Civil Writ - Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, Sections 452 and 636 - Unauthorized Construction - Demolition - Inaction of Municipal Authorities - Petitioner alleged that Respondent No. 4 combined two residential permits for Stilt + 2 floors to construct a single structure of Stilt + 4 floors without setbacks - Authorities failed to act on the complaint - Held, respondent authorities are vested with statutory powers under the GHMC Act to inspect properties, issue notices, and take appropriate action against unauthorized constructions after providing a fair opportunity of hearing. [Paras 1-9].

Telangana State Building Permission Approval and Self Certification System (TGbPASS) Act, 2020, Section 7(6) - Public Participation - Reporting of Violations - Provisions encourage citizens to inform authorities about unauthorized constructions while maintaining confidentiality - Held, such cases must be examined within a week and appropriate action initiated. [Para 7].

Administrative Law - Judicial Review - Planned Development - Violation of Town Planning Schemes - Reliance on Shanti Sports Club vs. Union of India (2009) 15 SCC 705 and Esha Ekta Apartments vs. Municipal Corporation of Mumbai (2013) 5 SCC 357 - Held, no relief should be granted to violators of town planning schemes; authorities must not turn a blind eye to illegal constructions due to the influence of higher functionaries or extraneous reasons - Executive apparatus must stop supporting affluent builder lobbies. [Paras 10-11].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – Respondent No. 3 directed to consider the petitioner’s representation dated 15.04.2026, put Respondent No. 4 on notice, provide a fair opportunity of personal hearing to both parties, verify sanctioned plans, and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within four weeks.

Criminal Law – Double Jeopardy – Section 300(1) CrPC – Article 20(2) of the Constitution – Petitioner previously tried and convicted by JMFC Vadodara for offences under Sections 419/420 IPC in relation to forged bank drafts – Subsequently charge-sheeted before Trial Court at Dhar for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 120-B IPC in relation to the same bank drafts – Trial Court and Revisional Court rejected the application under Section 300(1) CrPC – Held: Two of the three bank drafts forming the subject matter of the Dhar case were identical to those in the Vadodara case; addition of one more draft at Vadodara does not change the nature of the offence – Subject matter and nature of offence being the same, Section 300(1) CrPC and Article 20(2) of the Constitution are squarely applicable – Proceedings at Dhar quashed [Paras 10–13].

Double Jeopardy – Application under Section 300(1) CrPC – Delay – Limitation – Revisional Court erred in dismissing the application under Section 300(1) CrPC solely on the ground of delay – Held: The protection against being tried for the same offence twice is not merely a statutory right but a constitutional and fundamental right under Article 20(2) – An application invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy cannot be rejected on the ground of delay or on the ground that evidence would be required to be led; such protection can be exercised at any point in the life of a trial [Para 12].

Decision: Petition allowed – Impugned order dated 02.09.2011 passed by the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Dhar, in Criminal Revision No. 128/2011 set aside – Further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 2626 of 2007 pending before the Trial Court at Dhar quashed.

NDPS Act – Bail – Disclosure Statement of Co-Accused – Inadmissibility – Petitioner not present at the spot of recovery and not named in the FIR – 520 grams of heroin recovered from co-accused Lovepreet Singh alias Love – Petitioner implicated solely on the basis of disclosure statements of co-accused made during police custody – No independent recovery of contraband or discovery of fact from the petitioner consequent upon such disclosure – Held: Disclosure statement of a co-accused is inadmissible as substantive evidence against another accused; such statement recorded in police custody is prima facie hit by Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam – Rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act not attracted as nothing was recovered from the petitioner's possession – Bail granted [Paras 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 12].

Bail – General Rule – Presumption of Innocence – Undertrial Custody – Right to Speedy Trial – Petitioner in custody for four months and five days – Trial not likely to be concluded in the near future – No material on record to indicate likelihood of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses – Held: Grant of bail is the general rule and incarceration is the exception; prolonged undertrial detention without prospect of early trial infringes the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution – Bail allowed subject to conditions [Paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].

Decision: Petition allowed – Petitioner ordered to be released on bail on furnishing personal bond and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court – Subject to conditions of non-interference with witnesses, furnishing of address, and not leaving India without prior permission of the trial Court.

Income Tax – Prosecution – Section 276CC – Quashing of Proceedings – Lack of Jurisdiction – Petitioner assessed under jurisdiction of ITO, Non Corporate Ward 17(1), Chennai – Show Cause Notice issued by ITO – Petitioner replied, paid tax with interest – Complaint under Section 276CC lodged by Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (respondent) after obtaining sanction from Principal Commissioner – Petitioner contended respondent had no jurisdiction over his case as no transfer order under Section 127 was issued – Held: Only the officer vested with jurisdiction by virtue of directions or orders under Section 120 is the Assessing Officer – No order transferring petitioner's case from ITO to respondent under Section 127 – Respondent did not intimate petitioner that it was continuing proceedings so as to enable petitioner to avail rehearing under Section 129 – Principal Commissioner accorded sanction without application of mind on the question of jurisdiction – Respondent had no jurisdiction to initiate prosecution – Proceedings quashed [Paras 10-13].

Income Tax – Prosecution – Section 276CC – Non-Initiation of Penalty Proceedings – No Regular Assessment – Petitioner contended that respondent failed to initiate penalty proceedings under Section 271(f) before launching prosecution and did not conduct regular assessment to determine tax liability – Held: In absence of any proceedings to make regular assessment, initiation of prosecution is void – Proviso to Section 276CC(ii)(b) provides that prosecution lies only where tax payable after reduction of TDS and advance tax exceeds Rs. 10,000/- – Without regular assessment, such liability cannot be determined – Allowing trial without initiation of penalty proceedings would be an idle and empty formality and amounts to abuse of process of law – Relied upon: K.C. Builders v. Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2004) 135 Taxman 461 (SC) [Paras 14-16].

Bonafide Belief – Non-Filing of Return – Petitioner and wife sold property for Rs. 75 lakhs; purchaser deducted TDS; employer also deducted tax at source on salary – Petitioner held bonafide belief that no tax liability arose as sale proceeds were re-invested and TDS covered salary income – Held: Question of intention and bonafide belief is a matter of defence to be examined during trial; however, jurisdiction and penalty proceedings going to the root of the matter are quashable at Section 482 Cr.P.C. stage [Paras 7-8].

Decision: Criminal Original Petition allowed – EOCC No. 42 of 2019 on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences) I, Egmore, Chennai quashed – Connected miscellaneous petition closed.

Anticipatory Bail — Second Petition — Maintainability — No Change in Circumstances — The petitioner filed a second petition for anticipatory bail under Section 482 BNSS within ten days of dismissal of the first petition on 06.04.2026, without disclosing any substantial or drastic change in circumstances — Held: A successive anticipatory bail petition filed without material change in circumstances is not maintainable [Para 7].

Anticipatory Bail — Person Already on Bail — Addition of Graver Offence — Remedy — The petitioner had been granted regular bail by the trial Court on 05.08.2024 — During trial, charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC were ordered to be framed on an application for alteration of charge — The petitioner apprehended arrest consequent to addition of Section 302 IPC and sought anticipatory bail — Held: A person already on bail is in constructive custody of law and an application for anticipatory bail apprehending arrest does not lie in such circumstances — The appropriate remedies available are: (i) surrender and apply for bail for newly added offences; (ii) the investigating agency may seek cancellation of bail or arrest order from the Court; (iii) the Court may direct arrest and commit to custody under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC after cancellation of earlier bail; (iv) the investigating agency may obtain an order of arrest from the Court that granted bail before arresting the accused on addition of a new offence [Paras 7–8].

Decision: Petition dismissed — No ground to allow anticipatory bail.

MSME Act – Writ Jurisdiction – Maintainability – Arbitral Award – Statutory Remedy – Petitioner challenged ex parte award of the MSME Facilitation Council, Kanpur directing payment of Rs. 24,15,835/- including interest, on grounds of improper service and bar of limitation – Held: Writ petition not maintainable where a specific statutory remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is available – Acceptance of petitioner's submission would render the statutory mechanism redundant [Paras 9, 17–19].

Natural Justice – Ex Parte Award – Mixed Questions of Fact and Law – Petitioner contended that the MSME Council proceeded ex parte without proper service, in violation of principles of natural justice – Held: Determination of proper service requires examination of mode of service, acknowledgment, and addresses, which are disputed questions of fact and cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction – Issues are required to be examined by the forum competent under the statute [Paras 8–9].

Limitation – MSME Proceedings – Bar of Limitation – Petitioner contended that the claim was barred by limitation, the last supply having been made on 18.02.2017 and reference filed on 03.09.2020 – Held: Whether a claim is barred by limitation is a factual determination depending upon invoices, acknowledgments, and course of dealings, and does not justify bypass of statutory remedy under Section 34 – Reliance on Sonali Power Equipments (supra) does not permit such bypass [Paras 8, 12].

Writ Jurisdiction – Arbitral Matters – Scope of Interference – Scope of interference under Articles 226 and 227 in arbitral matters is extremely limited and confined to cases of patent perversity or exceptional circumstances – No manifest perversity demonstrated on the face of the record in the present case – Reliance on Serosoft Solutions (supra) misplaced [Paras 11, 18].

Pre-Deposit – Section 19, MSME Act – Writ Filed to Avoid Pre-Deposit – Held: A party cannot bypass the statutory remedy and invoke writ jurisdiction to avoid compliance with the requirement of pre-deposit under Section 19 of the 2006 Act – Relied upon: India Glycols Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, (2018) 1 SCC 143 [Para 10].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed as not maintainable – Executing Court directed to decide pending applications expeditiously – Petitioner at liberty to avail statutory remedies available in law – No order as to costs.

Civil Law – Earnest Money – Wrongful Retention – Interest – DDA – Contractual Liability – Respondent-plaintiff was the highest bidder in a DDA auction held on 17.12.2008 for a plot at Defence Colony, New Delhi and deposited earnest money of Rs. 63,12,500/- – A writ petition by residents challenged the auction, in which DDA itself filed an affidavit conceding cancellation of the auction – DDA refunded only the principal earnest money on 29.01.2013, without interest, after retaining it for over four years – Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of interest @ 18% p.a. – Trial Court decreed the suit awarding interest @ 12% p.a. from 07.12.2008 to 29.01.2013 and future interest @ 9% p.a. – Held: DDA's retention of the earnest money for more than four years without payment of interest rendered it liable; appeal dismissed [Paras 2, 3, 7, 20, 42].

Limitation – Section 53B DDA Act – Suit for Interest on Earnest Money – Not Barred – DDA contended that the suit was barred under Section 53B(2) of the DDA Act as it was not instituted within six months from the date the cause of action arose – Held: A suit seeking interest on earnest money wrongfully retained by DDA does not fall within the expression "any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act" so as to attract the special six-month limitation under Section 53B(2); DDA cannot take refuge under Section 53B(2) to defeat substantive contractual or restitutionary claims which are otherwise within the general limitation period; the identical plea had already been rejected by this Court in I.A. 24684/2014 [Paras 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33].

Contract – Auction Terms – Clause 7 – DDA's Own Stipulation – Interest @ 7% Payable Beyond Six Months – Clause 7 of the DDA auction advertisement expressly provided that where DDA withdrew the plot from auction and retained the earnest money beyond six months, it would pay interest @ 7% p.a. – Held: DDA did not exclude the liability to pay interest; on the contrary, Clause 7 acknowledged contractual obligation to pay interest @ 7% p.a. for retention beyond six months; DDA was in breach of its own contractual stipulation by refunding only the principal without interest [Paras 35, 36, 38].

Voluntary Intervention in Writ Proceedings – Effect on Interest Claim – DDA contended that the Plaintiff had voluntarily intervened in W.P.(C) No. 123/2009 and therefore could not claim interest during the pendency of the writ petition – Held: The Plaintiff's participation in the writ proceedings was in its capacity as a successful bidder protecting its legitimate commercial interest and not as a volunteer keeping litigation alive for speculative gain; the cancellation of the auction was consequent upon DDA's own stand taken through an additional affidavit; the Plaintiff cannot be penalised for having been impleaded as a respondent – Contention rejected [Paras 40, 41].

Cross-Objections – Interest Post-Refund of Earnest Money – Not Maintainable – Plaintiff filed cross-objections seeking interest @ 12% p.a. for the period from 29.01.2013 (date of refund of earnest money) to 30.06.2014 (date of filing of suit) – Held: Once the entire earnest money was admittedly refunded on 29.01.2013, there is no further liability to pay interest on the earnest money for the period after its return – Cross-objections dismissed [Paras 43, 44, 45].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Cross-objections dismissed – Decree of the Trial Court awarding interest @ 12% p.a. from 07.12.2008 to 29.01.2013 and future interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of judgment until realisation upheld – Pending applications disposed of.

Minority Educational Institutions – Right to Administer – Appointment of Principal – Article 30(1) of the Constitution – Circulars declared unconstitutional – The appellant, a minority aided institution, challenged the Single Bench's order directing the Regional Additional Director to reconsider the in-charge assignment of Principal in accordance with circulars dated 25/08/2021 (modified 08/09/2021), which mandated assignment of current charge only to the senior-most faculty member – Held: The freedom to choose the person to be appointed as Principal is a vital facet of the right to administer a minority educational institution under Article 30(1) and is absolute in character – The said circulars, to the extent applied to minority institutions, are violative of Article 30(1) and declared unconstitutional – Relied upon: Secy. Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose, (2007) 1 SCC 386; Manager, Corporate Educational Agency v. James Mathew, (2017) 15 SCC 595 [Paras 8–15].

Article 30(1) – Scope – Minority Institution – Choice of Principal – Seniority Cannot Be Imposed – Management of a minority aided educational institution is free to appoint a Principal of its own choice and is under no obligation to appoint the senior-most qualified member – The right to choose the Principal, as the head responsible for the tone, temper, discipline, and academic efficiency of the institution, is an important part of the right of administration – Even receipt of State aid does not dilute this right – Once a conscious choice of a qualified person is made by the management, courts cannot examine the merits, rationality, or propriety of such choice [Paras 9–11, 14–15].

Administrative Instructions – Competence of Authority – Statutory Authority – An authority vested with power under the statute alone can exercise its discretion and pass orders – Even a superior authority cannot direct a statutory authority to act in a particular manner without statutory competence – Any decision taken at the behest of a person having no statutory role is patently illegal – Relied upon: Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots' Assn. of India v. DG of Civil Aviation, (2011) 5 SCC 435 [Paras 12, 14].

Decision: Writ appeals allowed – Order dated 5.8.2025 of the Single Bench set aside – Order dated 27.02.2025 giving in-charge of Principal to Dr. S.K. Upadhyay upheld – No order as to costs.

POCSO Act – Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault – Conviction Confirmed – Sentence Modified – Appellant, owner of dance academy, convicted by Special Court under Section 376 IPC r/w Section 5(l) of POCSO Act and sentenced to life imprisonment for committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a minor girl student aged 15 years 5 months – Victim's testimony consistent across complaint (Ex.P2), Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement (Ex.P5), medical certificate (Ex.P3) and court deposition – Corroborated by evidence of PW.1 (father), PW.3 (dance instructor) and PW.11 (doctor) – Held: Prosecution proved offence beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction confirmed under Section 6 of POCSO Act; separate sentence under Section 376 IPC not necessary in view of clear case under Section 6 – Sentence modified to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment as trial court failed to assign reasons for imposing maximum sentence [Paras 33-34, 49-50].

POCSO Act – Proof of Age of Victim – School Bonafide Certificate – Admissibility – Evidentiary Value – Prosecution relied upon bonafide/study certificate (Ex.P10) issued by Baldwin Girls' High School showing victim's date of birth as 05.11.2001 and Age Estimation Certificate (Ex.P8) indicating radiological age above 16 years and below 18 years, both marked with consent of defence – Defence did not dispute or attempt to disprove the said documents – Held: A bonafide/study certificate issued on the basis of entries in the school admission register constitutes a "date of birth certificate from the school" within the meaning of Section 94(2)(i) of the Juvenile Justice Act – As a public document, Ex.P10 possesses evidentiary value and can be acted upon; defence having not challenged it, age of victim stood proved – Observation in P. Yuvaprakash v. State limited to its own facts [Paras 26-30].

Criminal Trial – Medical Evidence in Rape Cases – Absence of Injury – Effect – Absence of external injuries or semen stains on victim's clothes does not negate the offence or establish consent – Medical evidence serves as corroboration of victim's testimony rather than as a sole determinant of guilt – Delay in registration of case and examination of victim explained the absence of semen detection – Doctor (PW.11) confirmed hymen was not intact and victim was used to sexual activity – Accused not disputing that victim was used to sexual activity but denying responsibility – Held: Medical evidence corroborates prosecution case and does not advance the defence [Paras 41-43, 49].

Criminal Trial – Victim Testimony – Credibility – Delay in Complaint – Effect – Victim aged 15 years 5 months did not disclose assault to anyone until informed by PW.3's mother about a similar complaint – Held: Delay in disclosing sexual assault is a natural tendency in a young victim and does not render her testimony unreliable – Consistency across complaint, Section 164 statement and court deposition establishes credibility – Minor omissions do not make the evidence of PW.1 and PW.2 untrustworthy [Para 34].

Sentencing – POCSO Act – Maximum Sentence – Reasons Required – Traces of Consent – Imposition of maximum sentence of life imprisonment under Section 6 of POCSO Act requires valid reasons to be assigned by the trial court – Accused to be sentenced as per law in force on the date of crime i.e., before amendment of 16.08.2009, which permitted minimum 10 years' rigorous imprisonment to maximum life imprisonment – Strict scrutiny of victim's testimony disclosed a shadow of consent, though legally immaterial, which militates against maximum sentence – Sentence reduced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.25,000/- payable to victim as compensation under Section 357 Cr.P.C. [Para 50].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Conviction under Section 376 IPC r/w Section 5(l) of POCSO Act confirmed; offence treated as falling under Section 6 of POCSO Act – Sentence of life imprisonment set aside and modified to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.25,000/- to be paid to victim as compensation – Accused entitled to set off for period already spent in jail.