Locus Standi To Challenge Tenancy Orders | Person With Registered Agreement For Sale Is An 'Aggrieved Person' Under BTAL Act: Bombay High Court

"The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined to the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute, the specific circumstances of the case, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injuries suffered." Bombay High Court, in a significant ruling dated August 31, 2026, held that a person claiming interest in land through a registered Agreement for Sale, coupled with the payment of consideration and pending civil litigation, qualifies as an "aggrieved person" entitled to challenge orders passed under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (BTAL Act).

Justice Amit Borkar observed that the right to challenge a quasi-judicial order is not limited to absolute owners, but extends to any person who can demonstrate real legal prejudice to their interests.

The dispute concerns agricultural land in Village Shirdhon, Taluka Panvel. The Petitioners, who entered into a registered Agreement for Sale in 2007 and paid substantial consideration, challenged the orders of the Additional Tahasildar and A.L.T., Panvel, and the Sub Divisional Officer, which had fixed the purchase price in favour of the Respondents under Section 32-G of the BTAL Act. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (MRT) had previously dismissed the Petitioners' Revision Applications on the ground that they lacked the locus standi to challenge tenancy proceedings as they were not parties to the original dispute and had not perfected their title via a decree for specific performance.

The primary legal question before the Court was whether a person claiming an interest under a registered Agreement for Sale has the locus standi to challenge orders passed under Section 32-G of the BTAL Act. The Court also addressed whether the absence of a decree for specific performance or the non-party status in original tenancy proceedings serves as an absolute bar to such a challenge.

Defining the 'Aggrieved Person'

The Court rejected the contention that only an absolute owner has the standing to appeal or revise an order. Relying on established precedents, the Court noted that the "aggrieved person" doctrine is elastic and must be viewed through the lens of potential prejudice. If an order threatens a legally recognizable interest, the party affected has the right to approach the Revisional Authority.

Contractual Interest vs. Absolute Title - "Agreement For Sale Creates Legally Recognizable Interest"

The Court held that while an Agreement for Sale does not confer absolute ownership, it creates a bundle of rights that can be adversely affected by administrative or quasi-judicial orders. By paying consideration and initiating a civil suit for specific performance, the Petitioners demonstrated an interest that could not be dismissed as imaginary or remote.

Role of Section 64 of the BTAL Act - "Section 64 Does Not Bar Third-Party Challenges"

The Court examined Section 64 of the BTAL Act, which mandates specific procedures for the sale of agricultural land. The Court clarified that while Section 64 regulates the validity of such sales, it does not act as a statutory bar preventing an interest holder from challenging tenancy orders that proceed on the basis of a disputed land title. The validity of the underlying sale agreement remains a matter for the Civil Court to decide, but this does not divest the party of the right to contest prejudicial orders.

Requirement of Proper Inquiry - "Authorities Must Verify Authority of Representatives"

The High Court further noted that the authorities under the BTAL Act failed to scrutinize the legitimacy of the representatives appearing in the proceedings. The Court highlighted that issues regarding the revocation of Power of Attorney and the non-consideration of earlier revenue entries go to the root of the jurisdiction and fairness of the proceedings, necessitating a fresh look.

"It would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment. We think that ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding."

Concluding that the impugned orders of the MRT were flawed for failing to recognize the Petitioners' locus, the Court quashed and set aside the orders of the A.L.T., S.D.O., and the Tribunal. The matters were remanded to the MRT for fresh adjudication after providing all necessary parties an effective opportunity of hearing. The Court clarified that it had not pronounced on the merits of the specific performance suit, leaving that for the competent Civil Court to determine.

Date of Decision: 31 August 2026