Electronic Evidence – Tape-Recorded Conversation – Admissibility – Primary vs. Secondary Document – Section 65B(4) Certificate – In a specific performance suit, the plaintiffs relied on a tape record of alleged telephonic conversation between the parties as proof of a concluded oral contract – The trial Court, without determining whether the tape record was primary or secondary evidence and without requiring the mandatory certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act / Section 63(4) of the BSA, appointed FSL as Court Commissioner and directed the defendants to provide voice samples – Held: The impugned order is a patent illegality and is set aside – Application remanded for fresh decision [Paras 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 16].

Electronic Evidence – Tape Record – Secondary Evidence – Section 65B(4) Certificate Mandatory – The tape record produced by the plaintiffs was a copy made from the telephone instrument in which the conversation was originally recorded and therefore falls within the definition of secondary evidence – Before admitting such electronic evidence, production and proof of the certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act or Section 63(4) of the BSA is necessary, essential and mandatory – In the absence of such certificate, the Court cannot determine admissibility of the tape record – Held: Trial Court's order ignoring this requirement is contrary to binding precedent [Paras 7, 8, 9, 11].

Tape-Recorded Evidence – Conditions for Admissibility – The Supreme Court in Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329 and Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 4 SCC 143 laid down the conditions for admissibility of tape-recorded statements: the voice must be duly identified; accuracy must be proved by the maker; possibilities of tampering must be ruled out; and the subject matter must be relevant – Voice identification evidence is at best suspect and must be received with extreme caution – Standard of proof for tape-recorded evidence is more stringent than for other documentary evidence [Paras 12, 13].

Trial Court – Jurisdiction – Direction to Defendants to Provide Voice Samples – The trial Court, by directing the defendant-petitioners to provide their voice samples to the FSL for comparison with the tape recording, effectively required the defendants to furnish evidence to prove the plaintiffs' case – This amounts to exceeding jurisdiction – The question of directing the defendants to give voice samples does not arise until the tape record is first proved and admitted as evidence in accordance with law [Paras 3.3, 3.4, 8].

Decision: Petition allowed – Impugned order dated 30.12.2022 below Exhibit-119 quashed and set aside – Application at Exhibit-119 remanded to the learned trial Court to be decided afresh in accordance with binding precedent on admissibility of electronic evidence.

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, Sections 2(zk), 2(zn), 3, 4 and 5 - Promoter - Real Estate Project - Requirement of Registration - Element of Sale - Respondent obtained land on lease from a Trust for 29 years and 11 months to develop a commercial building with rights to sub-lease but no right to sell ownership - U.P. RERA rejected registration while Appellate Tribunal directed it - Held, the purpose of 'selling' is sine-qua-non for a person to be a 'promoter' under Section 2(zk) and for a project to be a 'real estate project' under Section 2(zn). In the absence of a sale component, the activity does not attract the provisions of the Act. A lessee with restricted rights of possession and sub-leasing without the power to transfer title by sale is not required to seek registration under Section 4. [Paras 30-38, 47-49].

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, Section 4(2)(l)(A) - Application for Registration - Legal Title - Authentication of title where land is owned by another - Held, while the statute provides for authentication of title for land owned by third parties, the statutory scheme primarily governs projects undertaken for the purpose of sale to allottees. Where the developer lacks the legal authority to sell plots, apartments, or buildings under the lease terms, the project falls outside the ambit of the Act. [Paras 43-48].

Interpretation of Statutes - Literal Rule of Construction - Intent of Legislature - Maxim A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum - Held, court must read sections in their literal sense and cannot rewrite them. The legislature consciously used the term 'sale' in defining the scope of RERA. When the language of a statutory provision is clear and unambiguous, it must be presumed that the legislature deliberately employed such words to give effect to the object of the Act, which is to regulate projects intended for sale. [Paras 39-41].

Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Sections 54 and 105 - Distinction between Sale and Lease - Held, a lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy property for a certain time, whereas a sale is a transfer of ownership for a price. RERA registration is predicated on the promoter's ability to execute a registered conveyance deed in favour of the allottee under Section 17, which is impossible where the developer only holds leasehold rights without the power of sale. [Paras 13, 31-33].

Decision: Appeal disposed of – Order of the Appellate Tribunal set aside to the extent it directed registration – Appellant Authority is under no obligation to provide registration number or Login ID as the respondent's project is beyond the purview of the Act – Authority directed to withdraw Form-D prohibitory/restrictive clauses against the Respondent.

Criminal Law - Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 - Section 138 - Quashing of Proceedings - Non-signatory Spouse - Liability under Section 138 is strictly in personam requiring a mandatory identity-link between the account holder, the drawer, and the signatory - Petitioner being a total stranger to the account and non-signatory to the instrument cannot be prosecuted - Held - To compel a non-signatory to undergo trial to prove a negative is a manifest failure of justice - [Paras 25-31]

Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 - Section 141 - Vicarious Liability - Sole Proprietorship - A sole proprietorship is not a Company within the meaning of Section 141 as it lacks a separate legal identity from its proprietor - Liability in a proprietorship begins and ends with the proprietor alone - Marital relationship is not a legal substitute for a partnership deed - Held - Roping in a spouse as a person in charge of a sole proprietorship is a legal fallacy and impermissible - [Paras 32-37, 61]

Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 - Section 138 Proviso (b) - Statutory Demand Notice - Gross Discrepancy - Dishonoured cheque was for 36,07,687 while the demand notice claimed only 7,607 - Statute requires a demand for the said amount of money meaning the exact cheque amount - Held - A notice claiming a fraction of the debt misleads the drawer and is non-est in the eyes of law - Cause of action never matures without a valid notice - [Paras 38-44]

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 202 - Mandatory Inquiry - Out-of-state Accused - Section 202 (now Section 225 BNSS) makes it obligatory for a Magistrate to inquire or direct investigation when the accused resides beyond the court's territorial jurisdiction - Requirement acts as a judicial sieve to prevent harassment of distant residents - Held - Mechanical issuance of process against a resident of Karnataka by a Kolkata court without mandatory inquiry constitutes a jurisdictional error - [Paras 45-52]

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 - Section 528 - Inherent Powers - Abuse of Process - Complainant used ambiguous description of proprietorship/partnership to circumvent restrictive boundaries of NI Act and suppressed the true legal status of the entity - Held - Initiation of proceedings against the non-signatory wife was a strategic attempt to exert extra-legal pressure and constituted a blatant abuse of the process of law - Proceedings quashed - [Paras 53-60]

Decision: Criminal Revisional Application allowed – Proceedings in Case No. CS/35126/2022 pending before the Learned 7th Judicial Magistrate at Calcutta are quashed insofar as they relate to the Petitioner – Petitioner discharged and all bail bonds/warrants cancelled – Trial Court directed to proceed against remaining accused.

Labour Law – Retrenchment – Section 25-F Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Casual Workers – Termination Without Compliance – Workmen engaged as casual daily-rated drivers and helpers on the 1995 Panel prepared pursuant to High Court's interim order, rendered continuous service for more than 240 days in a calendar year — terminated between August 1997 and October 1998 without notice, wages in lieu thereof, or retrenchment compensation — Management contended termination was in pursuance of High Court judgment dated 09/05/1997 — Held: Section 25-F is absolute and unqualified; it applies to every workman in continuous service for not less than one year without exception; the legislature consciously omitted the only proviso that existed by Act 49 of 1984; right under Section 25-F is earned through service itself and not derived from the nature or source of engagement; retrenchment in violation of all three conditions of Section 25-F is ex facie illegal — CGIT's finding of illegal termination upheld [Paras 84–92].

Termination Claimed to be in Compliance with Court Order – Not Established – Management justified termination by relying on High Court judgment dated 09/05/1997 — Termination effected over fourteen months after the judgment, in a staggered and selective manner spread across August 1997 to October 1998 — Held: Compliance with a court order must be prompt and consistent with such compliance; staggered selective termination of workmen at different intervals over eighteen months is wholly inconsistent with compliance with a judicial direction; factual matrix distinguishable from J.D. Biswas wherein termination was immediate and unbroken consequence of the court's direction; contention of compliance with court order cannot be sustained [Paras 79–83, 89–90].

Writ Jurisdiction – Maintainability Against Privatised Air India – Post-Privatisation Status – Air India privatised in 2022 — Respondent contended writ not maintainable against private entity — Held: The bar against writ jurisdiction against a private entity applies where the petitioner directly approaches the High Court without exhausting statutory remedies; where workmen have availed the statutory mechanism under labour laws and the writ challenges the award of a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, the writ is directed against the adjudicatory process and award itself and not merely against the private employer; such writ is maintainable under Articles 226 and 227; Section 17(2) of the Act excludes civil court jurisdiction and provides no statutory appeal, making writ jurisdiction the only available remedy — Writ maintainable [Paras 55–71].

Relief – Compensation in Lieu of Reinstatement – Quantum – Proportionality – Workmen engaged as casual daily-rated workers for periods of one to three years; dispute pending for nearly three decades; reinstatement at this stage impractical and would restore workmen only to casual status — Held: Reinstatement is not automatic upon violation of Section 25-F; courts must evaluate facts contextually including nature of employment, duration of service, delay and laches; compensation must bear direct nexus with length of service and cannot be nominal, uniform or arbitrary — CGIT award of uniform compensation of Rs. 25,000–55,000 set aside; compensation enhanced on proportionate basis: one year or more — Rs. 1,25,000; two years or more — Rs. 2,50,000; three years or more — Rs. 3,75,000 [Paras 93–108].

Decision: Writ petitions partly allowed — Finding of CGIT on violation of Section 25-F upheld — Compensation modified in terms of paragraph 108 — No order as to costs — Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 300 Exception 1 and Exception 4 - Section 302 - Section 304 Part I - Culpable Homicide not amounting to murder - Sudden Fight - Grave and sudden provocation - Accused and deceased were friends and attended a birthday function where alcohol was consumed - Altercation arose over a missing mobile phone and insults were traded regarding female family members - Accused later hacked the deceased with a knife brought from his house during a second quarrel on the way home - Held - The incident occurred without premeditation in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel - Voluntary intoxication and imputations of unchastity to female members created a situation of rage and fight - Act falls under exceptions to Section 300 IPC - Conviction modified from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I IPC - Sentence modified from life imprisonment to ten years - [Paras 27-36]

Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 32(1) - Oral Dying Declaration - Admissibility - Deceased informed his father P.W.1 and other neighbours about the attack by the accused immediately after the incident while being shifted to the hospital - Held - Information passed by the deceased to his father and others about the assailant is believable as an oral dying declaration - Scrutiny of dying declarations must ensure they are not a result of tutoring - Medical evidence corroborated the injuries mentioned in the declaration - [Paras 25-32]

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 374(2) - appreciation of evidence - Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus - Improvement in testimony - Witnesses P.W.1, 2, 3 and 6 claimed to see the actual hacking despite earliest reports suggesting they came out only on hearing cries - Held - Doctrine of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not applicable in the Indian legal system - Falsity in one aspect does not render the entire evidence false - Duty of the Court is to separate truth from falsehood - Fact of the attack and identity of the accused were established - [Paras 33-34]

Decision: Appeal allowed in part - Conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC modified to Section 304 Part I IPC - Sentence of life imprisonment reduced to ten years rigorous imprisonment - Fine of Rs. 2,000 maintained - Benefit of set-off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. granted - Appellant directed to surrender before the trial court to serve the remaining sentence.

U.P. Stamp (Valuation of Property) Rules, 1997, Rule 7(3) - Spot Inspection - Requirement of Notice - District Magistrate conducted spot inspection without issuing notice to the petitioner - Inspection report indicated land was situated in Vista Farmhouse Colony with cemented roads and boundary walls - Petitioner contended violation of procedural rules - Held, while Rule 7(3) stipulates that the Collector may inspect property after due notice, the failure to issue notice constitutes a mere irregularity and not an illegality unless the petitioner demonstrates substantial prejudice. Since the petitioner failed to provide specific evidence to refute the physical findings of the report, the inspection remains valid. [Paras 6, 12, 18-22].

Indian Stamp Act, 1899, Section 47A - Market Value - Potentiality of Land - Valuation based on proximate use - Petitioner purchased land as agricultural but surrounding areas were developed for residential purposes and sold as small plots - Held, following the Full Bench decision in Smt. Pushpa Sareen vs. State of U.P., the market value must be determined considering the use to which the land is reasonably capable of being put in the proximate future. The potentiality of the land as on the date of execution of the instrument is a material factor, and the Collector is justified in considering commercial/residential activities in the vicinity. [Paras 23-26].

Indian Stamp Act, 1899, Sections 33 and 40(b) - Deficiency of Stamp Duty - Suppression of facts - Sale deed executed by petitioner as Director of a construction company - Modus operandi involved purchasing agricultural land and quickly selling it as residential units - Finding of residential utility at the time of execution - Held, the impugned orders determining deficiency, imposing penalty, and interest are supported by both facts and law; suppression of actual land nature justifies the demand. [Paras 8-9, 23, 27].

Decision: All writ petitions are dismissed – Impugned orders for deficiency of stamp duty and penalty affirmed.

Constitution of India - Articles 226 and 227 - Service Law - Retrospective Regularization - Notional Seniority - Petitioner was engaged as a temporary Night Watchman against a vacant sanctioned post in 1996 - Despite multiple Tribunal directions the State failed to initiate regular recruitment and allowed the petitioner to continue on an ad hoc basis for over 24 years - Petitioner finally regularized in 2021 - Held - The State as a model employer cannot be permitted to intentionally delay the process of absorption to disentitle employees from the benefit of the old pension scheme - Inaction of the State in filling the post despite orders of the Tribunal cannot prejudice the employee - Petitioner held eligible for regularization with effect from 01.10.1996 on a notional basis - [Paras 5.1-5.4]

OCS (Pension) Rules 1992 - GPF (Odisha) Rules 1938 - Pensionary Benefits - National Pension System (NPS) - Entitlement - State contended that since the petitioner was regularized after 01.01.2005 he must be covered under NPS - Held - Since the petitioner continued against a vacant sanctioned post since 1996 and was entitled to retrospective regularization on a notional basis his services are deemed to have commenced prior to the cutoff date of NPS - Past service rendered on a contractual or temporary basis must be taken into account for the purpose of pension - Petitioner directed to be brought under the fold of OCS (Pension) Rules 1992 and GPF (Odisha) Rules 1938 - [Paras 5.5-5.6]

Service Law - Model Employer - Conduct of State - Exploitation of temporary employees - Court relied on Supreme Court precedents deprecating the culture of ad-hocism and the misuse of temporary employment labels to evade regular employment obligations - Held - Government institutions bear a greater responsibility to avoid exploitative practices and must ensure fair and stable employment for workers performing essential and recurring functions - [Paras 4.3-4.8]

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Impugned order dated 17.02.2022 quashed – Opposite Party No. 1 directed to absorb the Petitioner retrospectively with effect from 01.10.1996 on a notional basis and extend coverage under OCS (Pension) Rules, 1992 and GPF (Odisha) Rules, 1938 within two months.

Civil Law - Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, Section 50 - Succession to Male Bhumidhar - Married Daughter - Exclusion from Inheritance - Land originally held by a male bhumidhar (Ram Singh) was mutated in 1966 in equal shares between his son and married daughter (Rajban). Held, Section 50 of the DLRA provides a specific order of succession which includes an unmarried daughter but excludes a married daughter. Succession opens at the time of the death of the tenure-holder and is governed by the statute as it stood then. The married daughter, not being a statutory heir, did not acquire any inheritable interest despite the revenue entry. [Paras 19-20, 40].

Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, Sections 50, 51 and 53 - Nature of Mutation - Fiscal Entry vs Title - Petitioners claimed title through long-standing mutation and possession. Held, mutation entries are maintained solely for fiscal purposes and revenue administration. They do not, by themselves, create, vest, enlarge, or extinguish title. Inheritable rights in agricultural holdings governed by the DLRA cannot be created merely by a mutation entry in the absence of a legally recognised mode of transfer or devolution. [Paras 23-25, 34, 38].

General Principles of Law - Waiver, Estoppel and Family Arrangement - No Estoppel against Statute - Petitioners invoked waiver and long-term acquiescence by the son (Chander). Held, there can be no estoppel against statute. Conduct cannot confer a status which the law withheld. Mere silence or long-standing revenue entries do not constitute a legally operative abandonment of statutory rights in agricultural land. A family settlement must be specifically pleaded and proved with a juridical foundation, which was absent in the present case. [Paras 26-31, 39].

Precedents - Prospective Overruling - Applicability of Ram Mehar v. Mst. Dakhan - Conflict between personal law and DLRA. Held, judicial decisions are generally declaratory of what the law has always been. In the absence of an express direction for prospective operation by the court, a ruling remains retroactive. The Financial Commissioner was justified in applying the authoritative view in Ram Mehar (1972) that succession to bhumidhari rights is strictly governed by the DLRA and not general personal law, regardless of the earlier administrative understanding or the Gopi Chand (1964) decision. [Paras 32-36].

Constitution of India, Articles 226 and 227 - Supervisory Jurisdiction - Limits of Review - Challenge to Financial Commissioner's order. Held, the High Court’s supervisory role is limited to checking for legal misdirection, jurisdictional error, or manifest perversity. It is not a rehearing on facts. As the Financial Commissioner identified the correct legal position regarding the effect of mutation entries, no ground for interference is made out. [Paras 37-38, 42].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Financial Commissioner's order dated 14/11/2006 upheld – No legal or jurisdictional infirmity found.

SARFAESI Act — MPID Act — Secured Creditor — Priority of Rights — Non-Deposit of Court-Directed Amount — Appellant-Bank had sanctioned credit facilities to Respondent No.4, which were secured by mortgage deeds executed from 2009 to 2012 — Respondent No.4 was classified as NPA on 27.02.2015 — Demand notice issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act on 04.03.2015 — Upon default, symbolic possession of secured assets taken under Section 13(4) — Properties were also provisionally attached by the State Government under the MPID Act vide notifications dated 22.06.2015, 17.03.2016 and 06.04.2017 — Trial Court rejected the Appellant's application to sell mortgaged properties holding that the MPID Act (State Statute) prevails over the SARFAESI Act (Union Statute) and also on the ground that the Appellant had failed to deposit amounts as directed by the order dated 15.09.2017 — Held: Mere failure to deposit the amount as directed cannot non-suit the Appellant or deprive it of its right to be heard — Such a consequence would be wholly disproportionate and contrary to settled principles — Appellant, as a secured creditor whose mortgage was created much prior in point of time, is entitled to proceed against the secured assets under the SARFAESI Act — In the event sale proceeds are ultimately required to be appropriated towards NSEL depositors' claims, the Appellant having unquestioned financial capacity can be directed to deposit the requisite amounts — No justification to interdict the Appellant's statutory remedy at this stage [Paras 18-20].

Decision: Appeals allowed — Impugned order dated 08.03.2023 set aside — Appellant permitted to proceed against secured assets in accordance with the SARFAESI Act, 2002.