Money Laundering – Freezing of Bank Accounts – Section 17(1A), PMLA – Proceeds of Crime – Respondent Zo Pvt Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Winzo Games Pvt Ltd, had its bank accounts frozen under Section 17(1A) of the PMLA on 30.12.2025 – Enforcement Case Information Report registered on the basis of multiple FIRs alleging cheating, forgery, conspiracy and fraud in relation to real money gaming operations of the parent entity – Winzo alleged to have generated proceeds of crime of Rs.3,522.05 Crores – Unsecured loans of Rs.255 Crores advanced by Winzo to respondent-Zo, of which Rs.231.20 Crores outstanding – Freezing order passed in respect of assets of approximately Rs.690 Crores – Single Judge relegated respondent to Adjudicating Authority but directed payment of salaries from frozen accounts – Appellant challenged only the direction for payment of salaries [Paras 3-6].

"Proceeds of Crime Cannot Be Presumed" – Section 2(1)(u), PMLA – Strict Construction – Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) – Proceeds of crime must be strictly linked to a predicate offence – Only property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence can constitute proceeds of crime – Enforcement Directorate cannot proceed against a person for money laundering on mere assumption that property recovered must be proceeds of crime without a registered offence or pending inquiry – In the instant case, the sole surviving FIR involved only Rs.42 Lakhs; the contention that the entire amount in the accounts of the respondent represented proceeds of crime was held to be unacceptable [Paras 29-36].

Freezing Orders – Adjudicating Authority – No Power to Order Partial Defreeze – Section 8, PMLA – Admitted position before the Court was that the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 of the PMLA had no power to issue interim directions or to order payments from amounts frozen under Section 17(1A) – In such circumstances, the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge in directing payment of salaries, while relegating the respondent to its statutory remedy, was neither perverse nor unwarranted – Reliance placed by appellant on Mangal Rajendra Kamthe (supra) distinguished on facts, as in that case the statutory authority had powers to deal with the situation, unlike the Adjudicating Authority under the PMLA [Paras 36-40].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Direction of Single Judge permitting payment of salaries from frozen accounts upheld – Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 of the PMLA having no power to grant partial defreeze for salary payment, the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge was justified – No order as to costs – All pending interlocutory applications disposed of [Para 41].

Town Planning – Lapse of Reservation – Section 127 MRTP Act – PIL Dismissed – Petitioners challenged the State communication dated 21.09.2015 declaring reservations on subject lands lapsed – Respondent No. 5 had issued purchase notice dated 04.02.2008 under Section 127 of MRTP Act followed by reminder dated 03.06.2009 – Municipal council's general body on 07.03.2012 considered acquisition cost but expressed inability to acquire – No statutory steps towards acquisition were taken within the prescribed period – Second Revised Development Plan came into force on 10.02.2019 safeguarding reservations for public amenities elsewhere – Held: PIL dismissed – Lapse of reservation upheld – Reservation on subject land cannot be insisted upon [Paras 1, 25, 26].

Service of Purchase Notice – Substantial Compliance – Section 127 MRTP Act – Petitioner contended that purchase notice dated 04.02.2008 was never served on the municipal council and hence the statutory period for lapse never commenced – Municipal council's general body itself deliberated on the acquisition cost pursuant to the notice forwarded through the State Government – Held: Once the purchase notice is brought within the knowledge of the planning authority through the governmental channel, placed before the general body and acted upon, the requirement of service is satisfied in substance – Planning authority cannot defeat Section 127 by taking a stand of "no service" in the teeth of its own records [Paras 12, 13, 14].

Steps Towards Acquisition – Meaning of "Steps" – Mere resolutions or correspondence expressing inability to acquire due to financial constraints do not constitute "steps" towards acquisition within the meaning of Section 127 of the MRTP Act – Steps must be real steps leading to statutory declaration under acquisition law – Municipal council's resolution seeking grants is an explanation of inability, not a statutory step – Held: No steps towards acquisition were taken within the stipulated period, resulting in lapse by operation of law [Paras 16, 17].

Municipal Council's Conduct – Subsequent Resolutions – General body resolution dated 09.12.2015 recording that reservations had lapsed and that land was not required for acquisition – Municipal council's subsequent institutional conduct of treating reservation as lapsed, declining acquisition, and acting consistently with post-lapse situation precludes it from re-agitating the foundational plea of "no notice" – Earlier denial of receipt of notice cannot be treated as conclusive in light of subsequent admissions and conduct [Paras 15, 18].

PIL Jurisdiction – Public Amenities – Revised Development Plan – Petitioner's contention that reservation for public amenities must be maintained on the very same parcel rejected – Development plans are not immutable; MRTP Act contains provisions for revision and modification – Once competent planning authority revises the plan and safeguards public purpose reservations elsewhere, petitioner cannot insist as a matter of right that public purpose must remain pegged only to subject land – Urban planning is an evolving arrangement balancing public needs with legal limitations on sterilization of land [Paras 20, 21].

Mala Fides – Colourable Exercise of Power – Allegations of mala fides must be pleaded with particulars and supported by cogent material – Record shows State sought reports, municipal council deliberated, cited financial incapacity, and communication was issued accordingly – No material found to sustain a finding of mala fides – What emerges is a long period of inaction in acquisition, which is the precise circumstance Section 127 of the MRTP Act addresses [Para 22].

Decision: PIL dismissed – Communication dated 21.09.2015 upheld – Lapse of reservation under Section 127 of the MRTP Act held to be legal and valid – Civil Application No. 1034 of 2018 also stands disposed of – Rs. 25,000/- out of deposited amount of Rs. 50,000/- directed to be refunded to petitioners; remaining Rs. 25,000/- to be credited to High Court Legal Services Authority [Paras 25, 26, 27, 28].

Criminal Law – Human Trafficking – Immoral Traffic – Quashing of Charge – Sections 370, 370-A(2) IPC and Sections 3, 4, 5, 7 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 – Petitioner, owner-cum-manager of a Spa at Mapusa, sought quashing of order framing charges arising from a police trap operation in which a decoy customer paid marked currency notes for massage services, a victim girl accepted additional payment for extra/special massage, and marked notes were recovered both from the victim and the cash counter held by the Petitioner – Co-accused (customers and other named accused) had earlier been discharged by the Court – Held: Sufficient prima facie material exists on record to frame charge against the Petitioner and the challenge to the order framing charge fails – Petition dismissed [Paras 1, 20, 21].

"Owner-Cum-Manager Personally Implicated — Decoy Statement Establishes Direct Role"

Framing of Charge – Prima Facie Material – Role of Petitioner – The statement of the decoy customer disclosed that the Petitioner, seated at the counter, personally informed him of the massage charges, assured provision of female masseurs in closed-door rooms, received payment of Rs.1,500/- in marked currency, and arranged a victim girl for massage – Marked notes of Rs.1,500/- were recovered from the cash counter in the Petitioner's possession during the raid – Prima facie material clearly implicates the Petitioner in active management and facilitation of the alleged activities [Paras 10, 15].

"Victim Statements Alone Not Determinative — Context of Trap Raid Governs at Charge Stage"

Victim Statements – Stereotypical Nature – Insufficient to Negate Charge – The statements of the rescued victim girls were stereotypical, denying forced exploitation, but when read conjunctively with the complaint, decoy statement and scene of offence panchanama, prima facie material emerged showing one victim accepted Rs.500/- for extra/special/hand massage, which sum was recovered from her personal search – A packet of condoms was also recovered from the same room – The nature of the extra massage is a matter to be determined upon trial, not at the charge stage [Paras 12, 14, 15].

"Definition of 'Exploitation' Under Section 370 IPC is Inclusive, Not Exhaustive"

Trafficking Offence – Exploitation – Consent Immaterial – Section 370 IPC defines exploitation inclusively to cover any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery – Second Explanation to Section 370 renders the consent of the victim immaterial in determining the offence of trafficking – Whether a particular act constitutes exploitation depends upon the facts of each case and is a matter for trial [Paras 12, 13, 14].

"Principle of Parity Not Applicable — Role of Petitioner Distinct from Discharged Co-Accused"

Parity – Discharge of Co-Accused – Inapplicability – Accused Nos. 7, 8 and 9 were discharged as no role was attributed to them in the complaint or charge-sheet – Accused Nos. 2 to 6 were discharged as they were merely customers of the Spa – The Petitioner, being the licensee and owner-cum-manager who personally received payment and facilitated the alleged prostitution, stands on an entirely different footing – Principle of parity cannot be invoked in favour of the Petitioner [Paras 4, 17].

"Standard at Charge Stage — Court Not to Weigh Pros and Cons but Only Assess Prima Facie Grounds"

Framing of Charge – Standard of Scrutiny – At the stage of framing charge, the Court is only required to sift the evidence to determine whether sufficient grounds exist to proceed against the accused – The Court must assume the prosecution material to be true and assess whether the ingredients of the offence are prima facie disclosed – It is not the function of the Court at this stage to weigh the pros and cons of the evidence, which is the function reserved for the trial [Para 18].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Order dated 17.01.2024 of the Sessions Judge, North Goa, directing framing of charges against the Petitioner under Sections 370 and 370-A(2) IPC and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 upheld – Rule discharged [Para 21].

Trade Marks – Refurbishment of End-of-Life HDDs – Infringement – Passing Off – Reverse Passing Off – Appellants manufactured Hard Disk Drives sold to OEMs abroad; HDDs on reaching 'end-of-life' stage extracted, imported into India, and sold to respondent-refurbishers – Respondents effaced appellants' registered marks, refurbished HDDs, affixed their own marks/Serial numbers/Model numbers, and sold HDDs with full disclosure – Appellants alleged infringement under Sections 29, 30(3) and 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act, as well as passing off and 'reverse passing off' – Single Judge dismissed interlocutory injunction applications and permitted respondents to sell refurbished HDDs with disclosure conditions – Division Bench upheld dismissal – Held: (i) 'reverse passing off' is not an actionable tort in Indian trade mark jurisprudence; (ii) ingredients of passing off absent; (iii) no infringement under Section 29 as respondents do not use appellants' registered marks or any deceptively similar mark; (iv) Section 30(3) does not create a new species of infringement; (v) assuming Section 30(3) applicable, its conditions satisfied; (vi) Section 30(4) not applicable as no impairment of HDDs and no legitimate reason for appellants to oppose further dealings; (vii) principle of international exhaustion of rights confirmed – Appeals dismissed [Paras 1–149, 156–168].

"Reverse Passing Off – Not an Actionable Tort in Indian Trade Mark Law"

Reverse passing off, Sections 27(2), 134(1)(c), 135(1) – Appellants alleged that respondents misrepresented the appellants' HDDs as their own by effacing appellants' marks and affixing their own, constituting 'reverse passing off' – Held: The tort of 'reverse passing off' is foreign to Indian trade mark jurisprudence – Section 27(2) saves only the right of action against a person for passing off his goods as those of another, not the reverse scenario – Supreme Court in Kaviraj Pt Durga Dutt Sharma and Satyam Infoway Ltd confirmed that 'passing off' involves misrepresentation by a defendant of his own goods as those of the plaintiff – Section 134(1)(c) envisages a suit only where the defendant uses a mark deceptively similar to the plaintiff's, not where the defendant passes off the plaintiff's goods as his own – No right to sue or obtain injunction on the ground of reverse passing off is available in trade mark law – All contentions of appellants predicated on 'reverse passing off' rejected [Paras 83–94].

"Passing Off – Ingredients Absent – No Misappropriation of Goodwill"

Passing off, goodwill, misrepresentation, damage – Even assuming 'reverse passing off' were actionable, its ingredients were absent: (i) for reverse passing off, consumer must be able to identify the goods as the plaintiff's at the initial interest stage (point of initial sale), which was not established; (ii) ability to trace the original manufacturer only by using a technical tool (Crystal Disk Info) does not suffice; (iii) no misappropriation of appellants' goodwill by respondents; (iv) no damage or prejudice to goodwill demonstrated – HDDs sold by respondents not under appellants' marks – Appellants had no concern with HDDs once they reached end-of-life stage and warranty stood extinguished – No prima facie case of passing off or reverse passing off established [Paras 95–109].

"Section 29 – Infringement – Use of Registered Mark – No Infringement Where Respondents Efface Mark"

Section 29, Trade Marks Act, 1999 – infringement – use of registered mark – Held: Section 29 constitutes a complete and self-contained code with respect to infringement – Infringement under Section 29 requires the infringer to use the registered trade mark, or a deceptively similar mark, in the course of trade – Before selling the HDDs, respondents efface the appellants' trade marks and affix their own marks – Respondents thus do not use the appellants' registered marks or any deceptively similar mark – No case of infringement under Section 29 is made out – Consequently, no occasion arises to invoke Section 30(3) or 30(4) at all [Paras 110–115].

"Section 30(3) – Not a New Species of Infringement – Principle of International Exhaustion Confirmed"

Section 30(3), Trade Marks Act, 1999 – limits on effect of registered trade mark – international exhaustion – lawful acquisition – Section 30(3) does not create a new species of infringement; it merely limits the right to allege infringement in respect of goods bearing a registered mark that have been lawfully acquired – The 'market' in Section 30(3) is the international market, confirming India's adoption of the principle of international exhaustion of rights (Kapil Wadhwa approved) – Even after effacing the appellants' marks and substituting the respondents' own marks, the further sale of the goods constitutes 'sale of the goods in the market' within Section 30(3); the learned Single Judge erred in reading the words 'as such' into the sub-section – Assuming Section 30(3) applicable, all its conditions were satisfied: (i) no proscription on OEMs reselling end-of-life HDDs; (ii) no illegality in import; (iii) HDDs purchased against commercial invoices with GST paid; (iv) appellants themselves placed goods on the market [Paras 20–45, 116–127].

"Section 30(4) – 'Changed or Impaired' – Noscitur a Sociis – No Legitimate Reason to Oppose"

Section 30(4), Trade Marks Act, 1999 – changed or impaired – noscitur a sociis – legitimate reasons – Section 30(4) excepts the protection of Section 30(3) where the condition of the goods has been changed or impaired, or other legitimate reasons exist to oppose further dealings – Held: The word 'changed' in Section 30(4) must be read noscitur a sociis with the word 'impaired'; 'change' must partake of a negative character – The respondents' acts of erasing appellants' marks, loading new software, and assigning new Serial/Model numbers did not constitute 'change or impairment' in this sense – Once HDDs reached end-of-life stage and appellants' warranty was extinguished, the umbilical cord was severed and appellants had no further legitimate concern – No material demonstrating prejudice to the appellants' reputation or goodwill – Accordingly, Section 30(4) does not apply [Paras 39–45, 128–137].

"Importer of HDDs Bearing Registered Mark – Section 29(6)(c) – Import as 'Use' – Section 30(3) Protects"

Section 29(6)(c), Section 30(3), Trade Marks Act, 1999 – import bearing registered mark – use in course of trade – FAO(OS)(COMM) 104/2025 – respondent Hansraj Dugar himself imported HDDs from Hong Kong and Korea bearing the appellants' registered trade marks without having refurbished them first – Import of goods bearing a registered trade mark amounts to 'use' of the mark within Section 29(6)(c) and constitutes infringement where the importer is neither the registered proprietor nor permissive user – Unlike the refurbisher-respondents in the companion appeals, Section 30(3) is directly applicable here to examine whether the respondent can escape infringement – Held: Section 30(3) protects the respondent; no proscription on OEMs reselling end-of-life HDDs; import not illegal; goods seized in Customs area showed no change or impairment; Section 30(4) inapplicable – Appeal dismissed [Paras 150–168].

"Kapil Wadhwa – Approved with Qualification – 'Legitimate Reasons' Under Section 30(4)"

Section 30(4) – legitimate reasons – Kapil Wadhwa v. Samsung Electronics – Division Bench decision in Kapil Wadhwa v. Samsung Electronics, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 5172, approved in so far as: (i) 'lawful acquisition' connotes lawful acquisition as per the laws of the country of acquisition; (ii) India adopts the principle of international exhaustion; (iii) the 'market' in Section 30(3) is the international market – However, the identification of specific 'species' of legitimate reasons in para 68 of Kapil Wadhwa (difference in services/warranties, advertising, packaging, quality control, language of literature) not treated as absolute grounds; such circumstances must reduce the quality or value of the goods or impair the goodwill of the registered proprietor to constitute 'legitimate reasons' under Section 30(4) – Determination of whether legitimate reasons exist is primarily a question of fact [Paras 46–52].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Interlocutory injunction applications of appellants under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC found to be without prima facie merit on infringement, passing off, and reverse passing off – Operative directions of the learned Single Judge permitting respondents to sell refurbished HDDs subject to disclosure conditions maintained – Observations and findings in the judgment held to be prima facie and shall not inhibit the Commercial Court on the merits of the substantive suits [Paras 145–149, 166–168].

Civil Law – Permanent Injunction – Religious Shrine – Concurrent Findings – Appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining respondents from interfering with their possession over agricultural land measuring 8B-0B, including 0B-2B bearing Khasra No. 28//22/2 where a Guga Mari is situated – Trial Court partly decreed the suit but dismissed the claim over 0B-2B where the Guga Mari exists – First Appellate Court upheld the dismissal – High Court finds no substantial question of law – Held: RSA dismissed in limine [Paras 1, 5, 9].

Possession – Proof of Exclusive Possession – Simpliciter Suit for Injunction – Burden of Proof – In a suit for permanent injunction, the plaintiff is required to prove exclusive possession over the suit land – Appellants failed to lead any cogent or reliable evidence to establish exclusive possession over the 0B-2B land where the Guga Mari is situated – Both courts concurrently found that the land was being used for worship by the villagers since time immemorial – No evidence, even remotely, pointed to exclusive possession of appellants [Paras 8, 9].

Compromise – Evidentiary Value – Failure to Rebut – Defendant-respondents relied upon compromise document Ex.D1 purportedly signed by Plaintiff-Appellant No. 2 (Goverdhan Singh @ Gordhan Singh), whereby the appellants' family relinquished any right or concern over the Guga Mari land in consideration of Rs. 1,50,000/- paid by the villagers – Plaintiff-Appellant No. 2 chose not to enter the witness box – No handwriting expert was examined to dispute the signatures/thumb-impressions on Ex.D1 – Held: Compromise remained unrebutted and operates against the appellants [Para 8].

Substantial Question of Law – Second Appeal – Scope – High Court in Regular Second Appeal is competent to interfere only when a substantial question of law arises – Where both Trial Court and First Appellate Court have returned concurrent findings of fact based on evidence on record, and no substantial question of law is demonstrated, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed – Held: No question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arises in the present case [Para 9].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Concurrent judgments and decrees of the Trial Court dated 29.07.2015 and the First Appellate Court dated 18.11.2017 upheld – Pending applications, if any, disposed of.

Foreigners Act – Citizenship – Foreigners Tribunal – Writ petition challenging opinion declaring petitioner a foreigner – Petitioner failed to prove lineage with grandfather through contemporaneous records – Key documents including Kabin Nama, school certificate, and Gaon Panchayat certificate not proved by issuing authorities – DW-2 introduced new facts beyond pleadings regarding father’s residence in Cooch Bihar – Discrepancies in names across electoral rolls not explained – Burden of proof under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act not discharged – Held: No infirmity in Tribunal’s decision – Writ petition dismissed.

Foreigners Act – Foreigners Tribunal – Declaration as Foreigner – Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 – Petitioner declared a foreigner by the Foreigners Tribunal No. 9, Dhubri in F.T. Case No. FT-9/79/GKJ/2015 – Petitioner claimed to be an Indian citizen and that the letter ‘D’ was erroneously inserted against her name in the electoral roll – Petitioner attempted to establish lineage with her grandfather Sahar Uddin whose name appeared in the voters’ lists of 1966 and 1970 – However, failed to prove any linkage between herself and her grandfather through contemporaneous records – Registered Sale Deed of 1994 not accepted as a linking document due to overwriting on the purchaser’s name without explanation – Held: Petitioner failed to discharge her onus under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 [Paras 2, 9, 24, 25].

Evidence – Proof of Documents – Documentary Evidence Not Proved Through Contemporaneous Records – Petitioner relied on Kabin Nama, school certificate, and Gaon Panchayat certificate to establish lineage with her parents and grandparents – However, the Qazi who registered the marriage was not examined – The Secretary of the Gaon Panchayat who issued the certificate was not produced as a witness – The Headmaster who issued the school certificate was also not examined – The Member of the Tribunal did not sign the school certificate (Ext-1) – Held: Documents and their contents were not proved as the issuing authorities were not produced as witnesses and contents were not established through contemporaneous records – A document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge alone [Paras 7, 14, 15, 16].

Foreigners Tribunal – Pleadings – Evidence Beyond Written Statement – DW-2 (petitioner’s brother) introduced new facts through his evidence-in-chief that their father was a voter of Tufanganj Constituency in Cooch Bihar prior to 1990 – This fact was never mentioned by the petitioner in her written statement or evidence – DW-1 never submitted that her father was a resident of Cooch Bihar – Dissimilarities surfaced between the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 – Evidence recorded and exhibited in a haphazard manner with overlapping markings – Held: A party cannot traverse beyond the pleadings made in the written statement – Written statement is the basic statement of defence of a proceedee before the Foreigners Tribunal [Paras 12, 13, 17, 19, 21].

Foreigners Act – Burden of Proof – Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 read with Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Burden of proving citizenship lies upon the person who asserts to be a citizen – Facts relating to date of birth, place of birth, parentage, and their citizenship are within the personal knowledge of the person concerned – Petitioner failed to establish that her father Sakir Hossain was the son of Sohar Uddin – Not a single document was proved to establish that the petitioner’s father was a voter or an Indian citizen – Discrepancies in names of father and grandfather across voters’ lists of different years and constituencies were not properly explained [Paras 20, 22, 23, 25, 26].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – No infirmity found in the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunal No. 9, Dhubri – Petitioner held to be a foreigner of post-25.03.1971 stream – Consequences of the impugned order to follow – Bail order dated 09.02.2017 stands vacated – No order as to costs [Paras 26, 27, 28].

Gratuity claim – Limitation – Interest – Definition of wages – Employees filed applications for gratuity after several years – Employer contested on grounds of limitation and exclusion of special allowance from wages – Held: Where employer fails to issue notice under Section 7(2), limitation under Rule 10 does not apply – Employer liable to pay interest under Section 7(3A) on unpaid amounts – Matter remanded to determine whether special allowance constitutes dearness allowance under Section 2(s) – Petitions partly allowed.

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 7(1), Section 7(2) – Limitation – Employer's Obligation – Employees claimed gratuity after gap of several years without filing Form "I" within prescribed time – Employer contended claim barred by limitation – Held: Section 7(2) casts clear obligation on employer to determine gratuity and issue notice whether or not application is made by employee – Second proviso to Rule 10 provides that where employer fails to issue notice under Section 7(2) read with Rule 8, limitation shall not apply – Employer cannot defeat claim by taking advantage of delay when delay contributed to by employer's inaction – Objection on ground of limitation rejected [Paras 18-25]

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 7(3), Section 7(3A) – Interest on Delayed Payment – Employer deposited admitted amount before Controlling Authority but disputed balance – Employee entitled to interest on unpaid portion – Held: Section 7(3A) provides for simple interest where gratuity not paid within thirty days – Proviso creates exception only where delay attributable to employee and employer obtains written permission from Controlling Authority – No such permission obtained – Interest not payable on admitted amount from date of deposit – Interest payable on remaining balance from date specified until actual payment [Paras 26-36]

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 2(s) – Definition of Wages – Special Allowance – Whether special allowance forms part of wages for gratuity calculation – Employer contended special allowance is consolidated component of incentives, not dearness allowance – Held: Character of salary component cannot be determined merely by nomenclature – Depends on purpose of payment, manner of calculation, whether linked to cost of living – Appellate Authority failed to examine whether special allowance is in reality dearness allowance – Matter remanded for fresh consideration on this limited issue [Paras 37-45]

Evidence – Photocopied Documents – Evidentiary Value – Employee relied on photocopied document showing restructuring of perks – Authorities below did not examine original document or record finding about authenticity – Held: When documents produced in photocopy form, authority must examine whether they can be relied upon as secondary evidence – Exercise not carried out – Matter remanded for proper evaluation [Paras 40-41, 43-44]

Decision: Writ petitions partly allowed – Judgments of Appellate Authority dated 19.10.2024 and Controlling Authority dated 09.11.2023 affirmed except as modified – Matter remitted to Appellate Authority for fresh consideration on question whether special allowance constitutes dearness allowance under Section 2(s) and whether documents establish entitlement to gratuity at rate of 26 days – Appellate Authority to decide within eight weeks – No order as to costs.

NDPS Act – Cultivation of Cannabis – Proof of Possession and Control – Appellant convicted for cultivating cannabis plants on agricultural land jointly owned by multiple persons – No evidence to establish that appellant alone was in possession or actively cultivating the land – Failure of prosecution to prove foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction set aside and appellant acquitted [Paras 32, 35, 46].

Criminal Law – Burden of Proof – Reasonable Doubt – Prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and cannot shift burden on accused to prove non-involvement – Mere presence or admission before police insufficient – Held: Absence of clear evidence linking accused to cultivation creates reasonable doubt [Paras 44–45].

NDPS Act – Concept of “Cultivation” – Requires conscious act of planting, nurturing or tending cannabis plants – No material showing active involvement of appellant in cultivation – Held: Essential ingredient of offence not established [Paras 34–35].

Evidence – Joint Ownership of Land – 7/12 extract showed multiple co-owners – Investigating agency failed to ascertain who was actually cultivating specific portion – Non-examination of relevant witnesses and lack of verification fatal to prosecution case [Paras 25–26, 31].

Confession – Statement before Police – Alleged admission by accused pointing out spot cannot be sole basis of conviction without corroboration and compliance with legal procedure – Held: Such statement insufficient to establish guilt [Para 44].

Presumption under NDPS Act – Section 54 – Can arise only after prosecution proves foundational facts such as possession and control – In absence thereof, presumption not applicable [Para 44].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence set aside – Appellant acquitted of offence under Section 20(a)(i) NDPS Act – Directed to be released forthwith – Fine, if paid, to be refunded.

Hindu Law – Coparcenary Property – Burden of Proof – Declaration Suit – Appellants filed a suit for declaration claiming the suit land to be joint Hindu family coparcenary property and challenging the sale deed dated 23.05.2014 executed by defendant-respondent No. 1 (father/Karta) in favour of defendant-respondent No. 4 for Rs. 7,50,000/- over 6 Kanal of land – Trial Court dismissed the suit on 06.03.2019 – First Appellate Court affirmed dismissal on 10.03.2025 – High Court finds no substantial question of law – Held: RSA dismissed [Paras 1, 4, 8].

Ancestral Property – Four-Generation Rule – Proof Required – To establish the ancestral and coparcenary nature of property, the plaintiff is required to prove that the suit property was inherited through at least four male lineal descendants by way of survivorship – Appellants relied solely on oral testimony and Jamabandis (Ex.PW4/1 to Ex.PW4/10) – Revenue records showed property originally owned by Dyal Singh (father of defendant No. 1) who had four sons and two daughters – After his death, estate was inherited by all legal heirs – Held: Appellants proved ancestral nature only to the extent of two generations and failed to establish four-generation coparcenary lineage [Para 7].

Hindu Succession Act – Section 8 – Self-Acquired Property – Property Devolving by Succession – Where coparcenary or joint Hindu family property succeeds on the death of a common ancestor under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act by way of intestate succession and not by survivorship, such property received under intestate succession must be treated as self-acquired property and not coparcenary property – Relied upon: Maan Jain vs. Suraj Parkash Jain, 2018(3) RCR (Civil) 759 – Appellants also failed to prove whether defendant-respondent No. 1 inherited the property by survivorship or by succession under Section 8 [Para 7].

Substantial Question of Law – Second Appeal – Concurrent Findings – Scope of Interference – Where both Trial Court and First Appellate Court have returned concurrent findings of fact based on evidence on record and no cogent documentary evidence was produced by the appellants to demonstrate ancestral nature of suit property, no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arises warranting interference in RSA [Para 8].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 06.03.2019 and First Appellate Court dated 10.03.2025 upheld – Pending applications, if any, disposed of.