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by Admin
08 December 2025 10:10 AM
“Section 34 IPC Is Not About Vicarious Liability”, In a compelling ruling that bridges competitive exams and legal correctness, the Karnataka High Court held that a wrong interpretation of criminal law in the judicial service preliminary examination answer key cannot be allowed to determine a candidate's fate. Justice R. Nataraj, speaking through a detailed decision in Nithin Gowda J R vs. High Court of Karnataka, declared that "Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code does not embody the principle of vicarious liability," and that denial of marks on such a legally flawed basis is not sustainable.
The Court emphasized that “judicial service examinations must reflect legal accuracy, especially when the question involves statutory interpretation within the daily domain of courts,” and directed the Karnataka High Court's Civil Judge Recruitment Committee to award two grace marks to the petitioner, thereby qualifying him for the main written examination.
“Where the Court Deals With the Statute Every Day, No Expert Needed” – Court Says Legal Misreading Warrants Judicial Correction
The petitioner, Nithin Gowda J R, a candidate for the Civil Judge recruitment 2025, was denied qualifying status after scoring 58 out of the required 60 marks in the preliminary examination. He challenged the answer key to two questions—Nos. 86 and 98, which he argued were legally incorrect or internally inconsistent.
In particular, Question No. 86, which asked “which provision of the IPC reflects the principle of vicarious liability,” had the answer key marking Section 34 IPC as correct. However, the Court categorically stated:
“Section 34 of IPC only deals with common intention and does not even remotely suggest vicarious liability.”
Relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Vasanth alias Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 337, the High Court clarified:
“Although Section 34 deals with a criminal act which is joint and an intention which is common, it cannot be said that it eliminates the element of personal contribution... the individual offender must have participated in the offence.”
Justice Nataraj concluded that “Option ‘D’, which was marked correct in the key, is demonstrably wrong in law, and the petitioner ought to have been awarded the mark.”
“Answering Objective Questions Wrongly on Law is Not a Trivial Error”—Court Says Petitioner Was Denied Due Evaluation
In respect of Question No. 98, which concerned legal provisions related to mob lynching, the Court took strong exception to the inconsistency in the answer key, where options A and C were accepted, even though C included B, which the petitioner had chosen.
The Court found that “the petitioner selected option ‘B’, which, if ‘C’ is treated as correct (being a combination of A and B), logically includes his answer,” adding that:“If the Committee accepted Option C, it implicitly validated Option B as well. Denial of mark on the ground of ‘typographical error’ cannot override this logic.”
The High Court expressed disapproval of the argument raised by the respondent that the error was harmless, ruling that “where the consequences are the difference between qualification and disqualification, such inconsistency cannot be glossed over.”
“A Delay of 48 Hours Cannot Defeat the Right to a Fair and Legally Accurate Evaluation” – Procedural Deadline Held Subordinate to Substantive Justice
Though the petitioner raised the objection regarding Question No. 86 after the 48-hour deadline, the Court refused to penalize him for the delay, holding that:“The time given for filing objections was less than 48 hours. The right of the petitioner cannot be snuffed out by a non-statutory deadline.”
Invoking the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Rajkumar Girijoya v. DSSSB, the Court stressed that technical cut-offs cannot override substantive rights, especially in judicial recruitment, where the legal validity of the answer itself is in question.
“This Court Does Not Require the Omniscience of Experts When the Law Is Straightforward” – High Court Rejects Misplaced Deference to Committees
Addressing the common argument that courts should defer to expert committees in exam matters, Justice Nataraj made an incisive distinction: “The questions raised are not technical academic queries but are grounded in criminal law, which this Court deals with daily. It does not require academic omniscience to see that Section 34 IPC does not establish vicarious liability.”
Rejecting the misuse of Ran Vijay Singh and Vikesh Kumar Gupta precedents by the respondent, the Court observed:“Those decisions involved descriptive or technical subject evaluations. Here, we are dealing with fundamental principles of penal law—where the court has both the competence and the responsibility to intervene.”
“Benefit Limited to Petitioner Alone to Avoid Recruitment Disruption”—Court Balances Individual Right with Institutional Stability
Though the respondent expressed apprehension that allowing grace marks would open a floodgate of claims, the Court drew the line clearly:“The apprehension of a ‘Pandora’s box’ does not arise, since this is the only writ filed. The benefit is confined strictly to the petitioner.”
Citing Ashok Kumar v. Depinder Singh Dhesi, the Court held that individual rectification does not amount to general revision, and that fairness can be tailored to protect both justice for the individual and integrity of the process.
“Legal Accuracy is the Backbone of Judicial Selection”—Court Orders Petitioner to Be Allowed to Write Mains
Concluding the judgment, the Court directed:“The petitioner shall be awarded one mark each for Questions 86 and 98. He shall be permitted to pay the fee and appear for the main written examination scheduled on 06.12.2025 and 07.12.2025.”
The ruling underscores that in judicial service recruitment, there can be no compromise on legal correctness, and judicial review is not only appropriate but essential where wrong interpretations of penal statutes affect candidate outcomes.
Date of Decision: 5 December 2025
