Ownership is Irrelevant Right to Residence is a Statutory Protection Delhi High Court Upholds Daughter-in-laws Right in Shared Household

“A wife’s right to reside does not hinge on the niceties of title” – Delhi High Court delivered a significant judgment reinforcing a married woman’s right of residence in her matrimonial home, even when the property is owned by her father-in-law, and despite the fact that she had been disowned by the family. The Court emphatically held that legal ownership is immaterial under Section 17 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and that residence rights must be upheld against forcible dispossession.

Justice Sanjeev Narula, rejecting the revision petitions filed by the mother-in-law and late father-in-law, upheld the concurrent decisions of the Trial and Appellate Courts protecting the daughter-in-law, Gagandeep Sidhu, from being forcibly evicted from the ground floor of the shared household, stating:

“The residence order, limited to preventing dispossession without due process, operates as a safeguard rather than a sanction.”

“Shared Household is Defined by Domestic Relationship, Not Ownership” – Court Applies Satish Chander Ahuja Doctrine to Protect Wife’s Rights

The central legal issue was whether the ground floor of the property at Old Gobindpura Extension, Delhi, where Gagandeep Sidhu had resided with her husband post-marriage, could be classified as a “shared household” under Section 2(s) of the Domestic Violence Act, even though the property was exclusively owned by her father-in-law, late Daljit Singh, who had also disowned his son by public notice.

The High Court answered in the affirmative, declaring:

“Ownership is immaterial for Section 17 so long as the Section 2(s) test is satisfied... A property exclusively owned by in-laws may constitute a shared household if the aggrieved woman lived there with her husband in a domestic relationship.”

Relying extensively on the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja [(2021) 1 SCC 414], the Court clarified that residence orders under the DV Act are not predicated on proprietary rights:

“The DV Act is protective in character; residence orders do not adjudicate title and do not confer proprietary rights, but they do shield the aggrieved woman from dispossession, save in accordance with law.”

“Disownment Notices Have No Legal Impact Under the DV Act” – Court Rejects Attempts to Evade Responsibility Through Public Notices

In the background of the case, the petitioners – Khushwant Kaur (mother-in-law) and Daljit Singh (father-in-law, now deceased) – had publicly disowned their son, Saravjeet Singh, in 2011 through a newspaper notice and attempted to evict the daughter-in-law by alleging she had broken locks and occupied the house illegally.

However, the Court refused to accept such strategies as legally effective against the statutory rights of the aggrieved woman, stating:

“Disownment notices have no dispositive legal effect on rights under the PWDV Act.”

Further, the Court emphasized that the wife had begun residing in the property immediately after her marriage in 2010, and even if cohabitation ceased later, that did not extinguish her right to reside.

“Right to Reside Doesn’t End With Separation” – DV Act Protects Against Post-Separation Dispossession

One of the core arguments made by the petitioners was that since Gagandeep Sidhu had been living separately from her husband since 2011, and the domestic relationship had ended, her right of residence no longer survived.

Justice Narula dismissed this argument outright, observing:

“To suggest that the right of residence ceases the moment cohabitation ceases would render Sections 2(s) and 17 otiose and defeat the purpose of the Statute.”

The Court reaffirmed that the DV Act encompasses past domestic relationships, and Section 2(f) explicitly protects women who “have at any point of time lived together in a shared household”.

“Residence Protection Doesn’t Confer Ownership, But Prevents Extra-Legal Eviction” – Court Clarifies Scope of DV Act

The petitioners also challenged the Trial Court’s order restraining them from dispossessing or alienating the property, claiming it operated as a civil injunction against lawful owners. The Court clarified that such directions fall squarely within Section 19 of the DV Act, which permits magistrates to pass residence protection orders, including restraining alienation or dispossession.

It held:

“The order under challenge does not confer title; it preserves the status quo so that the respondent is not evicted by self-help or by transfers calculated to defeat her protection. That is precisely what the statute contemplates.”

Electricity Bills Can’t Displace Legal Protection – Court Rejects Claim of Abandonment Based on Power Usage

The petitioners sought to introduce electricity bills showing low consumption, arguing that the respondent no longer resided in the premises. The Court rejected this as inadmissible and insufficient evidence:

“Low electricity consumption, taken in isolation, is at best a weak indicator of non-occupation... To equate low consumption with abandonment would be speculative and inconsistent with the limited scope of revision.”

The Court emphasized that findings of actual residence by the lower courts were based on adequate evidence, including reports from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and witness statements.

“DV Court’s Jurisdiction is Independent and Co-Exists with Civil Remedies” – Supreme Court Proceedings Don’t Bar DV Protection

Although the petitioners highlighted that the civil court had ruled on possession in their favour, and the matter is pending before the Supreme Court (SLP No. 11649/2024), the High Court clarified that proceedings under the DV Act are independent and meant for protection, not adjudication of title:

“Section 26 of the DV Act permits reliefs to be sought before civil courts as well; it does not bar reliefs under the Act itself. The DV forum did not adjudicate title nor grant proprietary relief. It merely insulated the Respondent from being turned out without due process.”

Court Balances Interests by Recognising Co-Existence in Separate Floors

Noting that the petitioner (Khushwant Kaur) resides on the first floor, and the respondent on the ground floor, the Court acknowledged that this physical separation already balances interests:

“So long as each side respects the boundaries of use recognised by the courts below, coexistence in distinct portions of the property ensures that neither protection nor ownership is rendered illusory.”

The Court, thus, refused to substitute its own preferences for residence protection with monetary relief or alternate accommodation, holding that the magistrate’s discretion under Section 19(1)(f) was validly exercised.

DV Act Rights Trump Ownership Claims – No Eviction Without Due Process

Dismissing the revision petitions, the Court concluded:

“The subject premises qualifies as a shared household within Section 2(s); the Respondent’s right of residence under Section 17 stands attracted; and the residence orders under Section 19... fall well within jurisdiction and purpose.”

The Court clarified that nothing in the judgment affects civil title or possession claims, which may continue before appropriate forums.

Date of Decision: October 16, 2025