Civil Law - Temple Property – Fraudulent Decree – Pujari’s Lack of Ownership – Decree dated 10.01.1997 obtained by suppression, forged will, and concealment of necessary parties – Fraud vitiates all judicial acts – Pujari only a manager, not owner – Deity is juristic person; property vests in deity with State as guardian – Res judicata not attracted – Trial Court justified in declaring earlier decree void ab initio – Appeal dismissed [Paras 35–45, 56–57].

Fraud on Court – Nullity of Decree – Principles – Held: Judgment and decree dated 10.01.1997 passed in Civil Suit No. 42-A/1996 obtained by deliberate suppression of necessary facts, non-disclosure of earlier litigation, concealment of rejection of forged will, and non-joinder of deity and Aukaf Committee – Applying S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu, A.V. Papayya Sastry, Smriti Madan Kansagra, Vishnu Vardhan, decree is void ab initio – Fraud unravels everything [Paras 35–41].

Temple/Deity Property – Juristic Ownership – Guardianship – Held: Murti Shri Ram Mandir is a juristic person and perpetual minor; property vests in deity; State acts as guardian for protection of endowed property – Suit correctly instituted through SDO as guardian – Valid in law [Paras 49–51].

Pujari – Status and Rights – Managerial but not Proprietary Rights – Held: Pujari is only a manager/custodian, not an owner; cannot acquire Bhumiswami rights; cannot claim through guru-chela lineage; revenue entries of possession do not confer title – Reliance placed on State of M.P. v. Pujari Utthan Avam Kalyan Samiti (2021) 10 SCC 222, Mst. Kanchaniya, Kal Bhairav Trust [Paras 52–54].

Will of Guru Narayandas – Found Forged – Handwriting expert report (Ex. P/14), complaint (Ex. P/12), and admission of DW-1 establish fabrication – Gokuldas’ claim of succession rejected; his appointment as Pujari earlier set aside by Commissioner – His assertion of ownership illegal [Paras 40–41].

Res Judicata – Not Applicable – Held: Principle inapplicable where earlier decree obtained by fraud – Order dated 30.11.2006 already held suit maintainable; attained finality – Fraud is an exception to res judicata; decree can be challenged at any stage [Paras 42–44].

Order XXIII Rule 3-A CPC – No Bar – Earlier decree not a compromise decree; deity was not a party to earlier suit; therefore, bar under Rule 3-A does not apply [Para 43].

Revenue Records – Presumptive Value Only – Held: Revenue entries (Ex. D/1–D/68) show possession for management; cannot prove title – Property recorded as “Murti Shri Ram Mandir Mafi Okaf” (Ex. P/10) confirms ownership of deity – Follows Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society (2014) 2 SCC 269 [Paras 45–47].

Pujari’s Eligibility – Customary Tradition – Gokuldas’ two marriages violated celibate Nihang tradition of math; disqualified from claiming spiritual succession – No personal or hereditary right to property [Para 55].

Maintainability – Suit by Deity – Valid – Learned Trial Court correctly held suit maintainable and not hit by technical bars – State rightly represented deity as guardian [Paras 49–51].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Judgment and decree dated 14.03.2007 affirming that decree dated 10.01.1997 was void ab initio upheld – Earlier decree obtained by fraud, concealment of essential facts, forged will, and non-joinder of necessary parties – Deity is owner of property; Pujari only a manager – Suit validly instituted through State as guardian – No error in Trial Court findings – No order as to costs – Pending IAs closed [Paras 56–57].

Civil Law - Surplus Area Declaration – Mandatory Notice to Tenants – Rule 6 of Punjab Security of Land Tenure Rules, 1956 – Held: It is mandatory for the Collector to serve notice upon tenants in cultivating possession before declaring land as surplus. Where revenue records (Jamabandis 1950-1981) consistently showed plaintiffs as tenants, an order passed declaring land surplus without notice to them is in complete violation of statutory mandate and principles of natural justice. Such an order is void ab initio and non-est in the eyes of law. [Paras 16, 19-20].

Vesting of Land in State – Section 12(3) of Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 – Validity of Foundation Order – Held: Vesting of surplus land in the State postulates a valid surplus declaration. If the foundational order (1961 surplus order) is void for want of notice, no vesting takes place under Section 12(3). The State cannot acquire title based on a nullity, and consequently, cannot allot such land to third parties. [Paras 17-18, 21].

Jurisdiction of Civil Court – Bar under Section 26 of Haryana Ceiling Act – Exception for Void Orders – Held: The bar on Civil Court jurisdiction applies only to orders passed within jurisdiction by prescribed authorities. It does not apply where the foundational order is a nullity or void ab initio. The Civil Court retains jurisdiction to examine and set aside orders passed without complying with mandatory statutory procedures (specifically notice under Rule 6). [Paras 22-23].

Limitation – Suit for Possession based on Title – Article 65 Limitation Act – Held: A suit seeking recovery of possession based on title is governed by Article 65 (12 years limitation), not Article 58. Limitation does not run in favor of a party who takes possession under a void and non-est order. [Paras 25-26].

Decision: Appeal dismissed. Concurrent findings of Courts below affirmed. [Para 28].

Civil Law - Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Conduct of Plaintiff – Held: The plaintiff-appellants took divergent stands at different stages: initially claiming part of the land was acquired, then claiming the agreement was cancelled, and subsequently asserting the plot was not identifiable. Such contradictory stands negate the plea of readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The defendant-respondent was proven to be present at the Sub-Registrar’s office with necessary documents, whereas plaintiffs failed to perform their part. [Paras 8-9].

Concurrent Findings of Fact – Scope of Interference under Section 100 CPC – Held: Both the Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently found that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing. In the absence of any reliable evidence to the contrary or any substantial question of law, the High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact. [Paras 8-9].

Decision: Appeal dismissed. Pending applications disposed of. [Para 9].

Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Reconstruction Of Record - Non-Availability Of Trial Court Record - Effect On Appeal - Held: The destruction of the Trial Court's record does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the appeal or affirmation of the Trial Court's decree. Where reconstruction is not fully possible due to non-cooperation of respondents, the Appellate Court can proceed based on available documents, pleadings, and the judgment under challenge. A party cannot take advantage of their own wrong in failing to cooperate with reconstruction.

Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 16 - Undue Influence - Fiduciary Relationship - Burden Of Proof - Held: A fiduciary relationship exists between an elder brother and a younger brother where the latter reposes confidence in the former. Where a transaction (Relinquishment Deed) appears unconscionable and is between parties in a fiduciary relationship, the burden of proof shifts to the beneficiary (dominant party) to prove the transaction was not induced by undue influence. Inducing a younger brother to execute a deed to "save family honor" against a sister's partition suit constitutes undue influence.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 92 - Parol Evidence - Sham Documents - Held: The bar under Section 92 (excluding oral evidence to contradict written terms) does not apply when a party pleads that the document was a "sham" and was never intended to be acted upon. Oral evidence is admissible to prove that a transaction recorded in a document was a paper transaction meant to serve a collateral purpose (frustrating a third party's suit) and was not intended to be enforced between the signatories.

Muslim Law - Relinquishment Of Share - Spes Successionis - Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 - Section 6(A) - Held: A "Dastbardari" (Relinquishment Deed) cannot be valid if the beneficiary (transferee) denies the title/share of the transferor in the first place. One cannot relinquish a right that is not admitted to exist. Furthermore, under Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act and Muslim Law, the transfer of spes successionis (chance of succession) is void ab initio. A renunciation of a chance of succession is not valid.

Estoppel - Validity Of Sham Document - Held: A document obtained through undue influence and proven to be a sham (executed solely to defeat a sister's claim in a separate suit) creates no estoppel against the executor. Such a document, which was never acted upon or produced in the relevant partition suit for decades, cannot be enforced.

Decision: Appeal allowed. Judgment and Decree dated 6-1-1973 set aside. The "Dastbardari" dated 23-2-1966 is declared null and void. Parties held entitled to shares as per the preliminary decree in the connected partition suit (2/5th share each to brothers).

Constitutional Law – Resignation by Legislator – Inaction by Chairman – Writ maintainable – Petitioner, a Member of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council, submitted resignation on 23.11.2024 – Chairman failed to act upon it for over nine months – Held: Under Article 190(3)(b) and Rule 190 of the Council Rules, the Chairman is duty-bound to verify only voluntariness and genuineness of resignation and render a decision within reasonable time – Inaction held arbitrary and violative of Article 14 [Paras 26, 56, 64, 68]

Discretionary Power – Limits on Constitutional Functionaries – No absolute discretion – Discretion under Article 190(3)(b) and Rule 190 must align with constitutional standards – Use of term “may” in Rule 190(2) interpreted as “must” in light of constitutional intent and Parliamentary debates – Chairman cannot indefinitely delay action on resignation – Time beyond a month unreasonable [Paras 24, 29-33, 60-63]

Judicial Review – Legislative Procedure – Limited scope of interference – Courts may not decide voluntariness/genuineness but may intervene against prolonged delay – Held: Chairman’s prolonged inaction offends Wednesbury reasonableness and constitutional morality – Judicial review available on grounds of arbitrariness [Paras 24, 39, 44, 64-66]

Legislative Practice – Timeline for inquiry into resignation – Based on debates during 33rd Constitutional Amendment, inquiry into voluntariness/genuineness must be completed preferably within a fortnight or, at most, a month – Chairman’s call for personal interaction after one year held unjustified – Court directed completion of process within four weeks [Paras 53, 55, 68]

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Chairman directed to complete inquiry into petitioner’s resignation and render a decision within four weeks – Inaction held illegal, arbitrary, and violative of Article 14.

Criminal Law - CrPC – MPDVPK Act – Jurisdiction – Cognizance – Magistrate's power under Section 156(3) CrPC – Offences under Section 394 IPC and Sections 11/13 MPDVPK Act being “specified offences” – Only Special Court competent to take cognizance under Section 8 of MPDVPK Act – Magistrate not empowered to direct registration of FIR for specified offences – FIR and Magistrate’s order quashed – Petition allowed [Paras 10–15].

Criminal Procedure – Section 156(3) CrPC – Stage of Investigation – Distinction between ordering investigation and taking cognizance – Held: Direction under Section 156(3) CrPC is not itself cognizance; however, only a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 CrPC can issue such direction – Since MPDVPK Act excludes Magistrate’s power to take cognizance regarding specified offences, Section 156(3) order also cannot be invoked for such offences [Paras 10, 13].

Special Courts – MPDVPK Act – Sections 6 & 8 – Exclusive jurisdiction – Specified offences – Section 394 IPC expressly included in “specified offence” under Section 2(f)(2)(iii) – Only Special Court can take cognizance of such offences – Magistrate lacks jurisdiction even at pre-cognizance stage for directing registration of FIR in respect of specified offences – Order of Magistrate invalid [Paras 11–14].

Interpretation – Section 2(b) & 2(f) MPDVPK Act – Definition of “dacoit” and “specified offence” – Offences committed in notified dacoity-affected areas fall exclusively within Special Court jurisdiction – Magistrate cannot assume competence merely because investigation is at initial stage [Para 14].

Quashing of Proceedings – Section 482 CrPC – Magistrate’s order directing registration of FIR for offences under Section 394 IPC and Sections 11/13 of MPDVPK Act set aside – FIR registered pursuant thereto also quashed as being without jurisdiction – Petition allowed [Para 15].

Service Law – Seniority – Determination of Inter-se Seniority – Direct Recruits vs. Promotees – Recruitment Year vs. Date of Appointment – Held: Seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of vacancy or initiation of recruitment process unless expressly provided by rules – It must be reckoned from the date of substantive appointment/entry into the cadre – The judgment in K. Meghachandra Singh (2020), which overruled N.R. Parmar (2012), is binding – Direct recruits appointed later cannot claim seniority over promotees appointed earlier, even if the vacancies pertained to an earlier year. [Paras 12, 18-19]

Precedent – Binding Nature – Reference to Larger Bench – Held: The fact that the decision in K. Meghachandra Singh has been referred to a larger bench in Hariharan (2022) does not stay its operation or dilute its binding nature – Subordinate courts and Tribunals must follow the existing law declared by the Supreme Court until it is overruled – Administration of justice cannot be put on hold awaiting a larger bench decision. [Para 20]

Seniority – Retrospective Application – Held: An employee not borne in the cadre cannot be given seniority retrospectively to affect those validly appointed in the meantime – Petitioners (Direct Recruits) appointed in 2017 cannot claim seniority over Promotees appointed in 2016, despite vacancies relating to 2015/2016. [Para 19]

Decision: Writ Petitions dismissed. Tribunal order upholding the seniority list based on K. Meghachandra Singh affirmed.

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 – Section 3 – Reproductive Autonomy and Consent – Held: The right to make reproductive choices is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. The consent of the pregnant person is paramount in decisions regarding termination of pregnancy. Under Section 3(4)(b), no pregnancy shall be terminated except with the consent of the pregnant woman. Even in cases of minors, where guardian consent is required, the opinion of the minor must be considered. The State or the Court cannot interfere with the personal choice of a pregnant person to continue the pregnancy. [Paras 6-9]

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) – Applicability in Absence of Consent – Held: The SOP laid down by the Division Bench (in WP No. 5184/2025), which mandates forwarding the victim to the District Court/Medical Board and subsequently to the High Court for pregnancies exceeding 24 weeks, is not required to be carried out in cases where the prosecutrix/victim does not give consent for the same. No direction for medical termination can be issued against the victim's will. [Paras 3, 10]

Decision: PUD (Paper Under Disposal) disposed of. Copy of order sent to the concerned trial court. [Paras 11-12]

Cybercrime – Bail Denied – Elderly Victims – Digital Arrest – Accused impersonated Cyber Police officials and placed 84-year-old couple under illegal 'digital arrest' – Extorted ₹2.02 crore between 30.04.2025 and 08.05.2025 – Petitioners received ₹45 lakh – Bail applications rejected due to gravity and corroborated financial trail – Court finds petitioners’ claims false and unsupported [Paras 1–8].

Cybercrime Investigation – Structural Weakness in Policing – Court criticises inadequate cyber investigation skills among police – Investigating Officers lack technical training and fail to track layered money trail and crypto transfers – Recommends specialized cybercrime units and IT-qualified Inspectors [Paras 9–17.1].

Judicial Directions – Institutional Reforms – Court orders creation of Rajasthan Cyber Crime Control Centre (R4C) akin to I4C – Directs recruitment of IT Inspectors with technical qualifications – Mandates establishment of accredited digital forensic labs and regular audits of digital transactions in government departments [Paras 26–30].

Public Policy – Regulation of Digital Infrastructure – Court issues 31-point action plan addressing cybercrime across banks, SIM issuance, BPOs, e-commerce platforms, gig economy workers, social media users and children’s phone usage – Emphasises mandatory registration, KYC, AI tools, verification, and accountability to combat digital fraud [Paras 27–38].

Digital Threat – National Challenge – Highlights exponential increase in cyber complaints (from 26,000 in 2019 to over 20 lakh in 2024) with poor FIR conversion – Recognises MHA and I4C’s efforts but urges Rajasthan to build its own cyber defence infrastructure independent of Centre’s support [Paras 17.2–24].

Decision: Bail applications dismissed – Petitioners to remain in judicial custody – Court directs urgent, multi-level reform across Rajasthan’s investigative, prosecutorial, financial, and social sectors to address growing threat of cybercrime and ensure digital safety