Civil Law - Real Estate - RERA Act 2016 - Section 18 - Delayed Possession - Appellant promoter challenged the Appellate Tribunal order directing payment of interest for delay in handing over possession of apartments in the Wintergreen project - Possession was contractually due by 30th June 2017 under a MOFA agreement - MahaRERA initially directed possession by December 2019 allowing allottees liberty to demand interest at an appropriate stage following their request for parity with a previous order - Allottees appealed and the Tribunal awarded interest from 1st July 2017 until actual possession - Promoter argued that allottees accepted delayed performance by making payments under revised schedules and failed to give notice of intention to claim compensation as required under Section 55 of the Contract Act - Held - Section 18 of RERA Act confers an unqualified absolute statutory right to interest for delayed possession - This right is sacrosanct and linked to the date specified in the agreement - It is not affected by contingencies outside the terms of the agreement or acceptance of delayed performance - The requirement of notice under Section 55 of the Contract Act cannot be read into the summary proceedings of Section 18 RERA - Appeal dismissed - [Paras 1-62].

Civil Law - Statutory Interpretation - RERA Act 2016 - Section 89 - Indian Contract Act 1872 - Section 55 - Overriding Effect - Interplay between special and general law - Appellant contended that Section 55 of the Contract Act disentitles the promisee from compensation if delayed performance is accepted without notice - Court examined the inconsistency between the unqualified right in Section 18 RERA and the conditional right in Section 55 Contract Act - Held - RERA Act is a special enactment and Section 89 provides that it shall have overriding effect over anything inconsistent in other laws - Section 18 RERA gives an absolute right unimpeded by conditions whereas Section 55 Contract Act lays fetters on that right - The special law prevails over the general law - Promoter is obligated to pay interest from the date specified in the agreement even in the absence of notice by the allottee - [Paras 27-51].

Civil Law - Force Majeure - RERA Act 2016 - Section 18 - Covid-19 Pandemic - Moratorium benefit - Appellant sought to exclude the pandemic period from interest calculation - Possession was due in June 2017 and project completion date under RERA registration was 2019 - Held - As the date of performance was prior to the pandemic the subsequent Covid-19 lockdown cannot aid the promoter to escape liability for interest - Moratorium circulars do not apply where delay was pre-existing - [Paras 52-53].

Civil Law - Maintainability of Appeal - Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - Section 96(3) - Estoppel - Concession on law - Appellant argued that allottees invited the original MahaRERA order by requesting parity and thus were precluded from appealing - Held - A plea of parity or a request for an identical order does not constitute an express waiver or abandonment of the right to interest - There is no estoppel against law - Advocate's submission on a question of law does not prevent an allottee from filing an appeal - For estoppel to operate there must be an express relinquishment of a benefit which was not present in this case - [Paras 54-61].

Decision: Second Appeal dismissed – Appellate Tribunal order confirmed – Execution proceedings deferred for four weeks from 24th June 2026.

Criminal Law - Murder - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 302 and 34 - Appellants Premnarayan and Parmanand were convicted for the murder of Jamuna Prasad Patel - Prosecution case rested on the last seen theory and recovery of a 6-7 kg stone at the instance of accused - High Court found that the medical officer PW-16 did not provide a clear finding on whether the death was homicidal or accidental - Viscera report confirmed presence of ethyl alcohol suggesting intoxication - Evidence of wife PW-5 and son PW-8 of the deceased admitted no prior enmity - Seized stone and clothes of the accused had no blood stains - Field boundaries were 4-5 feet high making accidental fall plausible - Held - Circumstantial evidence failed to form a complete chain of guilt - Impugned judgment set aside and appellants acquitted - [Paras 1-18].

Criminal Law - Circumstantial Evidence - Evidence Law - Proof beyond reasonable doubt - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 3 - Five golden principles - Prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances excluding every other hypothesis of innocence - Suspicions however strong cannot replace proof - Deceased was intoxicated and might have fallen accidentally - No motive established - Held - Conviction cannot be based on surmises and conjectures - Reliance placed on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs State of Maharashtra - [Paras 8-10 16].

Evidence Law - Last Seen Together - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 7 - Appellants and deceased were neighboring farmers with fields and huts within 200 feet - Normal practice for farmers to stay in fields at night for irrigation - Merely being seen together in fields does not constitute a suspicious circumstance in rural context - Held - Last seen theory negated due to proximity of residences and lack of suspicious conduct - [Paras 10-13 16].

Decision: Both appeals allowed - Conviction and sentence under Section 302 and 302/34 IPC set aside - Appellants acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith.

Writ Law - Police Transfer - Karnataka Police Act - Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India - Tenure and Discipline - Petitioner was posted as Sub-Inspector Law and Order at Yelawala Police Station on 30-06-2025 after Respondent No. 3 was suspended for dereliction of duty - High Court subsequently quashed the suspension of Respondent No. 3 in W.P.No.33384/2025 and directed reinstatement - Official respondents posted Respondent No. 3 back to Yelawala Police Station displacing the Petitioner - Petitioner challenged the transfer as premature before the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (KSAT) - KSAT upheld the transfer but directed Petitioner be accommodated in a vacant post at the same station - Petitioner challenged KSAT order and subsequent posting order dated 04-05-2026 - High Court noted that Respondent No. 3 suppressed material facts in previous proceedings regarding the Petitioner's seniority and posting - Court observed that members of a disciplined force are expected to work in a disciplined manner and not quarrel over specific postings - Held - Such conduct affects the larger public interest and the ability to maintain law and order - Both officers directed to be transferred out of Yelawala Police Station and Mysuru District - [Paras 1-15].

Writ Law - Suppression of Facts - Conduct of Litigant - Respondent No. 3 failed to bring to the notice of the Court the posting of the Petitioner in his place while seeking reinstatement after suspension - Proper course was to implead the Petitioner - Held - A person who approaches the Court by suppressing material facts and failing to bring relevant facts to notice is not entitled to relief - [Paras 11-13].

Service Law - Transfer - Right to Posting - Karnataka Police Act - Tenure Protections - Petitioner and Respondent No. 3 both claimed right to continue at Yelawala Police Station based on tenure provisions - Held - No Government servant or official has a right to seek posting to a particular post or place - It is open for the Government to utilize services wherever needed subject to statutory provisions - If two Sub-Inspectors fight for a post they would not be in a position to maintain law and order - [Paras 11-13].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – Order of the Tribunal and the transfer order modified – Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 directed to post both the Petitioner and Respondent No. 3 out of Yelawala Police Station and out of Mysuru District within two weeks.

Civil Law - Land Acquisition - Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 - Section 34 - National Highways Act 1956 - Section 3G(5) and 3-J - Entitlement to Solatium - Appellants challenged District Court order dismissing Section 34 application where Arbitrator failed to award solatium - Appellants relied on Tarsem Singh case declaring Section 3-J of National Highways Act ultra vires Article 14 of Constitution of India - Respondents argued limited scope of Section 34 and 37 and highlighted Supreme Court Review Petition clarifying interest on solatium starts from date claims raised - High Court found Civil Court failed to decide Section 34(4) application for fresh adjudication by Arbitrator - Held - Non-grant of solatium constitutes a ground for challenge under Section 34(2)(3)(ii) as being against fundamental policy of Indian law - Quantum of compensation remains Arbitrator's domain - Impugned order set aside and matter remanded to Arbitrator for decision on solatium in light of Tarsem Singh and subsequent Review Petition - [Paras 1-12].

Civil Law - Remand - Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 - Section 34(4) - Failure to Adjudicate Solatium - District Judge failed to deal with application under Section 34(4) and relief for just compensation including solatium - Supreme Court settled law that land owners under National Highways Act are entitled to solatium - Held - Civil Court ought to have remanded matter to Arbitrator under Section 34(4) to decide quantum of compensation and solatium application - Matter remanded for decision in consonance with Union of India Vs Tarsem Singh - [Paras 7-9].

Civil Law - Arbitral Award - Rectification of Errors - Khasra Numbers - Appellants pointed out clerical or typographical mistakes in identity of land regarding Khasra numbers in specific appeals AA 53/2024 and AA 55/2024 - Held - Arbitrator directed to look into identity of property and verify whether mentioned properly in award - [Para 10].

Decision: Appeals allowed to a limited extent – Order of 24th District Judge Jabalpur dated 05.03.2024 set aside – Matter remanded to Arbitrator for fresh decision on solatium and interest – Parties directed to appear before Arbitrator on 16.07.2026.

Writ Law - Regularization of Service - Constitution of India - Article 141 - Respondent joined appellant University as Casual Labour in 1992 - Continued as Time Scale Worker from 2008 onwards - Obtained requisite educational and technical qualifications during service - University rejected representation for regularization as Junior Assistant-cum-Typist on grounds that Respondent had not completed 5 years of service as on 25.11.1993 per G.O.Ms.No.212 - Single Judge directed regularization in Junior Assistant cadre or equivalent post from date of order with notional seniority - Division Bench observed Respondent completed 33 years of service without any major punishment or court stay - Bench relied on Supreme Court precedents in Umadevi and Jaggo cases - Held - Procedural formalities cannot be used to perpetually deny substantive rights accrued over a considerable period through continuous service - University cannot rely on Act 2 of 1994 or G.O.Ms.No.212 to deny regularization to employees satisfying criteria laid down in Para 53 of Umadevi - Single Judge order sustained - Appeal dismissed - [Paras 1-13].

Service Law - Regularization - State of Karnataka v. Umadevi 2006 (4) SCC 1 - Interpretation of Para 53 - Distinction between illegal and irregular appointments - University argued respondent was over-aged for direct recruitment and failed cut-off date for regularization - High Court held that Umadevi does not intend to penalize employees fulfilling ongoing and necessary functions of the State for long years - Selective application of Umadevi to argue no vested right exists for temporary employees distorts the judgment's spirit - Prolonged and unblemished service performing inherently regular tasks transforms ad-hoc scenarios into those demanding fair regularization - Held - State instrumentalities must not weaponize the judgment against employees who rendered indispensable services over decades - [Paras 10-12].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Order of the learned Single Judge directing regularization of the respondent affirmed – No costs.

Criminal Law - Quashing of Proceedings - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Maintainability through Power of Attorney - Applicant Rakesh Mehra sought quashing of FIR No. 0177 of 2022 for offences under Sections 420 506 and 120B IPC through his power of attorney holder Mr. Akhil Arora - Applicant was declared a proclaimed offender under Section 82 CrPC and a Look-out Circular was issued due to non-cooperation with investigation - Complainant raised a preliminary objection that an accused intentionally evading law cannot seek extraordinary jurisdiction through a proxy - Court observed that Section 2 of the Power of Attorney Act cannot override specific statutory provisions requiring the appearance of an accused - Reliance placed on T.C. Mathai vs. District and Session Judge where the Supreme Court held that appearance through a power of attorney holder is not permissible in criminal proceedings - Held - A petition under Section 482 CrPC or a writ petition filed through a Power of Attorney holder by an accused who is an absconder and a proclaimed offender is not maintainable - [Paras 34-41].

Criminal Law - Nature of Dispute - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 420 and 506 - Co-existence of Civil and Criminal Liability - Dispute between firms owned by the applicant and the complainant regarding non-supply of materials despite payments - Petitioners argued that the dispute was civil and contractual involving an arbitration clause - Investigation revealed that huge amounts totaling approximately Rs. 31.25 crore were siphoned and transferred into the accounts of the applicant's married daughters shortly after the lodging of the FIR - Court noted that the presence of commercial relations does not exclude criminal liability if the complaint discloses a cognizable offence - Held - If a transaction has a civil flavor but involves fraudulent intent and siphoning of funds it must be tried as a criminal offence - Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC cannot be used to meticulously appreciate evidence at the threshold stage - [Paras 42-44].

Criminal Law - Freezing of Bank Accounts - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 102 - Validity - Petitioners Anushka Arora and Madhvi Mehra challenged the freezing of 14 bank accounts alleging they were opened post-transaction and were part of a family settlement - Investigating Agency submitted that funds were diverted to these accounts to circumvent the judicial process and evade recovery - Court found sufficient material to proceed with trial noting that the siphoning occurred within a short span after FIR registration - Held - Freezing of accounts was legal as they were directly linked to the alleged siphoning of funds by the main accused - [Paras 13-15 and 43].

Criminal Law - Proclaimed Offender - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 82 - Effect on Inherent Jurisdiction - Applicant argued that the proclamation was illegal as the offence did not fall under Section 82(4) CrPC - Court observed that the process of Look-out Circular and proclamation is to ensure availability of the accused and prevent circumvention of judicial process - Applicant failed to join investigation despite notices under Section 41A CrPC - Held - An accused who intentionally evades the process of law is not entitled to the court's extraordinary jurisdiction - [Paras 39-40].

Decision: Petitions dismissed – All interim orders vacated – Trial Court directed to proceed with the trial as per law.

Intellectual Property Law - Trade Marks - Trade Marks Rules 2017 - Rule 45 - Mandatory versus Directory deadline - Petitioner challenged Registrar order allowing Evidence Affidavit filed by Rectification Applicant after three year delay - Petitioner relied on Delhi High Court rulings in Sun Pharma and Mahesh Gupta asserting that Rule 45(2) creates a mandatory deadline with a deeming fiction of abandonment - Respondent relied on IPAB ruling in Sahil Kohli and Gujarat High Court ruling in Wyeth asserting the deadline is directory - Court examined the scheme of Rules 44 to 51 and Section 131 of TM Act - Found that Rule 48 explicitly grants Registrar discretion to permit further evidence at any time - Observed that Rule 45 is a procedural provision and not a provision of limitation - Held - The deadline in Rule 45(1) of 2017 Rules is directory and not mandatory - Section 131 of the parent Act provides an overriding power to the Registrar to extend time for any act not expressly provided in the Act - Deadlines in subordinate Rules do not constitute time expressly provided in the Act - Ratio in Delhi High Court judgments distinguished as they primarily interpreted 2002 Rules or specific factual matrices - Petition dismissed - [Paras 1-98].

Intellectual Property Law - Statutory Interpretation - Trade Marks Act 1999 - Section 131 - Extension of time - Scope of Registrar power - Court analyzed the phrase not being a time expressly provided in this Act in Section 131 - Comparison made with Sections 91 and 128 which use the phrase under this Act or the rules made thereunder - Absence of reference to Rules in Section 131 indicates Parliament did not intend to exclude deadlines stipulated in subordinate legislation from the Registrar extension powers - Rule 109(1) of 2017 Rules confirms this by listing specific Rule-based exclusions which do not include Rule 45 - Held - Registrar possesses statutory jurisdiction under Section 131 to extend Rule-based deadlines even after expiry - [Paras 46-61].

Intellectual Property Law - Deemed Abandonment - Trade Marks Rules 2017 - Rule 45(2) - Deeming fictions - Interpretation - Petitioner argued that failure to file evidence within two months leads to automatic abandonment of opposition - Court held that deeming fictions must be restricted to the purpose for which they are created - Procedural prescriptions are handmaids of justice and not tyrants - Held - Abandonment under Rule 45(2) cannot travel beyond the main provision and cannot nullify the Registrar power under Section 131 to condone delay for sufficient cause - Deemed abandonment only operates if no extension is sought or granted - [Paras 41-45].

Intellectual Property Law - Appealability - Trade Marks Act 1999 - Section 131(2) - Ministerial acts - Respondent argued appeal was not maintainable due to explicit bar in Section 131(2) - Court observed that while an order simply allowing time extension is generally ministerial and non-appealable - orders having repercussions like deemed abandonment might become appealable under Section 91 - Held - Since the petition raised a pure question of law regarding jurisdiction and interpretation of the 2017 Rules - the Court examined the merits but affirmed the bar on appeals against ministerial extensions - [Paras 81-86].

Decision: Petition dismissed - Order of the Registrar of Trade Marks dated August 26, 2025 upheld - No order as to costs.

Criminal Law - Dishonour of Cheque - Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 - Section 138 - Petitioner borrowed Rs. 3,00,000 and issued a cheque which was returned for insufficient funds - Trial Court convicted the petitioner and sentenced him to six months simple imprisonment with a direction to pay compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 - Conviction was confirmed by the First Appellate Court - During the pendency of the Criminal Revision Case the parties entered into a joint compromise memo - Petitioner paid a final settlement amount of Rs. 2,60,000 to the complainant via Demand Drafts - Petitioner was in judicial custody due to non-compliance with earlier bail conditions - State opposed the revision on the grounds that the conviction was already upheld on merits and compounding at this stage would be a misuse of process - High Court observed that the primary object of Section 138 is compensatory and not punitive - Held - Section 147 of the NI Act being a special law with a non-obstante clause prevails over the general procedure of Section 320 CrPC - Offence under Section 138 NI Act can be compounded at any stage including the revisional stage even after dismissal of an appeal - Conviction and sentence annulled - Petitioner acquitted and ordered to be released from jail forthwith - [Paras 1-51].

Criminal Law - Compounding of Offences - Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 - Section 147 - Power of High Court to compound at revisional stage - Distinction between Section 320 CrPC and Section 147 NI Act - Section 147 NI Act does not carry explicit guidance on the stage of compounding unlike Section 320 CrPC - The compensatory aspect of the NI Act must be given priority over the punitive aspect - The threat of imprisonment is intended as a mode to ensure recovery of money - Held - High Court is empowered to record a compromise and compound the offence to secure the ends of justice and provide justice at the doorstep - [Paras 33-47].

Criminal Law - Inherent Powers - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Exercise of power post-conviction - Use of inherent powers to prevent miscarriage of justice - Court noted that inherent powers can be invoked when no other statutory remedy is available or to give effect to an order under the Code - While quashing is an exception the court can intervene to avoid failure of justice - Held - In view of the amicable settlement and the nature of the offence as a private wrong the court is inclined to exercise its power to bring a quietus to the litigation - [Paras 26-31].

Decision: Criminal Revision Case disposed of in terms of the compromise – Conviction and sentence under Section 138 NI Act annulled – Petitioner acquitted – Direction issued to release the petitioner from jail forthwith.

Tax Law - Computation of Deduction - Income Tax Act 1961 - Section 80-I and Section 32AB - Interplay between investment deposit and industrial undertaking deductions - Appellant assessee engaged in manufacturing detergent cake claimed deductions under both Section 32AB and Section 80-I - Assessing Officer initially disallowed Section 80-I claim - CIT Appeals allowed the claim - Tribunal subsequently ruled that Section 80-I deduction must be calculated after reducing profits by the relief granted under Section 32AB - Matter remanded by Supreme Court for fresh consideration in light of Vijay Industries vs Commissioner of Income Tax (2019) - High Court analyzed the statutory scheme distinguishing between the concepts of profits and gains versus income - Court noted that Section 80-I provides for a deduction from profits and gains derived from an industrial undertaking - Such profits are arrived at after making actual expenses as per Sections 30 to 43D - Deduction under Chapter VI-A is an incentive on fulfilling eligibility conditions - Ratio decidendi established that deductions under Section 80-I are to be computed on the profits and gains of the undertaking without reference to net income adjusted for other Chapter VI-A deductions - Held - Tribunal was not justified in reducing the Section 80-I claim by the investment deposit under Section 32AB - Appeals allowed in favor of assessee - [Paras 1-14].

Tax Law - Statutory Interpretation - Income Tax Act 1961 - Section 80AB and Section 80HH - Prospective application - Revenue contended that Section 80AB was clarificatory and required all deductions to be made with reference to net income included in gross total income - Supreme Court in Vijay Industries overruled earlier contrary views in Motilal Pesticides - Court held that Section 80AB was brought on the statute book with prospective effect from April 1 1981 - It cannot apply to assessment years prior to its enactment - Distinction maintained between any income and profits and gains as understood in tax law - Held - Change in legal position via Section 80AB does not override the specific calculation method for profits and gains under Section 80-I for the relevant periods - [Paras 12-13].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Order of the Tribunal set aside – Question answered in favor of the assessee and against the Revenue.