Murder – Section 302/34 IPC – Common Intention – Abatement of Appeal – Surviving Appellant – Deceased Laxman was allegedly assaulted with laathis by four accused-appellants on 15.06.1982 near a well, following suspicion that Laxman had informed the police about illicit liquor manufacture at the house of Raghuver – Trial Court convicted all four accused-appellants under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment – Appellants Raghuver, Hira and Idal died during pendency of appeal and their appeals stood abated – Appeal adjudicated solely in respect of surviving accused-appellant No. 4, Chhakki [Paras 2, 11].

Section 34 IPC – Common Intention – Requirement of Premeditation, Pre-plan and Pre-concert – Prosecution witnesses Viran PW-1, Ram Dayal PW-2 and Tulsi PW-3 made only general allegations against all accused persons collectively and attributed no specific motive, cause or enmity to surviving accused-appellant Chhakki – Motive for the crime was exclusively personal to Raghuver and his brother Hira, who suspected Laxman of informing the police – Chhakki was not a family member of Raghuver and no evidence disclosed any reason for his participation – Investigating Officer PW-8 deposed that no witness stated they had seen the accused emerging from the house – Tulsi PW-3 contradicted himself in cross-examination as to whether he had seen the accused persons going from the back of the house – Held: Prosecution failed to establish premeditation, pre-plan or pre-concert between surviving accused-appellant Chhakki and the other accused-appellants; trial Court did not discuss or record any finding on common intention with reference to Chhakki; conviction with aid of Section 34 IPC is unsustainable in absence of proof of prior meeting of minds [Paras 14–20].

Section 34 IPC – Common Intention – Settled Principles – For conviction under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, the prosecution must establish that all accused shared a pre-arranged plan and that the criminal act was done in furtherance of common intention – The plan may develop on the spot but must precede the act constituting the offence; a definite conclusion as to prior concert is essential – Trial Court merely relied on the nature and extent of injuries to infer intention to kill and did not address the requirement of premeditation and prior concert in respect of Chhakki – Held: This approach is not sustainable in law, particularly in a heinous offence like murder where every ingredient must be proved beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 18–20].

Decision: Criminal appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence of surviving accused-appellant Chhakki under Sections 302/34 IPC as passed by the Sessions Judge, Lalitpur on 03.10.1983 in Sessions Trial No. 147 of 1982 set aside – Chhakki acquitted – Already on bail; need not surrender; bail bonds cancelled and sureties discharged – Appellant to comply with Section 437-A CrPC.

Preventive Detention – PITNDPS Act – Section 3(1) – Non-Application of Mind – Relevant Ground for Bail Ignored – Detention Order dated 13.05.2025 was passed against the petitioner based on her involvement in four FIRs under the NDPS Act and four other FIRs relating to illicit liquor trade – The Detaining Authority referred to the bail order dated 19.09.2024 passed in FIR No. 941/2023 only on the ground of parity with co-accused, while omitting the material ground that the Trial Court had also found prima facie non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act (failure to serve notice of second option to be taken before Magistrate/Gazetted Officer) – Held: The Detaining Authority failed to apply its mind to a very relevant consideration; had the violation of Section 50 been noticed, it may have influenced the Detaining Authority one way or the other; the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is accordingly vitiated [Paras 31–37].

Preventive Detention – Delay – Live and Proximate Link – Unexplained Gap – Certified copies of relevant papers were obtained by the Sponsoring Authority on 16.11.2024 and 27.11.2024, yet the proposal was sent only on 10.02.2025; thereafter the Detention Order was passed on 13.05.2025 and executed on 26.05.2025 – No satisfactory explanation was offered for the delay between the date of bail (19.09.2024) and the date of proposal (10.02.2025) – FIR No. 164/2025 dated 14.04.2025, involving only 3.65 grams of heroin and in which petitioner was released on bail on personal bond on the same day with no chargesheet filed even after a year, is insufficient to wish away the earlier delay – Held: Delay in passing the Detention Order itself demonstrates absence of live and proximate link between grounds of detention and the purpose sought to be achieved [Paras 38–43].

Preventive Detention – Bail Granted Despite Section 37 NDPS Act – State's Failure to Seek Cancellation – If an accused is released on bail despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, this is suggestive that the Court may not have found a prima facie case against her; this fact, had it been placed before the Detaining Authority, would have influenced the subjective satisfaction – The State neither challenged the bail orders nor sought cancellation; thereafter resorting to preventive detention was an extraordinary step that was not warranted in the circumstances – Relied upon: Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, 2023 9 SCC 587; Dhanyam v. State of Kerala, AIR 2025 SC 2868; Sushanta Kumar Banik [Paras 34–36].

Judicial Review – Preventive Detention – Parameters – The constitutional court when called upon to test the legality of a preventive detention order may examine: whether the order is based on requisite subjective satisfaction; whether all relevant circumstances have been applied to mind; whether the power is exercised for the authorised purpose; whether the satisfaction rests on rationally probative material; whether there is a live and proximate link between past conduct and the need to detain; whether grounds are precise, pertinent and relevant; and whether statutory timelines have been adhered to – Relied upon: Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, 2023 9 SCC 587 [Para 28].

Object of Preventive Detention – Preventive detention affords protection to society not by punishing a person for what he has done but by intercepting before he acts – However, it is a serious invasion of personal liberty and the safeguards provided under the Constitution and the enabling statute must be strictly adhered to – Relied upon: Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, (1982) 2 SCC 403 [Para 27].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Detention Order dated 13.05.2025 and Confirmation Order dated 08.08.2025 set aside – Petitioner directed to be released forthwith if not detained in any other case – Observations limited to validity of Detention Order; not to influence pending cases including FIR No. 164/2025 – No order as to costs.

Civil Procedure – Order IX Rule 13 CPC – Ex-Parte Decree – Setting Aside – Service of Summons – Postal Endorsement of Refusal – Presumption and Rebuttal – Respondent instituted a commercial suit against the Appellant and obtained an ex-parte decree on 22.03.2025 on the basis of a tracking report showing postal endorsement of "refusal" — Appellant denied service on oath, asserting that the tracking report did not bear his name and no summons were ever tendered to him — Trial Court dismissed the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree holding the Appellant duly served — Held: An endorsement of refusal gives rise to deemed service but the presumption is rebuttable; once a specific and sworn denial of service is made constituting credible rebuttal, the burden shifts upon the party asserting service to prove actual tender of summons by cogent evidence; failure to examine the postal official in such circumstances renders the finding of due service legally unsustainable [Paras 9–12].

Civil Procedure – Order IX Rule 13 CPC – Mutually Destructive Findings – Condonation of Delay and Simultaneous Finding of Prior Knowledge – The Trial Court condoned the delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC accepting the Appellant's date of knowledge as 11.04.2025 — simultaneously, the Trial Court held that the Appellant was duly served, thereby implying prior knowledge — Held: Once the Trial Court accepted 11.04.2025 as the date of knowledge for the purpose of limitation, it could not without cogent reconciliation simultaneously hold that the Appellant had prior due service; the two findings are mutually destructive and render the impugned order legally unsustainable [Para 13].

Civil Procedure – Service of Summons – Registered Post – Burden of Proof – A presumption of service arises under Section 114 Illustration (f) of the Evidence Act read with Section 27 of the General Clauses Act where a letter is sent by registered post — where the addressee specifically denies service, the burden is on the party asserting service to prove it; the burden does not stand discharged by mere production of a vague postal report without examination of the postal official [Paras 9–12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned Order dated 18.11.2025 set aside – Application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC allowed – Ex-parte judgment and decree dated 22.03.2025 set aside – Suit restored to its original position before the Trial Court – Parties directed to appear before the Trial Court on 20.05.2026 – Pending applications disposed of.

Murder – Section 302 IPC – Dying Declaration – Multiple Dying Declarations – Inconsistency and Infirmity – Reliability – Appellant-husband convicted by Additional Sessions Judge, Biloli for murder of his wife Komal, who suffered 96% burn injuries on 19.07.2019 and succumbed on 23.07.2019 – Conviction rested solely on two dying declarations: Exhibit-61 recorded by PW-4 Naib Tahsildar and Exhibit-47 recorded by PW-2 Police Head Constable – Held: Both dying declarations suffer from material inconsistencies — Exhibit-61 attributes the incident to a call from the sister-in-law the previous night, while Exhibit-47 attributes it to the deceased not waking up early; there is variance in the manner and cause of the incident between the two declarations; in such circumstances, they cannot form the sole basis of conviction and require corroboration [Paras 18, 22–23].

Dying Declaration – Mental Fitness of Declarant – Medical Officer's Endorsement – Procedural Lapses – Deceased had sustained 96% burn injuries; sedatives and painkillers (Cefsula 1.5 gm and Tramadol) were administered; Medical Officer admitted in cross-examination that patient's general condition was poor, her blood pressure was 95 and she was uncooperative and a-febrile; Medical Officer's endorsement of mental fitness is doubtful as he was standing outside the ward during recording of Exhibit-61 and no written requisition was given by PW-2 or PW-4 for his opinion – PW-2 admitted that the dying declaration Exhibit-47 was not recorded in question-answer form, was not in his handwriting, the person who wrote it was not examined, and the toe impression was not attested by him – PW-4 did not put questions to the deceased to ascertain her mental fitness before recording Exhibit-61 – Held: Administration of sedatives and painkillers to a patient with 96% burns raises serious doubts about voluntariness and reliability of dying declarations; procedural lapses vitiate their evidentiary value [Paras 18–19].

Dying Declaration – Tutoring – Adverse Inference – Non-examination of Material Witnesses – Possibility of tutoring cannot be ruled out as relatives were present in the ward before being asked to leave; PW-1 (eyewitness who reached the spot) stated the deceased was not in a position to speak; PW-5 (mother of deceased) deposed that the incident occurred accidentally while cooking; medical records from Government Hospital, Naigaon (first point of admission) were not produced; statements of neighbours who brought the deceased to hospital were not recorded – Held: Non-production of crucial medical evidence and non-examination of material witnesses warrants drawing of adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act; accused entitled to benefit of doubt [Paras 20–21].

Dying Declaration – Principles Governing Appreciation – Where multiple dying declarations suffer from inconsistencies, infirmities and procedural irregularities, they cannot form the sole basis of conviction and must be corroborated — the person recording the dying declaration must be satisfied as to the mental fitness of the declarant before recording the statement; a conviction based on doubtful dying declarations where the deceased was administered sedatives, sustained extensive burn injuries, and material witnesses were not examined, is not sustainable [Paras 16–28].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Biloli on 27.03.2023 in Sessions Case No. 28 of 2020 quashed and set aside – Appellant acquitted – To be released forthwith if not required in any other case – Fine, if paid, to be refunded after appeal period – Appellant to execute bond of Rs.15,000/- under Section 481 BNSS – Muddemal property to be dealt with in accordance with law.

Criminal Law - SFIO Complaint – Companies Act – Bonds Under Section 91 BNSS – Physical Presence – Petitioner was summoned as accused in a complaint filed by SFIO against 81 persons in connection with alleged fraud in 88 companies of SRS Group, wherein loans of Rs.528 crores were obtained from banks/financial institutions on the basis of false financial statements – Petitioner was never arrested during investigation – Petitioner applied under Section 91 BNSS for permission to furnish bonds without physical appearance before the Special Court – Trial Court dismissed the application holding that Section 91 BNSS does not envisage furnishing of bonds in the absence of the accused – Held: Trial Court committed no error; a bare reading of Section 91 BNSS makes it clear that bonds can be furnished only when the person is present in Court – However, direction issued to trial Court to follow Tarsem Lal guidelines and to not take the petitioner into custody if bonds are not accepted or found not in order, fixing the next date beyond two weeks [Paras 1–3, 21–24].

Tarsem Lal Principles – Applicability to Companies Act Complaints – Section 448 Companies Act 2013 – The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement (AIR 2024 SC 2512) in the context of complaints under PMLA were held applicable pari materia to complaints under Section 448 of the Companies Act, 2013, since Section 4 of PMLA and Section 448 of the Companies Act are similar provisions – Held: Once the accused was not arrested during investigation, the procedure of issuance of summons, acceptance of bonds under Section 91 BNSS, and the safeguards against automatic custody as outlined in Tarsem Lal, apply to such complaints also [Paras 17, 18, 19].

Tarsem Lal – Scheme Summarised – Upon filing of complaint where accused was not arrested during investigation: summons and not warrant to be issued; accused appearing on summons not to be treated as in custody and not required to apply for bail; Special Court may direct furnishing of bond; if accused fails to appear, bailable warrant first, then non-bailable warrant; bond under Section 91 BNSS is only an undertaking to appear and does not amount to grant of bail; if warrant or proclamation already issued, accused cannot be let off merely by furnishing bond but must apply for cancellation of warrant; when accused appears on cancellation application, custody not to be insisted upon if undertaking given to appear regularly; after filing of complaint, Investigating Agency cannot independently arrest the accused [Para 18].

Proclamation – Section 82 Cr.P.C. – First Prayer – Petitioner challenged order dated 19.04.2024 issuing proclamation – Held: Summons, bailable warrants and warrants of arrest were repeatedly issued and the petitioner did not appear; proclamation was the only course left for the trial Court; this prayer has no merit and is rejected [Para 16].

Via Media – Petitioner's Apprehension of Custody – Direction to Trial Court – Court noted the petitioner's anxiety about appearing in Court due to apprehension of being taken into custody if bonds are not accepted, which is a common concern at district level – Held: A via media is required; petitioner directed to appear before the trial Court on the next date; trial Court directed to entertain application for recalling of warrant and for permission to furnish bonds in light of Tarsem Lal; if bonds are not accepted or not found in order, trial Court shall not take petitioner into custody but shall fix the next date beyond two weeks to enable the petitioner to avail legal remedies [Para 24].

Decision: Petition partly allowed – Order dated 17.05.2025 dismissing the application under Section 91 BNSS set aside qua the petitioner – Trial Court directed to follow the dictum of Tarsem Lal – Prayer for quashing of proclamation order dated 19.04.2024 dismissed.

Freedom Fighter's Pension – Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme – Eligibility of Unmarried Daughter – Conditions Sine Qua Non – The appellant, unmarried daughter of late Krishna Pada Bera, a freedom fighter who participated in the Quit India Movement of 1942 and was imprisoned for six months, claimed pension after the death of her father in 1996 – Application made only in June 2007, i.e., more than 11 years after the death of the freedom fighter – Held: The conditions for grant of pension to an unmarried daughter are cumulative and not alternative — she must be unmarried with no source of income, must apply within six months of death of the freedom fighter, must declare she is not employed or receiving pension elsewhere, and must not be earning in excess of Rs.20,000/- per month; appellant was regularly employed and drawing salary on the date of death of her father and thus was not a dependent; failure to meet threshold conditions is fatal to the claim [Paras 13–15, 34].

Freedom Fighter's Pension – Unexplained Delay – Three Limbs – Monetary Claim in Writ Petition – The appellant failed to explain three distinct periods of delay: (i) 11 years from the date of death of father in 1996 till first application in 2007; (ii) rejection of representation in August 2012 not challenged, second representation in December 2016 also rejected in January 2017 and not challenged; (iii) no approach to court for more than six years after the second rejection — writ petition filed only in 2023 – Held: Even in the absence of a specified statutory limitation period, a monetary claim made in a writ petition must be explained if it falls beyond three years; appellant offered no explanation for any of the three delayed timelines; the findings in the rejection order of August 2012 — never challenged — have attained finality and are binding on the appellant [Paras 23–33, 34].

Freedom Fighter's Pension – 2014 Amendment – Timeline of Six Months – Nature of Timelines – The 2014 modification introduced a requirement that application for transfer of pension must be made within six months of the death of the freedom fighter; applications received thereafter were to be referred to the Ministry – Held: Timelines do not constrict a substantive right but merely discipline the mode and manner of its exercise; even if pension is treated as a right, it is not an unbridled right and comes with qualifications and restrictions; the appellant is unable to cross the threshold parameter of stipulated timelines [Paras 19, 22, 34].

Freedom Fighter's Pension – Office Memorandum of 2017 – Scope and Applicability – The 2017 Office Memorandum was issued to clarify that uniform income ceiling would apply to persons drawing pension which had been stopped; it served only to rejuvenate stopped pension of those already granted pension – Held: The 2017 memorandum does not create a fresh right in favour of an applicant who was never granted pension in the first place; the appellant's claim cannot be sustained thereunder [Para 21].

Freedom Fighter's Pension – Discrimination – Parity with Similarly Situated Claimants – Appellant relied on decisions in Alaka Bera (supra) and Kanchan Barman (supra) to contend that similarly placed persons were granted pension and she was being treated discriminatorily – Held: Those decisions were on a different and more restricted footing relating only to the date of application; the appellant stood on a materially different and weaker footing and the said decisions are not applicable [Para 31].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Impugned order of the learned Single Judge dated 04.10.2023 upheld – Appellant held not entitled to pension under the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980 – No order as to costs.

Section 102 CrPC – Power to Seize Property – Scope and Limits – Nexus Requirement – Freezing of Bank Accounts and Mutual Fund Units – The IO, in connection with an alleged fraud involving shares lent to accused persons, froze their bank accounts and mutual fund units under Section 102 CrPC – Held: The power under Section 102(1) CrPC to seize property is not a general power to seize any property of an accused but is limited to property which is alleged or suspected to have been stolen or found under circumstances creating suspicion of commission of an offence – The emphasis is on the character of the property rather than its association with the accused – A direct link between the seized property and the commission of the alleged offence is a pre-condition for valid exercise of the power – Section 102 does not enable the police to seize property with a view to do justice and hand it over to the person they believe to be rightfully entitled [Paras 19, 21, 22, 27, 28].

Section 102 CrPC – Principles Summarised – The following principles govern exercise of power under Section 102: (i) it is a tool of investigation to collect evidence; (ii) bank accounts and Demat accounts are property within its scope but immovable property is excluded; (iii) only property alleged or suspected to be stolen or found in circumstances creating suspicion of commission of offence can be seized; (iv) a direct link between seized property and alleged offence is essential; (v) the power cannot be used for compensatory justice or as a recovery mechanism for complainant; (vi) seizure can be challenged on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, the property not meeting the definition, or absence of nexus [Para 28].

Freezing of Accounts – Nexus Not Established – De-Freezing Justified – Prima facie, some of the mutual fund accounts of the accused were opened and units acquired much prior to the transactions in question – The trail of sale proceeds of allegedly lent shares to the amounts in the frozen accounts was not established – The IO appeared to have frozen the accounts swayed by the general allegation of fraud rather than establishing a direct nexus – Where the investigating agency lacks the direct link between seized property and commission of the offence, continuation of freezing would amount to detaining property of the accused pending adjudication, negating the presumption of innocence – Held: De-freezing of accounts was justified [Paras 36, 37, 38, 39].

Shares Transferred to Demat Account – Beneficial Ownership Presumption – Section 46 Companies Act, 2013 – Where shares are transferred to the Demat account of a person, Section 46(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that the record of the depository is prima facie evidence of the interest of the beneficial owner – It would be for the prosecution to dislodge this presumption – The real nature of the transaction is a matter for trial [Para 34].

Condition of Bank Guarantee – Onerous – Modified to Indemnity Bond – The trial Court while rightly ordering de-freezing imposed a condition of furnishing a bank guarantee of Rs.6.55 Crores, which virtually amounted to denial of the prayer for de-freezing – Having concluded that there was no nexus between the seized property and the alleged offences and no likelihood of early conclusion of trial, the trial Court ought to have imposed only reasonable conditions – Held: The condition of bank guarantee set aside – Substituted with a direction to furnish an indemnity bond for Rs.6.55 Crores to bring back the said amount with interest as directed by the Court at conclusion of trial [Paras 42, 43].

Withdrawal of Civil Interim Relief – Freezing Cannot Substitute – The first informant had instituted a civil suit and filed a Notice of Motion for interim relief but withdrew the Notice of Motion – Allowing the freezing of accounts to continue till conclusion of criminal trial would amount to an order of attachment before judgment without satisfying the requisite legal standard, indirectly circumventing the withdrawal of civil interim relief [Para 40].

Decision: Criminal Application No. 191 of 2024 (first informant) dismissed – Criminal Application No. 790 of 2024 (accused No. 2) allowed – Impugned order modified – Accounts to be de-frozen subject to accused No. 2 furnishing an indemnity bond for Rs.6.55 Crores – Interim relief to continue for six weeks.

Arbitration – Section 34 – Deposit of 75% of Award Amount – Withdrawal by Award Holder – No Objection by Award Debtor – Binding Effect – ONGC deposited 75% of the arbitral award amount before the Special Court pursuant to conditional stay granted by the Special Court during Section 34 proceedings – DIL filed I.A. No. 200 of 2023 seeking withdrawal and furnished undertaking to re-deposit as and when directed – ONGC, through its officer, filed counter expressly stating "No Objection" to withdrawal without security, citing DIL's ongoing contracts worth crores with ONGC as sufficient comfort – Special Court allowed withdrawal vide Order dated 08.05.2023 – In the appeal, ONGC sought to resile from the no-objection contending that the officer was not duly authorised and disciplinary action was being initiated – Held: The no-objection was given by ONGC in writing in a counter affidavit; the Order dated 08.05.2023 recorded the same and was never challenged before the Special Court or in any higher forum; ONGC cannot be permitted to take a contrary plea for the first time in the rejoinder affidavit in the application in appeal; the stand is an afterthought [Paras 24–25, 31].

Arbitration – Application to Re-deposit Withdrawn Amount or Furnish Security – Conditions for Grant – Changed Circumstances – ONGC sought direction to re-deposit or furnish bank guarantee on the ground that DIL had suffered a loss of Rs.78.76 crores in the financial year 2024-25 as against profit of Rs.125 crores in 2023-24, alleging precarious financial condition – DIL denied, submitting that the loss was attributable to a one-time non-cash exceptional accounting item on account of acquisitions of Kandla Energy and Dolphin Offshore Shipping, with no impact on liquidity or operational solvency; that DIL had active contracts with ONGC exceeding Rs.1,000 crores with ONGC itself holding substantial bank guarantees and making monthly running bill payments – Held: For direction to re-deposit or furnish security after withdrawal was permitted with the consent of the applicant-ONGC, a very strong case is required to be made out; disputed questions of financial capacity cannot be finally adjudicated in this jurisdiction; no case for grant of prayer made out at this stage [Paras 33–36].

Arbitration – Undertaking to Re-deposit – Survival After Dismissal of Section 34 Petition – DIL contended that the undertaking to re-deposit stood extinguished upon dismissal of CAOP No. 17 of 2022 under Section 34 – Held: An appeal under Section 37 is a continuation of the original proceedings; the undertaking given by DIL to re-deposit the amount when directed by the Court subsists in the appeal and DIL would remain bound by it if and when the Court directs re-deposit either consequent on the result of the appeal or otherwise; plea of extinguishment of undertaking rejected [Para 37].

Arbitration – No Objection to Withdrawal Without Security – Obligation to Challenge Order – ONGC contended the learned Special Judge erroneously recorded "no objection without security" – Held: If any statement in a court order is disputed as wrongly recorded, the appropriate course is to approach the same court; ONGC neither approached the Special Court nor challenged Order dated 08.05.2023 for over three years; such inaction also evidences that ONGC had no objection to withdrawal of the amount by DIL without security [Paras 30–31].

Decision: I.A. No. 2 of 2025 rejected – No direction issued to DIL to re-deposit the amount or furnish bank guarantee at this stage – DIL held bound by its undertaking to re-deposit if and when directed by the Court in the appeal – Pending miscellaneous petitions stand closed.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Dishonour of Cheque – Revision – Concurrent Findings – Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction – Revisionist-convict challenged concurrent conviction and sentence upheld by both trial court and appellate court — Trial court sentenced revisionist to imprisonment till rising of court with compensation of Rs.7,40,000/- inclusive of interest at 8% per annum from the date of institution of complaint, with default simple imprisonment of four months — Both courts extensively analysed the evidence and defence raised by the revisionist — Held: Scope of revisional jurisdiction is extremely narrow and does not extend to re-appreciation of evidence; interference is warranted only on a finding of perversity in the judgments below; where both courts below have concurred in conviction and sentence, the scope for interference is further limited; no perversity, incorrectness, illegality or impropriety found in the impugned judgments [Paras 6, 9–10].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Defences Raised – Non-filing of Income Tax Returns – Misuse of Cheques – Shifting of Defence – Revisionist contended before the High Court that the complainant's failure to file income tax returns showing the loan transaction was fatal to the prosecution, and that cheques given in some other property dispute were misused and labelled as loan repayment cheques — Held: Before the trial court, the defence taken was entirely different — that two blank signed cheques were stolen from his office drawer by someone and misused; the plea of misuse in a property dispute is a new case set up for the first time before the revisional court and cannot be entertained — Further, the revisionist admitted in his Section 313 CrPC statement that he had signed the cheque in question and that he had received the statutory notice; the trial court correctly held that filling of particulars on a cheque by the complainant does not constitute material alteration where the drawer does not dispute his signature [Paras 4, 7].

Decision: Revision petition dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/- to be paid by the revisionist to the respondent — Impugned judgments of conviction and sentence upheld — Revisionist directed to pay the complete fine amount to the respondent within three days, failing which the trial court to initiate procedure for default sentence — Pending application disposed of.