Tribunal Has Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Grant-In-Aid Related Disputes: Orissa High Court Rejects Writ Appeal in Lecturer Promotion Case

“Litigant Cannot Choose Forum at Convenience” — In a significant ruling Orissa High Court reaffirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the Odisha Education Tribunal under Section 24-B of the Odisha Education Act, 1969, in service-related disputes involving eligibility, entitlement, and salary—where such issues are tied to grant-in-aid. The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Harish Tandon and Justice Murahari Sri Raman dismissed Writ Appeal No. 1275 of 2025 filed by Haraprasanna Tripathy, holding that the writ petition was rightly rejected by the Single Judge on the ground of maintainability, and the appellant must approach the Tribunal.

“A litigant cannot choose the forum at his convenience as the jurisdictional issue strikes at the root… Even if the power of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be ousted, yet the Writ Court may decline to entertain the petition if a forum is provided in the statute, which is competent to deal with such issues within its folds.” [Para 21]

Lecturer Promotion Claim Rejected, Tribunal Already Moved Once

The case concerns Haraprasanna Tripathy, who was initially appointed as a Demonstrator in Physics at KBDAV College, Nirakpur in 1987. After the resignation of a Lecturer in 2000, he was permitted to hold the 7th post of Lecturer in Physics. A resolution was passed by the college's Governing Body in 2003 recommending his appointment, but the Director, Higher Education rejected it in 2012, stating that a Demonstrator under the Direct Payment Scheme does not meet the recruitment criteria under the Odisha Education Act and the 1974 Rules.

Tripathy initially challenged the rejection through a writ petition (W.P.(C) No. 9325 of 2013), which led to the authorities being directed to reconsider his case on grounds of possible discrimination, as similarly situated persons had been granted post-facto approvals. Subsequently, he also filed GIA Case No. 70 of 2018 before the Odisha Education Tribunal, which partially allowed his claim in 2022:

“The claim of the petitioner cannot be brushed aside on the ground that it is not in terms of Rule 8(2)(b) of the 1974 Rules… The authorities are required to consider the claim of the petitioner in the manner the claims of other Demonstrators were considered.” [Tribunal Order dated 23.02.2022]

After a long delay, the Director passed a fresh rejection order on 27th March 2025. Instead of challenging it before the Tribunal, Tripathy again approached the High Court under Article 226, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, directing him to seek remedy before the Tribunal.

Scope of Tribunal Jurisdiction Under Section 24-B of the O.E. Act

The core question was whether a writ petition challenging the Director’s order rejecting post-approval and salary benefits could be entertained under Article 226 when Section 24-B of the O.E. Act provides a specific statutory remedy.

The Court noted that while Article 226 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be ousted, the High Court may decline jurisdiction when the legislature provides a competent and efficacious alternative remedy:

“Once the Legislature has provided a forum for redressal… it would be preposterous to suggest that such forum is a forum of convenience and does not limit the right of the litigant to approach another forum.” [Para 21]

Eligibility, Entitlement and Grant-in-Aid Are Intricately Connected

A detailed exposition was undertaken by the Bench regarding the interpretation of Section 24-B of the O.E. Act. The appellant, arguing in-person, contended that the Tribunal's jurisdiction was limited strictly to “payment or non-payment of grant-in-aid”, and not to issues of eligibility or post-approval. The Court, however, firmly rejected this limited reading.

“The eligibility, entitlement and payment or non-payment of grant-in-aid… are intricately related to the educational institutions or any teacher or employee. Denial of salary or approval to a post comes within the purview thereof.” [Para 18]

Responding to arguments about the use of commas in the statutory text, the Court relied on precedents such as State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Bihar State Electricity Board v. Pulak Enterprises, emphasizing that punctuation cannot override legislative intent.

“The use of comma… may be a minor element in interpretation, but at times, it serves as a useful tool to ascertain the legislative intent. However, undue emphasis on punctuation must not be allowed to defeat the object of the enactment.” [Para 16]

The Court reviewed the legislative history and Cabinet documents preceding the 1998 Amendment that introduced Section 24-B. The Bench noted that the legislative intent was to “ease the burden of writ courts” and ensure a specialized forum for resolving disputes involving approval of appointments, post-eligibility, and grant-in-aid linked salaries.

“The denial of payment of salary and also the approval to the post, which is intricately connected to the payment of the salary, comes within the purview of Section 24-B. Any other meaning… shall be opposed to the legislative intent.” [Para 18]

No Forum Shopping Permissible When Tribunal Is Empowered

The Court was especially critical of the appellant's inconsistent approach—alternating between the Tribunal and the High Court—based on convenience.

“The appellant has been taking steps either by filing writ petitions or approaching the Tribunal, which appears to be convenient to him… Such conduct must be deprecated.” [Para 21]

It was reiterated that once a statutory forum exists, a litigant cannot bypass it to seek a parallel remedy unless the situation warrants extraordinary interference.

Appeal Dismissed, Tribunal Is Competent to Hear Promotion Dispute

The High Court upheld the decision of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal, holding that:

• The dispute regarding post-approval and salary falls squarely within the scope of Section 24-B.

• The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is not confined to grant-in-aid alone but extends to eligibility and entitlement when connected with salary and post-approval.

• The order dated 27th March 2025 was passed in execution of the Tribunal's earlier directions, and any challenge must be made before the same forum.

• No illegality or error was found in the Single Judge’s decision to relegate the appellant to the Tribunal.

“We do not find any infirmity and/or illegality in the impugned order. The appeal is, thus, dismissed.” [Para 23]

Date of Decision: 4 December 2025