dated 8 April 2025, 9 April 2025, and 4 December 2025 quashed and set aside – Matters remanded to EPFO for fresh consideration in accordance with observations in the judgment – EPFO directed not to reject claims solely for non-production of Form 6A or challans for the pre-2010 period; to examine Form 3A, EPF account statements, contribution history, and corroborative material; to independently verify its own records; and if contributions on higher wages and valid joint option are found, to process claims subject to payment of differential contribution with interest – Reconsideration to be completed within twelve weeks – Reasoned speaking order to be passed – No order as to costs.

Sexual Harassment — Section 354-A IPC — Quashing of FIR — Use of Abusive Language in Workplace Email — FIR registered against petitioner (Director of a company) for allegedly using the expression 'f*** off' in an email exchange with the complainant (Business Manager) during a dispute over medical leave — FIR lodged after more than four months of the incident, subsequent to issuance of legal notice for breach of contract — Held: The expression, even taken at face value, does not carry any sexual overtone or insinuation directed at the modesty or sexuality of the complainant — A solitary instance of an abusive remark, lacking sexual intent or pattern of conduct, does not meet the threshold of criminal culpability under Section 354-A IPC — FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed subject to deposit of Rs. 20,000/- in Poor Patient Welfare Fund, PGIMER, Chandigarh [Paras 14–17].

Ingredients of Section 354-A IPC — Sexually Coloured Remarks — Scope and Construction — Section 354-A IPC contemplates acts intrinsically sexual in nature, including unwelcome physical contact, demand for sexual favours, showing pornography, or making sexually coloured remarks — A remark made in the context of a work-related dispute over leave, without any sexual intent, does not fall within the ambit of the provision — Context of communication prima facie being a workplace disagreement, the expression falls short of constituting gender-based harassment under the penal provision [Paras 12–15].

Exercise of Inherent Jurisdiction — Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Parameters — At the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to assess probative value of evidence or conduct detailed examination of disputed facts — The sole consideration is whether the allegations in the FIR, read as a whole, disclose the essential ingredients of the offence alleged — Where uncontroverted allegations and material collected fail to disclose basic ingredients of the offence, continuation of criminal proceedings amounts to abuse of process of law — Four-step test in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani applied — Categories in Bhajan Lal referred to [Paras 9–11, 16].

Mala Fide Prosecution — Delay in Filing FIR — Relevance of — FIR lodged in February 2019 in respect of an incident occurring in October 2018, after the complainant was served with a legal notice for breach of contract — Complainant had also raised monetary demands in reply to legal notice — Circumstances indicate FIR was lodged to pressurize petitioner — Relevant factor in assessing whether criminal proceedings amount to abuse of process [Para 14].

Decision: Petition allowed — FIR No. 35 dated 10.3.2019 under Section 354-A IPC, registered at Police Station Women, Gurgaon, District Gurugram, and all subsequent proceedings including challan/final report, quashed qua the petitioner — Subject to deposit of Rs. 20,000/- in Poor Patient Welfare Fund, PGIMER, Chandigarh within one month.

Civil Procedure – Local Commissioner – Appointment under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC – Scope and Limitations – Petitioner filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with or raising construction over Khasra No. 722, on which a Kuhl (water channel) exists between the lands of the parties – Trial Court dismissed the application for appointment of a Local Commissioner on the ground that it cannot be used to collect or create evidence for a party – Held: Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC is not a panacea to be invoked by litigants who are unable to prove their case; the satisfaction for ordering a local investigation must be that of the Court, not of the parties – Petition dismissed [Paras 21–29].

Burden of Proof – Encroachment – Plaintiff Must Stand on Own Legs – It is a basic principle of law that he who alleges must prove – The plaintiff alleged encroachment over Khasra No. 722 by the defendants but failed to lead any independent or reliable evidence to substantiate the same – No steps were shown to have been taken before revenue authorities for demarcation prior to filing the application – The Court cannot lend a helping hand to a party to prove its own case through the mechanism of a Local Commissioner [Paras 20, 25, 29].

State Land – Necessary Party – Plaintiff's Locus – DW 2, the Revenue Officer, stated in cross-examination that Khasra No. 722 is owned by the State of H.P. – In the absence of the State as a party, no relief on the application could be granted to the petitioner – Even if encroachment were assumed, the affected party would be the State and not the plaintiff, who has failed to establish any right over the said Khasra [Para 19].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Impugned order of the trial Court dated 23.06.2025 dismissing the application under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC upheld – No jurisdictional error found – Pending applications, if any, also disposed of.

Service Law — Pay Parity — University Teacher vs. School Teacher — Central University — Visva-Bharati Act, 1951 — Respondent appointed as Assistant Lecturer (redesignated Assistant Professor) in Siksha Satra, a school unit of Visva-Bharati, on 15.06.1989 — Granted pay and benefits at par with University Assistant Professors through successive Pay Commission revisions up to 5th CPC — Upon implementation of 6th CPC w.e.f. 01.01.2006, University denied Academic Grade Pay of Rs.6000/- and Ph.D. increments, seeking to bring respondent under KVS school teacher pay structure pursuant to MHRD memo dated 31.12.2008 and UGC direction under threat of lapse of grant — Held: Differentiation of pay scales for posts having no difference in degree of responsibility is not a valid classification — The distinction between Assistant Professors of school units and University departments is not founded on legitimate basis in the University's own conceptual framework — Denial of Academic Grade Pay arbitrarily altered respondent's vested and accrued teaching status — Single Judge direction to maintain pay as prior to KVS scales upheld [Paras 13–14].

Vested Service Conditions — Contract of Service — Status — Alteration to Disadvantage — Roshan Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 applied — A contract of service pertains not only to contract but also to status; conditions of service followed since appointment cannot be altered to the incumbent's disadvantage arbitrarily — University's compelled alteration of status on threat of lapse of UGC grant and without any allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation against the respondent, does not justify denial of benefits — Discretion exercised in favour of respondent by single Judge affirmed — No patent error of law warranting appellate interference [Para 14].

Definition of 'Adhyapaka' — Section 3(c) Visva-Bharati Act, 1951 — The definition includes professor, reader, lecturer and any other person imparting instruction in any learning process — No artificial distinction can be drawn between Assistant Professors in school units and Assistant Professors of the University — The two classes cannot be segregated within the University's own statutory framework [Para 11].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — No order as to costs — Judgment of the single Judge affirmed.

Land Acquisition – National Highways Act, 1956 – Section 3A Notification – Brief Description – Plan Not Attached – Compliance – Petitioners challenged Notifications dated 30.11.2009, 27.07.2010 and 20.01.2012 issued under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 for acquisition of land in Martur village, Prakasam District, for six-laning of NH-5, on the ground that no plan was attached to the notifications published in newspapers and description of land was absent – Held: Section 3A(2) requires only a "brief description" of the land and not names of land owners or detailed plans – Notifications contained brief description of land and specifically stated that land plans and other details were available for inspection at the office of the Competent Authority – This constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3A(2) – Notifications upheld [Paras 9, 15, 16, 19].

Objections – Section 3C(1) – Scope – Non-Filing of Objections – Right to Object Not Defeated – Section 3C(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 confers a limited right to object, confined only to the utility of the land for the notified purpose, unlike the wider enquiry under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Petitioners admittedly did not file objections within the stipulated period of 21 days – In a project involving large-scale acquisition where the majority of landowners accepted the proceedings, objections of a minority cannot stall the entire scheme – Contention of procedural non-compliance rejected [Paras 20, 25].

Post-Award Notices – Sections 3E(1) and 3H(2) – No Description Required – Notices issued under Section 3E(1) for delivery of possession and under Section 3H(2) intimating compensation details are issued after the Award is passed and are not required to contain description of the land – Contention that such notices are defective for absence of land description is untenable [Para 22].

Scope of Judicial Review – National Highway Projects – Courts are not equipped to assess viability or feasibility of highway projects or the choice of alignment – Scope of judicial review is very limited in such matters – Acquisition can be invalidated only if it is ex facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted by mala fides – Neither violation of the Act nor malice is established in the present case [Para 24].

Market Value – Section 3G(7) – Date of Reckoning – Income Tax Deduction – Competent Authority fixed market value based on sales statistics for three years preceding the Section 3A(1) Notification date, with 9% annual increase for time lag – Petitioners contended that market value prevailing as on 30.11.2009 (date of Notification) was not correctly adopted and that deduction of Income Tax at source from compensation was contrary to law and adverse judgments of the Supreme Court – Court finds ambiguity as to whether market value as on the date of Section 3A(1) Notification was correctly applied – Issues of market value and income tax deduction require reconsideration by the Competent Authority – Petitioners given liberty to submit representations within eight weeks – Competent Authority to decide within eight weeks thereafter [Paras 26, 27].

Decision: Writ Petitions dismissed – No order as to costs – Petitioners granted liberty to submit representations to the Competent Authority on market value fixation and income tax deduction within eight weeks – Competent Authority directed to consider and decide the same in accordance with law within eight weeks of receipt – Miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed [Paras 27, 28].

Matrimonial Law – Interim Maintenance – Section 125 CrPC – Writ under Article 227 – Petition Dismissed – Husband challenged the Family Court's order awarding Rs. 20,000/- per month as interim maintenance to the wife, contending that the wife was independently employed earning over Rs. 40,000/- per month and that he himself was unemployed following retrenchment – Held: An able-bodied husband with documented professional qualifications and substantial prior income cannot evade maintenance obligation by citing unemployment – Family Court's order upheld as just and reasonable – Writ Petition dismissed – Arrears directed to be cleared within three months [Paras 16–21].

Capacity to Pay – Presumption Against Unemployed Husband – TDS Records as Evidence of Earning Capacity – Petitioner-husband, a qualified software engineer, claimed unemployment since 08.09.2023 following organizational restructuring – However, TDS statements for 2022–2024 disclosed total taxable income of Rs. 45,50,288/- and Rs. 66,29,532/- respectively – Petitioner also owned a 3BHK house in Yelahanka and two properties in the United Kingdom – Held: Past lucrative income and professional qualifications establish continued capacity to fulfill matrimonial obligations – Mere plea of unemployment is insufficient to negate liability [Paras 6, 13–14, 17].

Wife's Employment – Not an Absolute Bar to Maintenance – Status Gap – Respondent-wife, an M.Sc. holder employed as Administrative Support (SQA) at Elanco, Bangalore, earning Rs. 40,000/- per month – Held: Gainful employment of wife does not automatically disentitle her to maintenance – Court must assess whether wife's income suffices to maintain a lifestyle commensurate with that enjoyed during marriage – Given the husband's documented high income during marriage, wife's salary did not bridge the status gap [Paras 7, 18].

Quantum of Maintenance – Conservative and Supportive – Wife initially sought Rs. 70,000/- per month – Family Court judiciously reduced the amount to Rs. 20,000/- – High Court found this to be a conservative figure aimed at preventing destitution relative to the husband's status – No jurisdictional error or patent illegality found warranting supervisory interference under Article 227 [Paras 19–20].

Decision: Writ Petition dismissed – Impugned order dated 04.08.2025 of the IV Addl. Principal Family Judge, Bengaluru, in Crl.Misc.No. 685/2022 upheld – Petitioner directed to clear all arrears of interim maintenance within three months from the date of this order.

Family Law — Special Marriage Act, 1954 — Divorce Petition — Registration of Marriage — Not a Mandatory Precondition — Parties belonging to "Meda" Scheduled Tribe married according to community and customary rites on 30.04.2006 — Marriage not solemnized or registered under the Special Marriage Act — Husband's earlier divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act was rejected for want of jurisdiction under Section 2(2) of that Act, as members of Scheduled Tribes are excluded from its operation — Husband thereafter filed petition under Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act seeking dissolution of marriage on grounds of desertion and cruelty — Wife filed I.A. seeking rejection of the petition on the ground that the marriage was not registered under the Act — Family Court rejected the I.A. — Held: Section 15 of the Special Marriage Act only prescribes conditions for registration of marriage and does not declare registration compulsory or make it a precondition for maintaining a divorce petition under Section 27 — Section 27 does not contemplate registration of marriage as a requirement for filing a petition for divorce — Family Court's order upheld — Writ petition dismissed [Paras 12–16].

Section 15, Special Marriage Act — Registration — Directory, Not Mandatory — Section 15 enables registration of a marriage celebrated in any form, subject to fulfillment of prescribed conditions, but contains no declaration that registration is compulsory — Section 18 confers certain benefits where a marriage is registered, but absence of registration does not bar the parties from availing remedies under the Act — There is no specific provision in the Special Marriage Act which contemplates that a petition for divorce is not maintainable unless the marriage is registered under the Act [Paras 12–14].

Scheduled Tribe — Exclusion from Hindu Marriage Act — Remedy under Special Marriage Act — Section 2(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act excludes members of Scheduled Tribes from its operation unless the Central Government otherwise directs — Where parties belonging to a Scheduled Tribe are excluded from the Hindu Marriage Act and their divorce petition under that Act is rejected for want of jurisdiction, the remedy available to them for dissolution of marriage lies under the Special Marriage Act — To hold otherwise would leave such parties remediless [Paras 3–4, 9].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — Order dated 26.06.2025 of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Kanakapura, in M.C. No. 18/2024, rejecting I.A. No. I filed by the respondent-wife under Section 15 of the Special Marriage Act, upheld.

NDPS Act – Recovery of Poppy Straw – Acquittal – Prosecution story based on secret information received by Investigating Officer PW-17 at Bhugrani Chowk, followed by search of the house of appellant Angrejo Devi, yielding 16 bags of alleged contraband in the presence of both appellants – Trial Court convicted both appellants under Section 15 of the NDPS Act and sentenced them to 10 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- – Earlier acquittal by Division Bench set aside by Supreme Court and matter remanded for fresh consideration in light of State of H.P. v. Nirmal Kaur @ Nimmo, 2022 SCC Online SC 1462 – Held on remand: Despite application of the correct legal standard, prosecution case fails on account of material contradictions and hostile independent witnesses; appellants acquitted [Paras 1–5, 37–38].

Independent Witnesses Turning Hostile – Corroboration of Parallel Story – Both independent witnesses PW-1 Harpal Singh and PW-2 Gulsher denied the prosecution case in its entirety, stating that the police transported material in a vehicle to the flour mill, weighed it there, took them to the police station and thereafter brought them back to the village, where bags were placed in the room and flour mill for the purpose of photography – This parallel story corroborated by prosecution witness PW-16 Gulsher Ahmed (photographer) and PW-9 Ram Swaroop – Though conviction on police testimony alone is permissible, where independent witnesses put forth a credible parallel version corroborated by other prosecution witnesses, the prosecution case becomes doubtful on material particulars [Paras 13–15, 31, 35].

Contradictions in Police Testimony – Mode of Receiving Secret Information – PW-17 stated secret information was received from an informer who approached him at Bhugrani Chowk in person; PW-3 stated information was received on PW-17's personal mobile phone while standing at road diversion; PW-4 stated it was received on mobile while vehicle was moving; PW-5 stated all alighted from vehicle and SHO received information on mobile – These accounts are irreconcilable and go to the genesis of the prosecution story – Further contradiction as to whether authorization letter was handed over loose or in an envelope between PW-5, PW-11 and PW-17 [Paras 16–23].

Integrity of Seized Samples – Chain of Custody Not Established – Samples (Ex. P-1 to P-32) and bags (Ex. P-33 to P-48) were never physically opened or their seals checked during examination of prosecution witnesses at trial – No record by Trial Court of the seals affixed at the time of recovery or by the chemical laboratory – In absence of physical verification, the link connecting the exhibits with the appellants is missing; chemical examiner's report therefore of no assistance to the prosecution [Paras 24, 36].

Consent Memos – Fabrication Doubted – Consent memos obtained from uneducated appellants recorded consent in first person singular, inconsistent with the appellants' stated illiteracy – In Dula Ram's consent memo, the pronoun used was 'she' instead of 'he' – Signatures of Angrejo Devi appear below those of independent witnesses rather than below her consent, suggesting documents were not prepared contemporaneously – PW-17's signatures appear to have been inserted later in Ex. PW-1/B and were absent altogether in Ex. PW-1/C [Paras 25–27].

Decision: Both appeals allowed – Judgment of Special Judge-II, Sirmaur convicting and sentencing appellants under Section 15 of the NDPS Act set aside – Appellants acquitted – Bail bonds, if any, discharged [Para 38].

Criminal Law – Arrest – Grounds of Arrest – Mandatory Supply in Writing Two Hours Prior to Remand – Sections 109(1), 190, 191(3) BNS – Petitioners arrested on 03.02.2026 in connection with firing inside court premises – First arrest declared illegal for non-supply of written grounds before remand – Grounds supplied during hearing of first remand application at 03:20-03:35 p.m. – Re-arrest effected at 06:20 p.m. – Second remand application filed at 08:00 p.m. – Held: Grounds of arrest were supplied more than two hours before the second remand application; compliance of law as laid down in Mihir Rajesh Shah duly made out – No requirement to re-supply grounds of arrest prior to each arrest in the same FIR [Paras 13-14].

Criminal Law – Re-Arrest – Permissibility After Declaration of Initial Arrest as Non-Est – No statutory bar under CrPC or BNSS on re-arrest after curing procedural defects of a prior illegal arrest – Held: A procedural lapse by the investigating agency cannot and should not confer blanket immunity on an accused from future arrest, particularly where grave offences and serial offenders are involved – State is entitled to re-arrest after rectifying procedural irregularities; such re-arrest is permissible in law provided procedural safeguards are duly followed [Paras 32-42].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Re-arrest of petitioners held legal and procedurally compliant – Grounds of arrest duly supplied more than two hours before second remand application.