Criminal Law – Murder – Acquittal – Section 302 IPC – Appellant convicted by the Trial Court for allegedly pouring kerosene oil on the deceased and pushing her onto a burning stove, causing 90% burns from which she died the following morning – Conviction based on two dying declarations and circumstantial evidence, as all three purported eye witnesses turned hostile – High Court finds dying declarations unreliable, mutually contradictory and not corroborated by circumstantial evidence – Held: Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; appellant entitled to benefit of doubt – Conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted [Paras 39, 54, 59].

Dying Declaration – Reliability – MLC Entry as Dying Declaration – First purported dying declaration contained in MLC (Ex.PW-13/A) recorded by PW-13/Dr. Upender Sharma described appellant as "her new lover" – Expression appears to be personal observation of the doctor and not the deceased's own words – Doctor admitted that the word "kerosene" was written on the basis of smell noticed by him and not on account of the deceased uttering it – Word "Informant" appearing misaligned in the MLC raises doubt whether the narration was given by the deceased or by her neighbour PW-2/Nirmala – Absence of deceased's signature or thumb impression further undermines its evidentiary value – Held: Document cannot be regarded as a reliable dying declaration [Paras 44, 45].

Dying Declaration – Second Declaration – Procedural Infirmities – Second dying declaration (Ex.PW-15/C) recorded by Investigating Officer PW-15/S.I. Vijay Singh contained unusually detailed particulars including precise parentage and address of appellant, rendering it inherently improbable for a person with 90% burns – No cogent evidence of deceased being in fit condition to make the statement; certificate of medical fitness not proved; SDM or doctor not involved during recording – Held: Veracity of the said statement is highly doubtful [Para 46].

Dying Declaration – Mutual Inconsistency – Three Conflicting Versions – MLC records that appellant poured oil from the stove onto the deceased while she was pouring kerosene; Ex.PW-15/C records that appellant poured kerosene from a can and pushed her towards the burning stove; Brief Facts (Ex.PW-15/DA) recorded by the same Investigating Officer states that deceased fell on the stove during a scuffle and appellant got burnt while trying to save her – Three materially inconsistent versions not only cast doubt on the manner of occurrence but also on the veracity of both dying declarations – Third alleged dying declaration before PW-4/Ran Singh not mentioned in his Section 161 statement and held to be hearsay [Paras 47, 48, 50].

Circumstantial Evidence – Incomplete Chain – Presence of Appellant at Spot Insufficient – Defence of appellant attempting to save the deceased corroborated by burn injuries on his person, Brief Facts recorded by the Investigating Officer, statements of eye witnesses who turned hostile, and defence witnesses – Motive attributed not supported by substantive evidence – Unaccounted matchbox found in sealed pullanda not reflected in seizure memo; liquor bottle not mentioned in site plan; hospital documents from Meerut not traced – Held: Circumstances do not form a complete chain consistent only with guilt of the appellant; mere suspicion cannot substitute proof [Paras 51, 52, 53].

Dying Declaration – Legal Principles Restated – Dying declaration if voluntary, truthful and made in fit state of mind can form sole basis of conviction without corroboration – Court must first satisfy itself that the declaration is reliable and truthful – Where dying declaration suffers from inconsistencies, procedural infirmities and improbabilities, Court must exercise caution – Multiple dying declarations: Court to assess which is believable – Physical and mental fitness of declarant to be established from evidence on record; medical certification aids but is not always indispensable – Recording by Judicial Magistrate adds credence but dying declarations recorded by police are not inadmissible per se – Relied upon: Irfan v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar [Paras 41, 42, 55, 56].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Dismissal in Default – Singular Default – Complaint dismissed in default by ACJM, Shimla on 08.04.2025 for non-appearance of complainant and her counsel — Appellant-complainant submitted unavoidable circumstances prevented appearance and counsel was expected to seek adjournment — Matter repeatedly called throughout the day but neither complainant nor counsel appeared — Held: Trial court ought not to have straightway dismissed complaint; a single default in appearance does not justify dismissal with its serious consequence of acquittal — Appeal allowed; complaint restored [Paras 4, 11–13].

"Section 279 BNSS — Discretion Must be Exercised Judicially" – Section 279 of BNSS (erstwhile Section 256 CrPC) confers discretion on Magistrate to either acquit accused or adjourn the matter — Magistrate may also dispense with personal attendance where complainant is represented by advocate — Dismissal and consequent acquittal under Section 279 BNSS becomes final in view of Section 403 BNSS which bars courts from altering signed judgments — Held: Power under Section 279 BNSS must be exercised judicially and fairly; court could have issued fresh notice, adjourned, or proceeded on the basis of evidence already on record [Paras 5–6, 11].

"One Default Not Enough — Complainant's Track Record Relevant" – No prior default in prosecution of complaint shown on record — Held: Where complainant has no history of default, a single absence does not justify axing the complaint; court should adjourn to do substantial justice — Ratio of Associated Cement Co. Ltd., Mohd. Azeem, S. Anand and N.K. Sharma applied [Paras 7–11].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Order dated 08.04.2025 quashed and set aside — Criminal Complaint No.1351/2023 restored to its original number — Trial court directed to proceed from the stage at which complaint was dismissed — Parties directed to appear before trial court on 06.05.2026.

Criminal Law - Personal Liberty — Illegal Arrest — De Facto Custody — 24-Hour Mandate — Section 58 BNSS / Article 22(2) — Petition Allowed — Petitioner, a partner of pharmaceutical firm M/s Digital Vision, was allegedly involved in illegal inter-state diversion of psychotropic medicines — NCB conducted search of petitioner's premises on 31.10.2025 at about 10:45 P.M., served notice under Section 67 NDPS Act, and the petitioner travelled to Chandigarh in the NCB vehicle, remaining continuously with NCB officials from about 10:45 P.M. on 31.10.2025 — Formal arrest recorded only at 9:00 P.M. on 01.11.2025 — Petitioner produced before Magistrate at 2:00 P.M. on 02.11.2025 — Held: Petitioner was in coercive NCB custody from approximately 10:45/11:00 P.M. on 31.10.2025; formal arrest memo was a mere paper transaction; total period of detention exceeded 24 hours; arrest/detention is illegal [Paras 3, 13, 14].

Arrest — Definition and Commencement — De Facto vs. De Jure Arrest — Term 'Arrest' Not Defined in Cr.P.C./BNSS — The term 'arrest' is a term of art denoting a state of apprehension, restraint or total deprivation of liberty — Whether a person is arrested does not depend on the nomenclature assigned by the investigating agency such as "detention for questioning" or "custody for inquiry" but on the factual deprivation of personal liberty to move where he pleases — The moment police surveillance and restriction on the movement of the individual commences, the clock of liberty begins — Entry in the arrest memo is merely declaratory and not conclusive proof of actual time of arrest — Held: The terminus a quo for computing 24-hour period is the moment of actual physical deprivation of liberty, not the time noted in the formal arrest memo [Paras 11, 11.1, 11.2, 12].

Section 57 Cr.P.C. / Section 58 BNSS / Article 22(2) — Constitutional Safeguard — Dual Purpose — Violation Cannot Be Cured by Remand Order — The mandate of producing an arrested person before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours serves a dual sacrosanct purpose: (i) to verify the legality of arrest, and (ii) to subject the necessity of further detention to judicial scrutiny — This constitutional command is not a surplusage of legal prose but a peremptory command — Violation thereof cannot be cured by the subsequent passing of a remand order — Held: Once violation of Articles 21 and 22 is established, the arrest itself stands vitiated and the individual deserves to be enlarged on bail [Paras 11, 11.3].

Magistrate — Duty on Production of Arrestee — Proactive Judicial Scrutiny — The duty of a Magistrate before whom an arrestee is produced is not a mere ministerial act of recording presence but a solemn judicial interrogation of the arresting authority's narrative — The Magistrate must pierce the veil of documentation and identify the actual terminus a quo of detention by examining the factual substratum of arrest, stripping away any administrative curtain the investigating agency may have drawn — The Magistrate is duty-bound to inquire into the where, when and how of the capture so that a twilight zone of illegal detention is not regularized through sanitized police records [Para 11.4].

Investigative Powers — Distinction Between Lawful Summoning and Coercive Detention — A clear distinction must be drawn between coercive subsumption of volition and genuine investigative functions such as summoning for joining investigation, production of documents or recording of statements — Where no palpable fetter exists upon the individual's ambulatory freedom and he retains unhindered access to communicate with the world and is free to depart, the 24-hour clock does not commence — However, where a person is detained overnight in the police/agency office, compelled to eat and sleep there, and restricted from leaving, such restraint constitutes an arrest in law regardless of its label — No universal exhaustive guidelines can be laid down as each case has its own unique factual conspectus [Para 11.2].

Decision: Petition allowed — Petitioner held to have been arrested/detained by NCB beyond the prescribed 24-hour period without requisite judicial order — Petitioner directed to be released from jail, if not required in any other case, upon furnishing requisite bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court/CJM/Duty Magistrate — Observations not to affect merits of the trial.

Probate — Will — Suspicious Circumstances — Petition Dismissed — Petitioner (daughter-in-law of testatrix) sought probate of Will dated 08.08.2012, purportedly executed by Late Smt. Suraksha Sud, bequeathing GK Property in equal shares to petitioner and respondent No. 2 (husband), and other properties to granddaughters — Testatrix died on 25.08.2012, a mere seventeen days after the alleged execution — Will allegedly discovered in May 2018, nearly six years after death, from a leatherette bag in the testatrix's room — Sole surviving attesting witness (PW-7) turned hostile and categorically denied ever having met the testatrix or witnessed her sign the Will — Forensic expert (DW-2) opined that testatrix's signatures were forged and deceased attesting witness's signature was traced from his passport — Held: Petitioner failed to prove due and valid execution of the Will; petition dismissed [Paras 24, 34, 35].

Will — Standard of Proof — Suspicious Circumstances — Doctrine Restated — Burden on Propounder — The standard of proof for a Will is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but proof on preponderance of probabilities satisfying the judicial conscience — The propounder must establish testamentary capacity, due execution and attestation in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, and knowledge and approval of contents — Where suspicious circumstances surround the Will, the burden on the propounder becomes heavier and the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicion by cogent, convincing and reliable evidence — Suspicious circumstances must be assessed holistically and not piecemeal; individually explicable circumstances may in totality create an overwhelming cumulative effect disentitling the propounder from probate [Paras 15–18, 22, 23].

Section 63, Indian Succession Act — Attestation — Mandatory Requirement — Hostile Attesting Witness — Section 63(c) requires that the attesting witness must have seen the testator sign the Will — Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act requires examination of at least one attesting witness as a condition precedent to grant of probate — Mere identification by the attesting witness of his own signature on the Will is insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement; what is needed is that he witnessed the testator sign in his presence — Where the sole surviving attesting witness (PW-7) categorically denied ever having met the testatrix or witnessed her sign the Will, and such denial was positive, unequivocal and unshaken, the mandatory requirements of Section 63 are not satisfied — Evidence of Notary Public (PW-4) cannot substitute for evidence of an attesting witness [Paras 16, 19, 21, 30, 31, 32].

Suspicious Circumstances — Five Categories Identified — (I) Execution in proximity to death — Will executed only four days before testatrix fell gravely ill and seventeen days before her death; no medical evidence of sound testamentary capacity on date of execution — (II) Inordinate delay and conspicuous silence — Petitioner instituted at least five proceedings including FIR for forgery of a Will, Settlement Deed, DV complaint and civil suits over six years without a single reference to the alleged Will — conduct wholly inconsistent with a genuine beneficiary — (III) Inherently improbable discovery narrative — Original Will allegedly discovered in a leatherette bag containing daily jewellery, expired passports and debit card, left undisturbed for six years in the testatrix's room in the same premises where the petitioner resided — wholly incredible — (IV) Failure of attesting witness — discussed above — (V) Forensic evidence of forgery — Expert opined signatures of testatrix were forged and deceased attesting witness's signature traced from passport [Paras 25–33].

Hostile Witness — Probate Proceedings — Partial Reliance — While testimony of a hostile witness is not to be entirely discarded, only the credible portions may be relied upon — In the context of probate, portions of hostile attesting witness's testimony that are positive, consistent and unshaken, including categorical denial of having seen the testator sign the Will, are binding on the Court and cannot be ignored in favour of mere formal identification of the witness's own signature [Para 32].

Decision: Petition dismissed — Probate of Will dated 08.08.2012 refused — No order as to costs.

Menstrual Leave Policy – Constitutional Foundations – Enforcement – Unorganized Sector – Karnataka – Petitioner, a woman hotel worker engaged in arduous manual labour, sought enforcement of the State's Menstrual Leave Policy enunciated vide Gazette Notification dated 12-11-2025 and Government Order No. LD 466 LET 2023 dated 20-11-2025, and further sought issuance of guidelines for its uniform implementation, particularly across the unorganized sector – State affirmed the policy's progressive intent but projected practical impediments in monitoring the unorganized sector – The Karnataka Menstrual Leave and Hygiene Bill, 2025, placing the policy on a legislative footing, was also tabled before the Legislature – Court placed on record the historical and global evolution of menstrual leave, the constitutional basis of the policy rooted in Articles 15(3), 21, 39(e) and 42, and the affirmative obligation of the State to translate policy into meaningful implementation – Held: State directed to strictly and faithfully implement the existing policy pending enactment of the proposed legislation; upon enactment, Rules to be framed without undue delay; in the interregnum, the State to issue suitable guidelines, circulars and administrative instructions ensuring uniform and rigorous implementation across all sectors including the unorganized sector – Article 14 cannot be invoked to resist such a policy, as acknowledging biological difference between men and women in matters of health, dignity and bodily autonomy gives substantive meaning to equality, not derogates from it [Paras 1–23].

Menstrual Leave – Constitutional Right – Article 21 – Right to Dignity – Right to Health – The Supreme Court in Jaya Thakur (Dr.) v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 133, unequivocally held that the right to dignified menstrual health forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 – Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) is inseparable from the right to live with dignity, bodily autonomy, decisional privacy and reproductive health – State bears a positive obligation not merely to refrain from discrimination but to take affirmative measures to secure MHM for menstruating persons – Denial of adequate MHM facilities compels individuals to manage their bodies in a manner dictated by circumstance rather than choice, violating their autonomy [Paras 10–12].

Menstrual Leave – Policy – Historical and Global Perspective – The Soviet Union (1922/1931), Japan (1947), Indonesia (1948/2003), South Korea (2001), Taiwan (2002), Vietnam (2015) and Zambia (2015) have variously recognized and institutionalized menstrual leave through legislation – In India, Bihar introduced paid menstrual leave for Government employees; the Menstruation Benefits Bill, 2017 did not attain legislative fruition – Supreme Court in Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1694, directed formulation of a model menstrual leave policy at the Union level, clarifying that State Governments remain free independently to act – Taking cue therefrom, Karnataka constituted a Committee, obtained Law Commission recommendations, and formulated the present policy – The Karnataka Government Order of 20-11-2025 grants one day of paid menstrual leave per month (maximum 12 days per year) to all permanent/contract/outsourced women employees aged 18–52 years in establishments registered under specified labour legislations, without requirement of a medical certificate [Paras 7–9, 17–18].

Unorganized Sector – Menstrual Leave – Need for Inclusive Implementation – The existing Government Orders, in their present form, are confined to the organized sector – Unorganized sector comprises broadly: enterprises engaging fewer than 10 workers and daily wage labourers – Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of India v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 402, recognized the importance of extending social security benefits including maternity benefit to women in the unorganized workforce – While organized sectors are amenable to regulatory intervention, the unorganized sector requires a more facilitative and sensitization-oriented mechanism to bring women workers within the ambit of the policy [Paras 19–22].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – State of Karnataka directed to strictly implement the Menstrual Leave Policy pending enactment of the Karnataka Menstrual Leave and Hygiene Bill, 2025 – Upon enactment, Rules to be framed without undue delay – In the interregnum, State to issue guidelines, circulars and administrative instructions for uniform implementation across organized and unorganized sectors.

Excise Law – Liquor Licences – E-Auction – Reservation – Forfeiture of Lapsed Licences – Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2025 – Respondents, holders of CL-9 licences (bar and restaurant), challenged the amended Rules 5 and 5-A of the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquor) Rules, 1968 – The impugned amendments introduced e-auction as the mode of grant for CL-2A and CL-9A licences with government-fixed reservation norms, and deemed CL-2, CL-9 and CL-11(C) licences unrenewed as on 03-11-2025 as lapsed and forfeited, to fall into the auction pool – Single Judge stayed the amended Rules 5 and 5-A on a prima facie finding that the reservation-based eligibility and automatic forfeiture travelled beyond the enabling provisions of the Excise Act – On appeal, held: (i) the impugned rules did not exceed rule-making power conferred under Section 71 of the Excise Act, which is wide in scope; (ii) the provision for renewal of licence being a creature of the Rules, the Rules could equally curtail the same; (iii) proviso to Rule 5-A does not effect forfeiture of licence but curtails the right of renewal, which is within the State's competence; (iv) grant of licence through e-auction is not outside the State's domain; (v) adopting the State Government's own reservation policy by reference in the Rules does not constitute impermissible sub-delegation since the delegator and delegate are the same entity; (vi) singling out certain categories of licences does not offend Article 14 as the State is entitled to vary terms and conditions across licence categories; (vii) subordinate legislation carries a presumption of constitutional validity and a strong case of invalidity must be established before its operation is stayed – Appeal allowed – Impugned stay order set aside [Paras 1–77].

Liquor Licence – Nature of Licence – Privilege of State – No Vested Right of Renewal – The manufacture, distribution and sale of intoxicants is an exclusive privilege of the State – No citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to carry on trade in liquor – A licensee has no indefeasible right of renewal beyond the term of the licence; the right to renewal is governed by the Rules as they exist at the time of renewal and not at the time of grant – Applications filed prior to the amendment of Rules do not confer vested rights to be considered under the pre-amendment Rules – The State's power to grant, refuse, curtail or modify renewal is an incident of its exclusive privilege and is within its rule-making power under Section 71 of the Excise Act [Paras 46–65].

Delegated Legislation – Sub-delegation – Reservation Norms – Principle of Delegatus Non Potest Delegare – The proviso to Rule 5 of the Rules enables the State Government to adopt its own policy as to reservation norms for e-auction licences – This does not constitute impermissible sub-delegation since the delegatee (State Government framing the Rules) and the sub-delegatee (State Government fixing reservation norms) are one and the same – Principle of sub-delegation is inapplicable where the delegator and delegatee are identical – Furthermore, the Excise Act's rule-making power under Section 71 being couched in wide terms, the State Government has ample room to determine terms and conditions of the auction including reservation – Learned Advocate General undertook that reservation norms would be specifically incorporated in the Rules to obviate objection [Paras 53–58].

Subordinate Legislation – Presumption of Constitutional Validity – Courts cannot lightly stay delegated legislation – Tests for striking down executive action do not automatically apply to delegated legislation, which requires proof of manifest arbitrariness – Courts must make every effort to uphold constitutional validity, and if two views are possible, the one favouring validity must be preferred – In the present case, the writ petitioners had not surmounted the presumption of constitutionality; the Single Judge's order disregarded these settled principles and was therefore liable to be set aside [Paras 68–74].

Division Bench Precedent – B. Govindraj Hegde – Misapplication – The impugned order relied on the earlier Division Bench decision in State of Karnataka v. B. Govindraj Hegde, WA 3374/2016, which invalidated a relaxation of minimum room-capacity requirements for reserved-category hotel licences – However, that decision expressly held that reserving a quota of licences for reserved categories would be permissible – The impugned Rules introduce e-auction with reservation of a quota and do not relax any restrictive condition imposed in the public interest – Therefore, the said precedent did not support the petitioners' case [Paras 17–19].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Ad interim stay order dated 25-11-2025 passed by the Single Judge in W.P. No. 35227/2025 set aside – Liberty reserved to parties to advance submissions on the challenge to the proviso to Rule 12 of the Rules before the Single Judge in the pending writ petition.

Environmental Law – Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act – Vicarious Liability of Directors – Summoning Order – Quashing Refused – Applicants/Directors of M/s Simplex Infrastructures Limited were impleaded in complaint filed by U.P. Pollution Control Board for operating construction activities at Panki Thermal Power Plant without obtaining consent under the Air Act — applicants contended they had ceased to be Directors w.e.f. 15.03.2014 and 20.09.2016 respectively, i.e. prior to commencement of project — Board had verified directorship through Ministry of Corporate Affairs website at time of filing complaint in 2021, which showed applicants as Directors — complaint contained specific averments that applicants were in-charge and responsible for day-to-day business — Held: Whether applicants were in-charge at relevant time is a disputed question of fact that cannot be decided in Section 482 proceedings; no illegality or infirmity in summoning order; applications rejected [Paras 5–6, 17–21].

Section 40 of Air Act – Liability of Board of Directors – Collective Responsibility – Obtaining consent under pollution control legislation is not an individual act but a collective function of the Board of Directors — entire Board is responsible for running the unit without consent; it cannot be said that one or two Directors had no knowledge of or connection with non-compliance — Directors are duty-bound to set up treatment plants and obtain consent; deliberate violation renders the entire Board vicariously liable — case of Sunita Palita (pertaining to Sections 138/141 NI Act) held inapplicable to pollution law offences [Paras 12–15, 17–20].

Section 482 CrPC – Scope – No Mini Trial – At the stage of summoning, court is only required to form a prima facie opinion that the case is fit to be committed for trial — defence of cessation of directorship or absence of day-to-day control raises disputed questions of fact that must be decided by the trial court — applicants are at liberty to seek discharge before the trial court — this Court cannot weigh evidence or conduct a mini trial in Section 482 proceedings [Paras 16, 19–20].

Decision: Both applications rejected — Summoning order dated 14.03.2022 upheld — Interim order, if any, vacated.

Civil Law – Rejection of Plaint – Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Scope – Triable Issues – Appeal Allowed – Appellants filed suit in 2022 for partition and declaration of 1/3rd share each in suit property on the basis of an unregistered Will dated 17.02.2002 allegedly executed by deceased father, superseding an earlier registered Will dated 23.05.1997 – Single Judge rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) finding the suit vexatious, devoid of cause of action and barred by limitation – Division Bench holds that the Single Judge committed grave error by drawing adverse inferences based on the 1997 Will and arriving at premature conclusions beyond the scope of Order VII Rule 11 – Plaint raises triable issues requiring adjudication on evidence – Appeal allowed; suit restored [Paras 22–30].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Principles – At the stage of Order VII Rule 11, the court must assume the averments in the plaint to be true and cannot embark upon an inquiry into their correctness – Court must examine whether a real cause of action has been set out or whether clever drafting has created an illusion of one – No compartmentalisation, dissection or isolation of passages in the plaint is permissible; the plaint must be read as a whole – Following Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510 [Paras 16, 28].

Limitation – Article 58 of the Limitation Act – Fraud – Mixed Question of Law and Facts – Single Judge held the suit barred by limitation as cause of action arose in 2003 upon death of the testator – Division Bench holds that where the plaint specifically pleads lack of knowledge of the earlier Will and fraudulent procurement of Mutation and Conveyance Deed, limitation becomes a mixed question of law and facts requiring evidence – Such question cannot be summarily decided without trial; continuously accruing cause of action also pleaded [Paras 25–29].

Will – Subsequent Will Prevailing Over Earlier Will – Validity of earlier registered Will dated 23.05.1997 becomes immaterial if the later unregistered Will dated 17.02.2002 is held valid, since the latter, being subsequent in time, prevails – Finding of Single Judge that appellants did not dispute the 1997 Will is ex facie contrary to the pleadings in paragraph 32 of the plaint [Paras 23–24].

Cause of Action – Fraud – Knowledge – Where appellants pleaded that they first came to know about the Mutation dated 15.04.2021 and Conveyance Deed dated 26.08.2021 fraudulently obtained by respondent No. 1 on the basis of the 1997 Will only in November 2021 through a local property dealer, the cause of action for the suit is stated to have arisen in 2021 and not in 2003 – This raises a triable issue which cannot be rejected at threshold [Paras 8–9, 26–28].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and decree dated 02.04.2025 rejecting the plaint set aside – Suit restored to its original number – Parties directed to appear before the learned Single Judge (Roster Bench) on 28.04.2026 – No observations to affect the merits of the case [Paras 30–33].

Default Bail – NDPS Act – Computation of 60-Day Remand Period – Indefeasible Right – Petitioner arrested on 02.11.2025 for possession of 4632.80 grams of hydroponic cannabis, remanded on 03.11.2025 – Charge sheet filed on 05.01.2026 (64th day) at 1:00 p.m. – Default bail application filed at 12:30 p.m. on the same date – 60th day fell on 01.01.2026, which was a court holiday – Special Judge dismissed the application condoning delay in filing charge sheet – Held: Right to default bail under Section 187(2) BNSS is indefeasible; filing of charge sheet after expiry of 60-day period does not extinguish the accrued right, particularly where bail application was filed prior to charge sheet – Revision allowed; petitioner directed to be released on bail [Paras 2–3, 6–7, 16–17].

Computation of Remand Period – Date of Remand Included – Holidays Not Excluded – General Clauses Act Inapplicable – Period of 60 days under Section 187(3)(ii) BNSS runs from date of remand, with date of remand included in the count – Provisions of General Clauses Act and Limitation Act have no application to Section 187 BNSS – Last day falling on Sunday or holiday is to be counted as the 60th day itself and not extended to the next working day – Court holidays between 60th and 64th day cannot be excluded from the remand period – Filing of charge sheet on 61st day or later constitutes non-compliance of the mandatory provision [Paras 8(i)–(iv), 9, 13, 15(i)–(iv)].

Charge Sheet – Filing Before Remand/Duty Magistrate Permissible – To avoid non-compliance of the mandatory period, prosecution may file charge sheet before remand/duty magistrate even when Special Court is closed – Oral application for grant of default bail before remand/duty magistrate is sufficient, provided accused is prepared to furnish bail – Merits and demerits of the case are irrelevant while considering default bail; right is absolute and discretion-free [Paras 8(v)–(vii), 11, 15(v)–(vii)].

Criminal Revision – Maintainability – Order on Default Bail Not Interlocutory – Order passed on an application for grant of default bail is not an interlocutory order – Criminal revision against such an order is maintainable – Special Judge criticised for failing to follow settled and binding legal position and for condoning delay on oral prayer of prosecution despite accrual of indefeasible right in favour of accused [Paras 16–17].

Decision: Criminal revision allowed – Impugned order of Special Judge, NDPS, Bhopal set aside – Petitioner Armaan Hussain directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 50,000/- with one solvent surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court – Conditions under Section 480(3) BNSS imposed.