Matrimonial Law – Interim Maintenance – Section 125 CrPC – Writ under Article 227 – Petition Dismissed – Husband challenged the Family Court's order awarding Rs. 20,000/- per month as interim maintenance to the wife, contending that the wife was independently employed earning over Rs. 40,000/- per month and that he himself was unemployed following retrenchment – Held: An able-bodied husband with documented professional qualifications and substantial prior income cannot evade maintenance obligation by citing unemployment – Family Court's order upheld as just and reasonable – Writ Petition dismissed – Arrears directed to be cleared within three months [Paras 16–21].

Capacity to Pay – Presumption Against Unemployed Husband – TDS Records as Evidence of Earning Capacity – Petitioner-husband, a qualified software engineer, claimed unemployment since 08.09.2023 following organizational restructuring – However, TDS statements for 2022–2024 disclosed total taxable income of Rs. 45,50,288/- and Rs. 66,29,532/- respectively – Petitioner also owned a 3BHK house in Yelahanka and two properties in the United Kingdom – Held: Past lucrative income and professional qualifications establish continued capacity to fulfill matrimonial obligations – Mere plea of unemployment is insufficient to negate liability [Paras 6, 13–14, 17].

Wife's Employment – Not an Absolute Bar to Maintenance – Status Gap – Respondent-wife, an M.Sc. holder employed as Administrative Support (SQA) at Elanco, Bangalore, earning Rs. 40,000/- per month – Held: Gainful employment of wife does not automatically disentitle her to maintenance – Court must assess whether wife's income suffices to maintain a lifestyle commensurate with that enjoyed during marriage – Given the husband's documented high income during marriage, wife's salary did not bridge the status gap [Paras 7, 18].

Quantum of Maintenance – Conservative and Supportive – Wife initially sought Rs. 70,000/- per month – Family Court judiciously reduced the amount to Rs. 20,000/- – High Court found this to be a conservative figure aimed at preventing destitution relative to the husband's status – No jurisdictional error or patent illegality found warranting supervisory interference under Article 227 [Paras 19–20].

Decision: Writ Petition dismissed – Impugned order dated 04.08.2025 of the IV Addl. Principal Family Judge, Bengaluru, in Crl.Misc.No. 685/2022 upheld – Petitioner directed to clear all arrears of interim maintenance within three months from the date of this order.

Trademark – Passing Off – Standard of Proof – Distributor Relationship – Appellant, an Italian manufacturer of brass plumbing products, alleged that its erstwhile Indian distributor (respondent) had sold counterfeit or non-genuine goods under its registered trademarks "RB" and "Rubinetterie Bresciane" – Single Judge dismissed the passing off suit on the ground that no material object representing counterfeit products was produced and documentary evidence was inconclusive – Division Bench holds that in a passing off action, the standard is preponderance of probabilities and likelihood of misrepresentation, not conclusive proof of counterfeiting – Suit in C.S. No. 405 of 2014 partly decreed and injunction granted [Paras 49, 57–59, 64–66].

Passing Off – Cumulative Circumstantial Evidence – Respondent admitted appellant's prior adoption and proprietary rights in the trademarks – Respondent internally generated quality certification documents using earlier certificates issued by appellant without authorisation – Respondent sourced similar products from undisclosed third-party manufacturers including those in China while declining to disclose details on grounds of "business secrecy" – Invoices (Ex. P-15) showed supply of Pressure Reducing Valves of 65 mm size, a specification never manufactured or supplied by appellant – Respondent had applied for registration of trademark "RB" in its own name before Trade Marks Registry and claimed prior use, subsequently withdrawing the application – Held: Cumulatively, these circumstances reasonably establish likelihood of misrepresentation and confusion as to origin of goods in the course of trade [Paras 50–54, 58–59].

Documentary Evidence – Appreciation – Typographical Error – Ex. P-9 – Single Judge treated a clerical year-error in an email issued by Apco Trading Company as a material inconsistency undermining appellant's case – Division Bench holds that where documentary and oral evidence (P.W.1, Questions 75–77) clearly explains the discrepancy as a typographical error and the invoice number remains identical, such an error cannot be treated as a substantive inconsistency – Findings of Single Judge on this point unsustainable [Para 55].

Documentary Evidence – Expert Report – Ex. P-10 – Rejection Unjustified – Single Judge discarded third-party laboratory report (Ex. P-10) on the ground that official translation was not filed and the author was not examined – Division Bench holds that absence of certified translation is a curable procedural defect and cannot alone be the basis for wholesale rejection of the report, particularly when no serious objection was raised at the relevant time [Para 56].

Defamation – Commercial Communications – Termination of Distributorship – Appellant issued communications to customers after terminating the distributorship, informing them about the termination and advising purchase only from authorised sources – Single Judge held that since counterfeiting was not proved, the communications were ipso facto defamatory and awarded damages of Rs. 10,00,000/- – Division Bench holds that this approach is legally unsustainable – Defamation requires independent consideration of whether the statements were false, made without lawful justification, and actually caused harm – Communications issued in good faith for protection of legitimate commercial interests based on reasonable apprehension do not ordinarily constitute actionable defamation – Respondent produced no convincing material demonstrating actual loss of reputation or business resulting from the communications – Decree for damages in C.S. No. 891 of 2015 set aside [Paras 60–62, 64].

Damages – Passing Off – Claim Rejected – Appellant also failed to produce clear or reliable evidence of actual or quantifiable loss arising from respondent's conduct – Claim for damages by appellant accordingly rejected – However, absence of proved damages does not defeat entitlement to injunctive relief in a passing off case, as an injunction is primarily intended to prevent continued misrepresentation and protect goodwill associated with the mark [Para 63].

Decision: O.S.A. No. 241 of 2020 partly allowed – O.S.A. No. 255 of 2020 allowed – Common judgment dated 29.11.2019 set aside – C.S. No. 405 of 2014 partly decreed; permanent injunction granted restraining respondent, its agents and persons claiming through it from using appellant's trademark or any identical or deceptively similar mark in a manner likely to represent goods as those of the appellant – Claim for damages by appellant rejected – Decree for damages granted in C.S. No. 891 of 2015 set aside – Appellant permitted to withdraw deposited amounts with accrued interest – No order as to costs – Connected miscellaneous petitions closed [Paras 64–68].

Service Law — Pay Parity — University Teacher vs. School Teacher — Central University — Visva-Bharati Act, 1951 — Respondent appointed as Assistant Lecturer (redesignated Assistant Professor) in Siksha Satra, a school unit of Visva-Bharati, on 15.06.1989 — Granted pay and benefits at par with University Assistant Professors through successive Pay Commission revisions up to 5th CPC — Upon implementation of 6th CPC w.e.f. 01.01.2006, University denied Academic Grade Pay of Rs.6000/- and Ph.D. increments, seeking to bring respondent under KVS school teacher pay structure pursuant to MHRD memo dated 31.12.2008 and UGC direction under threat of lapse of grant — Held: Differentiation of pay scales for posts having no difference in degree of responsibility is not a valid classification — The distinction between Assistant Professors of school units and University departments is not founded on legitimate basis in the University's own conceptual framework — Denial of Academic Grade Pay arbitrarily altered respondent's vested and accrued teaching status — Single Judge direction to maintain pay as prior to KVS scales upheld [Paras 13–14].

Vested Service Conditions — Contract of Service — Status — Alteration to Disadvantage — Roshan Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 applied — A contract of service pertains not only to contract but also to status; conditions of service followed since appointment cannot be altered to the incumbent's disadvantage arbitrarily — University's compelled alteration of status on threat of lapse of UGC grant and without any allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation against the respondent, does not justify denial of benefits — Discretion exercised in favour of respondent by single Judge affirmed — No patent error of law warranting appellate interference [Para 14].

Definition of 'Adhyapaka' — Section 3(c) Visva-Bharati Act, 1951 — The definition includes professor, reader, lecturer and any other person imparting instruction in any learning process — No artificial distinction can be drawn between Assistant Professors in school units and Assistant Professors of the University — The two classes cannot be segregated within the University's own statutory framework [Para 11].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — No order as to costs — Judgment of the single Judge affirmed.

GST – Consolidated Show-Cause Notice – Multiple Financial Years – Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 – Reference to Larger Bench – Petitioners challenged single consolidated show-cause notices issued under Sections 73/74 of the CGST Act clubbing multiple financial years as being without jurisdiction — Contention based on co-ordinate Bench decision in Milroc Good Earth Developers v. Union of India holding no provision exists in CGST Act to club various tax periods — Revenue contended that the Delhi High Court in Mathur Polymers v. UOI & Ors. and Ambika Traders v. Commr. upheld consolidated notices, and the Supreme Court dismissed SLPs against both decisions, with the dismissal in Mathur Polymers being by a speaking order — Held: Significant legal issues not expressly considered in Milroc deserve consideration by a Larger Bench — Matter referred accordingly [Paras 9–31].

Consolidated Show-Cause Notice – Sections 73(1) and 73(3)/74(1) and 74(3) – Plain Reading – Held: Prima facie, on a plain reading of Sections 73 and 74 read conjointly, sub-section (3) specifically uses the words "for any period under sub-section (1)" and "such periods other than those covered under sub-section (1)", indicating legislative awareness and permission for notices covering different periods — To restrict sub-section (1) to a single financial year would amount to reading something into the provision which the legislature deliberately avoided — Sub-section (10) prescribes limitation only for passing of orders under sub-section (9) and does not in any manner restrict or create an embargo on issuance of a show-cause notice under sub-section (1) — A limitation to pass an order cannot be construed as a limitation on issuance of a show-cause notice — The two are independent statutory concepts [Paras 17–28].

Cleavage of Opinion – High Courts – Milroc vs. Mathur Polymers – Co-ordinate benches of the Bombay High Court at Goa and Nagpur as well as the High Courts of Kerala, Madras and Karnataka held consolidated notices impermissible — Delhi High Court and Allahabad High Court held such notices permissible — Supreme Court dismissed SLP against Mathur Polymers by speaking order — Held: Decision of Supreme Court dismissing SLP by speaking order constitutes a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution binding as per Kunhayammed and Ors. — Milroc may not lay down the correct position in law as it relied on Madras High Court decisions which in turn misapplied the Supreme Court judgment in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Caltex India, which dealt with validity of parts of a combined assessment order and not prohibition on consolidated notices [Paras 4, 24–26].

GST Policy Wing Clarification – Dated 16.09.2025 – Noticees' Rights Preserved – Clarification issued by the GST Policy Wing categorically states that consolidation of proceedings does not extend or alter the limitation period prescribed for each individual financial year — Each year stands independently for calculation of limitation — Held: Noticees are always entitled to raise objections that demand for a particular period is time-barred and the proper officer is bound to consider such objection and confine determination to periods within limitation [Para 27–28].

Questions of Law Referred to Larger Bench: (1) Whether sub-section (10) of Sections 73/74 controls sub-section (1) so as to prohibit consolidated show-cause notices for different years; (2) Whether sub-section (10) per se prohibits issuance of a single consolidated show-cause notice for multiple financial years/tax periods; (3) What is the effect of Section 160 of the CGST Act on proceedings initiated under Sections 73/74 by consolidated show-cause notice; (4) Whether Milroc Good Earth Developers lays down the correct position in law; (5) What is the legal position brought about by the Supreme Court's speaking order in Mathur Polymers under Article 141 of the Constitution [Para 30].

Decision: Matter referred to the Larger Bench for decision on five questions of law — Registry directed to place papers before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of Larger Bench — Interim orders in all matters to continue till decision by Larger Bench.

Family Law — Special Marriage Act, 1954 — Divorce Petition — Registration of Marriage — Not a Mandatory Precondition — Parties belonging to "Meda" Scheduled Tribe married according to community and customary rites on 30.04.2006 — Marriage not solemnized or registered under the Special Marriage Act — Husband's earlier divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act was rejected for want of jurisdiction under Section 2(2) of that Act, as members of Scheduled Tribes are excluded from its operation — Husband thereafter filed petition under Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act seeking dissolution of marriage on grounds of desertion and cruelty — Wife filed I.A. seeking rejection of the petition on the ground that the marriage was not registered under the Act — Family Court rejected the I.A. — Held: Section 15 of the Special Marriage Act only prescribes conditions for registration of marriage and does not declare registration compulsory or make it a precondition for maintaining a divorce petition under Section 27 — Section 27 does not contemplate registration of marriage as a requirement for filing a petition for divorce — Family Court's order upheld — Writ petition dismissed [Paras 12–16].

Section 15, Special Marriage Act — Registration — Directory, Not Mandatory — Section 15 enables registration of a marriage celebrated in any form, subject to fulfillment of prescribed conditions, but contains no declaration that registration is compulsory — Section 18 confers certain benefits where a marriage is registered, but absence of registration does not bar the parties from availing remedies under the Act — There is no specific provision in the Special Marriage Act which contemplates that a petition for divorce is not maintainable unless the marriage is registered under the Act [Paras 12–14].

Scheduled Tribe — Exclusion from Hindu Marriage Act — Remedy under Special Marriage Act — Section 2(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act excludes members of Scheduled Tribes from its operation unless the Central Government otherwise directs — Where parties belonging to a Scheduled Tribe are excluded from the Hindu Marriage Act and their divorce petition under that Act is rejected for want of jurisdiction, the remedy available to them for dissolution of marriage lies under the Special Marriage Act — To hold otherwise would leave such parties remediless [Paras 3–4, 9].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — Order dated 26.06.2025 of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Kanakapura, in M.C. No. 18/2024, rejecting I.A. No. I filed by the respondent-wife under Section 15 of the Special Marriage Act, upheld.

Criminal Law – Arrest – Grounds of Arrest – Mandatory Supply in Writing Two Hours Prior to Remand – Sections 109(1), 190, 191(3) BNS – Petitioners arrested on 03.02.2026 in connection with firing inside court premises – First arrest declared illegal for non-supply of written grounds before remand – Grounds supplied during hearing of first remand application at 03:20-03:35 p.m. – Re-arrest effected at 06:20 p.m. – Second remand application filed at 08:00 p.m. – Held: Grounds of arrest were supplied more than two hours before the second remand application; compliance of law as laid down in Mihir Rajesh Shah duly made out – No requirement to re-supply grounds of arrest prior to each arrest in the same FIR [Paras 13-14].

Criminal Law – Re-Arrest – Permissibility After Declaration of Initial Arrest as Non-Est – No statutory bar under CrPC or BNSS on re-arrest after curing procedural defects of a prior illegal arrest – Held: A procedural lapse by the investigating agency cannot and should not confer blanket immunity on an accused from future arrest, particularly where grave offences and serial offenders are involved – State is entitled to re-arrest after rectifying procedural irregularities; such re-arrest is permissible in law provided procedural safeguards are duly followed [Paras 32-42].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Re-arrest of petitioners held legal and procedurally compliant – Grounds of arrest duly supplied more than two hours before second remand application.

Eviction — Public Sector Undertaking — Loss of Rent Control Protection — MRC Act — Revision Dismissed — Applicant-IOCL operated a retail fuel outlet on suit premises at Kurla, Mumbai, held on lease from 1967 — Lease expired on 12.10.1997 — Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (MRC Act), which excluded public sector undertakings and companies with paid-up capital of ₹1 crore or more, replaced Bombay Rent Act from 31.03.2000 — MRC Act also inapplicable to open lands — Tenancy terminated by notice dated 27.11.2002 under Section 106 TPA — Trial Court decreed eviction Suit; Appellate Bench confirmed — Held: IOCL lost protection from eviction and rent escalation upon coming into force of MRC Act; concurrent findings of Trial and Appellate Courts affirmed; revision dismissed [Paras 15, 42, 43, 44].

Section 213, Indian Succession Act — Probate — Suit for Eviction — Not a Suit to Establish Right Under Will — Section 213 bars a legatee or executor from establishing any right in respect of bequeathed property in a court of justice without probate — However, Section 213 has no application where the suit is not founded on the Will and the plaintiff does not seek to establish any right under the Will — A landlord suing a tenant for recovery of possession need not prove title; establishment of landlord-tenant relationship suffices — Where the plaint contains no reference to the Will and is framed on the basis of landlord-tenant relationship, Section 213 is inapplicable — Held: Suit not based on Will; objection on ground of want of probate rejected [Paras 20, 21, 22, 41].

Landlord-Tenant Relationship — Estoppel — Payment of Rent — Section 116 Evidence Act — Applicant-IOCL offered rent to Plaintiff No. 1 (Mrs. Perviz Patel) through letters spanning December 2002 to June 2024 — IOCL itself acknowledged ownership of Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 in a Suit filed by it bearing No. 487 of 2017 — Held: IOCL having admitted landlord-tenant relationship by offering rent and acknowledging ownership, is estopped from questioning title of Plaintiffs or their right to sue — Payment of rent is sufficient to establish landlord-tenant relationship [Paras 25, 26, 35].

Power of Attorney — Maintainability of Suit — Institution and Evidence — Verification of plaint by constituted attorney does not mean the suit is filed by the attorney in personal capacity — A power of attorney holder, to the extent of his personal knowledge, can depose as a witness — In the present case, the constituted attorney (Plaintiff No. 4/Papeyon) had personal knowledge of issuance of the termination notice and deposed accordingly — Plaintiff No. 4 was the power of attorney holder of the original Plaintiffs at the time of filing suit in 2003; conveyance in its favour was executed only on 29.07.2011 — Held: Suit maintainable; evidence of constituted attorney, based on personal knowledge, not liable to be discarded [Paras 36, 37, 38, 39, 40].

Termination Notice — Validity — Issuance by Power of Attorney Holder — Termination notice dated 27.11.2002 issued on behalf of three original Plaintiffs — Mere fact that the constituted attorney gave instructions for issuance does not mean notice was issued on attorney's behalf — Notice bore no indication that it was issued on behalf of the attorney — IOCL did not dispute factual receipt of the notice — Held: Termination notice validly issued on behalf of original Plaintiffs; tenancy validly terminated [Para 37].

Section 213 Indian Succession Act — Scope — Right as Legatee/Executor vs. Right in Other Capacity — Section 213 bars only establishment of right as executor or legatee and not right in any other capacity — Where a legatee files suit for recovery of possession from a tenant in capacity as landlord, and not for declaration of title under the Will, Section 213 is no bar — Distinction between right under a Will and right arising otherwise clearly established — Held: Applicant's reliance on Section 213 wholly misplaced; the provision does not operate to bar a landlord-tenant suit where Will is neither pleaded nor relied upon [Paras 21, 34, 35, 41].

Decision: Civil Revision Application dismissed — Concurrent findings of Trial Court and Appellate Bench affirmed — No costs — Stay not continued.

Service Law – Termination – Principles of Natural Justice – Temporary Employee – Petitioner serving as Shift Supervisor with HOMCO since 2012 on renewed contractual spells of 179 days – Terminated by Ext.P11 order solely on the basis of Managing Committee's decision dated 17.02.2026 without being afforded any opportunity of hearing – Held: Where termination is punitive in nature, attaches stigma and adversely affects livelihood and future employment prospects, principles of natural justice must be complied with regardless of the contractual or temporary nature of employment – Ext.P11 set aside [Paras 6-7].

Natural Justice – Punitive Action – Stigmatic Termination – Distinction between contractual termination and punitive action – Though no departmental enquiry may be mandatory in case of contractual/temporary employees, where the action amounts to punishment for alleged misconduct or negligence, even a temporary employee of long standing must be granted a reasonable opportunity to present her case and adduce evidence – Managing Committee, before taking the decision underlying Ext.P11, ought to have heard the petitioner [Paras 5-7].

Relief – Remand – Limited Period Contract – Since petitioner's contract subsists only till May 2026, Managing Committee directed to decide whether petitioner should be permitted to continue for the remaining period – If proceedings are to be continued, an unbiased hearing must be afforded and evidence of the petitioner duly considered before any decision is taken [Para 7].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – Ext.P11 order of termination set aside – Managing Committee directed to afford proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before taking any fresh decision in the matter.

Land Acquisition – Enhancement of Compensation – Market Value – Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Appeal Dismissed – Land bearing Gat No. 307 admeasuring 82,200 sq. mt. at Village Kusgaon acquired vide Section 4 Notification dated 19 December 1996 – SLAO awarded compensation at Rs. 14.5 per sq. mt. solely on the basis of Ready Reckoner rates – Reference Court enhanced compensation to Rs. 500 per sq. mt. – Respondent-Claimant accepted the enhanced compensation – On appeal, Held: SLAO's reliance solely on Ready Reckoner rates for determining compensation is legally impermissible – Ready Reckoner rates are meant for collection of stamp duty and cannot form the basis for determining compensation under the Land Acquisition Act [Paras 49–54].

Valuation – Expert Report – Registered Government Valuer – Weightage – Valuer determined market value at Rs. 950 per sq. mt. after applying 25% deduction from base rate of Rs. 1273.10 per sq. mt. – Valuation report took into account proximity to Lonavala Municipal Council limits, non-agricultural and industrial potentiality, hill-top location with resort/farmhouse potential, availability of basic amenities in vicinity, and comparable sale instances – Held: Expert valuation report is entitled to due weightage and cannot be ignored – Appellant failed to controvert the report [Paras 56–57].

Comparable Sale Instances – Deductions Towards Development Charges – Six sale instances at Exhibit 13 considered – Closest exemplar being first sale instance dated 7 September 1995 for land at village Bhangarwadi at Rs. 787 per sq. mt. – Reference Court applied further deductions beyond the 25% already deducted by the Valuer to arrive at Rs. 500 per sq. mt. – Held: Deduction of approximately 35% from first sale instance and approximately 45% from Valuer's figure reflects a holistic and reasoned determination – Large area of land not fetching the same rate as small plots is not an absolute proposition [Paras 60–73].

Principle of Guesstimation – Compensation Determination – Held: Determination of compensation for acquired land is not an exact science – In absence of direct evidence and comparable exemplars, Court may resort to informed estimation (guesstimation) grounded in evidence and relevant factors – Exercise must be holistic, considering characteristics of land, its future potentiality, and market sentiment – Sliding scale of judicial discretion cannot be extended to mere speculation – Reference Court's findings are within permissible limits of discretion and do not warrant interference [Paras 75, 83].

Deductions – Development Charges – Upper Limit of 75% – No Straight-Jacket Formula – Held: Deductions towards development charges vary depending on facts and circumstances of each case – Upper benchmark of 75% is the maximum permissible limit and is not automatically applicable – Reference Court's determination of Rs. 500 per sq. mt. after considering negative factors under Section 24 of the Act is neither perverse nor excessive [Paras 70–72, 81].

Decision: First Appeal dismissed – Reference Court's Impugned Judgment dated 2 June 2007 confirmed – Respondent permitted to withdraw decretal amount of Rs. 3,99,06,045/- deposited with the Registry, along with accrued interest, within four weeks – No order as to costs – Judgment not to be acted upon for four weeks from date of uploading.