Sect 90 IEA | Presumption Cannot Be Invoked When Document Is Only 22 Years Old: Gauhati High Court

"Courts Below Committed a Grave Legal Error by Applying Section 90 of the Evidence Act to a 22-Year-Old Document That Was Neither Produced Nor Proved", In a crucial ruling sharpening the standards for proving title through registered documents, the Gauhati High Court declared that a 22-year-old sale deed—allegedly executed in 1978—cannot enjoy the presumption of authenticity under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, especially when the execution is disputed and no attesting witness has been examined. The Court came down heavily on the trial and appellate courts for relying on an evidentiary presumption that, in law, simply did not apply.

Justice Robin Phukan held:

“The impugned findings of both the courts below, relying upon the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act in respect of a sale deed which was only 22 years old at the time of filing of the suit, are legally unsustainable.”

Setting aside the concurrent judgments of the lower courts, the High Court declared the impugned sale deed as fraudulent and void, while restoring full ownership rights of the plaintiffs over the suit land.

"Execution Must Be Proved—Not Presumed, Not Believed, and Certainly Not Inferred"

The judgment turns the spotlight on a disturbing pattern where unproved documents are accepted at face value in civil disputes, particularly in title suits. The Court noted that the registered sale deed dated 29.03.1978, allegedly executed by Abdul Rahim in favour of the defendant, was neither produced in original nor proved by any acceptable legal evidence in the suit.

At the core of the case lies the assertion of the plaintiffs—legal heirs of Abdul Rahim—that the defendant had fraudulently procured a mutation in his favour by creating a fabricated sale deed and taking advantage of the death of the original landowner.

The High Court held:

“A certified copy of a sale deed cannot invoke Section 90 unless the original is more than 30 years old and produced from proper custody. That legal threshold was not satisfied in this case. Worse, the document was never proved in terms of Section 67 of the Evidence Act.”

Defendant Failed to Prove Execution—No Witness, No Proof, No Title

While the defendant relied on municipal and revenue records post-sale deed, the Court underlined that mere mutation or municipal assessment does not confer title, especially when the underlying sale deed is under challenge and execution is not proved.

Justice Phukan observed:

“The defendant has not examined any attesting witness or the scribe. There is no explanation for non-production of the original document. No witness has proved the handwriting or the signature of the alleged executant, Abdul Rahim.”

Further, it was revealed during trial that the signature of Abdul Rahim was never exhibited, and the testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, including Abdul Rahim's son, remained unshaken on material points.

The Court recalled the binding precedent in Lakhi Baruah v. Padma Kanta Kalita, (1996) 8 SCC 357, wherein the Supreme Court had clearly held:

“A certified copy of a sale deed is not admissible to prove the contents or execution of the document unless original is proved.”

Plaintiffs’ Ownership Restored—Fraud Nullifies All Derivative Entries

The High Court found that the plaintiffs had established title through prior registered sale deeds of 1969 and 1972, and their oral evidence, coupled with rent and tax receipts, was sufficient to discharge their burden of proof.

The defence raised by the respondent that the document had been proved in a parallel suit was flatly rejected, as the High Court reiterated:

“It is trite that evidence recorded in one proceeding cannot be imported into another proceeding unless formally adopted or parties agree to do so.”

In that context, the reliance on the sale deed from another title suit filed by the defendant was held to be legally impermissible.

Further, the High Court quashed the mutation under Section 52 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 and the municipal assessment under Section 83(2) of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956, holding that both were procured without notice to the lawful heirs, thereby violating principles of natural justice.

Concurrent Findings Set Aside—Perversity Warranted Interference Under Section 100 CPC

While second appeals under Section 100 CPC lie only on substantial questions of law, the Court invoked the doctrine of perversity, holding that the trial and appellate courts had misapplied basic principles of evidence law and wrongly shifted the burden of proof.

Justice Robin Phukan cited Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262, and Hira Lal v. Gajjan, (1990) 3 SCC 285, to underline the principle that:

“When the courts below proceed on assumptions or apply incorrect legal standards, particularly in regard to burden of proof and admissibility of evidence, such concurrent findings are not immune from appellate interference.”

A Word of Caution to Civil Courts—Presumption Under Section 90 Is Not a Shortcut to Proof

The judgment serves as a powerful reminder that Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act is not a catch-all provision to dispense with the need for proof of execution in title disputes. The law is clear: only documents more than 30 years old, produced from proper custody, can enjoy the benefit of that presumption. Anything short of that, particularly where execution is specifically denied, demands strict proof.

The High Court cautioned:

“The burden of proving the sale deed lay squarely on the defendant. Once the plaintiffs alleged fraud and denied execution, the burden could not shift back on them unless the deed was properly proved by the defence.”

Fraud Cannot Be Sanctified by Passage of Time

Ultimately, the Court decreed the plaintiffs’ suit, declared the sale deed dated 29.03.1978 as fraudulent, void, and inoperative, and restored the plaintiffs’ right, title, and interest over the suit land.

Justice Phukan concluded:

“A document that is not proved, a signature that is not authenticated, and a title that rests on nothing but assumptions—these cannot form the basis of a valid transfer. Courts must guard against such fraud camouflaged as regularity.”

Date of Decision: 06 November 2025