Man Who Blackmailed Woman With Her Own Nude Photos To Rape Her Repeatedly Can't Escape Conviction Merely Because His Voice Sample Wasn't Taken: Delhi High Court

"Once He Takes Up A Defence And Enters The Witness Box, No Further Protection Is Available To Him And It Is For Him To Prove His Defence", Delhi High Court has upheld the conviction of a man who blackmailed a woman he met on a matrimonial website with her own private photographs and used the threat of circulating them to rape her repeatedly at a hotel in Delhi, extort money from her, and criminally intimidate her and her family.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha dismissed the appeal filed against a Trial Court's 2024 judgment convicting the appellant under Sections 376(2)(n), 384 and 506 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, holding that the prosecutrix's testimony was consistent, corroborated by medical evidence and firmly backed by forensic electronic data extracted from the phones of both parties.

The prosecutrix met the appellant through a matrimonial website in 2015 and entered into a long-distance relationship during which she shared private photographs with him. According to the prosecution, the appellant later used these photographs to blackmail her, extorting money and coercing her into sexual acts, including raping her twice at Hotel Radisson, Paschim Vihar, once during his stay from 23.01.2017 to 25.01.2017 and again later that year. The Additional Sessions Judge, West District, convicted him and sentenced him to ten years' rigorous imprisonment for rape besides separate terms for extortion and intimidation. He appealed to the Delhi High Court under Section 415 BNSS.

The central question before the Court was whether the conviction and sentence for rape, extortion and criminal intimidation were sustainable on the evidence on record. This required the Court to examine whether minor inconsistencies in the prosecutrix's testimony discredited her account, whether the absence of a voice sample or forensic voice comparison rendered the call-recording evidence inadmissible or unreliable, and whether the ingredients of Sections 375, 383 and 506 IPC stood established.

The appellant argued that the allegation of rape was an afterthought since the initial PCR call referred only to blackmail and not rape. Rejecting this, the Court held that an emergency call for police assistance cannot be expected to contain a full narration of events.

"A PCR call made in an emergent situation cannot be expected to contain a detailed narration of the entire incident or all the particulars which may find a place in the FIS/FIR, the 164 statement or the testimony."

On the defence's reliance on inconsistencies regarding the date of the second incident, the Court noted that the appellant himself, while deposing as DW1, admitted visiting Delhi and staying at the same hotel on 29.08.2017, a fact corroborated by an unchallenged hotel registration card, even though the prosecutrix had mistakenly referred to the month as September.

"PW1 might have gone wrong in referring to the date of the second incident as 29.09.2017 instead of 29.08.2017. That alone cannot be taken as a ground to reject the prosecution case in the light of the other materials on record."

Addressing the argument that the essential ingredient of penetration had not been established, the Court distinguished the precedents cited by the defence, noting that the prosecutrix had specifically and consistently deposed to rape, not merely vague "physical relations," and that this was corroborated by her medical examination.

"The medical evidence herein provides corroboration to the testimony of PW1. The testimony of PW1 is specific as to the nature of the acts committed by the accused and the same is supported by the medical evidence."

The Court also rejected reliance on the "false promise of marriage" line of authority, holding that the case was not founded on an unfulfilled promise to marry following consensual relations but on sustained blackmail and coercion using the prosecutrix's private photographs.

On what the Court called the most significant technical objection, the absence of any voice sample or forensic voice-comparison of the recorded calls, the Court held that the recordings were not mere self-serving material retained by the complainant but data extracted by the FSL directly from the mobile phones seized from both the prosecutrix and the appellant, and cross-verified against Call Detail Records and IMEI numbers.

"The trial court is seen to have even checked the IMEI number of the mobile phones seen in Ext. PW9/G (colly.) CDR with the ones mentioned in Ext. PW11/I and Ext. PW11/J seizure memos of the phones of the accused and PW1 respectively and found the same to be tallying."

Distinguishing the appellant's reliance on Anil Markende & Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh, where an uncorroborated recording retained solely by the complainant was held insufficient to prove a bribe demand, the Court observed that the present case involved forensically extracted primary data corroborated independently through telecom records.

"Unlike in Anil Markende (supra), where the recording device remained in the complainant's custody, the recordings here were extracted by the FSL from the mobile phones seized from PW1 and the accused."

The Court further held that since primary electronic evidence in the form of the seized devices and FSL-extracted data was available, no certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act was even required for the transcript relied upon.

On the appellant's defence that the prosecutrix's family had falsely implicated him to extort money from him, and that a CD allegedly containing proof of such a demand had been sent to his family, the Court found the defence unconvincing since the CD was never produced and the appellant could not even name the advocate to whom it was supposedly handed over. It was in this context that the Court made its central observation on the burden shifting once an accused chooses to testify.

"He has every right to remain silent. But once he takes up a defence and enters the witness box, no further protection is available to him and it is for him to prove his defence though the burden on him would not be proof beyond reasonable doubt, but on a preponderance of probability."

Holding that the prosecution had proved the offences of rape, extortion and criminal intimidation beyond reasonable doubt through consistent testimony corroborated by medical and forensic electronic evidence, the Court found no infirmity in the Trial Court's judgment.

"The prosecution has succeeded in establishing the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n), 384 and 506 IPC against the accused beyond reasonable doubt."

The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the conviction and sentence upheld.

Date of Decision: 25.08.2026