Criminal Law - Disproportionate Assets – Discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. – Public Servant – Accused working as Office Attendant in Transport Department alleged to have amassed assets disproportionate to known sources of income to the extent of 39.30% – Revision petitioner contended that assets and income of wife and father-in-law were wrongly included – Special Court rejected discharge holding existence of prima facie case – Held: Materials on record disclose strong suspicion warranting trial – Discharge rightly refused [Paras 3–5, 10, 14].

Prevention of Corruption Act – Section 13(1)(e) – Scope of “Known Sources of Income” – Inclusion of Family Members’ Assets – Wife and father-in-law residing with accused during check period – Vigilance Manual provides that “public servant” includes dependent family members – Assets, income and expenditure of wife and father-in-law can be considered while assessing disproportionate assets – Prima facie allegation made out [Paras 6, 8–10].

Disproportionate Assets Case – Methodology of Calculation – Challenge at Pre-Trial Stage – Accused questioned correctness of inclusion and exclusion of various items in asset, income and expenditure statements – Held: Such disputes relate to appreciation of evidence – Matters to be decided only during trial and not at stage of discharge [Paras 11–13].

Discharge – Scope and Limits – Strong Suspicion Test – At stage of Section 227 Cr.P.C., court to examine whether allegations taken as a whole disclose commission of offence on basis of strong suspicion – Detailed evaluation of evidence impermissible – Special Court committed no illegality in declining discharge [Paras 11, 14].

Criminal Revision – Interference – Revisional Court not to re-appreciate factual materials at discharge stage when prima facie case exists – No perversity or illegality found in order under challenge – Revision petition dismissed – Interim stay vacated – Trial directed to proceed [Paras 14–15].

Decision: Criminal Revision Petition dismissed – Order rejecting discharge confirmed – Interim stay vacated – Trial court directed to proceed with the case.

Civil Writ - SARFAESI Act – Priority of Secured Creditor – Refusal to Register Sale Deed – Bank conducted e-auction of secured asset after borrower defaulted and deposited full sale consideration – Sub-Registrar refused registration citing later attachment for State tax dues – Held: Secured creditor’s charge created earlier in time has priority over subsequent attachment for State dues – Sub-Registrar cannot refuse registration on basis of later revenue entry [Paras 1–3, 5–8].

Charge – Priority – Bank’s Mortgage vs State Dues – Mortgage in favour of Bank created in 2013 by deposit of title deeds – Charge in favour of State Food and Supply Department created only in 2018 – No statute conferring first charge on State for dues arising from Custom Milling Agreement – Held: Such dues are contractual and do not override prior mortgage of secured creditor [Paras 5–7].

Revenue Entry – Legal Effect – Rapat Entry – Attachment entry in revenue records does not determine or extinguish rights of parties – Such administrative entry cannot defeat statutory right of secured creditor under SARFAESI Act – Refusal to register sale deed based solely on rapat entry held illegal [Paras 8–8.1].

Crown Debt – Priority – Settled Law – Right of secured creditor to recover secured debt has precedence over crown debts and Government dues unless statute expressly provides otherwise – Reliance placed on Supreme Court decisions reaffirming primacy of secured creditor’s claim [Paras 8.1–9].

SARFAESI Amendment – Section 26E – Clarification – Though Section 26E was notified later and not directly applicable to facts of case – Court clarified that for transactions after 24.01.2020, statutory priority to secured creditors would operate in terms of Section 26E of SARFAESI Act [Para 11].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Mandamus issued directing Sub-Registrar to register sale deed in favour of auction purchaser within two months – Attachment/charge in revenue records in favour of State quashed – Liberty reserved to State to recover dues after satisfaction of Bank’s claim or by other lawful means – Costs of Rs.25,000/- imposed on State of Haryana.

Arbitration Law – Enforcement of Foreign Award – Objections under Section 48 – Respondent challenged enforcement on grounds of limitation, absence of concluded contract and arbitration clause, and non-confirmation of award under Texas law – Held: Petition filed on 16.05.2024 not barred by limitation as period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 excluded due to COVID-19 – Limitation to be counted from 16.09.2020 (date of Vedanta judgment) – Application within time [Paras 13–15.2]

Foreign Award – Binding Nature – Section 48(2)(a) – Commercial Court decree declaring arbitration award null and void not binding on foreign award enforcement – Held: Foreign award can only be set aside by court of the country where or under whose law it was made – Indian court lacks jurisdiction to annul a foreign award – Decree passed by Indian Commercial Court cannot override enforceability under Section 48 [Paras 16–17.5]

Arbitration Law – Confirmation Requirement under Foreign Law – Respondent argued that award unenforceable without confirmation under Texas Civil Code – Held: Section 171.087 of Texas Code mandates confirmation unless objection grounds exist – No requirement of confirmation in absence of objection – Award enforceable as it became binding under arbitration clause and SMA Rules – Absence of confirmation does not defeat enforcement under Indian law [Paras 18–19.4]

Foreign Award – Public Policy and Judicial Review – Scope of Objections – Court reaffirms narrow grounds under Section 48 and principle of minimal judicial interference – Foreign award passed under SMA Rules in New York cannot be invalidated by an Indian court unless objections under Section 48 are strictly satisfied – Enforcement bias and comity of courts to be respected [Paras 17.3–17.5, 19.3]

Judicial Discipline – Risk of Conflicting Decisions – Court noted pendency of first appeal (FA No. 604/2024) before Division Bench challenging Commercial Court decree – To avoid conflict, registry directed to place both matters before Chief Justice for allocation to one Bench [Paras 21–22]

Decision: I.A. Nos. 7505/2024 and 8151/2024 rejected – Objections to enforcement under Section 48 overruled – Order dated 15.07.2024 made final – Registry directed to place AC No. 60/2024 and FA No. 604/2024 before Chief Justice for assignment to same Bench to avoid conflicting decisions.

Contract Law – Rescission of Railway Contract – Forfeiture of Security Deposit – Petitioner awarded contract for re-spacing of SC sleepers under N.F. Railway – Work halted due to technical variation – Petitioner submitted multiple representations seeking approval of variation and extension of time – Railway issued show-cause notices under Clause 62 of General Conditions of Contract without specifying exact default – Contract rescinded and guarantee forfeited immediately after petitioner informed about readiness to resume work – Held: Authorities acted arbitrarily and failed to consider representations – Principles of natural justice violated – Termination notice and forfeiture orders set aside – Respondents directed to refund security deposit and performance guarantee [Paras 5-7, 16-18].

Natural Justice – Hearing Before Termination – Petitioner’s letters dated 22.11.2021, 29.11.2021 and 19.01.2022 were not responded to – No speaking order passed showing consideration of replies – Held: Decision to rescind contract without addressing representations amounts to violation of natural justice [Paras 16-18].

Alternative Remedy – Arbitration Clause – Clause 64 of Railway Contract provides arbitration except for matters under Clause 62 – Held: Termination under Clause 62 is an “excepted matter” – Court has jurisdiction to entertain writ – Further, violation of natural justice justifies invoking Article 226 despite alternate remedy [Paras 14-16].

Administrative Law – Arbitrary Action – Failure of Railway to consider contractor’s request for variation approval and intent to complete work – No finding recorded on replies – Decision to terminate appears predetermined and one-sided – Held arbitrary and unsustainable in law [Paras 16-18].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Termination notices dated 16.11.2021, 25.11.2021 and rescission order dated 20.01.2022 set aside – Respondents directed to refund the security deposit and performance guarantee within two months [Para 18-19].

Criminal Law – Murder – Common Intention – Evidence of Eye-witnesses – Conviction Upheld – Appellants convicted under Sections 302/34, 324/34, and 325/34 IPC for murdering a 13-year-old boy and grievously injuring his father and other family members – Trial Court convicted 3 out of 8 accused – High Court found that all three convicted accused acted with common intention and came armed to assault the deceased and others – Medical and ocular evidence corroborated each other – Minor inconsistencies in testimonies did not affect core of prosecution’s case – Held: Conviction justified and supported by credible eye-witnesses including injured witnesses [Paras 3, 39-41, 48-49]

Criminal Law – Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC – Not Attracted – Sudden Fight – Premeditation – Defense Plea Rejected – Appellants argued that the incident occurred due to a sudden quarrel arising from a dispute over cattle – Held: Evidence revealed prior threats, premeditated attack, and targeted killing – Deceased was chased, dragged from hiding, and fatally attacked – Injured witnesses consistently testified to intent and brutality – Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC not applicable – Conviction under Section 302 IPC upheld [Paras 42-47]

Witness Testimony – Family Members as Eye-Witnesses – Credibility – PW.1 (mother), PW.4 & PW.8 (sisters), and PW.11 (father) were injured eye-witnesses – Testimonies corroborated and supported by VDP Secretary (PW.3) and others – Held: Relationship with the deceased does not discredit testimony if otherwise credible and consistent – No reason to disbelieve their statements [Paras 36, 39-41]

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 302/34, 324/34, and 325/34 IPC confirmed – No grounds for interference.

Rape and POCSO – Conviction – Repeated Penetrative Sexual Assault on Minor – Accused convicted for offences under Sections 376(2)(i) and 376(2)(n) IPC and Section 6 r/w Section 5(l) POCSO Act – Prosecution alleged repeated sexual assault on a 13-year-old girl between September 2015 and February 2016 – Trial Court imposed sentence of rigorous imprisonment for ten years with fine – Held: Evidence on record proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction and sentence affirmed [Paras 1–4, 31].

Evidence – Testimony of Child Victim – Reliability – Victim’s deposition consistent, cogent and free from embellishments – Clear narration of repeated sexual assault inside her house – Medical evidence showed torn hymen and signs consistent with sexual intercourse – Testimony corroborated by mother of the victim – Held: Sole testimony of victim of sterling quality sufficient to sustain conviction [Paras 8–12].

POCSO Act – Section 29 – Presumption of Guilt – Foundational facts of penetrative sexual assault proved through oral and medical evidence – Statutory presumption under Section 29 attracted – Accused failed to rebut presumption – Held: Trial Court rightly invoked presumption against accused [Paras 11–12].

Age of Victim – Proof – Birth Certificate and Oral Evidence – Ext.P2 birth certificate showed date of birth as 18.08.2002 though name of child not recorded – Victim’s unchallenged testimony regarding date of birth corroborated by certificate – Absence of child’s name in birth certificate not fatal – Held: Age of victim proved on cumulative appreciation of evidence [Paras 13, 28–30].

POCSO Act – Determination of Age – Applicability of Juvenile Justice Acts – Principles in Jarnail Singh and Yuvaprakash considered – Held: Provisions of Juvenile Justice Acts provide guidance but are not the exclusive mode for determining age of a victim under the POCSO Act – Courts may rely on evidence admissible under the Evidence Act – Rigid application of JJ Act norms would defeat object of POCSO Act [Paras 15–27].

Sentence – Leniency – Refusal – Nature of offence grave involving repeated sexual assault on a minor – Young age of accused not a mitigating circumstance – Minimum statutory punishment justified – Compensation awarded to victim upheld [Paras 5–6, 31].

Decision: Criminal Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 376(2)(i), 376(2)(n) IPC and Section 6 r/w Section 5(l) POCSO Act confirmed – Compensation to victim sustained.

Service Law – Gratuity – Conflict between Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and Service Rules – CMD of Government Company – Applicability of MSTC CDA Rules – Appellant-company challenged Single Judge judgment upholding entitlement of respondent (former CMD) to gratuity under the 1972 Act – Held: Where service conditions are governed by CDA Rules permitting continuation of disciplinary proceedings and recovery of pecuniary loss from gratuity, such Rules prevail – Single Judge erred in applying the Payment of Gratuity Act in exclusion of the Rules [Paras 27–38].

Service Jurisprudence – Disciplinary Proceedings after Superannuation – Legal Fiction of Continuation in Service – Rule 30A of MSTC CDA Rules – Disciplinary proceedings initiated prior to retirement and concluded thereafter – Punishment of recovery from gratuity imposed – Held: Rule 30A(i) creates a legal fiction of deemed continuation in service – Authority competent to impose punishment including recovery from gratuity even after superannuation [Paras 28–35].

Gratuity – Forfeiture / Recovery – Section 4(6), Payment of Gratuity Act – Interpretation – Respondent contended forfeiture impermissible absent termination – Court held that Rule 30A(ii) of CDA Rules operates disjunctively – Recovery permissible either for misconduct under Section 4(6) of the Act or for negligence causing pecuniary loss proved in disciplinary proceedings – Compliance with Section 4(6) not mandatory in every case of recovery under CDA Rules [Paras 31, 35–37].

Service Rules – Primacy over Gratuity Act – Effect of Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindranath Choubey – Supreme Court held that Payment of Gratuity Act does not fetter power of employer to continue disciplinary proceedings or impose punishment under applicable service rules – Single Judge relied on overruled decision in Jaswant Singh Gill – Held: Impugned judgment contrary to settled law and unsustainable [Paras 7–8, 32–38].

Judicial Review – Limits – Gratuity Proceedings – Controlling and Appellate Authorities under Gratuity Act cannot examine legality or propriety of disciplinary proceedings – Single Judge erred in traversing into disciplinary findings while adjudicating gratuity claim – Held: Such exercise beyond permissible scope [Paras 38].

Service Law – Finality of Disciplinary Punishment – Respondent did not challenge punishment order dated 30/04/2013 imposing recovery from gratuity – Accepted and allowed to attain finality – Held: Subsequent gratuity claim cannot indirectly unsettle final disciplinary order [Paras 36–37].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of Single Judge dated 25/03/2025 in WPA No. 15908 of 2019 set aside – Order of Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act dated 30/04/2019 set aside – Order of Controlling Authority dated 20/02/2018 upheld – Respondent not entitled to gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Municipal Law – License Fees – Sections 244, 245, 386(2) MMC Act – Upheld – The Municipal Corporation has the legal authority to levy license fees for granting/renewing permissions for sky-signs, hoardings, and advertisements under Sections 244, 245, and 386(2) of the MMC Act – The contention that the Municipal Commissioner lacks authority to fix or enhance these fees is rejected, as the statutory scheme and the 2003 Rules clearly empower the Commissioner to issue licenses and written permissions on payment of fees, which are fixed from time to time with the sanction of the Corporation – The challenge to the constitutional validity of these provisions was not pressed by the petitioners – The argument that a distinction between "sky-sign" and "advertisement" for license fee purposes is misconceived and contrary to the Rules – The Court found no illegality in the Municipal Corporation's decision-making process [Paras 135, 148].

Taxation – Fee vs. Tax – Article 243X, Entry 5, Entry 66 List II, Seventh Schedule – Regulatory Fee – The license fee collected by the municipal corporation for sky-signs and hoardings is a regulatory fee, not a tax – The distinction between "tax" and "fee" has evolved, and strict quid pro quo is not always necessary for a regulatory fee; a broad and general correlation between the fee collected and the services rendered (e.g., regulatory oversight, public safety, urban planning) is sufficient – The contention that the fee is a tax because it contributes to municipal revenue is rejected, as Section 82 of the MMC Act includes fees as part of the municipal fund – The deletion of Entry 55 from List II of the Seventh Schedule (advertisement tax) does not affect the Municipal Corporation's power to levy regulatory fees, as legislative competence is derived from Article 243X read with Entries 5 and 66 of List II, which remain intact and recognize the power of State Legislatures to authorize municipalities to impose fees [Paras 138-147, 157, 160].

Goods and Services Tax (GST) – Impact on License Fees – Deletion of Entry 55 List II – No Obliteration – The provisions of the MMC Act permitting the municipal corporation to recover license fees do not stand obliterated by the introduction of the Central/Maharashtra Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – The Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, specifically Section 173, repeals only the Maharashtra Advertisements Tax Act, 1967, which dealt with tax on cinematographic advertisements, not the license fees under the MMC Act – The license fee for sky-signs/hoardings is a regulatory fee, distinct from an "advertisement tax" under the erstwhile Entry 55 of List II – The GST regime applies to the supply of goods or services by advertisers to their clients, which is a separate transaction from the license granted by the municipal corporation for erecting/retaining sky-signs – Therefore, there is no double taxation or loss of authority for the municipal corporation to levy these fees [Paras 157, 159, 160].

Retrospective Application – Sanction of Rates – Section 386(2) MMC Act – Valid – The action of the Municipal Commissioner in proposing a hike in the license fee to Rs.222/- per sq. ft. p.a. from 1 April 2013, as sanctioned/ratified by the General Body of the Pune Municipal Corporation vide Resolution No.667 dated 28 September 2018, is legal and valid – The term "sanction" in Section 386(2) does not necessarily imply "prior sanction" and can include ex-post facto ratification, especially when the legislature has not used qualifying words like "prior" or "previous" as it has in other sections of the MMC Act – The payment of fees by advertisers, even under protest, and the subsequent General Body approval validate the levy from the specified date – The argument that such retrospective levy is illegal is rejected [Paras 165-169, 172].

Reasonableness of Fees – Regulatory Nature – Upheld – The petitioners' contention that the license fee of Rs.222/- per sq. ft. p.a. is unreasonable and disproportionately high is untenable – The rate was fixed based on market response from a tender process in 2011 and is comparable to rates in other municipal corporations – The municipal corporation's need to generate revenue for public welfare, infrastructure, and administrative costs, which have increased over time, justifies the revision of fees – The Court will not interfere with rate fixation unless it is palpably arbitrary or unreasonable to the extent of extinguishing business [Paras 173-176, 184, 185].

Scrutiny Fee – Rs.5000/- – Valid – The levy of a Rs.5000/- scrutiny fee for processing applications for grant or renewal of licenses for sky-signs/hoardings is administrative in nature and justified – This fee covers the costs of site verification, technical scrutiny, and other administrative processes involved in licensing – It is distinct from the license fee and is not arbitrary or illegal [Paras 177, 178].

Administrator's Powers – Section 452A MMC Act – Valid – The Municipal Commissioner, when acting as an Administrator under Section 452A of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, has the full authority and power of the municipal corporation itself, including the power to enhance license fees – This dual capacity is a consequence desired by the legislation, and rendering such a provision nugatory would be untenable [Paras 180-182].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – No costs.

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Bail – Section 37 NDPS Act – Prolonged Incarceration – Article 21 Constitution of India – Bail application rejected where commercial quantity of Heroin and Charas were recovered from a vehicle linked to the applicant, and bank transactions indicated involvement in drug trafficking – Applicant sought bail citing prolonged pre-trial detention (over three and a half years) as a violation of the right to speedy trial under Article 21, relying on Supreme Court precedents like Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb and Rabi Prakash v. The State of Odisha – Court noted that the co-accused, Bashir Ahmed, was granted bail by the trial court despite similar allegations – Prosecution argued that the applicant was involved in criminal conspiracy, acted as a courier for Bashir Ahmed, and had significant bank transactions related to drug trade – Court found sufficient evidence of prima facie involvement in illicit traffic of commercial quantity contraband – Held that the statutory bar under Section 37 of the NDPS Act applies, and the applicant failed to satisfy the twin conditions for bail, particularly regarding non-involvement in the offence – The plea of prolonged incarceration was rejected in light of the nature and gravity of the offences and their impact on society – Bail application dismissed. [Paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17]

Criminal Procedure – Bail – Speedy Trial – Article 21 Constitution of India – Section 37 NDPS Act – While prolonged incarceration can be a ground for bail, especially under Article 21, this principle is not absolute and must be harmonized with statutory restrictions in special statutes like the NDPS Act – The Supreme Court in Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb held that Section 43D(5) of UAPA (analogous to Section 37 NDPS Act) does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of Article 21 violation, particularly when there is no likelihood of trial completion within a reasonable time and incarceration has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence – However, the present case involves commercial quantity of contraband, triggering the rigors of Section 37 NDPS Act – The Court, relying on Union of India v. Vigin K. Varghese, emphasized that a finding of non-guilt based on prolonged incarceration must be supported by a careful appraisal of material and cannot be a casual observation – In the absence of material to satisfy the twin conditions of Section 37, the plea of prolonged incarceration alone is insufficient to grant bail, especially given the gravity and societal impact of drug trafficking offences – The application for bail was dismissed. [Paras 3, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Bail application dismissed along with connected application(s) – [Paras 17, 18].