Criminal Law – Quashing - Extortion – Ingredients under Section 383 IPC – Not Prima Facie Made Out – Quashing of FIR Allowed – To establish extortion under Section 383 IPC, there must be intentional fear caused, dishonest inducement, and delivery of property by the victim. In this case, the complainant, who was not a direct victim, alleged extortion under the Electoral Bond Scheme. The Court held that there was no evidence of any person being dishonestly induced to deliver property, nor was there fear or delivery as required under the provision. [Paras 16-20]

Locus Standi – Section 384 IPC – Requirement of Aggrieved Person – Criminal law can generally be set in motion by any person. However, in offences under Section 384 IPC, only the aggrieved victim, i.e., the person put in fear and made to deliver property, has the standing to file a complaint. The complainant, being a Co-President of a public forum, was not an aggrieved party and hence lacked locus standi. [Paras 17-20]

Role of Magistrate – Reference under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Failure to Apply Mind – The Magistrate's referral of the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was held to be improper as the essential ingredients of the alleged offence under Section 384 IPC were not prima facie made out. The Court criticized the Magistrate for acting as a "rubber stamp" without examining whether the complaint disclosed cognizable offences. [Paras 22-23]

Power of High Court – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of FIR – The High Court exercised its inherent powers to quash the proceedings where allegations in the complaint did not disclose the ingredients of the offence and were inherently improbable. The proceedings were deemed frivolous, and the Court held that continuing the investigation would amount to abuse of process. [Paras 23-24]

Electoral Bond Scheme – Alleged Extortion and Criminal Conspiracy – Lack of Prima Facie Evidence – Allegations of coercion under the Electoral Bond Scheme, based on raids conducted by Enforcement Directorate officials, were held to lack specificity and substantiating evidence. The complaint was deemed a “figment of imagination,” with no material to support claims of quid pro quo or delivery of property under threat. [Paras 11-12, 16, 24]

Judgments Referred – Scope of Public Interest Complaints – Not Applicable to Extortion Cases – The Court distinguished the case at hand from precedents where public interest complaints were entertained for offences affecting society at large. It held that extortion under Section 384 IPC is victim-specific and cannot be set in motion by a stranger or public forum. [Paras 20-22]

Decision – Criminal proceedings in Crime No. 224/2024 were quashed in respect of the petitioner, as the complaint failed to meet the statutory requirements of offences under Section 384 IPC and lacked the requisite locus standi. [Paras 24-25]

Defamation Allegation on Online Platforms – Section 69A of the IT Act – Directions against Intermediaries Denied – Petition Dismissed – The petitioner sought the removal of a video on YouTube alleging it to be defamatory and contrary to the rights of the Marthoma community – Held: The content in question does not fall within the scope of Section 69A of the IT Act, which is limited to situations affecting sovereignty, integrity, and public order, among others – The Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India [(2015) 5 SCC 1] categorically limits intermediary obligations under Section 69A to Court-ordered directions for blocking content – Decision: Writ Petition dismissed as no grounds for removal under Section 69A were made out [Paras 8-12].

Intermediary Liability – Section 79 of the IT Act – No Direct Obligation on Intermediary Without Court Order – Petition Dismissed – The petitioner’s contention that the intermediary violated its statutory responsibility was rejected – The Hon'ble Court clarified that under Section 79, intermediaries like YouTube are exempt from liability unless actual knowledge of unlawful acts is notified by a Court order – Reliance placed on the Shreya Singhal case, which read down Section 79(3)(b) to mean that an intermediary can only act upon actual knowledge from a competent authority or Court order – Decision: No relief granted, as no Court order existed to mandate the removal of content [Paras 8-11].

Scope of Section 69A and 79 – Limitation of Relief in Absence of Court Order or Government Notification – Petition Dismissed – The petitioner failed to demonstrate how the content violates Section 69A or that any Court order had been passed directing its removal – Held: Without such specific orders, intermediaries cannot be compelled to act solely based on allegations of defamation – Decision: Writ Petition dismissed, finding no statutory violation on part of the intermediaries [Paras 10-12].

Admissions via Fraud – Cancellation of Admissions – RPMT 2009 – Allegations of Impersonation – Dismissal of Petitions – Petitioners challenged the cancellation of their MBBS admissions by Rajasthan University of Health Sciences (RUHS) due to allegations of cheating by impersonation in RPMT 2009 – Respondents relied on Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) reports and a committee report affirming impersonation allegations – Petitioners argued violations of natural justice and delay in proceedings – Held: Admissions attained via fraud are void; principles of natural justice do not mandate adherence when fraud is established – Cancellation upheld [Paras 4–8, 31.4–31.9].

Fraudulent Means – Doctrine of Res Judicata – Bar on Re-litigating Issues – Petitioners contended FSL report and committee findings lacked evidentiary support under Indian Evidence Act – Court held: Fraud vitiates all acts, and the principle of res judicata barred re-litigation of issues settled in earlier judicial decisions – Past judgments categorically upheld the cancellation of admissions, deeming them attained through fraudulent means [Paras 31.1–31.2, 31.6].

Impact on Public Interest – Integrity of Examination Process – Court emphasized the societal impact of allowing candidates who attained admissions via fraud to continue medical practice – Fraudulent admissions compromise the integrity of merit-based selection in medical education – Held: Cancellation of admissions aligns with public interest and preserves examination integrity [Paras 31.4–31.5].

Delay in Challenging Orders – Consequences of Laches – Petitioners failed to challenge foundational orders at the appropriate time, rendering their petitions untenable – Court observed: Delay and acquiescence preclude equitable relief – Impugned orders upheld [Paras 31.7–32].

Decision: Petitions dismissed – Impugned cancellation orders upheld – Relief denied due to fraud, delay, and lack of merit [Para 33].
 

Civil Procedure Code – Section 80(1) – Mandatory Nature and Waiver – Provision for statutory notice under Section 80(1) of the CPC is mandatory but can be waived by defendants – Held: Where defendants fail to object to non-service of notice in their written statement or during trial, they are deemed to have waived the requirement – Suit maintainable in such cases [Paras 14–17].

Waiver of Notice – Consequences of Non-Objection – Courts held that the absence of objection regarding notice in written statements, trial arguments, or issues framed implies a waiver – Principles reaffirmed by Apex Court precedents [Paras 15–17].

Second Appeal – Scope of Substantial Questions of Law – Lack of Pleading and Objections – Dismissal – Held: Defendants’ failure to raise notice-related objections before lower courts precludes such arguments at the second appellate stage – No interference warranted with concurrent findings of lower courts [Paras 13, 18].

Decision:

Second appeal dismissed – Judgments and decrees passed by the trial court in T.S. No. 04 of 1992 and first appellate court in T.A. No. 04 of 1993 affirmed – Appellants’ arguments on Section 80(1) notice deemed untenable due to waiver [Paras 19–20].

Municipal Law – Inclusion of Gram Sabha Areas – Statutory Guidelines Violated – Petitioners challenged notification dated 25/04/2023, extending the municipal limits of Kalanwali to include Gram Sabha areas, without adhering to criteria under Annexure P-12 and Section 4(2) of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 – Held: The impugned notification violated statutory provisions mandating consideration of objections and personal hearing – Notification quashed with liberty to reissue after compliance with statutory requirements [Paras 29–39].

Principles of Natural Justice – Civil Consequences – Necessity of Personal Hearing – Conversion of Gram Sabha areas to municipal limits entails significant civil consequences, including taxation and loss of agrarian character – Even absent explicit statutory mandate, principles of natural justice apply – Failure to grant personal hearing vitiates notification [Paras 27–38].

Panchayati Raj – Duration of Panchayats – Article 243E of the Constitution – Reduction in Panchayat’s tenure through inclusion of Gram Sabha areas in municipal limits violates constitutional mandate of five-year term for elected Panchayats – Impugned notification found unconstitutional [Paras 14–15].

Judicial Review – Applicability of Precedents – Decisions in Tehal Singh and Rameshchandra Porwal distinguished – Inapplicability of earlier rulings relied upon by respondents due to factual dissimilarities – Apex Court’s ruling in Baldev Singh emphasizing necessity of personal hearing upheld [Paras 25–37].

Decision: Writ Petition Allowed: Impugned notification dated 25/04/2023 quashed.

Directions Issued: Respondents granted liberty to reissue notification after:

Granting personal hearing to objectors.

Recording detailed and reasoned decisions on objections.

Time frame for compliance: Four months from the date of this judgment.

Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Applicability of Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act – Demand and Acceptance as Sine Qua Non – Proceedings Quashed - Petitioner, a public servant, sought quashing of criminal proceedings against him for alleged involvement in irregularities linked to the I Monetary Advisory (IMA) Group scam – Allegations included receiving bribes and failing to act as the Competent Authority under the Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial Establishments Act, 2004 – Held: Both "demand" and "acceptance" of illegal gratification must be conclusively proven for invoking Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act – Mere recovery or vague approver statements do not suffice – Observed: There was no direct evidence of demand or acceptance, no trap or recovery from the petitioner, and no incriminating materials in search and seizure – Accordingly, proceedings quashed [Paras 12-18].

Approver Statements – Evidentiary Value – Vagueness Insufficient for Framing Charges - Statements of approvers indicated alleged transfer of money to petitioner – Held: Statements lacked specificity and were based on hearsay – Law requires direct or circumstantial evidence to establish demand and acceptance – Observed: Vague or unsupported statements by approvers cannot justify framing of charges under Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act [Paras 13, 17].

Discharge of Similarly Placed Co-Accused – Extension of Benefit to Petitioner – Quashing Proceedings - Co-accused public servants facing identical allegations had been discharged in earlier proceedings – Observed: Trial court noted no material evidence or demand and acceptance against the co-accused – Petitioner entitled to similar relief based on parity – Proceedings against petitioner quashed [Paras 14-15].

Principles of Demand and Acceptance under Prevention of Corruption Act – Judicial Interpretation – Requirement of Direct Evidence - Reiterated: Demand and acceptance are core ingredients of offences under Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act – Mere recovery or vague inferences cannot establish culpability – Presumption under Section 20 applies only when demand and acceptance are conclusively proven – Proceedings against petitioner unsustainable [Paras 16-18].

Abuse of Process of Law – Lack of Evidence – Trial Not Warranted - Search and seizure yielded no incriminating materials, and prosecution failed to produce direct or circumstantial evidence of wrongdoing – Held: Allowing trial in absence of substantive evidence would amount to abuse of process of law and result in miscarriage of justice – Proceedings quashed [Paras 18-19].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed. Proceedings in Special C.C. No. 1055 of 2019 before the XXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Bengaluru, quashed.

Civil Law - Stay of Subsequent Suit – Application of Section 10 CPC – Doctrine of Res Sub Judice – The petitioners challenged the trial court's order staying the subsequent suit under Section 10 CPC, contending that the two suits were based on different causes of action and sought different reliefs – The Court held that the core issue in both suits pertained to the ownership and possession of the same property – It was observed that any decision in the previously instituted suit would directly impact the outcome of the subsequent suit and operate as res judicata – The trial court’s order staying the subsequent suit was upheld [Paras 13-15, 22].

Scope of Section 10 CPC – Identity of Matter in Issue – The Court reiterated that for Section 10 CPC to apply, the matter in issue in both suits must be directly and substantially the same, and a final decision in the earlier suit must affect the maintainability of the subsequent suit – The provision is mandatory and aims to prevent conflicting decisions and multiplicity of proceedings [Paras 8-12].

Supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution – Limited Scope – The Court clarified that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate authority to correct errors of fact or law but ensures that the subordinate court acts within its jurisdiction – The trial court’s findings were found to be within its jurisdiction and not perverse, warranting no interference [Paras 16-21].

Decision – The revision petition was dismissed, and the trial court's order staying the subsequent suit under Section 10 CPC was upheld [Para 23].

Service Law - Recruitment Policy – Prescribing Qualifications – Role of Employer – Judicial Restraint – The determination of eligibility criteria, including minimum qualifications for a post, lies exclusively within the domain of the employer. Courts cannot interfere with recruitment policies or expand the ambit of prescribed qualifications through judicial interpretation. Held: Degree Engineers cannot claim equivalence to Diploma qualifications unless explicitly provided in the recruitment rules. [Paras 10-12, 13, 26]

Equivalence of Qualification – Diploma vs. Degree – Absence of Hierarchical Relationship – The Court rejected the argument that a degree in engineering presupposes a diploma qualification, emphasizing that both qualifications operate independently. Equivalence of qualifications must be explicitly provided in rules or clarified by the employer, not presumed. [Paras 21-22, 24]

Judicial Review – Exclusion of Higher Qualification Without Explicit Provision – Following precedents (Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and Unnikrishnan CV v. Union of India), the Court held that judicial review cannot expand or modify qualifications specified in recruitment rules or advertisements. Where recruitment is exclusively for Diploma holders, Degree Engineers are ineligible unless explicitly permitted. [Paras 13, 15-17, 19]

Rules 2012 and Advertisement – Clear Exclusion of Degree Engineers for JE Civil Posts – The Odisha Diploma Engineers’ Service Rules, 2012 explicitly prescribe Diploma as the qualification for Junior Engineer (Civil) posts, with limited exceptions for JE (Mechanical) where Degree Engineers possessing a Diploma are eligible. The advertisement dated 08/12/2023, governed by the Rules, 2012, does not accommodate Degree Engineers for JE Civil posts. [Paras 9-11, 26]

No Presumption of Hierarchical Equivalence – The Court clarified that higher qualifications (e.g., a degree) do not automatically include lower ones (e.g., a diploma). Absence of express equivalency provisions in the rules precludes Degree Engineers from competing for Diploma-specific posts. [Paras 20-21]

Puneet Sharma Distinguished – Recruitment Context – The Court distinguished Puneet Sharma v. HPSEB, where Degree Engineers were allowed due to specific quotas for higher qualifications in recruitment rules, a scenario absent in the Odisha recruitment framework. [Paras 15, 18-19]

AICTE Regulations and Lateral Entry – Limited Scope – The AICTE Regulations, 2007, equating a diploma with the first year of a degree for lateral entry into degree courses, do not establish equivalence between Degree and Diploma Engineers for recruitment purposes. [Paras 24-25]

Judicial Precedents – The Court relied on rulings in Zahoor Ahmad Rather (2019) 2 SCC 404, Ankita Thakur (2023), and Jyoti K.K. (2010) 15 SCC 596, affirming that recruitment qualifications are a matter of policy and must be adhered to strictly. Judicial review cannot extend to equivalence or eligibility determinations absent explicit provisions. [Paras 16-20]

Decision – The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that Degree Engineers, unless specifically possessing a Diploma in Engineering, are ineligible for Junior Engineer posts under the current advertisement and rules. Interim orders were vacated. [Paras 27-28]

Income Tax Law – Section 153C – Assessment Proceedings Initiated for a Non-Searched Person – Challenges Rejected - Jurisdiction – Validity of Notices under Section 153C – Extended Period of Ten Years – Petitioner challenged notices under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the Assessment Years (AYs) 2009-10 to 2014-15 as being time-barred – Court held that as per the amended provisions introduced by the Finance Act, 2017, the extended period of ten years is applicable when the escaped income exceeds ₹50 lakh – Satisfaction note recorded on 23.10.2019, allowed reopening of assessments from AY 2009-10 to AY 2018-19 – Held: Notices were within the extended limitation period and validly issued [Paras 31, 34].

Satisfaction Note – Requirement for Valid Initiation of Proceedings – Petitioner contended that satisfaction notes by the Assessing Officer (AO) of the searched person (dated 31.03.2018) and by the AO of the petitioner (dated 23.10.2019) were invalid – Court observed that satisfaction was duly recorded before transmitting material to the jurisdictional AO and within the period prescribed for completing assessments of the searched person – Held: Satisfaction note complied with Section 153C requirements and the CBDT Circular No. 24/2015 [Paras 27-28, 33].

Incriminating Material – Validity of Notices for Years Without Specific Material – Petitioner argued that notices for AYs where no incriminating material was found were invalid – Court held that the relevance of incriminating material to specific AYs could be addressed during assessment proceedings and through statutory remedies – Held: Challenges on this ground are premature and can be raised before the AO [Paras 35].

Principles from Precedents – Compliance with Judicial Guidelines – Court referred to the decisions in CIT v. Calcutta Knitwears [(2014) 362 ITR 673 (SC)], CIT v. Jasjit Singh [(2023) 458 ITR 437 (SC)], and Principal CIT v. Karina Airlines [(2024) 165 Taxman.com 421 (Delhi)] to affirm that:

Satisfaction notes must be recorded at the appropriate stage, but minor delays are permissible unless prejudicial to the assessee.
Notices may cover ten AYs when income exceeding ₹50 lakh has escaped assessment post-amendment.
A composite satisfaction note suffices if it refers to incriminating material impacting the relevant AYs [Paras 26-33].

Alternative Remedies – Premature Invocation of Writ Jurisdiction – Court held that the petitioner had adequate remedies during assessment proceedings and by filing appeals against any adverse order – Writ jurisdiction was deemed inappropriate at this stage to decide the validity of satisfaction or incriminating material’s sufficiency [Paras 18, 23].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Notices under Section 153C validly issued for AYs 2009-10 to 2014-15 – Assessment proceedings allowed to continue – Rule discharged [Paras 35].