-
by sayum
21 December 2025 10:40 AM
“This Court cannot offend the express provisions present in any legislative instrument merely to provide a benefit to an offender, not envisaged under the law.” – In a significant pronouncement Supreme Court of India delivered a detailed judgment in the conjoined criminal appeals dealing with the contentious issue of probation in food adulteration cases. The Court unequivocally ruled that “the benefit that the Probation Act envisages is inapplicable to an offence committed under the PoFA Act, if the offence has been committed between introduction of Section 20AA in 1976 and its repeal in 2006 by the FSS Act.” This decision reaffirms the non-applicability of probationary relief for offences committed under the repealed Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, even in the face of claims invoking reformatory justice and constitutional protections.
The lead appeal arose from a case involving Nagarajan and Selvaraj, shopkeepers in Tamil Nadu, from whom a sample of curd was collected in June 2001. The curd was tested and initially found to have fat content below the required standard under the PoFA Act. A complaint was filed, resulting in their conviction under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 2(ia)(a)(m) of the PoFA Act. They were sentenced to six months' simple imprisonment and fined Rs. 3,000. Their appeal and criminal revision were dismissed by the appellate court and the Madras High Court.
The second appeal involved Naresh Chandra, a shopkeeper in Uttar Pradesh, who was convicted in 1987 for obstructing a food inspector from collecting a sample of food items, under Sections 7/10(1) read with 16(1)(c)(d) of the PoFA Act. His conviction and sentence of six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 were also affirmed by the High Court.
Both sets of appellants approached the Supreme Court seeking leniency in sentencing, arguing for the benefit of probation or reduced punishment based on the repeal of the PoFA Act by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.
The Court framed two critical legal questions:
(i) Whether the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or Section 360 of CrPC can be granted to persons convicted under the PoFA Act despite Section 20AA?
(ii) If not, can the reduced punishment prescribed under the FSS Act be applied to the appellants?
On the first issue, the appellants argued that Section 20AA of the PoFA Act, which bars probationary relief, violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. They contended that denying probation to first-time offenders defies the reformative justice philosophy and the intent behind the Probation of Offenders Act.
However, the Supreme Court was unambiguous in rejecting this line of reasoning, observing: “Section 20AA, introduced by way of amendment, is too clear admitting of no absurdity and seals this question of law against the appellants.”
The Court further noted: “This Court cannot offend the express provisions present in any legislative instrument merely to provide a benefit to an offender, not envisaged under the law.”
Referring to the legislative mandate under Section 20AA of the PoFA Act and the savings clause in Section 97 of the FSS Act, the Court concluded that probation could not be granted in cases where the offence was committed between 1976 (when Section 20AA was inserted) and 2006 (when PoFA was repealed).
On the second issue of whether the reduced punishment under the FSS Act could be applied retrospectively, the Court again ruled against the appellants. Citing Basheer v. State of Kerala, the Court held:
“Mollification must only be provided in cases where a provision in relation to ‘repeal and savings’ is either not present or where the ‘repeal and savings’ clause envisages such a possibility.”
The Court emphasized that the savings clause in the FSS Act expressly preserved liabilities and punishments under the repealed PoFA Act, and therefore:
“The benefit of mollification of sentence cannot be given when a ‘repeal and savings’ clause in the repealing statute expressly saves a penalty incurred under the repealed statute.”
Despite its rejection of the main legal pleas, the Court granted limited relief to the appellants on equitable considerations. In Nagarajan’s case, the Court found a material discrepancy between the two lab reports—while the local analyst found 4.6% fat (below the 5% standard for buffalo milk), the Central Food Laboratory reported 8.3% fat (above the threshold).
Quoting from C. Mohammed v. State of Kerala, the Court noted that even when conviction stands, sentence could be altered if doubt exists over adulteration severity. Hence, it held:
“This apparent discrepancy should be interpreted to the benefit of the accused.”
Accordingly, Nagarajan and Selvaraj’s sentence of imprisonment was converted to a fine of Rs. 30,000 each.
In Naresh Chandra’s case, the Court relied on a coordinate bench ruling in A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of West Bengal, despite expressing reservations about its reasoning. It observed: “In the interest of justice, equity, propriety and judicial comity, we propose to follow the same and proceed to partly allow the connected appeal too.”
Naresh Chandra’s sentence was thus converted to a fine of Rs. 20,000, noting that he had suffered the weight of the case for over 40 years.
The Supreme Court in no uncertain terms concluded:
“The safety of consumers was the goal of the PoFA Act… no leeway must be given in such circumstances.”
It reaffirmed that: “The probationary process… must remain subservient to the wisdom of the legislature… Section 20AA of the PoFA Act read with Section 97 of the FSS Act makes it clear that the benefit under the Probation Act cannot be made applicable…”
Ultimately, the judgment underscores that while reformation is an essential goal of criminal justice, courts must not override express statutory exclusions. Relief in sentencing, if any, must come from factual mitigation—not from disregard of legislative mandates.
Date of Decision: May 15, 2025