Criminal Law – Sexual Assault – POCSO Act – Determination of Victim’s Age – The appellant was convicted under Section 7/8 of the POCSO Act for sexual assault on a minor girl – The appellant argued that the age of the prosecutrix had not been correctly determined and that the scholar register alone was insufficient to prove the age – Court upheld the trial court’s reliance on the scholar register (Exhibit-P/6), showing the prosecutrix's date of birth as 09/10/2007, making her under 12 years of age at the time of the incident – Held: The prosecutrix was below 18 years and falls within the scope of a "child" under the POCSO Act – Conviction upheld Paras10−13.

Outraging Modesty of a Minor – Section 7/8 POCSO Act – The appellant contended that the sexual intent was not proven – Court held that the act of pressing the prosecutrix's chest and threatening her was sufficient to indicate sexual intent – Under Section 30(1) of the POCSO Act, the presumption of culpable mental state was applicable, and the appellant failed to prove the absence of such intent – Conviction under Section 7/8 of the POCSO Act was upheld based on the prosecutrix’s testimony and corroborative evidence Paras19−22.

Contradictions in Testimonies – Materiality in Criminal Cases – The appellant pointed out contradictions in the prosecution’s evidence, particularly in the testimony of the prosecutrix’s friend, who turned hostile – Court held that minor contradictions or omissions are not grounds to discard the testimony of the prosecutrix, who is considered an injured witness – In cases of sexual assault, the victim’s consistent testimony is of paramount importance and minor discrepancies do not affect the overall credibility Paras16−18.

Sentencing in POCSO Cases – Stringent Punishment Required – The appellant sought leniency in sentencing, arguing that the charges under Section 9/10 POCSO Act should have been applied due to the victim’s age – Court noted that although the charges were framed under Section 7/8, no remand was necessary for re-trial – The three-year sentence imposed under Section 7/8 POCSO Act was appropriate given the circumstances of the case and the appellant's conduct Paras24−26.

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence of three years R.I. with a fine of Rs.1,000/- under Section 7/8 of the POCSO Act affirmed – Appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence  Paras27−28.

Civil Procedure – Amendment of Plaint – Application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC – Amendment allowed to correct typographical errors and include additional facts – High Court considered amendments necessary for proper adjudication of the controversy – Amendments included correction of receipt date, addition of payment details, and challenge to a Sale Deed executed after the original suit was filed – Court applied a liberal approach in allowing the amendment as trial had not yet commenced – Limitation challenge to the Sale Deed to be determined during trial [Paras 1-5, 38-43].

Limitation and Knowledge – Amendment related to Sale Deed challenge – Plaintiff sought to amend the plaint to challenge a Sale Deed executed in favor of new defendants (added later in the case) – Plaintiff claimed to have been unaware of the Sale Deed at the time of filing the original suit – High Court noted that the issue of limitation would be determined based on evidence after the amendment was allowed – Liberal approach to amendment upheld in view of ongoing pre-trial stage [Paras 4, 41-42].

Decision – Amendment Application Allowed – Held – The application for amendment was allowed considering that the amendments sought were necessary for resolving the real issues in controversy – The amendments did not alter the nature of the suit or prejudice the defendants – The amended plaint was accepted by the Court, with directions for subsequent pleadings to be filed within stipulated timeframes [Paras 44-48].

Interim Maintenance – Enhancement – Appeal against Family Court’s order – Both parties filed appeals, one for setting aside and the other for enhancement of interim maintenance – Family Court granted enhanced maintenance considering husband’s income and wife’s dependency – Appeal by husband dismissed, appeal by wife partially allowed, enhancing maintenance further [Paras 1-88].

Concealment of Income – Family Court’s findings – Husband concealed true income and assets – Attempts to mislead court documented – Appeal against this finding rejected [Paras 28-48].

Functus Officio – Family Court’s jurisdiction – Family Court can decide interim maintenance applications even after withdrawal of main divorce petition – Reliance on judicial precedents supporting this view – Husband’s contention rejected [Paras 18-23].

Maintenance for Adult Child – Application under Section 26 of HMA – Maintenance can be awarded to a child pursuing education even after attaining majority – Family Court’s grant of maintenance till the son attains age of 26 or becomes financially independent upheld [Paras 24-34].

Delay in Adjudication – Dilatory tactics by husband – Family Court noted and addressed undue delay caused by husband’s tactics – Impact on maintenance payments acknowledged [Paras 3, 11].

Decision:

MAT.APP.(F.C) 226/2018 by Husband dismissed with costs.

MAT.APP.(F.C) 120/2019 by Wife allowed to the extent of enhancing interim maintenance to Rs.1,45,000/- per month from 28^th February 2009 to 14^th July 2016, with interest.

Arrears and interest to be paid within eight weeks.

No bearing on pending Cr.P.C. Section 125 proceedings [Paras 62-61].

Interest on Delayed Payment of Gratuity – Rate of Interest –

Petitioner challenged the order directing payment of simple interest on delayed gratuity at 10% per the 1987 notification, arguing for application of the 7.1% rate per the 2022 notification – Court held the 1987 notification specifying 10% interest as valid and applicable – Misreading of Section 7(3A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act by petitioner noted – Court reiterated that the rate specified by the 1987 notification remains in force [Paras 5-9].

Statutory Provisions – Section 7(3A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act –

Employer must pay interest on delayed gratuity as notified by the Central Government – Court clarified that the 2022 notification concerning long-term deposits does not override the specific 1987 notification under the Payment of Gratuity Act – Correct interpretation and application of statutory notifications emphasized [Paras 7-9].

Decision:

All petitions dismissed – Court upheld the order directing payment of simple interest at 10% on delayed gratuity as per the 1987 notification – Petitioner’s claim for 7.1% interest rate rejected [Paras 9-10].

Criminal Revision Petition – Dismissal – Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Marriage and Dowry Allegations – Respondent's claim of marriage in 2006 and dowry payment of Rs. 5 lakh. Assertion of domestic violence and harassment by the petitioner and his family, leading to the filing of a DV Act petition and a criminal case under Section 498A of IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act. [Paras 2, 3]

Trial Court Findings – Conclusion of domestic violence under the DV Act. Order for the petitioner to pay Rs. 25,000 monthly maintenance, cover 50% of the child's educational expenses, and prohibition from committing domestic violence or interfering with the respondent's residence. [Paras 4]

Appeals and Re-Appreciation of Evidence – Dismissal of appeal by the First Appellate Court, upholding Trial Court's findings. [Para 4]

Petitioner's Contentions – Challenge on grounds of erroneous application of DV Act, questioning maintenance amount, and readiness to provide accommodation. [Paras 5, 6]

Respondent's Defense – Emphasis on petitioner's non-involvement at the time of the child's birth and continued domestic violence, justifying the need for DV Act's protection. [Para 7]

High Court's Observation – Confirmation of the Trial Court's decision, considering the petitioner's income and the necessity of maintenance and residence rights under DV Act. No substantial legal error found in the Trial Court's and First Appellate Court's decisions. [Paras 8, 9]

Decision:

Revision petition dismissed, upholding the orders of the Trial and First Appellate Courts. [Para 10]

Quashing of Cognizance and Summoning Order – Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Applicant seeks quashing of order of cognizance and summoning dated 11.05.2015 in Case No.110 of 2015 – Allegations under Sections 406/323/504/506/34 IPC – Applicant contends that order lacks application of mind as his name was transcribed in the order but no cognizance was taken against him – Applicant argues that proceedings against him are an abuse of process of law – State argues that cognizable offence against applicant is made out – Court examines the legality of taking cognizance on a printed proforma without application of judicial mind – Court emphasizes the duty of Magistrate to apply judicial mind while taking cognizance – Court cites precedents highlighting the requirement of judicial application in summoning orders – Court observes that order lacks proper application of mind and is against settled judicial norms – Court quashes impugned cognizance and summoning order – Direction given to decide issue afresh within two months while adhering to judicial norms. [Paras 1-40]

Criminal Procedure - Bail Application – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Application of Section 439 CrPC - The accused applied for bail under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, in connection with offences under Sections 22(c) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Applications were consolidated due to arising from the same crime. [Para 1]

Prosecution Allegations – Possession of Contraband – MDMA and Methamphetamine – Accusations against the accused included possession of 499.28 grams of MDMA, later identified as Methamphetamine, a commercial quantity of contraband, seized during a vehicle interception by the authorities. [Para 2, 6]

Defence Contentions – Violation of NDPS Act Provisions and Rules, Prejudice Due to Delay in Sample Analysis – Defence argued innocence and false implication, highlighting procedural violations in the seizure and analysis of contraband under the NDPS Act and related Rules, specifically pointing out delay in forwarding samples to the laboratory, causing prejudice to the accused. [Para 4, 11]

Prosecution's Argument – Substance as Commercial Quantity, Compliance with NDPS Act Requirements – Prosecution contended the involvement of the accused, citing the commercial quantity of the contraband and compliance with procedural requirements under the NDPS Act. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court and High Court precedents emphasizing the irrelevance of detention length in NDPS cases. [Para 5]

Judicial Analysis – Consideration of Rule Violations, Application of Section 37 of NDPS Act – The court noted the allegation of rule violations, but maintained that determination of procedural compliance and resulting prejudice was a matter for trial. The focus was on the applicability of Section 37 of the NDPS Act due to the commercial quantity of the contraband. [Para 7-15]

Decision – Denial of Bail, Application of Section 37 Rigours – Bail was denied considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the commercial quantity of the contraband, and the applicability of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The court found no reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioners had not committed the alleged offences and noted the potential risk of repetition of offences. [Para 16-21]

Criminal Law – Money Laundering – Bail Application – Applicant Sanjay Kansal, involved in creating fictitious firms and facilitating bogus transactions leading to siphoning of funds from a bank loan received by M/s SBBEL – Arrested under ECIR for money laundering, with allegations of being instrumental in bogus sales and purchases totaling significant amounts – Applicant not a key managerial person but alleged to have acted under the direction of relatives who were the main accused – Prosecution based on statements under Section 50 PMLA, which applicant claims were manipulated – Various similarly placed co-accused not arrested, raising issues of parity – Bail granted based on the lack of direct evidence of applicant’s knowledge or intent to launder money, his role in the company, and judicial discretion under PMLA regarding bail conditions. [Para 1-35]

Summoning - Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, Section 28 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sections 468, 469 - Offence punishable under - Maximum punishment - Imposition of sentence - Scope of - Whether, in a case where an offence is punishable under Section 28 of the Drugs Act with a maximum imprisonment for a term of one year, the Court can take cognizance of the offence beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. - Held, no - Once the report of the Government Analyst was received by the respondent, the complaint filed after the expiry of the period of limitation was clearly barred by limitation - Summoning order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa against the petitioner was beyond jurisdiction - Criminal proceedings rendered unsustainable . (para 9, 10)

Amendment of complaint - Maintaining a criminal complaint against a company without impleading its authorized representative - Whether permissible - Held, maintaining criminal proceedings against the company only, when sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed on the juristic person, is an exercise in futility - Application seeking impleadment through amendment doubted for its maintainability. (para 11)

Limitation - Commencement of the period of limitation - Report of the Laboratory - Whether the limitation for filing a complaint commences from the date of receipt of the report of the Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory or from the date of the report received from the competent authority – Held - the limitation commences from the date of the offence alleged to have been committed - The report received from the competent authority cannot be the basis for the commencement of limitation. (para 8)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 468, 469 - Offences under Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 - Limitation for taking cognizance of offence - Whether the period of limitation should be computed from the date of the offence or from the date of receipt of the report or from the date of knowledge of the commission of offence – Held - the period of limitation should be computed from the date of the offence alleged to have been committed - The date of receipt of the report or the date of knowledge of the commission of offence are relevant only when the date of the offence is not known to the person aggrieved or the police officer. (para 8)