Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 CrPC – Allegations of Forced Religious Conversion – Petitioner, Principal of a school, sought quashing of FIR alleging she pressured the complainant teacher to convert from Hinduism to Christianity and terminated her services upon refusal – Petitioner contended FIR was malicious and motivated by service dispute after termination of complainant – Held: Allegations in FIR and statement of complainant recorded under Section 164 CrPC prima facie disclose commission of offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2021 – At the stage of quashing, Court cannot examine reliability of allegations – Petition dismissed [Paras 8, 12–14].

Criminal Law – Exercise of Inherent Powers – Scope of Interference in Investigation – High Court reiterated that power under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised sparingly and only in rare cases – Criminal proceedings should not be scuttled at the initial stage where FIR discloses a cognizable offence – Court cannot undertake enquiry into the truthfulness of allegations or evaluate defence such as existence of service dispute at the quashing stage [Paras 8, 11].

Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2021 – Offences of Conversion by Inducement or Pressure – Complainant alleged that she was repeatedly pressured to convert her religion and was subjected to harassment and termination upon refusal – Material collected during investigation and statement recorded before Magistrate supported allegations – Held: Allegations are serious and sufficient to put the petitioner on trial – Defence regarding service dispute may be considered during trial but cannot justify quashing of FIR at this stage [Paras 9, 12–13].

Decision: Petition under Section 482 CrPC dismissed – FIR and criminal proceedings allowed to continue – Petitioner at liberty to establish innocence during trial.

Criminal Law – Murder – Section 302/34 IPC – Conviction Upheld – Eye-Witness Testimony – Four appellants convicted for the murder of Sita Ram Pradhan, who was shot dead at a fair price shop in the presence of P.W.1 (complainant-Gram Pradhan) and P.W.2 (a villager present for kerosene oil) on 13.07.1994 – Accused Bhullar caught the deceased and pulled him down; accused Bashir and Hamid fired from country-made pistols; accused Wakeel Ahmad alias Munda fired at the face of the deceased from a double-barrel gun at close range – Held: testimonies of P.W.1 and P.W.2 were consistent, cogent and coherent on all material particulars — time, place, manner of occurrence, names of accused and their individual roles — no material contradiction emerged in extensive cross-examination spanning approximately 82 pages for P.W.1 – Conviction upheld and sentence confirmed [Paras 28–31, 51–52].

Eye-Witness – Chance Witness – Natural Presence at Scene – P.W.1 was present at the fair price shop for distributing kerosene oil of his village; P.W.2 was present for purchasing kerosene oil – Held: where witnesses are present at the spot for a specific and natural purpose, they cannot be characterised as chance witnesses – Their presence was natural and satisfactorily explained – Mere enmity or interest does not warrant rejection of testimony; such evidence requires deep scrutiny and corroboration, not automatic rejection – Allegations of illicit relationship between P.W.1 and wife of the deceased, and of false implication under political pressure, were unsubstantiated by any cogent evidence adduced by the defence – Bare allegations cannot substitute proof [Paras 30, 33–34, 36–38].

Ocular Evidence and Medical Evidence – Consistency – Post-Mortem Report – P.W.4, Dr. B.B. Sethi, found four entry and four exit firearm wounds on the body of the deceased corresponding to the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.2 that four shots were fired – Blackening and tattooing around the wound on the face confirmed close-range firing as stated by eye-witnesses – Cause of death: shock and haemorrhage due to ante-mortem firearm injuries – Medical evidence fully corroborated the ocular testimony – Held: there was complete coherence between medical and ocular evidence; no inconsistency established [Paras 39–41].

Time of Occurrence – Empty Stomach – No Ground for Doubt – Defence contended that the incident occurred at 04:00 A.M. and not at 07:30 A.M. as alleged, citing the empty stomach of the deceased as found in post-mortem – Held: P.W.1 specifically deposed that the deceased had observed a Tuesday fast and had not yet defecated or eaten on the morning of the incident – The act of attending to nature's call and presence or absence of food in the stomach cannot be fixed with mathematical precision – The doctor's opinion as to time of death is not conclusive when contradicted by cogent direct evidence – Contention rejected [Paras 40].

Non-Examination of Witnesses – Non-Seizure of Documents – Adverse Inference – Prosecution not bound to examine every named witness – It is the prerogative of the prosecution to produce such evidence as it considers necessary – Non-examination of persons named in FIR or ration card holders does not automatically invite adverse inference – Non-seizure of the register of distribution of essential commodities is not fatal where the place of occurrence is firmly established by reliable eye-witness account corroborated by medical evidence [Paras 43–44].

Section 313 CrPC – Opportunity to Accused – All incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence were duly put to the appellants in their statements under Section 313 CrPC – No illegality or infirmity found in the manner in which opportunity was afforded – Reliance by appellants on Ashok v. State of U.P. (2024 INSC 919) on this ground rejected [Para 49].

Direct Evidence vis-à-vis Circumstantial Evidence – Distinction in Appreciation – Where a case rests on direct ocular testimony, the Court must assess whether the witness falls within the categories of wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, and whether such testimony is corroborated – In cases of circumstantial evidence, the chain must be complete and conclusively point to guilt, where motive assumes greater significance – In cases of trustworthy direct evidence, motive recedes into the background – Sathya Narayanan v. State (2013 (80) ACC 138), which pertains to circumstantial evidence, held inapplicable to the present case based on direct ocular evidence [Para 50].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction of all four appellants under Sections 302/34 IPC upheld – Sentence of life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 20,000/- confirmed – Appellants already in jail directed to remain in custody and serve out sentence – Trial Court record to be transmitted within ten days.

Criminal Law – Abetment of Suicide – Cruelty – Acquittal – Accused charged under Sections 498A and 306 IPC for alleged harassment and dowry demands leading to the suicide by hanging of his wife Rekhaben on 24.04.2007 – Trial Court acquitted the accused holding that prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt – State preferred appeal under Section 378 CrPC – Held: No infirmity in the acquittal; appeal dismissed [Paras 1, 19–21].

Abetment of Suicide – Ingredients – Section 306 IPC – For conviction under Section 306 IPC, prosecution must establish an active role of instigation, conspiracy or intentional aiding by the accused – Mere harassment or domestic discord does not ipso facto constitute abetment – There must be a direct causal link and proximate connection between the accused's conduct and the deceased's decision to commit suicide – Prosecution failed to prove any positive act or mens rea proximate to the time of suicide [Paras 9.1–9.8].

Instigation – Legal Threshold – Instigation connotes an active suggestion or incitement of such intensity that it operates upon the mind of the victim and pushes her toward suicide – A word uttered in anger without intending consequences to follow cannot constitute instigation – Accused must have created circumstances leaving the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide – Not established in the present case [Paras 9.5, 9.6, 10, 10.1].

Prosecution Witnesses – Unreliable and Contradictory Testimony – Key witnesses including the complainant (P.W.7), father (P.W.10), mother (P.W.11), sister (P.W.12) and brother-in-law (P.W.13) either turned hostile, gave contradictory versions, or admitted ignorance of material facts – Son of deceased (P.W.9) categorically denied any harassment or cruelty by the accused – Neighbour statements recorded by P.W.6 revealed no evidence of harassment [Paras 8.5–8.13].

Motive – Extra-Marital Affair and Dowry Demand – Prosecution alleged accused had an extra-marital affair and demanded dowry of Rs.41,000/- at the time of marriage – No witness could identify the alleged other woman – Material witnesses admitted they were unaware of the personal life of the accused and deceased at Mundra – Motive not conclusively proved [Paras 8.1, 8.9–8.12].

Acquittal Appeal – Scope of Interference – Appellate court has full power to review evidence in an acquittal appeal but must bear in mind the double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused – High Court should not interfere where the trial court's view is reasonable and plausible and two reasonable conclusions are possible – Interference warranted only where judgment suffers from patent perversity or misreading of material evidence [Paras 13–18].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Acquittal of respondent-accused under Sections 498A and 306 IPC confirmed – No infirmity found in the trial court's judgment – Record and proceedings remitted to the concerned trial court.

Trade Marks – Refurbishment of End-of-Life HDDs – Infringement – Passing Off – Reverse Passing Off – Appellants manufactured Hard Disk Drives sold to OEMs abroad; HDDs on reaching 'end-of-life' stage extracted, imported into India, and sold to respondent-refurbishers – Respondents effaced appellants' registered marks, refurbished HDDs, affixed their own marks/Serial numbers/Model numbers, and sold HDDs with full disclosure – Appellants alleged infringement under Sections 29, 30(3) and 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act, as well as passing off and 'reverse passing off' – Single Judge dismissed interlocutory injunction applications and permitted respondents to sell refurbished HDDs with disclosure conditions – Division Bench upheld dismissal – Held: (i) 'reverse passing off' is not an actionable tort in Indian trade mark jurisprudence; (ii) ingredients of passing off absent; (iii) no infringement under Section 29 as respondents do not use appellants' registered marks or any deceptively similar mark; (iv) Section 30(3) does not create a new species of infringement; (v) assuming Section 30(3) applicable, its conditions satisfied; (vi) Section 30(4) not applicable as no impairment of HDDs and no legitimate reason for appellants to oppose further dealings; (vii) principle of international exhaustion of rights confirmed – Appeals dismissed [Paras 1–149, 156–168].

"Reverse Passing Off – Not an Actionable Tort in Indian Trade Mark Law"

Reverse passing off, Sections 27(2), 134(1)(c), 135(1) – Appellants alleged that respondents misrepresented the appellants' HDDs as their own by effacing appellants' marks and affixing their own, constituting 'reverse passing off' – Held: The tort of 'reverse passing off' is foreign to Indian trade mark jurisprudence – Section 27(2) saves only the right of action against a person for passing off his goods as those of another, not the reverse scenario – Supreme Court in Kaviraj Pt Durga Dutt Sharma and Satyam Infoway Ltd confirmed that 'passing off' involves misrepresentation by a defendant of his own goods as those of the plaintiff – Section 134(1)(c) envisages a suit only where the defendant uses a mark deceptively similar to the plaintiff's, not where the defendant passes off the plaintiff's goods as his own – No right to sue or obtain injunction on the ground of reverse passing off is available in trade mark law – All contentions of appellants predicated on 'reverse passing off' rejected [Paras 83–94].

"Passing Off – Ingredients Absent – No Misappropriation of Goodwill"

Passing off, goodwill, misrepresentation, damage – Even assuming 'reverse passing off' were actionable, its ingredients were absent: (i) for reverse passing off, consumer must be able to identify the goods as the plaintiff's at the initial interest stage (point of initial sale), which was not established; (ii) ability to trace the original manufacturer only by using a technical tool (Crystal Disk Info) does not suffice; (iii) no misappropriation of appellants' goodwill by respondents; (iv) no damage or prejudice to goodwill demonstrated – HDDs sold by respondents not under appellants' marks – Appellants had no concern with HDDs once they reached end-of-life stage and warranty stood extinguished – No prima facie case of passing off or reverse passing off established [Paras 95–109].

"Section 29 – Infringement – Use of Registered Mark – No Infringement Where Respondents Efface Mark"

Section 29, Trade Marks Act, 1999 – infringement – use of registered mark – Held: Section 29 constitutes a complete and self-contained code with respect to infringement – Infringement under Section 29 requires the infringer to use the registered trade mark, or a deceptively similar mark, in the course of trade – Before selling the HDDs, respondents efface the appellants' trade marks and affix their own marks – Respondents thus do not use the appellants' registered marks or any deceptively similar mark – No case of infringement under Section 29 is made out – Consequently, no occasion arises to invoke Section 30(3) or 30(4) at all [Paras 110–115].

"Section 30(3) – Not a New Species of Infringement – Principle of International Exhaustion Confirmed"

Section 30(3), Trade Marks Act, 1999 – limits on effect of registered trade mark – international exhaustion – lawful acquisition – Section 30(3) does not create a new species of infringement; it merely limits the right to allege infringement in respect of goods bearing a registered mark that have been lawfully acquired – The 'market' in Section 30(3) is the international market, confirming India's adoption of the principle of international exhaustion of rights (Kapil Wadhwa approved) – Even after effacing the appellants' marks and substituting the respondents' own marks, the further sale of the goods constitutes 'sale of the goods in the market' within Section 30(3); the learned Single Judge erred in reading the words 'as such' into the sub-section – Assuming Section 30(3) applicable, all its conditions were satisfied: (i) no proscription on OEMs reselling end-of-life HDDs; (ii) no illegality in import; (iii) HDDs purchased against commercial invoices with GST paid; (iv) appellants themselves placed goods on the market [Paras 20–45, 116–127].

"Section 30(4) – 'Changed or Impaired' – Noscitur a Sociis – No Legitimate Reason to Oppose"

Section 30(4), Trade Marks Act, 1999 – changed or impaired – noscitur a sociis – legitimate reasons – Section 30(4) excepts the protection of Section 30(3) where the condition of the goods has been changed or impaired, or other legitimate reasons exist to oppose further dealings – Held: The word 'changed' in Section 30(4) must be read noscitur a sociis with the word 'impaired'; 'change' must partake of a negative character – The respondents' acts of erasing appellants' marks, loading new software, and assigning new Serial/Model numbers did not constitute 'change or impairment' in this sense – Once HDDs reached end-of-life stage and appellants' warranty was extinguished, the umbilical cord was severed and appellants had no further legitimate concern – No material demonstrating prejudice to the appellants' reputation or goodwill – Accordingly, Section 30(4) does not apply [Paras 39–45, 128–137].

"Importer of HDDs Bearing Registered Mark – Section 29(6)(c) – Import as 'Use' – Section 30(3) Protects"

Section 29(6)(c), Section 30(3), Trade Marks Act, 1999 – import bearing registered mark – use in course of trade – FAO(OS)(COMM) 104/2025 – respondent Hansraj Dugar himself imported HDDs from Hong Kong and Korea bearing the appellants' registered trade marks without having refurbished them first – Import of goods bearing a registered trade mark amounts to 'use' of the mark within Section 29(6)(c) and constitutes infringement where the importer is neither the registered proprietor nor permissive user – Unlike the refurbisher-respondents in the companion appeals, Section 30(3) is directly applicable here to examine whether the respondent can escape infringement – Held: Section 30(3) protects the respondent; no proscription on OEMs reselling end-of-life HDDs; import not illegal; goods seized in Customs area showed no change or impairment; Section 30(4) inapplicable – Appeal dismissed [Paras 150–168].

"Kapil Wadhwa – Approved with Qualification – 'Legitimate Reasons' Under Section 30(4)"

Section 30(4) – legitimate reasons – Kapil Wadhwa v. Samsung Electronics – Division Bench decision in Kapil Wadhwa v. Samsung Electronics, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 5172, approved in so far as: (i) 'lawful acquisition' connotes lawful acquisition as per the laws of the country of acquisition; (ii) India adopts the principle of international exhaustion; (iii) the 'market' in Section 30(3) is the international market – However, the identification of specific 'species' of legitimate reasons in para 68 of Kapil Wadhwa (difference in services/warranties, advertising, packaging, quality control, language of literature) not treated as absolute grounds; such circumstances must reduce the quality or value of the goods or impair the goodwill of the registered proprietor to constitute 'legitimate reasons' under Section 30(4) – Determination of whether legitimate reasons exist is primarily a question of fact [Paras 46–52].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Interlocutory injunction applications of appellants under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC found to be without prima facie merit on infringement, passing off, and reverse passing off – Operative directions of the learned Single Judge permitting respondents to sell refurbished HDDs subject to disclosure conditions maintained – Observations and findings in the judgment held to be prima facie and shall not inhibit the Commercial Court on the merits of the substantive suits [Paras 145–149, 166–168].

Criminal Law – Human Trafficking – Immoral Traffic – Quashing of Charge – Sections 370, 370-A(2) IPC and Sections 3, 4, 5, 7 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 – Petitioner, owner-cum-manager of a Spa at Mapusa, sought quashing of order framing charges arising from a police trap operation in which a decoy customer paid marked currency notes for massage services, a victim girl accepted additional payment for extra/special massage, and marked notes were recovered both from the victim and the cash counter held by the Petitioner – Co-accused (customers and other named accused) had earlier been discharged by the Court – Held: Sufficient prima facie material exists on record to frame charge against the Petitioner and the challenge to the order framing charge fails – Petition dismissed [Paras 1, 20, 21].

"Owner-Cum-Manager Personally Implicated — Decoy Statement Establishes Direct Role"

Framing of Charge – Prima Facie Material – Role of Petitioner – The statement of the decoy customer disclosed that the Petitioner, seated at the counter, personally informed him of the massage charges, assured provision of female masseurs in closed-door rooms, received payment of Rs.1,500/- in marked currency, and arranged a victim girl for massage – Marked notes of Rs.1,500/- were recovered from the cash counter in the Petitioner's possession during the raid – Prima facie material clearly implicates the Petitioner in active management and facilitation of the alleged activities [Paras 10, 15].

"Victim Statements Alone Not Determinative — Context of Trap Raid Governs at Charge Stage"

Victim Statements – Stereotypical Nature – Insufficient to Negate Charge – The statements of the rescued victim girls were stereotypical, denying forced exploitation, but when read conjunctively with the complaint, decoy statement and scene of offence panchanama, prima facie material emerged showing one victim accepted Rs.500/- for extra/special/hand massage, which sum was recovered from her personal search – A packet of condoms was also recovered from the same room – The nature of the extra massage is a matter to be determined upon trial, not at the charge stage [Paras 12, 14, 15].

"Definition of 'Exploitation' Under Section 370 IPC is Inclusive, Not Exhaustive"

Trafficking Offence – Exploitation – Consent Immaterial – Section 370 IPC defines exploitation inclusively to cover any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery – Second Explanation to Section 370 renders the consent of the victim immaterial in determining the offence of trafficking – Whether a particular act constitutes exploitation depends upon the facts of each case and is a matter for trial [Paras 12, 13, 14].

"Principle of Parity Not Applicable — Role of Petitioner Distinct from Discharged Co-Accused"

Parity – Discharge of Co-Accused – Inapplicability – Accused Nos. 7, 8 and 9 were discharged as no role was attributed to them in the complaint or charge-sheet – Accused Nos. 2 to 6 were discharged as they were merely customers of the Spa – The Petitioner, being the licensee and owner-cum-manager who personally received payment and facilitated the alleged prostitution, stands on an entirely different footing – Principle of parity cannot be invoked in favour of the Petitioner [Paras 4, 17].

"Standard at Charge Stage — Court Not to Weigh Pros and Cons but Only Assess Prima Facie Grounds"

Framing of Charge – Standard of Scrutiny – At the stage of framing charge, the Court is only required to sift the evidence to determine whether sufficient grounds exist to proceed against the accused – The Court must assume the prosecution material to be true and assess whether the ingredients of the offence are prima facie disclosed – It is not the function of the Court at this stage to weigh the pros and cons of the evidence, which is the function reserved for the trial [Para 18].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Order dated 17.01.2024 of the Sessions Judge, North Goa, directing framing of charges against the Petitioner under Sections 370 and 370-A(2) IPC and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 upheld – Rule discharged [Para 21].

Criminal Law – Murder – Conviction – Circumstantial Evidence – Appellant convicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of deceased Rakesh Beyong by multiple stab injuries at Khola Camp, Bhalukpong on 18.02.2017 – Trial Court sentenced him to life imprisonment with 10 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/- – On appeal, High Court finds the chain of circumstances complete and unbroken pointing exclusively to the guilt of the Appellant – Held: No infirmity in the judgment of conviction; appeal dismissed [Paras 2, 70].

Circumstantial Evidence – Governing Principles – For conviction based on circumstantial evidence, circumstances must be cogently established, of definite tendency unerringly pointing to guilt, cumulatively forming a complete chain leaving no escape, and incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than guilt of the accused – Prosecution must prove the complete chain beyond reasonable doubt – Tests restated and applied [Paras 64, 17].

Motive – Prior Altercation and Humiliation – Deceased had assaulted and humiliated the Appellant at a picnic at Atobong during the day of the incident after consumption of alcohol – Appellant sustained injuries during the tussle – Strong inference of motive for revenge drawn from the said incident – Motive, though not sole basis, forms an important link in the chain of circumstances [Paras 57, 61].

Last-Seen Evidence – Presence Near Place of Occurrence – Evidence of PW-5 (Ajit Rangmo) establishes that deceased and Appellant visited his shop in the evening between 5:00–6:00 PM with a gap of about half an hour – Both left in different directions – Evidence of PW-8 (Narayan Sharma) establishes Appellant's presence at his shop at around 7:00–7:30 PM with blood on right hand – Appellant admitted visiting PW-8's shop under Section 313 CrPC though disputed the timing – Presence of Appellant near place of occurrence at relevant time established [Paras 50–56, 63].

Bloodstained Hands – Adverse Inference – PW-8 deposed that Appellant visited his shop at 7:00–7:30 PM with blood on his right hand – Appellant admitted the visit but made no comment on the blood observed by PW-8 – Silence on a specific incriminating question, while consistently answering other questions, constitutes a relevant circumstance – Non-denial treated as an additional inculpatory link [Paras 65–66].

Absconding – Guilty Conduct – Appellant fled to Assam after the incident and returned only after being lured by PW-5 over phone with false assurance that deceased was alive and under medical treatment – Claimed to have gone to Mumbai and returned within four days, which the Court found physically impossible without any supporting evidence – False alibi itself constitutes an additional incriminating circumstance undermining presumption of innocence [Paras 57–58, 62].

Extra-Judicial Confession – Admissibility – PW-12 (brother-in-law of deceased) deposed that Appellant admitted having killed the deceased – PW-17 stated he was present when Appellant made a statement admitting the offence before police – Appellant denied the same under Section 313 CrPC – Extra-judicial confession, while a weak piece of evidence, is not the sole basis of conviction in this case – Relied upon as corroborative along with independent circumstantial evidence [Paras 68–69].

Non-Recovery of Weapon – Not Fatal – Weapon of offence (knife) allegedly thrown at the site of the weekly Sunday market held the very next day – Non-recovery explained by the prosecution – Held: Recovery of weapon is not an inflexible requirement; conviction can stand where other evidence is cogent, consistent and sufficient to establish guilt [Para 67].

Test Identification Parade – Not Mandatory – PW-8 could not specifically identify the Appellant in the dock but the Appellant himself admitted visiting PW-8's shop under Section 313 CrPC – Once the accused acknowledges his presence, TIP becomes redundant as it is merely an investigative tool and not substantive evidence [Para 23].

Section 313 CrPC – Statements – Relevance – Portions of the statement under Section 313 CrPC supporting the prosecution case can be relied upon in conjunction with other evidence – Court may draw adverse inference from false or evasive answers – Conviction cannot rest solely on Section 313 statement but the same serves as a relevant additional link [Para 66].

Decision: Criminal appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC upheld – Trial Court record sent back – Amicus Curiae to be paid fee by Arunachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority.

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Mental Cruelty – Unsubstantiated Allegations in Written Statement – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Appellant-husband sought divorce on ground of mental cruelty – Trial Court dismissed the suit – On appeal, held: allegations levelled by the respondent-wife in her written statement, including attempt to kill their second daughter, illicit affair of the husband with another lady, and incitement of third parties to make immoral proposals to the wife, were wholly unsubstantiated – Allegation of attempt to kill daughter on February 15, 2019 demolished by wife's own admission in cross-examination that she had not returned to her matrimonial home after December 15, 2018, three months prior to such alleged incident – No corroborative evidence, oral or documentary, adduced for the alleged illicit affair – Testimony of wife (DW-1) and her mother (DW-2) stood in stark contradiction to each other – Reckless, defamatory and unsubstantiated allegations in pleadings against the spouse and his family, including jeopardising the husband's service in the CISF (a disciplined force), constitute mental cruelty – Trial Court erred in not taking this component of cruelty into account – Appellant entitled to decree of divorce on this ground alone [Paras 27–36].

Mental Cruelty – Plaint Allegations by Husband – Not Substantiated – Adverse Inference – Allegations by the appellant-husband of the wife refusing to do household work, ill-behaving with in-laws and perpetrating cruelty during her stay at the matrimonial home were vague and unaccompanied by specific dates or instances – PW-2, an acquaintance of the husband, admitted he learnt of the facts the day before deposing, relegating his testimony to hearsay – None of the family members of the husband, who would have been the best witnesses, were produced, warranting adverse inference against the appellant on the plaint case of cruelty during cohabitation – Trial Court justified in rejecting plaint allegations for want of independent corroboration [Paras 24–26].

Restitution of Conjugal Rights – Not a Prerequisite for Divorce – The learned Trial Judge erred in holding that non-filing of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was indicative of lack of bona fides on the part of the husband – Held: there is no requirement in law that a party must initiate restitution proceedings as a precondition for seeking divorce – No evidence of animus revertendi on the part of the respondent-wife during the entire period of separation since December 15, 2018 [Para 38].

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Independent Ground for Divorce – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Parties had been separated for over eight years since December 2018 – Both parties stated during arguments that they did not wish to resume conjugal life – No attempt made by either party to unite during this period – Held: a marital relationship that has only become bitter and acrimonious over the years inflicts cruelty on both sides; keeping the facade of such a broken marriage alive does injustice to both parties – Irretrievable breakdown of marriage itself spells cruelty to both parties and is a ground for dissolution under Section 13(1)(ia) – Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433, followed [Paras 39–41].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree dated December 6, 2023 of the Additional District Judge, Khatra, in Matrimonial Suit No. 07 of 2020 set aside – Suit decreed – Marriage between the parties dissolved by divorce – No order as to costs.

SARFAESI Act – E-Auction Purchaser – FIR – Quashing – Petitioner purchased mortgaged property in e-auction conducted by Union Bank of India as the highest bidder — FIR lodged alleging collusion with bank officials in undervaluation of the property — valuation of property challenged before DRT, Ranchi in S.A. No. 88 of 2024, which affirmed the valuation and dismissed the informant's application — order of DRT attained finality — FIR against bank officials already quashed by coordinate bench — held: no offence of fraud, forgery or criminal breach of trust made out against the petitioner who is a bona fide auction purchaser — FIR quashed — writ petition allowed [Paras 8–11].

"Quashing of FIR – Exceptional Jurisdiction – When Criminal Law is Set in Motion Against a Bona Fide Auction Purchaser"

Quashing of FIR in writ jurisdiction is done only in exceptional cases when the FIR itself does not disclose any offence against the petitioner — principal charge of undervaluation in the FIR is not directed against the auction purchaser since valuation was done before he participated in the e-auction — allegation of criminal conspiracy confined to the claim that he colluded with bank officials in undervaluation — when DRT has affirmed the valuation and such order has attained finality, permitting continuation of FIR against the auction purchaser would be a misuse of the process of court — auction has not been set aside by any competent court [Paras 9–10].

"DRT Order Attaining Finality – Effect on Criminal Proceedings"

Informant's challenge to the e-auction before this Court resulted in direction to pursue remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before DRT, Ranchi — DRT, after hearing parties, dismissed S.A. No. 88 of 2024 affirming valuation of the property — said order attained finality having not been challenged before any higher forum — co-ordinate bench of this Court had already quashed the FIR against two bank officials in W.P. (Cr.) Nos. 158 and 159 of 2025 — in such circumstances, continuance of FIR against the auction purchaser on identical allegations cannot be sustained [Paras 5–10].

Decision: Writ petition allowed — FIR in Argora P.S. Case No. 24 of 2025 quashed qua the petitioner — pending interlocutory application, if any, disposed of [Para 11].

Civil Law – Title to Immovable Property – Declaration – Second Appeal – Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet – Concurrent findings of trial Court and first appellate Court that plaintiff holds valid title to the plaint schedule property through a chain of registered sale deeds tracing back to 1981 – Defendant No.3's vendor had no title on the date of the 2018 sale deed, the property having already been conveyed by his father as GPA holder in 1981 – Will relied upon by defendants relating only to Bangalore properties and not to the Nellore plot – Held: No substantial question of law arises – Second appeal dismissed at admission stage – Two months' time granted to vacate [Paras 22, 26, 27, 28].

"Second Appeal — Substantial Question of Law is Sine Qua Non — Concurrent Findings of Fact Not to Be Interfered With"

Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – Substantial Question of Law – The appellants challenged concurrent findings of two Courts — Held: A second appeal under Section 100 CPC lies only when a substantial question of law arises — A proper test is whether the question directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and is either an open question or not free from difficulty — In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the inference drawn by the first appellate Court will not be interfered with — Mere appreciation of facts, documentary evidence, and contents of documents cannot constitute a substantial question of law — The questions raised are not even pure questions of law, let alone substantial questions of law — Second appeal dismissed at the stage of admission [Paras 14, 27, 28].

"Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet — No Title Passes from a Vendor Who Has No Title"

Title to Immovable Property – Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet – Registration Act, 1908 – The defendants' vendor (defendant No.3) purported to sell the plaint schedule property in 2018 — However, by 1981, his father as GPA holder of defendant No.3's sister had already sold the same plot to Epuru Sulochanamma under a registered sale deed — The Will of 1991 (Ex.B-1), relied upon by the defendants, was admitted even by its propounder (D.W.2) to relate only to Bangalore properties and movable properties and not to the Nellore property — Held: The principle "nemo dat quod non habet" applies — Defendant No.3 had no title on the date of execution of the 2018 sale deed and could not have transferred any title to defendant No.1 — Registration of a document by the registering authority does not confer title unless the transferor is the lawful owner [Paras 21, 22, 23, 26].

"New Plea of Ancestral Property Under Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act Not Permissible for First Time in Second Appeal"

Pleadings – New Plea in Second Appeal – Section 6, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – The appellants raised for the first time in second appeal the contention that the property was ancestral and that defendant No.3 and his sister were co-owners along with their father by virtue of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act — Held: This plea was neither raised in the written statement nor suggested to plaintiff's witnesses in cross-examination before the trial Court nor raised before the first appellate Court — The second appellate Court cannot go into a question not raised in the pleadings or evidence — Contention rejected [Para 25].

"Registered Will Confined to Bangalore Properties — Cannot Pass Title Over Nellore Property"

Will – Scope of Bequest – Evidence – The defendants' title rested on a Will dated 30.05.1991 (Ex.B-1) — D.W.2, the propounder of the Will and vendor of defendant No.1, himself admitted in evidence that there is no specific recital about the plaint schedule property in the Will and that the Will relates only to properties at Bangalore and movable properties — By the date of the alleged Will, the father of defendant No.3 had already conveyed the plaint schedule plot to Sulochanamma in 1981 through a registered sale deed and was therefore not seized of that property to bequeath — Held: The Will cannot confer any title over the Nellore property [Paras 19, 20, 21].

Decision: Second appeal dismissed at the stage of admission — Concurrent judgments and decrees of trial Court and first appellate Court confirmed — Defendants granted two months' time to deliver vacant possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff — No order as to costs [Para 28].