Property Law - Doctrine of Lis Pendens vs. Bona Fide Purchaser - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 19(b) - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 52 - Appellant filed a suit for specific performance of a registered agreement to sell dated 03.09.1981 executed by Defendant No. 1 - During the pendency of the suit, Defendant No. 1 executed a sale deed in favour of Defendants No. 2 to 7 on 11.10.1982 - Trial court denied specific performance holding the subsequent purchasers to be bona fide purchasers for value without notice under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act - Held: Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act operates at a stage prior to the institution of a suit - Once a suit is instituted, the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act comes into force and prevails over Section 19(b) - The defense of bona fide purchaser without notice is not available to pendente lite transferees, as Section 52 is based on public policy - Subsequent purchasers are bound by the decree irrespective of good faith or lack of notice - Trial court legally erred in granting the benefit of Section 19(b) to pendente lite purchasers [Paras 32-37, 65-70].

Property Law - Transfer by Unauthorized Person - Subsequent Acquisition of Interest - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 43 - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 13(a) - At the time of executing the agreement to sell (03.09.1981), Defendant No. 1 had an imperfect title as the property had been previously sold to a third party - Subsequently, on 07.09.1981, Defendant No. 1 acquired perfect title when the prior sale deed was cancelled via a compromise decree - Held: Under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act, if a vendor acquires any interest in the property subsequent to the contract and the agreement subsists, the purchaser can compel the vendor to make good the contract out of such acquired interest - Subsequent purchasers cannot oppose specific performance on the ground of the vendor's initial lack of title [Paras 35-38, 66-68].

Specific Performance - Readiness and Willingness - Proof of Execution - Plaintiff proved payment of substantial earnest money (Rs. 41,000/- out of the total consideration of Rs. 79,500/-) and the execution of the registered agreement - Plaintiff further proved readiness and willingness by remaining present at the Sub-Registrar's office on the stipulated date and serving legal notice - Defendant No. 1 committed default by failing to obtain the requisite income tax clearance and failing to execute the sale deed - Held: Plaintiff successfully established readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract - Plaintiff is entitled to the primary relief of specific performance [Paras 59-61].

Decision: Appeal allowed with costs - Impugned judgment and decree dated 30.09.1986 of the trial court set aside - Suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 03.09.1981 decreed against all defendants - Defendant No. 1 directed to execute the sale deed and hand over vacant possession upon receiving the balance consideration within two months, failing which the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree executed through the court.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 149(2)(a)(ii) — Invalid Driving License — Liability of Insurance Company — Pay and Recover — Avoidance Clause in Policy — Deceased was traveling in a three-wheeler tempo when the offending tanker driven rashly and negligently on the wrong side collided with the tempo, causing his death — Driver of the tanker found to be holding driving license valid only till 9th September, 2004, the accident having occurred on 9th June, 2010 — Driver was also carrying hazardous chemical (Hydrochloric Acid) — Driver and owner chose not to appear before the Tribunal — Insurance company established its defence of invalid driving license through RTO certificate and driving license extract — Held: Defence under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of absence of valid driving license was duly established — However, considering the avoidance clause in the standard commercial vehicle package policy which provides that nothing in the policy shall affect the right of any person indemnified by the policy to recover amounts under the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurance company is liable to satisfy the entire award to the claimants at first instance — Insurance company granted liberty to recover the amount from the owner of the offending vehicle in execution [Paras 14, 15, 18, 20].

Motor Accidents — Quantum of Compensation — Income of Deceased — Skilled Labourer — Minimum Wages — Conventional Heads — Pranay Sethi — Deceased was an idol-maker earning his livelihood through skilled craft — Tribunal had assessed income as Rs. 4,000/- per month in absence of direct proof — Held: In absence of direct proof of claimed income of Rs. 10,000/-, income to be fixed based on minimum wages for skilled labour prevailing at the time of accident i.e. Rs. 4,210/- per month — Deceased being self-employed, 25% addition towards future rise of income as per Pranay Sethi principles — Deduction of 1/4th towards personal expenses justified as deceased was survived by 5 dependents — Multiplier of 13 correctly applied for age group of 46-50 years as per Sarla Verma — Dependency loss redetermined at Rs. 6,15,732/- — Conventional heads enhanced applying 10% rise — Funeral expenses and loss of estate at Rs. 18,150/- each — Loss of spousal consortium Rs. 48,400/-, filial consortium for both aged parents Rs. 96,800/-, parental consortium for two major sons Rs. 96,800/- — Total compensation enhanced from Rs. 5,63,200/- to Rs. 8,94,032/- [Paras 21-27].

Decision: First appeal partly allowed — Cross objections allowed — Award enhanced to Rs. 8,94,032/- with interest at 9% per annum from date of filing of claim petition — Insurance company directed to deposit enhanced amount of Rs. 3,30,832/- with the Tribunal within six weeks — Liberty granted to insurance company to recover amount from owner of offending vehicle in execution.

Railway Law – Refund of Freight – "Overcharge" vs. "Illegal Charge" – Section 106(3) of the Railways Act, 1989 – NRL booked petroleum products from Numaligarh Refinery Siding (NMGS) during April 2005 to July 2009 — Railways collected both "through distance" charges (9 km) and "siding charges" for the same railway service — Railways admitted the duplication vide letters dated 11.11.2008 and 08.07.2009 and the CGS/NMGS certified Rs. 2,98,22,483/- as refundable vide certificate dated 07.01.2013 — Railways resisted the claim on the ground that notice under Section 106(3) was not served within six months from the date of payment — Held: "Overcharge" means a charge in excess of prescribed rates; where the Railways themselves contend that the siding charges were legal and valid, the charge cannot simultaneously be described as an "overcharge" — a charge that is either illegal or subsequently admitted to be refundable does not attract the mandatory notice requirement under Section 106(3) [Paras 19–21].

Railway Law – Section 106(3) – Applicability Limited to Overcharges – Section 106(3) of the Railways Act, 1989 specifically applies to claims for refund of "overcharges" and uses the words "paid" and "date of payment" — if on the date of payment, the charge was not an overcharge, subsequent events cannot make it one for the purpose of triggering the limitation under Section 106(3) — a fine and clear distinction exists between an "overcharge" and an "illegal charge" — Section 106(3) has no application to claims for refund of illegal charges — Held: The mandatory notice requirement under Section 106(3) does not apply to the present claim [Para 19, relying on Union of India v. M/s Indian Oil Corporation Limited, 2024 INSC 242].

Railway Law – Challenge to Condonation Order Barred by Time – The Railway Claims Tribunal had condoned the delay in filing the claim application vide order dated 21.10.2016 — no challenge was preferred by the Railways against that order within the 90-day period prescribed under Section 23(3) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 — Held: Challenge to the condonation order is hopelessly time-barred and stands repelled [Para 8].

Railway Law – Authenticity of CGS Certificate – Railways Cannot Disown Admissions of Authorised Officials – CGS/NMGS certified the refundable siding charges at Rs. 2,98,22,483/- in 2013 and reaffirmed the same through RTI response in 2017 — Railways sought to deny authenticity by claiming records could not be found — Held: Authenticity of the certificates cannot be disproved by a mere assertion that records are unavailable — Railways cannot abjure responsibility for the actions of their own authorised officials [Paras 25–28].

Railway Law – Interest – Enhancement Refused – NRL in cross-appeal sought enhancement of interest from 6%/9% to 12% per annum — identical issue decided against NRL by a Coordinate Bench in MFA 12/2009 in a similar matter — Tribunal had no specific statutory provision for interest and granted it in exercise of inherent powers — Held: Once the Tribunal has consciously exercised its discretion in granting interest, the same cannot be re-agitated in appeal unless perversity or patent illegality is demonstrated — cross-appeal dismissed [Paras 29–31].

Decision: Both appeals dismissed — MFA No. 142/2019 filed by Union of India (Railways) dismissed — MFA No. 82/2019 filed by M/s Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. dismissed — Railway Claims Tribunal's order directing refund of siding charges with interest at 6% per annum till date of judgment and 9% per annum thereafter on default, upheld — parties to bear their own costs.

Service Law – Dismissal from Service – CRPF – Absence of Departmental Enquiry – Petitioners, Constables (GD) in the 39th Battalion CRPF, dismissed w.e.f. 09.11.2009 by invoking Section 11 of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27-CC(ii) of the CRPF Rules, 1955, on the basis of FIR No. 12/2009 for offences under Sections 147, 148, 294, 506-B and 307 IPC – Disciplinary authority formed opinion that regular departmental enquiry was not reasonably practicable and no enquiry was held – No witness examined, no opportunity of hearing granted – Held: Procedure under Section 11 of the CRPF Act read with Rule 27-CC(ii) of the CRPF Rules not followed in its true spirit – Impugned orders of dismissal, appeal and revision set aside [Paras 3, 6, 11].

Natural Justice – Major Penalty – Mandatory Procedural Safeguards – Removal from service entails serious civil consequences – Delinquent employee must be afforded adequate opportunity at every stage including show cause notice, framing of charges, supply of documents, examination of evidence and cross-examination – Mere assertion that witnesses were unwilling to depose cannot justify dispensing with a full-fledged enquiry – Satisfaction recorded by disciplinary authority not supported by cogent or compelling material – Held: Imposition of major penalty without proper enquiry and reasonable opportunity of hearing cannot be sustained [Paras 12, 16, 21].

Criminal Acquittal – Effect on Departmental Action – Petitioners convicted under Section 323 IPC by Trial Court – Conviction set aside in Criminal Appeal No. 744/2012 vide judgment dated 15.05.2014 by this Court on benefit of doubt – Judgment of acquittal attained finality – Though departmental and criminal proceedings operate in distinct spheres, once departmental enquiry itself was not conducted in accordance with law and criminal conviction also did not survive, foundation of impugned dismissal becomes unsustainable – Held: Basis of dismissal ceased to exist [Paras 13, 14, 22].

Discrimination – Similarly Situated Employees – Reinstatement – Co-delinquents dismissed by same order dated 09.11.2009 and subsequently acquitted were reinstated in service – Denial of same benefit to present petitioners whose conviction was also set aside amounts to manifest arbitrariness and hostile discrimination – Violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India – Held: Discriminatory treatment not justified [Paras 15, 23].

Relief – Reinstatement – Back Wages – Petitioners entitled to reinstatement in service – However, back wages denied having regard to long period during which petitioners remained out of service – Period from date of removal till reinstatement to be treated as service for all other purposes including continuity of service and retiral benefits – No order as to costs [Paras 25, 26, 27, 28].

Decision: Writ petitions allowed — Orders of removal from service, appellate and revisional orders quashed — Petitioners directed to be reinstated in service — Back wages denied — Period of absence to count for continuity of service and retiral benefits.

Family Law – Alienation of minor's undivided interest in joint family property – Requirement of Court's permission – Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Sections 6, 8 and 12 – Appellant-mother sought permission to sell minor daughter's 1/4th share in undivided joint family property for her higher education – Lower court appointed her guardian but refused permission to sell – Held: Under Section 12, no guardian can be appointed for a minor's undivided interest in joint family property if it is under the management of an adult member – Father having died, the mother is the adult member managing the joint family property and the natural guardian under Section 6 – Restrictions under Section 8(2) do not apply to the fluctuating undivided interest of a minor in joint family property managed by an adult member – Mother is competent to sell the minor's share for legal necessity and welfare – Refusal of permission by the lower court is unsustainable [Paras 26–29, 34–36].

Family Law – Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Section 12 – Interpretation of "adult member" – Held: The adult member of the family managing the joint Hindu family property may be either male or female, not necessarily the Karta – Mother, being an adult female member in management of the joint family property after the death of the father, is fully competent to manage and deal with the undivided interest of the minor – Minor being a Hindu and having an interest in undivided joint family property is protected by the management of the mother – Lower court's order set aside and permission granted for the welfare of the minor [Paras 27, 31–36].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and order dated 17.07.2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge is set aside – Prayer of the appellant to sell the minor's undivided share for her higher education is granted.

Civil Law – Preliminary Issues – Order XIV Rule 2 CPC – Discretionary Nature – Post-1976 Amendment – Suit for cancellation of Will instituted in 2006 – Issues framed in December 2008 – Plaintiff's evidence substantially recorded – Application by defendant filed in July 2025 to decide issues of limitation and bar under Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act as preliminary issues – Held: After the 1976 Amendment, Rule 2 of Order XIV is no longer mandatory – The word "shall" of the unamended rule has been replaced by "may," making it discretionary for the court to decide issues of jurisdiction or bar to suit as preliminary issues – Only issues of law which do not require inquiry into facts can be tried as preliminary issues – Plea of limitation being a mixed question of fact and law cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts – Application filed after 18 years is not bona fide – Direction to decide all issues simultaneously at the time of final decision issued [Paras 4–23].

Preliminary Issue – Limitation – Mixed Question of Law and Fact – A plea of limitation cannot be decided as a preliminary issue as the starting point of limitation is entirely a question of fact requiring evidence – Where the decision on an issue of law depends upon decision of facts, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue – Court has no jurisdiction to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues [Paras 17–18].

Bona Fides – Belated Application – Where defendant chose not to press for decision of issues as preliminary issues for 18 years from the date of framing of issues, and the application was filed only after substantial recording of plaintiff's evidence, such application cannot be regarded as bona fide – It would be appropriate for the court below to consider and decide all issues simultaneously at the time of final decision [Paras 21–23].

Decision: Petition disposed of – Trial court directed to decide all issues framed in Original Suit No. 859 of 2006 simultaneously – Trial court to endeavour to decide the suit expeditiously, preferably within one year from production of certified copy of this order.

Companies Act – Appointment of Woman Director – Section 149 – Compliance – Triable Issue – Petitioner company alleged to have violated Section 149 of the Companies Act, 2013 by failing to appoint a woman director within the prescribed period ending 31st March, 2015 – Petitioners claimed appointment of Ms. Kirti Sanghavi as woman director by Board resolution dated 3rd January, 2015, but Form DIR-12 uploaded before the Registrar of Companies only on 6th October, 2015 upon payment of penalty – Petitioners failed to disclose when DIN was applied for and allotted to the newly appointed director – No reply to show cause notice produced – Held: Whether the appointment was actually made within the statutory timeframe is a triable issue requiring evidence by parties and cannot be adjudicated in revisional jurisdiction – Revision dismissed [Paras 6–11].

Quashing of Proceedings – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Scope – Petitioners contended that the complaint was an abuse of process of law as they had complied with the statutory requirement and also paid the prescribed penalty – Held: In the absence of satisfactory material before this Court establishing compliance within time, the revisional application is not entertainable and the matter is to be decided by the trial court after leading of evidence – Application dismissed [Paras 3–4, 10–11].

Decision: Criminal Revisional application dismissed – Proceeding before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore to continue – Interim order, if any, vacated.

Service Law – Pension – Counting of Past Service – Rule 26, M.P. Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 – Petitioner initially appointed with MPEB in 1981, subsequently appointed as Sub-Inspector in Police Department in 1988 after obtaining NOC from MPEB – Retired as Inspector in 2017 – Claim for counting past service with MPEB towards pension declined by District Pension Officer on the ground that Rule 26 does not cover service rendered with MPEB as it is not State Government service – Held: Service conditions of MPEB employees were determined by the State Government since the Board was constituted and its members appointed by the State Government under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and MPEB had power to frame service regulations – Objection of District Pension Officer overruled – Petitioner entitled to count service from 21/06/1981 to 15/01/1988 towards qualifying service – Petition allowed [Paras 9-19, 24].

Qualifying Service – Rule 3(p) – Scope and Construction – Rule 3(p) defines qualifying service as service under the State Government but its latter part extends it to service qualifying under any other order or rule in force – Cumulative reading makes clear that service rendered under any pensionable arrangement, including one governed by rules other than the 1976 Rules, qualifies – When pension rules are capable of more than one interpretation, courts must lean in favour of the employee [Paras 11-13, 17].

Prior Permission – NOC from Earlier Employer – Objection that petitioner did not take up subsequent appointment with prior permission of earlier employer – Rejected – NOC granted by MPEB on 13/11/1987 specifically stated no objection to petitioner's selection as Sub-Inspector – Application also forwarded through Board's authority – Petitioner served for about 30 years before retirement – Raising objection of absence of prior permission at this stage not permissible – Prior permission to be presumed unless State establishes contrary [Paras 20-23].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Objection raised by District Pension Officer overruled – Respondents including District Pension Officer, Shivpuri, directed to process petitioner's claim for counting service from 21/06/1981 to 15/01/1988 in pursuance of order dated 15/05/2018 [Para 24].

Service Law – Departmental Proceedings – Acquittal in Criminal Case – Effect on Disciplinary Action – Constable dismissed from service on charges of misconduct arising out of alleged involvement in narcotic trafficking under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C) and 29 of the NDPS Act – Criminal court acquitted the respondent recording categorical finding that prosecution failed to establish his involvement and that plea of alibi stood proved by cogent documentary and oral evidence – Disciplinary authority proceeded to dismiss despite acquittal, relying on same set of witnesses whose testimony was discarded by the criminal court – Single Judge set aside dismissal and directed reinstatement – Held: Where the foundation of the departmental proceedings rests on the same factual matrix as the criminal case and the same witnesses whose evidence was rejected by the criminal court form the basis of the inquiry, the departmental proceedings are based on "no evidence" and are unsustainable – Writ Appeal dismissed [Paras 3–21].

Plea of Alibi – Established by Cogent Evidence – Effect on Departmental Proceedings – Respondent established during criminal trial that on the date of alleged offence he was undergoing official training at Phulbani from 25.05.2015 to 30.05.2015 – Training records and testimony of D.W.1 accepted by the trial court – Criminal court recorded that respondent was not even present at the spot – Inquiry officer relied on the very same witnesses whose statements before the criminal court were rejected – Held: Once the plea of alibi is judicially accepted and attains finality, the entire genesis of the departmental charge stands washed away on facts – Departmental findings based on no evidence [Paras 17–20].

Judicial Review – Scope in Disciplinary Matters – Perversity of Findings – Appellants contended that the Single Judge exceeded permissible limits of judicial review by re-appreciating evidence – Held: High Court's interference was not by way of appellate re-appreciation but on the ground that the findings of the disciplinary authority were based on no evidence, being premised entirely on witnesses whose version stood judicially discredited – Interference was warranted and cannot be faulted on law or facts [Paras 13–14, 20].

Decision: Writ Appeal dismissed – Order of Single Judge setting aside dismissal and directing reinstatement with all consequential service and financial benefits upheld.