Litigant Pursuing Review Petition Bona Fide Cannot Be Penalised With Limitation Bar For Subsequent Appeal: Delhi High Court

"Once a court having seized of an application chooses to adjudicate it on merits rather than reject it at the threshold, the party who has bona fide pursued that remedy cannot, at a later stage, be visited with the consequence of the review having been belatedly filed, for the purpose of assessing sufficient cause in the subsequent appeal." Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling, held that a litigant who bona fide pursues a review petition cannot be penalized with a limitation bar when filing a subsequent appeal.

A division bench comprising Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Renu Bhatnagar observed that if a review application is heard and dismissed on merits rather than at the threshold, the time spent in prosecuting it constitutes "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The appellant-husband challenged a Family Court order directing him to pay an interim maintenance of Rs. 8,00,000 per month to his wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Aggrieved by this, he initially invoked the review jurisdiction of the Family Court, which was subsequently dismissed on merits with costs. Following this dismissal, the husband approached the High Court challenging both orders, filing an application to condone a 116-day delay in appealing the original maintenance order.

The primary question before the court was whether the time spent in pursuing a review petition before a lower court constitutes "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to warrant condonation of delay in filing an appeal.

Liberal Interpretation Of 'Sufficient Cause'

The court began by reiterating the settled jurisprudence that the expression "sufficient cause" is elastic and must receive a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented interpretation. The bench emphasised that while this discretion cannot be exercised mechanically, substantive rights of parties should not be defeated merely on procedural delays. In this context, the court relied upon the Supreme Court's ruling in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy, noting that the court must be satisfied the delay is bona fide and not attributable to deliberate negligence.

Pursuit Of Review Was Not Frivolous

Examining the facts, the court noted that the appellant's review petition under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code was entertained and adjudicated on merits by the Family Court. The bench observed that the review was neither rejected at the threshold nor dismissed as not maintainable, concluding that the appellant's course of action was not frivolous or vexatious. The mere dismissal of a review petition, the court stated, does not by itself render the pursuit of such a statutory remedy mala fide.

Adjudication On Merits Cures Belated Filing

Addressing the respondent's contention that the review application itself was filed belatedly before the Family Court, the High Court found no merit in the submission. The bench highlighted that the lower court chose to adjudicate the application on merits after full consideration instead of dismissing it on grounds of delay. Placing reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the court held that a matter requiring adjudication on merits ought not to be scuttled purely on the basis of limitation.

"If delay in filing an appeal can be condoned even where the anterior review stood dismissed for delay, the case for condonation stands on a still stronger footing where, as here, the review has actually been heard and dismissed on merits."

Procedural Technicalities Must Not Defeat Justice

The court further clarified that while the mere pendency of a review petition does not automatically suspend the limitation period for an appeal, the bona fide prosecution of such a remedy is a relevant circumstance for exercising discretionary jurisdiction. The bench found no material on record to suggest that the appellant's delay was deliberate, intentional, or actuated by any ulterior motive. The court stressed that denying the appellant an opportunity to prosecute the appeal on merits would result in elevating procedural technicalities over substantial justice.

Consequently, the High Court expressed its satisfaction that the appellant had demonstrated sufficient cause under the Limitation Act. Finding the explanation furnished to be plausible and inspiring confidence, the court allowed the application and condoned the 116-day delay in filing the present appeal.

Date of Decision: 24 July 2026