“There Is No Presumption That Property Remains Joint After Partition” – Supreme Court Restores Validity of Sale by Coparcener Holding Self-Acquired Property

“High Court Cannot Re-Appreciate Evidence as a Second Court of Facts Under Section 100 CPC” – Supreme Court holding that once a partition among coparceners is effected under Hindu law, the property allotted becomes the self-acquired property of the recipient, unless the contrary is proved. The Court further reiterated that the High Court, in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot re-appreciate evidence without a clearly framed substantial question of law. Setting aside the Karnataka High Court’s judgment which had reopened the findings of the First Appellate Court, the Supreme Court restored the validity of a sale deed executed by one of the brothers post-partition, holding the property to be self-acquired.

The dispute revolved around a 7-acre 20-gunta agricultural property located in Mahadevapura Village. Originally part of joint family holdings, the property was allotted to one C. Thippeswamy under a registered partition deed dated May 9, 1986. He later sold it to his brother, Defendant No.1, on October 16, 1989, who in turn sold it to Defendant No.2 (the appellant) on March 11, 1993. The plaintiffs, children of Defendant No.1, filed a suit in 1994 seeking partition and separate possession of the property, claiming it retained its ancestral character and was wrongfully sold without legal necessity or their consent.

The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. However, the First Appellate Court reversed the decision, finding that the property was self-acquired by Defendant No.1. The High Court of Karnataka, in a Regular Second Appeal, reinstated the trial court’s decree, prompting the current appeal before the Supreme Court.

The central legal issue was whether a property, once acquired by a coparcener through purchase post-partition, retained its ancestral nature or became his self-acquired property.

The Supreme Court categorically held that "there is no presumption that property remains joint merely because it was once part of joint family property." It emphasized that after partition, each coparcener’s share becomes separate property and can be freely alienated unless proven otherwise.

The Court rejected the High Court's reliance on the doctrine of blending and noted, “For the doctrine of blending to apply, it must be clearly established that there was an intention to treat the separate property as joint family property. Mere use or shared enjoyment does not suffice.”

The High Court was severely criticized for crossing its jurisdictional limits under Section 100 CPC. The Court observed, “By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be termed even a question of law, far from being a substantial question of law,” and condemned the exercise as “a venture into re-appreciation of evidence.”

Referring to established precedents, the Court reminded that “the High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn are erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law.”

The Court also discussed the plaintiffs’ failure to produce substantive evidence that the property was purchased using joint family funds. It noted, “There is no evidence to show that income from the ancestral lands was utilized in the purchase. The burden of proving nucleus and its sufficiency was not discharged by the plaintiffs.”

The Supreme Court carefully examined both oral and documentary evidence. Defendant No.1's purchase of the property was funded through a loan from DW3, which was repaid by selling a different piece of land. This fact was corroborated by multiple witnesses and documents.

“The sale deed clearly states the property was self-acquired by Defendant No.1. No evidence was led to contradict this,” the Court noted. It further rejected claims about the use of partition money or family assets for the purchase, stating, “Except bare assertions and oral claims, no documentary evidence was furnished to establish the existence of any joint family surplus.”

On the legal necessity of the sale, the Court held that even if the sale was to meet marriage expenses, it constitutes a valid necessity under Hindu law. “The performance of a daughter’s marriage is a pious obligation of the Karta and qualifies as legal necessity,” the bench observed.

Ultimately, the Court ruled, “The First Appellate Court rightly held the property to be self-acquired, and the sale by Defendant No.1 to Defendant No.2 was valid in law.”

The Supreme Court restored the judgment of the First Appellate Court, thereby upholding the legality of the 1993 sale. In doing so, it reasserted vital principles of Hindu succession law and procedural propriety in appellate jurisdiction.

“The High Court erred in re-appreciating the evidence without framing any substantial question of law. Its judgment is legally unsustainable,” the Court concluded.

This judgment serves as a key precedent reaffirming that coparcenary rights cease upon partition unless expressly retained, and reiterates that second appellate courts must not reopen factual issues in the absence of legal error.

Date of Decision: April 22, 2025