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by Admin
14 December 2025 5:24 PM
“The relationship between the appellants and the said school is in the realm of private contract. Assuming that there was a breach of private contract, the same does not involve any public law element.” - Supreme Court of India ruled that Air Force Schools are not "State" or "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the Court held that writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are not maintainable against such schools, especially in disputes arising out of employment.
The Court concluded that the contractual employment of teachers in these schools lacks any "public law element", thus placing them outside the purview of constitutional remedies via writ jurisdiction.
Origin of the Dispute: Teachers Challenged Termination by Air Force School
The first appellant, Dileep Kumar Pandey, was appointed as a physical education teacher in 2005 in the Air Force School, Bamrauli, and was later declared surplus. He was offered either a contract post or termination. The second appellant, Sanjay Kumar Sharma, was a post-graduate commerce teacher who later became officiating principal. He was subjected to disciplinary proceedings and eventually terminated following internal complaints.
Both challenged their service terminations through writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court, claiming that the Air Force School, though managed by the IAF Educational and Cultural Society, performed a public function, and thus was subject to judicial review under Article 226.
The Constitutional Query: Can Air Force Schools Be Deemed "State"?
The central legal issue was whether the Air Force School was an “authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution, and whether actions taken by its management could be challenged under writ jurisdiction.
The Single Judge of the High Court initially ruled in favor of the appellants, holding the school as "State" under Article 12. However, the Division Bench overturned this, finding that the school was not sufficiently controlled by the government, nor funded by public money, to fall under the definition of “State”.
Supreme Court Majority: “Control by IAF Is Not Pervasive—No Public Element in Employment”
Justice Abhay S. Oka, delivering the majority opinion, meticulously dismantled the claim that Air Force Schools are “State” entities:
“Even if pay scales applicable to all IAF schools are determined by the IAF, that by itself will not amount to pervasive control.”
“There is nothing in the Education Code to show that the IAF has control over the said school.”
“Although some funds may have originated from the Army Welfare Society, it cannot be said that the State or the IAF has any control, let alone all-pervasive control, over the school.”
The Court found that the financial and administrative autonomy of the schools placed them outside the category of public authorities. Even if their buildings were constructed on defence land or their management included Air Force personnel, those facts did not convert them into State entities for the purpose of writ maintainability.
“The audited accounts of the school for the period from 2019–20 to 2023–24 indicate that no public funds or grants were received by the school.”
“The relationship between the appellants and the said school is in the realm of private contract… the same does not involve any public law element.”
Thus, the appeals were dismissed, with the Supreme Court affirming that employees of private educational institutions without statutory backing cannot invoke writ jurisdiction merely on the ground of public function.
Dissent by Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah: “IAF Has Deep and Pervasive Control—Writ Must Be Maintainable”
In a robust dissent, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah took a sharply divergent view. According to him, the dominant administrative and financial control by the Indian Air Force, coupled with the public function of education, warranted writ jurisdiction:
“Ultimately, it is the IAF which is in control of the School’s management and has the last word in the administration of the school.”
“The public duty of imparting education has to be done through teachers… Any matter affecting the service conditions… would have a direct bearing and nexus with the imparting of education.”
He emphasized that the Air Force Schools are entirely dependent on IAF infrastructure, personnel, and funding mechanisms including welfare and regimental funds:
“The school’s building is on IAF land and has been built entirely by the funds of the IAF.”
“Orders of appointment, extension of probation, and pay fixation are passed under the authority of IAF officers.”
Justice Amanullah relied on Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Trust, asserting that public duty and control, even if not statutory, may still attract constitutional remedies.
He concluded: “For all practical purposes, in every sphere of activity relating to the school, the funding consists substantially of funds which are ultimately traceable to the public exchequer.”
The Broader Legal Takeaway: Private Schools with Government Links Not Necessarily ‘State’
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion reinforces a critical legal threshold—mere association with the government or performance of a public function does not automatically render an institution “State” under Article 12. Pervasive control—financial, functional, and administrative—must be clearly established. Employment disputes within such institutions, unless backed by statutory provisions, will not invite judicial review.
The dissent, however, reflects a growing concern over institutional accountability in publicly funded yet privately governed spaces. It leaves the door open for re-examination in future cases with deeper government involvement.
“It is not possible for us to take a contrary view… We are unable to find any fault with the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court.”
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the Air Force School, Bamrauli, is not a “State” under Article 12, and therefore writ petitions challenging employment decisions are not maintainable.
Date of Decision: 21 May 2025