Tenancy Law — West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976 — Renewal of Tenancy — Mandatory Prerequisites — Section 3(2) Provisos and Rule 5 — Lease of respondent-tenant expired by efflux of time on 08.08.1998 and further terminated by notice under Section 3(1) — Renewal under the 1976 Act requires an application within the prescribed period along with simultaneous deposit of all arrears of rent with interest — Respondent never made any such formal application nor deposited arrears simultaneously — Request for issuance of monthly rent bills dated 05.05.2014 held not to constitute an application for renewal — Held: Respondents not entitled to renewal under the 1976 Act or the 1976 Rules for non-compliance with mandatory prerequisites [Paras 40–54].

1976 Act — Distinguished from Rent Control Laws — Government Premises on Different Footing — Argument that 1976 Act being beneficial legislation should be interpreted analogously to Sections 7 and 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Acts of 1997 and 1956 — Held: The 1976 Act operates on an entirely different premise; Government premises are treated distinctly due to administrative exigencies and public interest; the provisos to Section 3(2) are subservient to the main provision and no analogy with Rent Control laws is permissible [Paras 46–53].

Beneficial Scheme — Existing Allottee — Scope of Expression — Respondent applied for benefit of WBSIDCL Special Scheme dated 18.02.2021 (extended 25.08.2022) for conversion of short-term to 99-year long-term lease within the extended period — Scheme uses expression "existing allottees" and not "existing lessees" — Held: The deliberate use of "allottees" over "lessees" indicates that the Scheme was intended to benefit all allottees in occupation of the estate irrespective of whether any valid lease subsisted; respondent being in occupation as an allottee qualifies as an "existing allottee" — Application cannot be refused on the ground of absence of subsisting lease [Paras 55–63].

Scheme — Conditions of Withdrawal of Litigation and Payment of Arrears — Not Pre-conditions to Application — Appellants contended that pending litigation and non-deposit of arrears disentitled respondent from Scheme benefits — Held: Payment of arrears and withdrawal of litigation are conditions to be fulfilled after the application is considered and sanctioned in principle; requiring withdrawal of litigation as a pre-condition before any decision would leave the applicant remediless — Such interpretation cannot be countenanced under a beneficial Scheme [Para 64].

Article 14 — Discriminatory Treatment — Parity with M/s. Gravo Prints — M/s. Gravo Prints, whose lease had also expired and who was also a defaulter, was granted the benefit of the Scheme and treated as an existing allottee, with liberty to deposit arrears subsequent to application — Respondent stands on similar footing yet application was not even considered — Held: Once a privilege under a State Scheme is granted to one entity, all entities standing on similar footing acquire a right to similar treatment; refusal to consider respondent's application while extending benefit to M/s. Gravo Prints constitutes arbitrary and discriminatory State action violating Article 14 [Paras 68–75].

Legal Malice — State Action — Dispossession on Day of Filing of Writ Petition — WBSIDCL effected physical possession of subject-plots on 14.09.2023, the very date when respondents filed WPA 22402/2023, despite being served a copy of the writ petition and being informed that the matter would be taken up at 2:00 PM — Resumption order was also hurriedly passed immediately after WPA 4280/2014 was dismissed for default, before respondents could seek restoration — Held: Actions of appellant-authorities reek of legal malice; due process was merely paid lip-service; fairness must be read into due process — Element of legal malice manifest; impugned actions rightly set aside [Paras 76–82].

Decision: Appeals dismissed on contest — Impugned judgment dated 16.08.2024 affirmed — Possession of Plot Nos. K-10 and K-10/2, Behala Industrial Estate directed to be restored to respondents — WBSIDCL directed to extend benefits of the Scheme under Circular dated 18.02.2021 as extended on 25.08.2022 to respondents — No order as to costs.

Criminal Law – Quashing of proceedings – Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS – Scope and limits – FIR and victim statements disclose serious allegations of rape, administration of stupefying substance and blackmail – Presence of supporting material including alleged objectionable videos – Held: Where allegations prima facie disclose commission of cognizable offences and raise triable issues, inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to stifle prosecution; quashing refused [Paras 8–11]

Rape and sexual exploitation – Allegation under guise of exorcism – Victim allegedly administered ‘Prasad’ containing stupefying substance leading to unconsciousness and sexual assault – Subsequent repeated rape on threat of making videos viral – Held: Allegations indicate abuse of position of influence and coercion; require full-fledged trial [Paras 3–4, 9]

Blackmail and extortion – Sections 506 and 384 IPC – Allegation of recording objectionable videos and threatening victim with publication to compel sexual acts – Accused found prima facie in possession of such material as per supplementary affidavit – Held: Possession of such material lends prima facie corroboration to prosecution version; matter cannot be adjudicated at quashing stage [Para 9]

Delay in FIR – Effect – FIR lodged after two years of initial incident – Defence raised delay and alleged false implication due to enmity – Held: Delay and defence of false implication are matters of evidence and trial; cannot be grounds for quashing when allegations are otherwise credible [Paras 5, 9]

Consent – Plea of consensual relationship – Accused claimed love affair and consensual sexual relations – Victim denied such relationship and alleged coercion through blackmail – Held: Disputed question of consent cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 CrPC/528 BNSS; requires trial [Para 9]

Inherent powers – “Rarest of rare” standard – Powers under Section 482 CrPC/528 BNSS are wide but to be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of process or secure ends of justice – Not to be invoked where factual matrix discloses prima facie offence – Held: Case does not fall within parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal and subsequent precedents [Para 10]

Evaluation of evidence – Impermissibility at quashing stage – Court cannot conduct mini-trial or weigh defence evidence such as alleged monetary transactions or enmity – Held: Such defences to be examined during trial [Paras 5, 9]

Decision: Application dismissed – Charge sheet and criminal proceedings upheld – Trial to proceed in accordance with law.

Income Tax – Section 131(1A) – Summons for Investigation – Challenge on Ground of Malafide – Not Established – Petitioner challenged summons issued by the Income Tax Officer (Investigation) on 14.11.2025 requiring production of books of account, bank statements and property details, alleging it was issued at the instance of the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax who is remotely related to defendants in a pending civil suit – Held: None of the respondents are parties to the civil suit; petitioner himself is not a party; the Tax Evasion Petition was received on 12.11.2025 and summons issued following Standard Operating Procedure; interim injunction in the civil suit was passed in April 2025, months before the summons; plea of malafide raised only in the writ petition and not in replies before the income tax authorities; plea based on Chartered Accountant's affidavit which was introduced after the summons and is afterthought – Malafide in fact not proved [Paras 24, 34].

Income Tax – Malice in Law – Legal Malafide – Distinction – Malafide in fact requires direct proof of ill will or improper motive; malice in law is an act done without lawful excuse or for purposes foreign to those for which power is vested – Where the statutory authority has acted on an anonymous Tax Evasion Petition following the prescribed SOP, allotting Unique Identification Number and obtaining approval of the competent authority before issuing summons, there is no question of malice in law or colourable exercise of power – Burden of establishing malafide is very heavy on the person who alleges it [Paras 26-35].

Income Tax – Section 131(1A) – Jurisdiction of Income Tax Officer (Investigation) – Not Raised in Writ Petition – Reading Section 131(1A) with Section 132(1), the Income Tax Officer is included as an authorized officer to issue summons on being authorized by the competent superior authority – Additionally, the ground of want of jurisdiction was never raised in the writ petition or in the petitioner's replies before the income tax authorities and was raised orally for the first time at arguments, which is impermissible – Held: No jurisdictional infirmity made out [Paras 40-42].

Income Tax – Section 131(1A) – Stage of Investigation – Confidentiality – At the stage of summons under Section 131(1A), the income tax authority is not required to disclose the reasons, source of information, line of inquiry or scope of ongoing investigation; details of such investigation are confidential and even exempt from disclosure under Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act – Disclosure would defeat the purpose of investigation [Para 6].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Summons under Section 131(1A) held legal and not suffering from any infirmity – IA No. 4 of 2026 rejected – IA No. 3 of 2026 and all pending miscellaneous petitions closed.

POCSO – Penetrative Sexual Assault – Conviction Upheld – Victim's Testimony – Section 4 POCSO Act – Appellant convicted by Trial Court for sexually penetrating the anus of a minor boy and for showing pornographic material to a minor – Sentenced to simple imprisonment of seven years under Section 4 POCSO Act and one year under Section 293 IPC – On appeal, victim's testimony found natural and creditworthy – Absence of anal injury not fatal as Medical Officer found discomfort and slight pain during digital examination and opined possibility of penetration could not be ruled out – Corroboration not a sine qua non for conviction in sexual offences – Appeal dismissed [Paras 12–14, 25, 39–43].

Delay in FIR – Sexual Offences – Delay Not Fatal – Incident occurred on 02.09.2013; FIR lodged on 03.09.2013 – Victim's father was absent from home; victim and mother cannot be faulted – Delay in lodging FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard prosecution case, especially in sexual offences; court only examines whether satisfactory explanation has been offered [Para 17].

Witness Testimony – Contradictions – Discrepancies Not Going to Core – Discrepancies between victim's statement and his mother's statement regarding number of surrounding houses and whether victim attended school next day – Statements recorded more than six months after incident – Held: Minor discrepancies bound to arise with passage of time and do not shake the core of the prosecution case; each person reacts to a traumatic event in his own way and non-disclosure to neighbours or classmates cannot discredit the victim [Paras 22, 23].

Evidence – Cross-Examination – Failure to Challenge Witness – Recovery of Mobile Phone – Witness (PW4) who proved recovery of mobile phone containing memory card was not cross-examined – Held: Where testimony of a witness is not challenged in cross-examination, the same cannot be challenged during arguments; the recovery of the mobile phone with the memory card and pornographic clip must be accepted as proved, corroborating the victim's version [Para 26].

Evidence – Contradiction of Witness – Section 145 Evidence Act – Previous Statement – Victim's credit cannot be impeached on the ground that showing of pornographic clip was not mentioned in the FIR, as the victim's attention was not drawn to his previous statement in the manner prescribed under Section 145 of the Evidence Act; courts cannot suo motu take cognisance of contradictions not brought on record as per law [Paras 29–32].

Presumption – POCSO Act – Sections 29 and 30 – Foundational Facts – Burden on Accused – Statutory presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act is activated only after the prosecution establishes foundational facts, namely: (i) victim is a child; (ii) alleged incident has occurred; (iii) accused committed the offence; and (iv) supporting medical evidence where physical injury is caused – Once foundational facts are proved, burden shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption on a preponderance of probabilities – In the present case, victim's testimony was sufficient to prove foundational facts and the accused failed to lead any rebuttal evidence [Paras 34–39].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 293 IPC upheld – Sentence of seven years simple imprisonment under Section 4 POCSO Act and one year under Section 293 IPC confirmed [Paras 42, 43].

Criminal Law – Murder – Sections 302/34, 307/34, 509/34 and 506 IPC – Brutal daylight incident – Accused persons, armed with gun, knife and sharp-edged weapon (Daav), attacked deceased Chameli Devi due to land dispute – Deceased was knocked down, assaulted, beheaded and her head hung on a tree – Child witness also sustained firearm injury – Eyewitness account of PW-1 (informant), PW-2 and injured PW-8 found consistent on material particulars – Medical evidence establishing decapitation and abdominal injuries – Forensic evidence confirming presence of human blood on seized articles – Conduct of accused Lakhmi at spot (dancing near corpse with weapon) further corroborates prosecution version – Held: Chain of evidence complete and prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction affirmed [Paras 77–80]

Evidence – Child Witness – Competency and Reliability – Section 118 Evidence Act – PW-8 Krishna Kumar, injured eyewitness aged about 7 years at time of incident – Trial Court conducted preliminary examination to test understanding and capacity – Witness gave coherent, consistent account of assault, firing and beheading – Withstood lengthy cross-examination without material contradictions – No evidence of tutoring or embellishment – Presence at spot proved by injury and medical evidence showing firearm wound with blackening – Held: Testimony of injured child witness highly reliable, carries great evidentiary value and can independently sustain conviction without necessity of corroboration [Paras 61–72]

Evidence – Minor contradictions and inconsistencies – Appreciation – Alleged inconsistencies in testimony of PW-8 regarding presence of villagers and sequence after firearm injury – Explained in light of natural human conduct and surrounding circumstances – Witness fleeing after injury does not negate his presence or ability to witness occurrence – Distinction reiterated between normal discrepancies due to shock, trauma and lapse of time and material contradictions affecting core prosecution case – Held: Discrepancies trivial and do not dent credibility of prosecution [Paras 43–52]

Evidence – Injured witness – Evidentiary value – PW-8 being injured witness lends assurance to prosecution case – His presence at scene cannot be doubted – Medical evidence corroborates ocular testimony – Held: Testimony of injured witness entitled to great weight and reliability [Paras 51, 72]

Doctrine of Falsus in Uno Falsus in Omnibus – Applicability – Argument that entire testimony must be discarded if part found unreliable – Rejected – Held: Doctrine not applicable in Indian criminal law – It is only a rule of caution – Court entitled to separate grain from chaff and rely upon trustworthy portion of evidence [Paras 53–56]

Defence Evidence – Alibi – Evaluation of defence witness – DW-5 projected as chance witness claiming no one present at spot at 4:00 PM – Statement inconsistent with prompt FIR (lodged at 04:30 PM mentioning incident at 03:15 PM) and with testimony of PW-7 who reached spot at 03:45 PM and apprehended accused – Failure to explain timeline discrepancy – Held: Defence version unreliable and rightly discarded; plea of alibi not established [Paras 57–60]

Criminal Trial – Non-examination of witness – Non-examination of Komal – Occurrence near his house – Held: Not fatal to prosecution – Evidence of eyewitnesses cogent and reliable – Moreover, witness was inimical to informant; defence could have examined him – No adverse inference warranted [Para 74]

Evidence – Recovery of weapons and forensic corroboration – Recovery of Daav and trident from appellant Lakhmi at spot – Knife and gun recovered on pointing out of co-accused – FSL report confirms bloodstains and presence of human blood – Medical evidence corroborates firearm injury – Non-recovery of empty cartridge not fatal in light of other clinching evidence – Held: Scientific and physical evidence fully supports prosecution case [Paras 75–76]

Criminal Law – Common intention – Section 34 IPC – Accused jointly lying in wait, armed with different weapons, surrounding and attacking deceased, and acting in coordinated manner – Role of each accused clearly established – Held: Common intention proved beyond doubt [Paras 1, 72, 77]

Decision: Criminal appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentences under Sections 302/34, 307/34, 509/34 IPC upheld – Conviction of Languri and Yogesh under Section 506 IPC also upheld – Appellants to remain in jail to serve out sentence awarded by Trial Court.

Criminal Law – Murder – Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Theory – Recovery of Deceased's Belongings – Conviction Upheld – Deceased had an illicit relationship with Appellant No. 2 (Shanno); after his marriage, the appellants planned his elimination – Deceased last seen leaving with the appellants on 25.07.2000 – At the instance of the appellants, two gold rings, a wrist watch, and a cloth tape (katran) used for strangulation were recovered; one ring recovered from sister of Appellant No. 2 and another from a goldsmith to whom Appellant No. 1 had sold it – Deceased's body thrown into river Ram Ganga but not recovered despite search – Held: Circumstances including last seen evidence, recoveries of articles belonging to the deceased identified by prosecution witnesses, and disclosure statements form a complete chain of circumstances pointing only to the guilt of the appellants [Paras 20, 54–56, 60].

Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Theory – Not Standalone Proof – Last seen theory is only one of the circumstances in the chain; alone it is not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt but when coupled with other proved circumstances it plays a vital role – Delay in lodging complaint after disappearance of deceased is not unnatural where the deceased was last seen voluntarily leaving with a known acquaintance and complainant made his own efforts to trace him before approaching police [Paras 48, 49, 50–53].

Recovery – Disclosure Statements – Presumption under Section 114 Illustration (a) – Gold rings belonging to deceased recovered at the pointing of appellants from the sister of Appellant No. 2 and a goldsmith — identified by prosecution witnesses including the maker of the rings — give rise to a presumption under Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act that the appellants had also committed the murder of the deceased – Non-examination or hostility of one witness (PW-6) does not vitiate the recovery as it stands corroborated by police witnesses from multiple U.P. police stations, DD entries, and remand application [Paras 39, 55].

Corpus Delicti – Non-Recovery of Dead Body – Not Fatal – Non-recovery of the dead body is not an absolute requirement for conviction in a murder case and is only one of the relevant factors — where other cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death is available through circumstantial evidence forming a clinching and definitive chain, conviction can be sustained even without recovery of the body [Paras 57–59].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction under Sections 365/34, 302/34, 201/34 and 404 IPC upheld – Appellants directed to surrender within two weeks to undergo remaining sentence [Paras 60, 61].

Arbitration – National Highways Act – Applicability of Section 29A of Arbitration Act – Statutory arbitration under Section 3G(5) – Whether time limit for making award applies – Held Section 29A inapplicable as NH Act is special self-contained code – Provisions relating to extension, substitution and termination of mandate inconsistent with scheme of NH Act – Application would render statutory mechanism unworkable – Appeals dismissed [Paras 31–35, 38–40, 48–49]

Arbitration – Legislation by reference – Applicability of subsequent amendments – Arbitration Act applied to NH Act only to extent not inconsistent – Test of intention and unworkability applied – Section 29A excluded due to conflict with statutory scheme [Paras 32–34]

Arbitration – Appointment of Arbitrator – Section 3G(5), NH Act – Exclusive power of Central Government – Court cannot substitute arbitrator under Section 29A(6) – Special law overrides general law – Inconsistency leads to exclusion of Section 29A [Paras 38–41, 44–45]

Arbitration – Delay in making award – Award passed after about six years – Whether void – Held delay does not render award without jurisdiction in statutory arbitration under NH Act – Remedy lies under Article 226 in case of unreasonable delay [Paras 49–50]

Land Acquisition – Determination of compensation – Section 26, RFCTLARR Act, 2013 – Arbitrator relied on multiple comparable sale instances – Higher value transactions considered – Uniform rate justified based on location and potential – No patent illegality [Paras 52–57, 65–69, 71]

Land Acquisition – Rejection of sale instances by Competent Authority – Majority of sale deeds discarded without reasons – Arbitrator entitled to reassess evidence – Approach consistent with law laid down by Supreme Court [Paras 54–56]

Arbitration – Scope under Sections 34 and 37 – Limited interference – No re-appreciation of evidence – Interference only in case of patent illegality or perversity – Concurrent findings upheld [Paras 60–63, 74–75]

Land Acquisition – Multiplication factor – Classification as rural land – Application of factor of 2 upheld based on notification and findings of fact – No error found [Para 72]

Decision: All Arbitration Appeals dismissed – Section 29A held inapplicable to arbitrations under National Highways Act – Arbitral awards upheld – No interference warranted under Section 37.

UAPA – Bail – Section 43D(5) – Overground Worker – Logistical Support – Long Incarceration – Appellant alleged to be a courier, messenger and overground worker of CPI (Maoist) who collected levy of Rs. 5 lakhs from a contractor on the direction of Maoist commander Ravindra Ganjhu – Cash, a letter of demand and other incriminating articles recovered from his possession – Charge sheet filed against six accused; out of 160 witnesses only five examined so far – Appellant in custody since 05.01.2020, completing over six years of incarceration – Held: Rigours of Section 43D(5) UAPA yield where there is no likelihood of trial being concluded in the near future and incarceration has already exceeded a substantial period; appellant entitled to bail [Paras 6, 12, 13].

UAPA – Bail – Parity – Distinguishable Role of Co-accused – NIA opposed bail citing rejection of bail of co-accused Kunwar Ganjhu in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 944 of 2025 – Held: Role of Kunwar Ganjhu under para 17.50.3 of the charge sheet is distinguishable as he was directly involved in extortion from contractors by putting them in fear of bodily injury and was a habitual offender, whereas the present appellant's role under para 17.50.2 is confined to that of a courier and messenger providing logistical support – Parity not applicable [Paras 10, 11].

Constitutional Law – Right to Speedy Trial – Article 21 – UAPA – Statutory restrictions under Section 43D(5) UAPA do not oust the jurisdiction of constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution – Rigours of Section 43D(5) melt down where trial completion within reasonable time is unlikely and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence – Held: Section 43D(5) UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 NDPS Act and does not impose a precondition of prima facie innocence [Para 12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order dated 01.12.2025 rejecting bail set aside – Appellant directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- with two sureties of like amount each – Condition imposed that appellant shall remain physically present before the trial court on each and every date till conclusion of trial.

Criminal Law – Grievous Hurt – Section 325 IPC – Conviction Upheld – Appellant, a neighbour, objected to construction work on the complainant's property and struck the victim (daughter-in-law of the complainant) on the head with a sabal (iron rod), causing grievous bleeding injuries resulting in loss of consciousness – Prosecution examined seven witnesses including PW1 (de facto complainant), PW3 (independent eyewitness), PW5 (victim/injured), PW6 (treating doctor) and PW7 (Investigating Officer) – Medical evidence (Exhibit-3) confirmed grievous nature of the lacerated head injury consistent with a blunt pointed instrument – Held: Prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt; conviction affirmed [Paras 18-37].

Evidence – Injured Witness – Independent Corroboration – PW5, as the injured victim, carries significant evidentiary value and her testimony was corroborated by PW1 and PW3 (independent neighbour) – Cross-examination failed to shake the credibility of any of the three witnesses – Minor discrepancy regarding precise place of occurrence (pathway adjacent to the house) held not to constitute a material contradiction – Non-examination of Sisir Mistry (cited charge-sheeted witness) explained by the Trial Court as having been gained over by the accused – Held: Evidence of PW1, PW3, PW5 consistent, mutually corroborative and reliable [Paras 23-34].

Sentencing – Undue Delay – Leniency – Article 21 – Right to Speedy Trial – Incident occurred in 2008; appeal pending since 2010; appellant on bail continuously for over fifteen years with no subsequent criminal conduct – Held: Protracted delay in disposal of criminal proceedings, not attributable to the accused, amounts to a violation of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 – Prolonged pendency itself constitutes mental suffering and operates as a form of punishment – Substantive sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment reduced to period already undergone; fine enhanced from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 10,000/- [Paras 39-50].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Conviction under Section 325 IPC affirmed – Sentence of rigorous imprisonment reduced to period already undergone – Fine enhanced to Rs. 10,000/-, payable within three months; default imprisonment of two months – Bail bond cancelled.