Service Law - Distance Education Degree – Validity for Public Service Commission Appointments – The petitioner obtained an M.A. (English) degree from Annamalai University via distance education in 2015-2017 – The Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC) rejected her application for the post of Scheduled Caste Development Officer, citing that Annamalai University’s distance education programs after 2015 were not approved by the University Grants Commission (UGC) – Held: In light of the Madras High Court's ruling in University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, students enrolled in Annamalai University’s distance education programs in 2015-16 are protected – KPSC’s rejection was unwarranted [Paras 6-7].

UGC Notification and Its Impact – Application of Judicial Precedents – The KPSC relied on a 2022 UGC public notice cautioning against admissions to Annamalai University’s distance education courses – The Court observed that the Madras High Court had clarified that students who enrolled in 2015-16 were unaffected by later restrictions – Held: KPSC must allow the petitioner to proceed in the selection process, subject to the final outcome of pending litigation before the Supreme Court [Paras 7-9].

Recognition of Degree – Equivalence Certificate from Calicut University – The petitioner presented an equivalency certificate from the University of Calicut recognizing her M.A. (English) degree as equivalent to its own – The Court ruled that such certification further strengthened her eligibility – Held: A recognized university’s equivalency certificate should be given due consideration in public employment matters [Paras 4-5].

Interim Relief – Participation in Selection Process Allowed – The Court permitted the petitioner to participate in the ongoing selection process, provided the final appointment remains subject to the Supreme Court’s ruling on the Madras High Court’s decision – Held: The selection process should proceed without prejudice to the pending Supreme Court case [Paras 10].

Decision: Petition allowed. KPSC directed to allow the petitioner to participate in the selection process, subject to the final outcome of the Supreme Court case.
 

Service Law – Pension Entitlement – Deemed Opt-in Under Office Order – Pension Benefits Granted – The respondent, a retired Deputy Manager (Personnel) in Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC), did not explicitly opt for either the CPF Scheme or the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme within the prescribed period under the 1992 Office Order – As per para 9 of the 1992 Order, an employee who failed to exercise an option within 30 days was deemed to have opted for the Pension Scheme – The High Court, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in University of Delhi v. Shashi Kiran (2022) 15 SCC 325, held that the deeming clause in the 1992 Office Order automatically shifted the respondent to the Pension Scheme, irrespective of the fact that he continued contributing to CPF – Held: The respondent is entitled to pension benefits under the Pension Scheme [Paras 6-10, 28].

Retirement Benefits – Effect of Receiving CPF Benefits – No Estoppel Against Pension Claim – The DTC argued that the respondent continued contributing to CPF throughout his service and accepted CPF benefits on retirement, which should preclude him from switching to the Pension Scheme – The Court rejected this argument, holding that mere receipt of CPF benefits does not override the deemed pension opt-in provision in para 9 of the 1992 Order – Held: The respondent’s claim to pension remains valid, but he must return the CPF amount received upon retirement before receiving pension benefits [Paras 11-14, 29-31].

Applicability of Supreme Court Rulings – Deemed Pension Enrollment Irrevocable – S.L. Verma and Shashi Kiran Followed – The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in S.L. Verma v. Union of India (2006) 12 SCC 53, which held that where a government notification or office order automatically transfers employees to a pension scheme unless they explicitly opt out, such transfer is irrevocable – The Court reiterated the principle from Shashi Kiran that any employee who did not exercise an option to remain in CPF by the cut-off date automatically shifted to the Pension Scheme, irrespective of subsequent contributions to CPF – Held: The DTC’s challenge is without merit as the legal fiction created by para 9 of the 1992 Order is binding [Paras 27-33].

Doctrine of Acquiescence and Estoppel – Not Applicable to Mandatory Legal Fiction – DTC contended that the respondent’s failure to claim pension earlier, coupled with acceptance of CPF funds, amounted to acquiescence and estoppel – The Court rejected this argument, holding that estoppel does not apply against statutory entitlements and legal fictions – Held: Pension entitlement arises from statutory rules and employer-issued office orders, and cannot be waived merely by conduct [Paras 34-35].

Reimbursement of CPF Amount – Condition for Pension Entitlement – While granting relief to the respondent, the Court directed that before receiving pension benefits, the respondent must refund the CPF amount received upon retirement, along with applicable interest – Held: Pension payments shall commence only upon reimbursement of CPF dues as per the conditions stipulated in the 1992 Office Order [Paras 36-37].

Decision: Writ Petition Dismissed – The High Court affirmed the CAT's orders dated 23 December 2015 and 8 February 2016 – DTC directed to extend pension benefits to the respondent in accordance with the GPF-cum-Pension Scheme – The respondent must return the employer's CPF contribution before receiving pension benefits – No order as to costs [Paras 38-40].
 

Public Interest Litigation – Locus Standi – Bona Fide of Petitioner in Question – The petitioner, an investigative journalist, sought cancellation of a contract awarded to MEIL on the ground that it submitted fraudulent bank guarantees from Euro Exim Bank, which is not recognized by the Reserve Bank of India – The respondents argued that the petitioner had a personal vendetta due to prior civil and criminal disputes with MEIL and had suppressed material facts about these disputes – Held: A petitioner in a PIL must come with clean hands, and suppression of relevant litigation history indicates a lack of bona fide intention – PIL dismissed [Paras 5-7, 25].

Scandalizing the Court – Social Media Posts by Petitioner – Contempt of Court Avoided – The petitioner published tweets making allegations against government authorities and the High Court – The Court noted that the tweets amounted to scandalizing the judiciary, but since the petitioner deleted them within five days on legal advice, no contempt proceedings were initiated – Held: The tweets were inappropriate and undermined the integrity of the judicial process, but the Court exercised judicial magnanimity in not initiating contempt proceedings [Paras 23, 28].

Suppression of Material Facts – Failure to Disclose Prior Litigation – The petitioner failed to disclose multiple pending civil and criminal cases against MEIL, including defamation suits, FIRs, and financial disputes – The Bombay High Court Public Interest Litigation Rules, 2010, require full disclosure of relevant litigation – Held: Non-disclosure of material facts and failure to comply with procedural requirements justified dismissal of the PIL without examining its merits [Paras 24-26].

Judicial Review of Government Contracts – Scope of PIL – The Court reiterated that judicial intervention in government contracts should be limited to cases involving clear arbitrariness, corruption, or mala fide actions – The bank guarantees issued by Euro Exim Bank had been authenticated by scheduled banks, and the petitioner failed to establish any illegality – Held: A PIL cannot be used as a tool for personal vendettas or business rivalries [Paras 14-15].

Decision: PIL dismissed. No costs imposed.
 

Regular Bail - NDPS Act  - Compliance with Section 50 – Procedural Violation Alleged – Petitioner alleged that search of vehicle and subsequent dissent memo were recorded in violation of Section 50, NDPS Act and Apex Court guidelines – Search was conducted before informing accused of his rights – Held: Prima facie violation noted but court refrains from making conclusive opinion on merits [Paras 3-4].

Drug Recovery – Non-commercial Quantity – Applicability of Bail Principles – Alleged recovery of 100 grams of heroin falls under non-commercial quantity – Court emphasized that pre-trial detention in such cases needs cautious approach due to Article 21 rights and delay in trial progress – Held: No justification to keep petitioner incarcerated indefinitely [Paras 4-5].

Impact of Police Target-Driven Anti-Drug Drive – Apprehension of Misuse – Court took judicial notice of recent DGP's press statement assigning ‘targets’ to police officers for drug arrests – Held: Quantified target-based assessment of police performance may encourage wrongful implication of innocent persons – Directed the State to adopt a balanced approach ensuring public confidence [Paras 4-5].

Criminal Antecedents – Effect on Bail – Court held that pendency of other cases alone cannot be a ground for denial of bail unless evidence in the present case independently supports such denial – Held: Prosecution must prove case-specific facts for opposing bail, not rely merely on antecedents [Para 5].

Bail – Right to Speedy Trial – Bail Granted – Charges already framed, no prosecution witness examined so far, trial likely to take long – Court applied Article 21 jurisprudence and Apex Court ratio in Dataram Singh and Hussainara Khatoon – Held: Bail granted subject to conditions [Paras 4-5].
 

Civil Writ - Auction of Property – Challenge under Revenue Code – Sale Already Finalized – Writ Dismissed – Petitioners defaulted on loans taken in 1998 – Ancestral house auctioned in 2010 – Despite liberty granted by earlier High Court order (in 2010) to challenge the sale, petitioners failed to pursue timely remedies under Rules 40–41 – Sale deed and certificate already executed – Petition filed under Section 50 of MPLRC held not maintainable [Paras 3–5, 13–15].

Jurisdiction – Additional Collector’s Power – No Review Over Order by Counterpart – Proper Finding – Additional Collector rightly refused to entertain objection against auction citing lack of jurisdiction to review predecessor’s order – Held: Once sale confirmed and title passed, remedy lay only in civil suit under Rule 45(2), not revision under Section 50 [Paras 4, 15–17].

Interim Order Not Complied – Conditional Stay Ignored – Petitioners Failed to Deposit Amount – Court noted petitioners were required to deposit ₹10 lakhs as per interim relief in earlier writ petition but failed – Sale certificate and deed issued lawfully – No scope for interference [Paras 9–10].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Court held that once statutory limitation for challenging auction expired and title transferred via registered sale deed, remedy lies only through civil suit – No merit found in petition under writ or revisional jurisdiction [Para 18].
 

Negotiable Instruments Act – Deposit of 20% Compensation – Judicial Discretion – Orders Set Aside – The petitioner, convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act, challenged the ASJ’s order requiring him to deposit 20% of the compensation amount for suspension of sentence – Petitioner contended that the ASJ erroneously treated the deposit as mandatory and failed to exercise discretion – Held: The phrase “may order” in Section 148 of the NI Act grants discretion to the appellate court – Imposition of deposit must be reasoned and not automatic – ASJ failed to consider the petitioner’s financial capacity and wrongly assumed ownership of a business in its reasoning – Orders directing deposit quashed, and matter remanded for fresh consideration [Paras 15-20].

Criminal Procedure – Right to Appeal – Unjustified Financial Burden Not Permitted – Appellate courts must ensure that financial conditions do not unjustly deprive the convicted person of their right to appeal – Held: Courts must assess financial capacity before directing deposit – Blanket imposition of deposit without application of mind is not permissible – ASJ’s order lacked proper assessment, warranting remand for reconsideration [Paras 22-24].

Judicial Precedents – Applicability of Supreme Court Rulings – Failure to Follow Established Law – Petitioner relied on Jamboo Bhandari v. MP State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 446, and Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi, (2019) 11 SCC 341 – Held: Supreme Court has clarified that while deposit under Section 148 is generally required, exceptions can be made where the deposit would be unjust or deprive the appellant of their right to appeal – ASJ failed to apply these principles, necessitating fresh consideration [Paras 21-22].

Final Decision – Orders Quashed – Case Remanded for Fresh Consideration – High Court set aside the ASJ’s orders dated 27.01.2025 and remanded the matter for reconsideration of the deposit requirement in light of the petitioner’s financial condition and Supreme Court precedents – ASJ directed to pass fresh orders after proper evaluation [Paras 30-35].

Criminal Law – Attempt to Commit Rape – Prima Facie Case Not Made Out – Summoning Order Modified – The revisionists were summoned for attempt to commit rape (Section 376 read with Section 18 of POCSO Act) based on allegations that they grabbed the victim’s breasts, broke the string of her lower garment, and attempted to drag her beneath a culvert – The Court held that these acts did not establish a prima facie case of attempt to rape, as there was no evidence of an intent to commit penetrative sexual assault – Held: Summoning order modified; accused to be charged under Sections 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act instead [Paras 26-29].

Standard for Attempt to Commit Rape – Distinction Between Preparation and Attempt – The Court applied the test for attempt in sexual offences, holding that an attempt requires an overt act beyond mere preparation – Citing Rex v. James Lloyd (1836) 7C & P 817 and Express v. Shankar (1881) ILR 5 Bom 403, the Court ruled that mere disrobing or touching without further decisive action does not constitute an attempt to rape – Held: The accused’s conduct did not indicate an unequivocal intent to commit rape, and therefore, the charge under Section 376 IPC was unsustainable [Paras 24-25].

POCSO Act – Aggravated Sexual Assault – Conviction Under Section 9/10 of POCSO Act Justified – The Court held that the allegations against Akash and Pawan constituted aggravated sexual assault under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act, as the victim was below 12 years of age – The punishment for aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 of POCSO Act is imprisonment for not less than five years but up to seven years – Held: The accused shall face trial under Section 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of POCSO Act instead of Section 376 IPC [Paras 27-28].

Criminal Intimidation – Summoning Under Sections 504 and 506 IPC Upheld – The victim’s family was allegedly threatened with a country-made pistol, and the victim's mother was abused and intimidated when she complained – The Court held that these acts justified summoning the accused Ashok under Sections 504 and 506 IPC – Held: No modification required in summoning for criminal intimidation charges [Paras 22-23].

Decision: Revision Partly Allowed – The Court modified the summoning order, holding that the accused Akash and Pawan should be charged under Sections 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act, instead of Section 376 IPC read with Section 18 of POCSO Act – The summoning of Ashok under Sections 504 and 506 IPC remains unaltered – Trial court directed to issue fresh summons accordingly [Paras 29-30].

Landlord-Tenant Law – Eviction on Termination of Tenancy – Appeal Dismissed – Plaintiff, the owner of the suit premises, initiated eviction proceedings after serving a valid quit notice – Defendant claimed lower rent and denied arrears – Trial court decreed eviction, which was upheld by the first appellate court – Held: The tenancy was month-to-month and duly terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act – The tenant failed to provide evidence of regular rent payments – Eviction order upheld [Paras 16-19].

Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – No Substantial Question of Law – Appeal Not Maintainable – Appellant sought to challenge concurrent findings of fact – Held: A second appeal under Section 100 CPC can only be admitted on substantial questions of law – No legal issues warranting interference were raised – High Court cannot reappreciate factual findings of lower courts unless there is a manifest error or violation of law – Appeal dismissed at admission stage [Paras 20-22].

Judicial Precedents – Scope of Second Appeal – Limited to Substantial Questions of Law – Following Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC 155, and Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, AIR 2006 SC 1975, the court held that factual determinations by lower courts are binding unless there is a legal infirmity – Mere dissatisfaction with concurrent judgments does not justify a second appeal [Paras 13-15, 22].

Final Decision – Second Appeal Dismissed – Three Months Time for Tenant to Vacate – High Court dismissed the second appeal, confirming the eviction order – Granted three months for the appellant/tenant to vacate the premises – No costs imposed [Para 23].

Service Law – Resignation Under Duress – No Break in Service – Writ Petition Allowed – The petitioner, an Assistant Engineer in the Howrah Municipal Corporation, was required to resign before being released for deputation as an Executive Engineer under the Ministry of Surface Transport – Upon termination of deputation, he was reappointed as an Assistant Engineer but was denied continuity of service due to an alleged break – Held: The resignation was not voluntary but imposed as a condition for deputation – Resignation letter was conditional and does not constitute a valid resignation – The break in service must be condoned [Paras 19-26].

Employment Law – Conditional Resignation – Not a Voluntary Relinquishment of Office – A valid resignation requires an unconditional intention to relinquish office – Held: Since the resignation was a forced precondition for deputation and not voluntary, it cannot be treated as a resignation in law – Relying on Dr. Prabha Atri v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 701 and Moti Ram v. Param Dev, (1993) 2 SCC 725, the court held that an employee cannot be deemed to have resigned if the act was compelled by the employer [Paras 20-22].

Continuity of Service – Break in Service Unjustified – Petitioner Entitled to Benefits – The Howrah Municipal Corporation imposed the resignation condition, which led to the break in service – Held: Since the break was due to the Corporation’s actions, the petitioner must be treated as being in continuous service from his original appointment date – Following Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 325, the court directed reinstatement with full financial and retirement benefits [Paras 30-40].

Final Decision – Writ Petition Allowed – Break in Service Condoned – Financial Benefits Granted – High Court quashed the Corporation’s decision treating the period as a break in service – Directed the Corporation to restore continuity of service and pay arrears and retirement benefits within six weeks [Paras 41-42].