Criminal Procedure – Proclaimed Person vs. Proclaimed Offender – Section 82(4) CrPC – NDPS Offences – Petitioner granted bail in NDPS case, failed to appear on one date due to miscommunication, bail cancelled, non-bailable warrants issued, proclamation effected on 13.02.2025 and petitioner declared proclaimed offender on 17.03.2025 – Held: Declaration as proclaimed offender under Section 82(4) CrPC is permissible only in respect of offences specified therein, which are exclusively certain provisions of the IPC – Offences under Sections 22(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act do not find mention in Section 82(4) CrPC – Petitioner could only have been declared a proclaimed person under Section 82(1) CrPC and not a proclaimed offender – Impugned order set aside to that extent [Paras 10-12].

Proclaimed Person and Proclaimed Offender – Distinction – There is a stark distinction between a proclaimed person under Section 82(1) CrPC and a proclaimed offender under Section 82(4) CrPC – All persons absconding or concealing themselves to evade arrest can be proclaimed persons, but only those accused of specified IPC offences can be declared proclaimed offenders – The difference in punishment under Section 174-A IPC reflects this distinction: up to three years for a proclaimed person and up to seven years for a proclaimed offender – Sections 83 to 86 CrPC dealing with attachment of property apply to proclaimed persons and do not deal with proclaimed offenders [Para 11].

Proclamation – Mandatory Requirements – Section 82(1) CrPC – Proclamation must specify a date and place for appearance of the accused and such date must not be less than 30 clear days from the date of publication – In the present case, proclamation effected on 13.02.2025 and case merely adjourned to 17.03.2025 for recording statement of serving official – Mandatory requirement of fixing date of appearance beyond 30 clear days from date of publication not complied with – Adjournment cannot cure the inherent defect in proclamation proceedings – Fresh proclamation required to be issued in accordance with law – Proclamation proceedings vitiated [Paras 13-18].

Decision: Petition allowed – Impugned order dated 17.03.2025 set aside to the extent of declaring petitioner as proclaimed offender – Petitioner directed to surrender before Trial Court/Duty Magistrate within two weeks subject to payment of Rs. 5,000/- as costs to Poor Patients Welfare Fund, PGIMER, Chandigarh – Petitioner to furnish fresh bail and surety bonds and undertaking to appear regularly – Order to be treated as vacated if petitioner fails to appear within stipulated period [Paras 20-22].

Tenancy Law – Will by Tenant – Bequeathal of Tenancy Rights – Section 45, H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act – Panchi was recorded as a non-occupancy tenant under Ishru, a widow, as per Jamabandi for 1977-78 – Panchi executed a Will dated 27.11.1984 in favour of the defendant – Defendant contended that Panchi had become the owner upon commencement of the Act – Held: Section 104(8) of the Act expressly excludes operation of Sections 104(1) to (6) in the case of a tenancy under a widow during her lifetime – Panchi could not have acquired proprietary rights during the lifetime of Ishru – Tenancy rights cannot be bequeathed by way of a Will – Section 45 of the Act provides the exclusive rule of succession to tenancy rights – Will held void ab initio [Paras 28-36].

Civil Court Jurisdiction – Tenancy Dispute Between Successors of Tenant – Section 58 Bar – Sections 112 and 115, H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act – Bar under Section 58 applies only where the status of landlord and tenant is not disputed and not to cases where parties are claiming to be successors of the tenant – Dispute between two persons each claiming to be successor of a tenant does not fall within the cognizance of Revenue Courts – Bar of Civil Court jurisdiction under Sections 112 and 115 applies only when validity of orders passed under Chapter X is called in question, and not where no such order is involved – Civil Court jurisdiction held not barred [Paras 21-27, 37-40].

Additional Evidence – Application Dismissed – Order XLI Rule 27 CPC – Defendant sought to lead additional evidence by producing copy of Pariwar register to prove date of death of Ishru – No pleading in the written statement that Ishru had died and Panchi had consequently become owner – Additional evidence cannot be allowed to prove a plea never taken in pleadings – Further, copy of Pariwar register is not admissible to prove date of birth or death; only entries in the Register of Births and Deaths can be proved – Application dismissed [Paras 15-20].

Decision: Regular Second Appeal dismissed – All three substantial questions of law answered against the appellants – Judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court upheld.

Forest Rights – Other Traditional Forest Dwellers – Section 2(o), Forest Rights Act, 2006 – Burden of Proof – Appellants claimed rights over Reserved Forest land to the extent of 291.60 acres in Suriyur Village, Salem, contending that their ancestors were in possession and cultivation thereof for more than 75 years – District Level Committee rejected the claim finding no documents produced to prove possession and enjoyment for 75 years as required under the Act – Writ Court upheld the rejection – Held: Appellants failed to establish essential ingredients under the Act – Appeal dismissed [Paras 3-12].

Definition – "Other Traditional Forest Dwellers" – Three Generations – Section 2(o) of the Act, 2006 requires that the claimant must have been primarily residing in and depending on the forest land for bona fide livelihood needs for at least three generations prior to 13.12.2005 – Explanation to Section 2(o) defines "generation" as a period of 25 years, thus requiring continuous residence and dependence for 75 years – Appellants admittedly not residing in the subject land and living at addresses outside the Reserved Forest – Aadhar cards of appellants showed different addresses – Not established that appellants solely depend on forest produce for bona fide livelihood needs [Paras 8-11].

Reserved Forest – Encroachment – Jarugumalai Forest Block notified as Reserved Forest under Section 16 of the Madras Forest Act, 1882 with effect from 15.03.1926 – Appellants made attempts to encroach upon the Reserved Forest from 1980 – Forest Department filed cases against them for trespass – All encroachers evicted and entire land restored to Forest Department – Appellants cannot claim rights as traditional forest dwellers merely on account of attempted encroachment and cultivation of commercial nature [Paras 6, 10].

Judicial Review – Article 226 – Scope – Power of judicial review is to ensure that the decision-making process of the competent authority is in consonance with the provisions of statutes and rules, and not to review the merits of the decision itself – In the present case, procedures were followed scrupulously by the District Level Committee with due opportunity to parties – No interference warranted [Para 13].

Decision: Writ Appeal dismissed – No costs.

Preventive Detention – Public Safety Act – Law and Order vis-à-vis Public Order – Bovine Smuggling – Petitioner detained under Section 8(1)(a) of the J&K Public Safety Act by order dated 11.07.2025 on the basis of two FIRs and three unverified Daily Diary Entries alleging habitual bovine smuggling – One FIR already disposed of and the other (FIR No. 0049/2025 dated 03.05.2025) pending investigation – Petitioner not directly involved in the pending FIR as admitted by the Detaining Authority – Held: Alleged activities of bovine smuggling constitute infractions of law and order and do not rise to the level of acts prejudicial to public order as defined under Section 8(3) of the Act – Detention order quashed [Paras 10-19].

Public Order – Distinction from Law and Order – Acts affecting individuals or isolated criminal conduct cannot be equated with disturbance of public order – Public order is the even tempo of life of the community – Only where the disturbance subverts the community at large does it amount to a public order problem – Mere infraction of law leads to disorder but not necessarily public disorder [Paras 13-16].

Preventive Detention – Proximity – Live Link – Detention order dated 11.07.2025 passed about two months after the last alleged incident of 03.05.2025 – Three Daily Diary Entries unverified and uncorroborated – No explanation by Detaining Authority for the delay – Undue and unreasonable gap between alleged activities and passing of detention order snaps the live link – Detaining Authority also failed to address why normal criminal law was inadequate and did not challenge the bail granted to the petitioner – Non-application of mind established [Paras 19-24].

Preventive Detention – Subjective Satisfaction – Misuse of Power – Preventive detention is an exception to the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 – Detention orders must be passed with great care and caution, only in cases of genuine and inevitable necessity – Provisions of Article 22(5) require proper communication of grounds, opportunity to make representation and application of mind – Impugned order is the outcome of non-application of mind and misuse of powers [Paras 25-27].

Decision: Petition allowed – Detention order No. 08-PSA-2025 dated 11.07.2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Udhampur, quashed – Petitioner directed to be released forthwith from preventive detention.

Prevention of Corruption Act – Bribe Demand and Acceptance – Hostile Complainants – Conviction Upheld – Appellant No. 1 Prithvilal Meena, working as Assistant Engineer, JVVNL, inspected electricity meters at complainants' premises on 29.01.2016 and imposed VCR penalty of Rs. 80,000 — subsequently demanded illegal gratification for settlement — ACB trap organised on 02.02.2016 — tainted amount of Rs. 5,500/- recovered from the conscious possession of appellant No. 2 Hemraj @ Foru, who acted as conduit on directions of appellant No. 1 — phenolphthalein test of hands and pocket of appellant No. 2 positive — both appellants present in the same room at time of trap — complainant PW-8 Ramphool turned hostile and complainant PW-13 Kailash resiled in cross-examination — Held: Conviction sustained on the basis of electronic evidence, trap proceedings and circumstantial evidence — appeal dismissed [Paras 1–3, 59–65].

"Electronic Evidence – Voice Recording – Admissibility – Section 65-B Certificate – Demand Established"

Prevention of Corruption Act – Electronic Evidence – Admissibility – Voice Recording – The prosecution relied upon digitally recorded conversations of 01.02.2016 and 02.02.2016 capturing demand and direction for acceptance of illegal gratification by appellant No. 1 Prithvilal Meena — transcripts proved as Ex. P-11 and Ex. P-15 — certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 produced as Ex. P-38 by PW-14 Tarunkant Somani, leader of trap team — appellant No. 1 did not dispute voice recording during trial nor challenged its authenticity in cross-examination — appellants refused to furnish voice samples despite lawful notice — Held: Adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 drawn against appellants for withholding best evidence — voice recording admissible and demand legally established — hostile testimony of complainants does not demolish prosecution case when electronic evidence independently proves demand [Paras 28–35, 37].

"Demand and Acceptance – Proof by Electronic and Circumstantial Evidence – Hostile Complainant"

Prevention of Corruption Act – Demand and Acceptance – Sine Qua Non – Proof – Demand is sine qua non for constituting offence under Prevention of Corruption Act — demand can be proved by electronic or circumstantial evidence and not necessarily by direct testimony of complainant — conviction can be sustained even if complainant turns hostile, provided demand is otherwise established — in the present case, transcription of voice recordings clearly disclosed demand by appellant No. 1 accompanied by threat of VCR penalty — trap laid immediately after recorded conversation — tainted amount recovered corresponds exactly to amount discussed in voice recording — both accused found present together — chain of incriminating circumstances complete and unbroken — Held: Demand and acceptance duly proved — presumption under Section 20 of the Act operative — burden to rebut not discharged by appellants [Paras 18–19, 29, 36, 57–59].

"Acceptance Through Middleman – Section 8 – Private Person as Conduit – Criminal Conspiracy"

Prevention of Corruption Act – Section 8 – Private Person – Acceptance as Conduit – Appellant No. 2 Hemraj @ Foru, a private person, accepted bribe amount of Rs. 5,500/- from complainant pursuant to directions of appellant No. 1 Prithvilal Meena — tainted money recovered from his trouser pocket — phenolphthalein test positive — corroborated by FSL Report Ex. P-23 and testimonies of PW-9, PW-10, PW-14, PW-15, PW-16 and PW-17 — Held: Acceptance of illegal gratification through agent or middleman is deemed acceptance by public servant himself — personal recovery from public servant not indispensable — Section 8 of the Act squarely covers private person acting as conduit — concerted action of both appellants constitutes criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC — Section 8 and 120-B IPC proved against appellant No. 2 [Paras 40–51].

"Prosecution Sanction – Application of Mind – Valid Sanction"

Prevention of Corruption Act – Prosecution Sanction – Validity – PW-11 Sunil Mehta, sanctioning authority, deposed that entire investigation record was perused before according sanction — cross-examination did not show non-application of mind — all relevant documents considered — Held: Sanction order reflects due application of mind and is valid [Para 52].

"Shadow Witness – Partial Overheard Conversation – Trap Proceedings – Practical Realities"

Trap Proceedings – Shadow Witness – Partial Overhearing – Defence argument that voice recording findings are unsafe as shadow witness did not overhear entire conversation — Held: It is neither legally mandated nor practically feasible for a shadow witness to overhear every word — accused may insist on private conversation or meeting in restricted area — close proximity of shadow witness may arouse suspicion and frustrate trap — what is required is proof beyond reasonable doubt and not proof through any particular mode — trap proceedings cannot be judged by artificial laboratory standards [Paras 38–39].

"Panchsheel Test – Circumstantial Evidence – Chain Complete"

Circumstantial Evidence – Panchsheel Test – Sufficiency – All circumstances collectively establish complete and unbroken chain of evidence — electronic evidence, recovery of tainted amount, positive phenolphthalein test, documentary evidence in form of red diary and handwritten slip, presence of both accused together and failure to rebut presumption under Section 20 — chain of circumstances consistent only with guilt of appellants and excludes every possible hypothesis of innocence — Held: Panchsheel test as propounded in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 satisfied — conviction affirmed [Paras 62–64].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Kota in Sessions Case No. 10/2016 dated 06.07.2019 affirmed — appellants directed to surrender forthwith to serve remaining sentence.

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Mental Cruelty – Unsubstantiated Allegations in Written Statement – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Appellant-husband sought divorce on ground of mental cruelty – Trial Court dismissed the suit – On appeal, held: allegations levelled by the respondent-wife in her written statement, including attempt to kill their second daughter, illicit affair of the husband with another lady, and incitement of third parties to make immoral proposals to the wife, were wholly unsubstantiated – Allegation of attempt to kill daughter on February 15, 2019 demolished by wife's own admission in cross-examination that she had not returned to her matrimonial home after December 15, 2018, three months prior to such alleged incident – No corroborative evidence, oral or documentary, adduced for the alleged illicit affair – Testimony of wife (DW-1) and her mother (DW-2) stood in stark contradiction to each other – Reckless, defamatory and unsubstantiated allegations in pleadings against the spouse and his family, including jeopardising the husband's service in the CISF (a disciplined force), constitute mental cruelty – Trial Court erred in not taking this component of cruelty into account – Appellant entitled to decree of divorce on this ground alone [Paras 27–36].

Mental Cruelty – Plaint Allegations by Husband – Not Substantiated – Adverse Inference – Allegations by the appellant-husband of the wife refusing to do household work, ill-behaving with in-laws and perpetrating cruelty during her stay at the matrimonial home were vague and unaccompanied by specific dates or instances – PW-2, an acquaintance of the husband, admitted he learnt of the facts the day before deposing, relegating his testimony to hearsay – None of the family members of the husband, who would have been the best witnesses, were produced, warranting adverse inference against the appellant on the plaint case of cruelty during cohabitation – Trial Court justified in rejecting plaint allegations for want of independent corroboration [Paras 24–26].

Restitution of Conjugal Rights – Not a Prerequisite for Divorce – The learned Trial Judge erred in holding that non-filing of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was indicative of lack of bona fides on the part of the husband – Held: there is no requirement in law that a party must initiate restitution proceedings as a precondition for seeking divorce – No evidence of animus revertendi on the part of the respondent-wife during the entire period of separation since December 15, 2018 [Para 38].

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Independent Ground for Divorce – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Parties had been separated for over eight years since December 2018 – Both parties stated during arguments that they did not wish to resume conjugal life – No attempt made by either party to unite during this period – Held: a marital relationship that has only become bitter and acrimonious over the years inflicts cruelty on both sides; keeping the facade of such a broken marriage alive does injustice to both parties – Irretrievable breakdown of marriage itself spells cruelty to both parties and is a ground for dissolution under Section 13(1)(ia) – Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433, followed [Paras 39–41].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree dated December 6, 2023 of the Additional District Judge, Khatra, in Matrimonial Suit No. 07 of 2020 set aside – Suit decreed – Marriage between the parties dissolved by divorce – No order as to costs.

Civil Law – Permanent Injunction – Proof of Possession – Second Appeal – Plaintiffs' suit for permanent injunction dismissed by trial Court for failure to prove lawful possession – First appellate Court reversed, erroneously relying on recitals in an earlier suit (O.S.No.678/1988) and drawing perverse inferences from revenue records – High Court held that the first appellate Court's findings were contrary to evidence and pleadings – Oral and documentary evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3 wholly insufficient to establish possession as on the date of filing of the suit – Second appeal allowed – Judgment of first appellate Court set aside – Trial Court's dismissal of suit restored [Paras 19, 25, 29, 30, 31].

"Suit for Bare Injunction — Plaintiff Must Prove Physical Exclusive Possession as on Date of Suit"

Permanent Injunction – Proof of Possession – Bare Injunction Suit – In a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter, the plaintiff must establish that as on the date of filing the suit, he was in lawful and physical exclusive possession of the suit property and that the defendant attempted to disturb such possession – The plaintiffs failed to produce any documentary evidence to prove possession over the plaint schedule property – P.W.1 (plaintiff No.2) had no personal knowledge about the alleged Nazarana payment or the alleged partition between Mukkaiah and Bheemaiah, being only 10 years old at the time of Mukkaiah's death – P.W.2 and P.W.3 also failed to speak to possession – No patta, no revenue records bearing the suit survey number, and no credible witness examined to prove the alleged oral partition [Paras 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 28].

"Tax Receipts Not Conclusive Proof of Possession — Revenue Records Must Specifically Reference Suit Survey Number"

Evidence – Tax Receipts – Revenue Records – Proof of Possession – The plaintiffs relied on tax receipts (Ex.A-4, Ex.A-10) to prove possession, but the suit schedule survey number and extent were not mentioned in those receipts – Held: Payment of tax receipts is not a conclusive proof of possession of property — Tax receipts show only that a person paid land revenue and not that he was in actual physical possession of the specific suit property — In the absence of any document linking the plaintiffs to R.S.No.394 specifically, the receipts are of no evidentiary value for the purpose of the suit [Para 24].

"Recitals in Earlier Suit Not an Admission of Plaintiffs' Possession — First Appellate Court Drew Perverse Inferences"

Evidence – Admissions – Prior Suit Proceedings – Perverse Findings – The first appellate Court drew the erroneous conclusion that since the defendants in an earlier suit (O.S.No.678/1988) claimed possession of only Ac.16.00 cents against third parties, they were impliedly admitting the plaintiffs' possession over the remaining Ac.16.00 cents – Held: The recital in that earlier plaint that the Revenue Authorities had by mistake recorded only Ac.16.00 cents against the defendants and the remaining Ac.16.00 cents as in the name of Bheemaiah cannot be construed as an admission of Bheemaiah's possession — Findings of the first appellate Court on this point were perverse — Ex.A-1 to Ex.A-3 are of no use to prove plaintiffs' possession [Paras 22, 23, 26].

"When Title is Disputed, Suit for Bare Injunction Without Seeking Declaration is Not Maintainable"

Suit for Injunction – Title in Dispute – Declaration Required – The defendants disputed the title of the plaintiffs in the written statement, denying that the alleged partition between Mukkaiah and Bheemaiah ever took place — Held: Where the title of the plaintiff is in dispute or under a cloud and the defendant asserts title, the plaintiff is required to file a suit for declaration of title along with the consequential relief of injunction — A suit for bare injunction simpliciter will not lie in such circumstances — The plaintiffs neither sought declaration of title nor amended the relief clause during pendency of the suit — Ananthula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. applied [Para 27].

Decision: Second appeal allowed — Judgment and decree dated 27.02.2006 in A.S.No.25 of 1999 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur, set aside — Judgment and decree of the trial Court (I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kovvur) dismissing the suit restored — Each party to bear their own costs [Para 31].

Civil Law – Title to Immovable Property – Declaration – Second Appeal – Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet – Concurrent findings of trial Court and first appellate Court that plaintiff holds valid title to the plaint schedule property through a chain of registered sale deeds tracing back to 1981 – Defendant No.3's vendor had no title on the date of the 2018 sale deed, the property having already been conveyed by his father as GPA holder in 1981 – Will relied upon by defendants relating only to Bangalore properties and not to the Nellore plot – Held: No substantial question of law arises – Second appeal dismissed at admission stage – Two months' time granted to vacate [Paras 22, 26, 27, 28].

"Second Appeal — Substantial Question of Law is Sine Qua Non — Concurrent Findings of Fact Not to Be Interfered With"

Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – Substantial Question of Law – The appellants challenged concurrent findings of two Courts — Held: A second appeal under Section 100 CPC lies only when a substantial question of law arises — A proper test is whether the question directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and is either an open question or not free from difficulty — In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the inference drawn by the first appellate Court will not be interfered with — Mere appreciation of facts, documentary evidence, and contents of documents cannot constitute a substantial question of law — The questions raised are not even pure questions of law, let alone substantial questions of law — Second appeal dismissed at the stage of admission [Paras 14, 27, 28].

"Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet — No Title Passes from a Vendor Who Has No Title"

Title to Immovable Property – Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet – Registration Act, 1908 – The defendants' vendor (defendant No.3) purported to sell the plaint schedule property in 2018 — However, by 1981, his father as GPA holder of defendant No.3's sister had already sold the same plot to Epuru Sulochanamma under a registered sale deed — The Will of 1991 (Ex.B-1), relied upon by the defendants, was admitted even by its propounder (D.W.2) to relate only to Bangalore properties and movable properties and not to the Nellore property — Held: The principle "nemo dat quod non habet" applies — Defendant No.3 had no title on the date of execution of the 2018 sale deed and could not have transferred any title to defendant No.1 — Registration of a document by the registering authority does not confer title unless the transferor is the lawful owner [Paras 21, 22, 23, 26].

"New Plea of Ancestral Property Under Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act Not Permissible for First Time in Second Appeal"

Pleadings – New Plea in Second Appeal – Section 6, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – The appellants raised for the first time in second appeal the contention that the property was ancestral and that defendant No.3 and his sister were co-owners along with their father by virtue of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act — Held: This plea was neither raised in the written statement nor suggested to plaintiff's witnesses in cross-examination before the trial Court nor raised before the first appellate Court — The second appellate Court cannot go into a question not raised in the pleadings or evidence — Contention rejected [Para 25].

"Registered Will Confined to Bangalore Properties — Cannot Pass Title Over Nellore Property"

Will – Scope of Bequest – Evidence – The defendants' title rested on a Will dated 30.05.1991 (Ex.B-1) — D.W.2, the propounder of the Will and vendor of defendant No.1, himself admitted in evidence that there is no specific recital about the plaint schedule property in the Will and that the Will relates only to properties at Bangalore and movable properties — By the date of the alleged Will, the father of defendant No.3 had already conveyed the plaint schedule plot to Sulochanamma in 1981 through a registered sale deed and was therefore not seized of that property to bequeath — Held: The Will cannot confer any title over the Nellore property [Paras 19, 20, 21].

Decision: Second appeal dismissed at the stage of admission — Concurrent judgments and decrees of trial Court and first appellate Court confirmed — Defendants granted two months' time to deliver vacant possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff — No order as to costs [Para 28].

Criminal Law – Murder – Section 302/34 IPC – Conviction Upheld – Eye-Witness Testimony – Four appellants convicted for the murder of Sita Ram Pradhan, who was shot dead at a fair price shop in the presence of P.W.1 (complainant-Gram Pradhan) and P.W.2 (a villager present for kerosene oil) on 13.07.1994 – Accused Bhullar caught the deceased and pulled him down; accused Bashir and Hamid fired from country-made pistols; accused Wakeel Ahmad alias Munda fired at the face of the deceased from a double-barrel gun at close range – Held: testimonies of P.W.1 and P.W.2 were consistent, cogent and coherent on all material particulars — time, place, manner of occurrence, names of accused and their individual roles — no material contradiction emerged in extensive cross-examination spanning approximately 82 pages for P.W.1 – Conviction upheld and sentence confirmed [Paras 28–31, 51–52].

Eye-Witness – Chance Witness – Natural Presence at Scene – P.W.1 was present at the fair price shop for distributing kerosene oil of his village; P.W.2 was present for purchasing kerosene oil – Held: where witnesses are present at the spot for a specific and natural purpose, they cannot be characterised as chance witnesses – Their presence was natural and satisfactorily explained – Mere enmity or interest does not warrant rejection of testimony; such evidence requires deep scrutiny and corroboration, not automatic rejection – Allegations of illicit relationship between P.W.1 and wife of the deceased, and of false implication under political pressure, were unsubstantiated by any cogent evidence adduced by the defence – Bare allegations cannot substitute proof [Paras 30, 33–34, 36–38].

Ocular Evidence and Medical Evidence – Consistency – Post-Mortem Report – P.W.4, Dr. B.B. Sethi, found four entry and four exit firearm wounds on the body of the deceased corresponding to the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.2 that four shots were fired – Blackening and tattooing around the wound on the face confirmed close-range firing as stated by eye-witnesses – Cause of death: shock and haemorrhage due to ante-mortem firearm injuries – Medical evidence fully corroborated the ocular testimony – Held: there was complete coherence between medical and ocular evidence; no inconsistency established [Paras 39–41].

Time of Occurrence – Empty Stomach – No Ground for Doubt – Defence contended that the incident occurred at 04:00 A.M. and not at 07:30 A.M. as alleged, citing the empty stomach of the deceased as found in post-mortem – Held: P.W.1 specifically deposed that the deceased had observed a Tuesday fast and had not yet defecated or eaten on the morning of the incident – The act of attending to nature's call and presence or absence of food in the stomach cannot be fixed with mathematical precision – The doctor's opinion as to time of death is not conclusive when contradicted by cogent direct evidence – Contention rejected [Paras 40].

Non-Examination of Witnesses – Non-Seizure of Documents – Adverse Inference – Prosecution not bound to examine every named witness – It is the prerogative of the prosecution to produce such evidence as it considers necessary – Non-examination of persons named in FIR or ration card holders does not automatically invite adverse inference – Non-seizure of the register of distribution of essential commodities is not fatal where the place of occurrence is firmly established by reliable eye-witness account corroborated by medical evidence [Paras 43–44].

Section 313 CrPC – Opportunity to Accused – All incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence were duly put to the appellants in their statements under Section 313 CrPC – No illegality or infirmity found in the manner in which opportunity was afforded – Reliance by appellants on Ashok v. State of U.P. (2024 INSC 919) on this ground rejected [Para 49].

Direct Evidence vis-à-vis Circumstantial Evidence – Distinction in Appreciation – Where a case rests on direct ocular testimony, the Court must assess whether the witness falls within the categories of wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, and whether such testimony is corroborated – In cases of circumstantial evidence, the chain must be complete and conclusively point to guilt, where motive assumes greater significance – In cases of trustworthy direct evidence, motive recedes into the background – Sathya Narayanan v. State (2013 (80) ACC 138), which pertains to circumstantial evidence, held inapplicable to the present case based on direct ocular evidence [Para 50].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction of all four appellants under Sections 302/34 IPC upheld – Sentence of life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 20,000/- confirmed – Appellants already in jail directed to remain in custody and serve out sentence – Trial Court record to be transmitted within ten days.