“Police Cannot Register FIRs for PCPNDT Act Offences; Complaint Must Be Filed by Statutorily Notified Authority” – Rajasthan High Court Strikes Down FIR and Complaint

“Strict Compliance with Special Statute is Mandatory; FIR and Complaint by Unauthorised Officer under PCPNDT Act Held Without Jurisdiction” - Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) delivered a significant judgment holding that any prosecution for offences under the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 must strictly adhere to the procedure laid down in Section 28 of the Act. The Court categorically ruled that an FIR under Section 154 CrPC is impermissible for offences under the PCPNDT Act and that cognizance can only be taken on a complaint filed by an Appropriate Authority or an officer duly authorised by a notification issued by the Central or State Government.

Justice Anand Sharma, delivering the judgment, observed that when a statute prescribes a particular mode of prosecution, that alone must be followed, and criminal law must be construed strictly. The judgment quashed FIR No. 2/2014 and Complaint No. 7/2014, along with all consequential proceedings, terming them an abuse of process and without jurisdiction.

The controversy arose when FIR No. 2/2014 was registered by Police Station PBI, Jaipur against Mahendra Singh, Manager of Indu Ultrasound Centre, and subsequently, Complaint No. 7/2014 was filed against Dr. Yogesh Kumar, a practising radiologist. The allegations pertained to violations of various provisions of the PCPNDT Act and Rules, including alleged unlawful sex determination, improper record keeping, and breach of licensing conditions, along with charges under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 31 of the Rajasthan Medical Act.

The petitioners argued that the PCPNDT Act is a special statute which provides a self-contained prosecutorial mechanism under Section 28, and hence registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was contrary to law. It was also contended that the complaint against Dr. Yogesh Kumar was filed by a police officer who had no statutory authority to do so, thereby vitiating the entire prosecution.

The Court examined the statutory scheme of the PCPNDT Act in detail. It noted that under Section 28 of the Act, cognizance can only be taken upon a complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority or by a person authorised by the Central or State Government. It was further observed that “complaint” as defined under Section 2(d) of the CrPC explicitly excludes police reports, and that FIRs under Section 154 CrPC are not an alternative mechanism for initiating proceedings under the Act. The Court held that although offences under the PCPNDT Act are cognizable in nature under Section 27, that alone does not permit police registration of FIRs or filing of charge sheets without a valid complaint from a competent authority.

The High Court pointed out that the registration of FIR No. 2/2014 by the police was per se without jurisdiction, as the police had no authority to act under the Act of 1994. It relied upon the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Dr. Mohammad Imtiyaz v. State of Rajasthan, which had held the same view and was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 103/2023, decided on 28th March 2025. The Court also reaffirmed the settled principle of law that when a special law provides a particular procedure for prosecution, the general provisions of CrPC cannot override it.

In the connected petition involving Dr. Yogesh Kumar, the Court further examined the validity of the complaint filed against him. The complaint was filed by Madanlal Sharma, Sub-Inspector in the PCPNDT Bureau of Investigation. The Court scrutinised the authorisation documents and found that Madanlal Sharma was never authorised to file complaints under Section 28 of the PCPNDT Act. It was revealed that the order dated 11th November 2013, issued by the Chairman of the State Appropriate Authority, only authorised Madanlal Sharma to conduct search and seizure operations under Section 29(2), and not to file complaints. Moreover, authorisation to file complaints under the Act must be issued by the Central or State Government and not merely by the Chairperson of the Appropriate Authority.

The Court made a clear finding that the complaint filed by Madanlal Sharma was incompetent and contrary to the statutory mandate. It observed that continuation of prosecution on the basis of a complaint filed by an unauthorised person would amount to gross abuse of the criminal justice process. It relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in CBI v. Indra Bhushan Singh (2014) 12 SCC 100 and Ravindra Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2495, which held that proceedings initiated by unauthorised officers are vitiated and liable to be quashed.

Justice Anand Sharma summarised that the provisions of Sections 27 and 28 of the PCPNDT Act are not merely procedural but jurisdictional. Cognizance can only be taken on a valid complaint, and when a statute excludes the application of general criminal law, such exclusion must be respected. He reiterated that in criminal law, substantial compliance is not enough; strict compliance is mandatory. The Court found that both the FIR and the complaint were without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.

Accordingly, the Court allowed both petitions. It quashed FIR No. 2/2014 registered against Mahendra Singh and Complaint No. 7/2014 filed against Dr. Yogesh Kumar, along with all consequential proceedings, including pending trial and investigations.

The decision reinforces the position that under the PCPNDT Act, the police cannot bypass the procedure laid down by law, even though the offences are cognizable. It upholds the sanctity of special statutory mechanisms and protects individuals from being prosecuted without legal authority.

The ruling serves as a strong reminder that procedural safeguards are essential in criminal prosecution, and when the law demands a particular route, the authorities must comply strictly. The Court has reaffirmed that even when the social objective behind the law is noble, the means of enforcement must be strictly legal.

Date of Decision: 12.11.2025