Matrimonial Acrimony a Strong Motive for False Implication: Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses State's Appeal in POCSO Acquittal

“The possibility of tutoring cannot be ruled out, especially when the child was in exclusive custody of the mother, amidst intense matrimonial litigation” — In a significant reaffirmation of criminal jurisprudence on appeals against acquittal, the Punjab and Haryana High Court declined the State of Haryana’s application for leave to appeal against the acquittal of a man accused under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The respondent, accused of sexually assaulting his 8-year-old niece, was acquitted by the Fast Track Court, Faridabad on 30.08.2019, which had noted grave contradictions in the minor’s testimony, inconclusive medical findings, and strong motives rooted in long-standing matrimonial discord between the child’s parents.

Dismissing the State’s plea for appeal under Section 378(3) CrPC, the High Court held that “there exists no perversity or illegality in the trial court’s appreciation of evidence and findings”, and “the acquittal deserved the full benefit of the double presumption of innocence”.

“Contradictions in Child’s Statements Cast Grave Doubt on the Prosecution Story”

The central legal question before the Court was whether the trial court erred in granting the benefit of doubt to the accused, particularly when the prosecution relied heavily on the statement of the minor victim, who was the niece of the accused.

The Court extensively analysed the three statements given by the child at different stages — including one before a Legal Aid Advocate, another before the Child Welfare Committee, and one under Section 164 CrPC. Each account varied significantly in terms of the location of the alleged assault, sequence of events, and presence of family members.

The Court observed: “In all three statements marked Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-3, there are material contradictions as to the manner in which the incident occurred, whether the light was on or off, whether the child was gagged or not, whether the aunt was home or in Delhi. The sequence of events changed with every statement.”

It further held that such inconsistencies, when seen in the background of the child's sudden change of custody from father to mother during a bitter matrimonial dispute, raise serious concerns regarding the voluntariness and reliability of the testimony.

“Medical Evidence Not Conclusive — Torn Hymen Alone Is Not Proof of Sexual Assault”

The prosecution had also relied on medical evidence to substantiate its claim, with the medical examination conducted on 31.03.2018 at AIIMS indicating a torn hymen.

However, the High Court held that the medical testimony did not establish rape or penetrative assault under Section 376 IPC or Section 6 POCSO. The examining doctor (PW-9), in cross-examination, admitted that there was “no redness, no laceration, and no irritation observed,” and that “the torn hymen could be caused by non-sexual factors like cycling, masturbation, or trauma.”

The Court held: “The medical report does not corroborate the version of sexual assault. The absence of accompanying physical injuries or inflammation makes the finding of torn hymen insufficient to support a charge under POCSO or IPC.”

“Strained Matrimonial Relationship and Delayed FIR Create Serious Doubts about the Motive of Complaint”

One of the most persuasive aspects of the defense, and accepted by the trial court and the High Court, was the motive for false implication, which was tied to the deeply fractured relationship between the victim’s mother and father.

The child's mother had been living separately for nearly five years, had filed multiple criminal and matrimonial cases against the father, and reclaimed custody of the child shortly before the FIR was lodged. During this time, the child was allegedly exclusively under the mother’s care and influence.

As noted in the judgment: “The complainant-mother admitted that she had not met or cared for the child for several years, and that the child was brought to Delhi on 25.03.2018. The FIR was filed on 01.04.2018 — after a week of exclusive access. These facts, coupled with her own admission that she was under pressure from her husband’s family to take custody of the child, establish a real possibility of tutoring.”

The Court added: “If the mother truly had affection and concern, she wouldn’t have left the child with in-laws for five years. Her sudden affection, triggered by knowledge of her husband's alleged remarriage, seems to have prompted this complaint.”

The father, who testified as DW-1, stated that the accused-brother was only occasionally at home, did not reside upstairs where the incident allegedly occurred, and that the complaint was a deliberate attempt to exert pressure on the family. DW-2, the sister-in-law, also testified that the accused never entered the first-floor rooms in her absence.

“Child Witness Testimony Requires Extra Caution — Particularly Where Tutoring Is Apparent”

Citing several binding precedents, including Mangoo v. State of M.P., Panchhi v. State of U.P., and Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate v. State of Maharashtra, the High Court reiterated that a child witness is susceptible to external influence, and unless independent corroboration exists, the Court must closely scrutinize such evidence.

The Court highlighted: “Child witnesses are inherently pliable and can be moulded — especially in emotionally volatile environments like matrimonial disputes. Their statements must be tested against the backdrop of consistency and surrounding circumstances.”

Referring to State of M.P. v. Ramesh, it reaffirmed:
“If there is evidence that a child witness has been tutored, the Court may reject the statement in whole or in part. Here, the evidence of tutoring is overwhelming.”

“Acquittal Deserves Deference — No Perverse View, No Interference”

Concluding that the trial court’s view was a possible and plausible appreciation of evidence, the High Court refused to disturb the acquittal. It noted that the trial judge had recorded the child’s statement personally, was in a position to assess her demeanor, and had based the verdict on sound legal principles.

The Court reminded that: “In an appeal against acquittal, interference is only justified when the trial court’s view is manifestly unreasonable or perverse. That threshold is not crossed here.”

Reiterating the doctrine of double presumption of innocence, the Bench held:
“An acquitted person enjoys a higher presumption of innocence. When a trial court has acquitted the accused after considering all evidence, the appellate court must exercise great caution in reversing such finding.”

Final Word: No Leave to Appeal, Acquittal Stands

Summing up the case, the Division Bench concluded:
“The background of the parties, the delay in lodging the FIR, the contradictory statements of the victim, the medical evidence being inconclusive, and the defense evidence all cumulatively lead to the conclusion that the trial court's decision to grant benefit of doubt was reasonable and cannot be interfered with.”

Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Date of Decision: 31 October 2022