“You Can't Disguise a Suit for Cancellation as One for Possession Just to Beat the Clock”: Supreme Court Slams Time-Barred Property Claim

“When the Crux of the Suit Is to Undo a Sale Deed, You Must Challenge It Within Three Years — Describing It as a Possession Suit Won’t Save You” —  In a judgment that decisively reinforces the principle of limitation and the integrity of pleadings, the Supreme Court of India, held that plaintiffs cannot bypass limitation laws by cleverly labeling a suit for cancellation of sale as one merely for possession. The Court set aside the High Court and First Appellate Court judgments and reinstated the Trial Court’s order dismissing the suit as hopelessly time-barred.

Justice Dipankar Datta, speaking for the Bench that included Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, was categorical: “The plaintiffs sought to recover possession on the plea that the sale deeds were invalid, but cleverly avoided seeking cancellation. What they projected as a suit under Article 65 was, in truth, a time-barred claim under Article 59.”

The Dispute: A 1951 Will, a 1992 Sale, and a 2003 Suit
The case revolved around a property in Muzaffarnagar originally owned by Dr. Babu Ram Garg, who, according to the plaintiffs, had executed a will in 1951 leaving it to two of his sons. However, the third son, Ramesh Chand, allegedly excluded from the will, sold the property in 1992 to the appellants.
The plaintiffs, claiming through the will, filed a suit in 2003, not seeking to cancel the 1992 sale deeds, but for possession and declaration of their rights — eleven years after the sale.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, calling it barred by limitation and finding that the will was not proved. The First Appellate Court reversed the dismissal, and the High Court upheld that reversal. The buyers appealed to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court: “You Can’t Do Through the Backdoor What the Law Prohibits at the Front”
The Supreme Court ruled that the actual relief sought was cancellation of the sale deeds — and that Article 59 of the Limitation Act mandates such a challenge be made within three years of knowledge of the sale. The plaintiffs had clearly known about the 1992 sale but waited until 2003 to act.
“It is not the form of the relief but the substance that matters. The suit was clearly one for cancellation, dressed up as a possession suit to avoid limitation.”

The Court held that the plaintiffs could not avoid the bar of limitation merely by dropping the cancellation prayer midway and seeking only recovery.
“You cannot cast off the suit’s skeleton and retain only its outer skin. The cloak of possession cannot hide the core of cancellation.”

On the Will: “You Can’t Prove a Will by Filing a Certified Copy and Hoping for the Best”
The Court also noted that the plaintiffs relied on a certified copy of a 1951 registered will, but failed to produce the original or any valid explanation for its absence. No attesting witness was examined.
“In the absence of compliance with Section 68 of the Evidence Act, the will cannot be accepted as proved.”

The Court emphasized that a will cannot be presumed, especially when title hinges entirely on it. Nor could the plaintiffs invoke the U.P. amendment to Section 90A, as that presumption does not apply to testamentary documents forming the basis of a claim.

On Ostensible Ownership: “When You Let Someone Appear to Be the Owner for 40 Years, You Can’t Claim Fraud Later”
The Supreme Court found that Ramesh Chand, who executed the sale deeds in 1992, had been in undisputed possession since 1956, his name was mutated in revenue records, and he had collected rent. The buyers, it held, were bona fide purchasers protected by Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.

“The respondents stood by for decades while Ramesh Chand acted as owner. They cannot now claim surprise. Section 41 clearly applies.”
Even though the defendants hadn’t specifically cited Section 41 in their written statement, the Court held that legal rights don’t depend on labeling — what matters is whether facts sufficient to invoke the provision were pleaded.

On Collusion and Lis Pendens: “You Can’t Manufacture Rights After a Sale Has Taken Place”
The plaintiffs argued that the sale deeds were void under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (lis pendens), but the Court found this unconvincing. The relevant suit had been compromised months after the sale, and the compromise did not revive any right, as Ramesh Chand had already divested his interest.
“The compromise was clearly collusive. No right can be created by compromise when the seller had already sold the property.”

Final Word: “No Declaration, No Title — No Possession Can Be Granted Without It”
The Court reminded that the plaintiffs had abandoned their declaration relief mid-trial, which was fatal to a claim of possession. Citing Anathula Sudhakar and Sopanrao, the Bench reiterated: “If title is in dispute and the plaintiff is out of possession, a suit must be for declaration and possession. Not for possession alone.”
Since the will was unproven and the sale deeds stood, no title was established — and no decree for possession could follow.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the Trial Court’s dismissal, and reaffirmed critical doctrines on limitation, proof of title, and framing of suits.
“The plaintiffs’ suit was an attempt to revive rights long extinguished by law. Clever drafting cannot override the statutory clock.”

This ruling provides clarity on how property suits must be framed, and strongly warns against manipulating the relief sought to bypass limitation or shift burdens of proof.

Date of Decision: April 23, 2025