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by sayum
05 December 2025 8:37 AM
“Pre-trial Incarceration Cannot Be Allowed to Degenerate Into Punitive Imprisonment”, In a judgment that carefully balances the twin imperatives of judicial fairness and liberty under Article 21, the Punjab & Haryana High Court on 2nd December 2025, granted regular bail to petitioner Neeraj Jaswal @ Romi, who had been in custody for over two years in connection with an FIR under the NDPS Act and Arms Act, where the prosecution case rested solely on the disclosure statement of a co-accused.
Justice Sumeet Goel, presiding over the criminal miscellaneous petition (CRM-M No. 63807 of 2025), delivered a reasoned and reportable verdict invoking a broad spectrum of constitutional and statutory jurisprudence, ultimately allowing bail by holding that:
“Such disclosure statements, in the absence of corroborative evidence, hold limited evidentiary value and cannot be the sole basis for implicating the petitioner. The reliance on this unsubstantiated statement raises serious doubts about the fairness and objectivity of the investigation.” [Para 6]
The case was registered under Sections 21-B, 27-A, 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985, Section 25 of the Arms Act, and later dealt with under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The FIR related to recovery of 15 grams of heroin and ₹54.44 lakhs alleged drug money, of which ₹39.65 lakhs was purportedly attributed to the petitioner through the co-accused’s disclosure.
“Custody Beyond 2 Years, No Trial Progress: Liberty Cannot Be Held Hostage to Procedural Inertia”
The Court noted that the petitioner was arrested on 12th June 2023, and although the challan was presented in December 2023, not a single one of the 28 cited prosecution witnesses had been examined till the date of hearing.
This prolonged pre-trial custody, unaccompanied by any substantive progress in the trial, weighed heavily with the Court, especially when viewed through the prism of Article 21 of the Constitution.
Referring to a string of constitutional precedents, including Hussainara Khatoon, Abdul Rehman Antulay, Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain, Chitta Biswas and Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan, the Court stated:
“Pre-trial detention cannot be permitted to degenerate into punitive imprisonment, particularly where such delay is neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons.” [Para 6.5]
In this regard, the Court echoed what it had previously stated in Kulwinder v. State of Punjab:
“An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in the rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.” [Para 6.5]
“Twin Conditions Under Section 37 Are Cumulative, But They Cannot Override Fundamental Rights”
While the allegations involved commercial quantity of contraband, typically attracting the strict conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the Court invoked its constitutional duty to interpret the statute harmoniously with fundamental rights.
Justice Goel reiterated the twin conditions laid down in Section 37(1)(b) — that the Court must be satisfied that the accused is (i) not guilty and (ii) not likely to commit any offence while on bail — but observed that:
“The rigour(s) of Section 37 of the NDPS Act pale into oblivion when bail is sought on account of long incarceration in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.” [Para 6.2(iii)]
He further held:
“The twin conditions are cumulative and not alternative. However, when the facts demonstrate that the petitioner is implicated only through a disclosure statement, and the trial remains stagnant for years, those rigours must yield to constitutional protection.” [Para 6.3]
“Disclosure of Co-Accused Is a Flimsy Basis for Denial of Liberty”
In an emphatic rejection of prosecution’s sole reliance on the disclosure statement of co-accused Bikramjit Singh @ Bikka, the Court cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, holding that:
“A confession made by a co-accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is inherently a very weak piece of evidence. Such statements, by themselves, cannot form the sole basis for the conviction of an individual.” [Para 6.3]
The petitioner’s presence at the scene was not established. No recovery was made from him. The only linkage was the unsubstantiated disclosure of a third party, which the Court found insufficient to sustain further detention.
“Antecedents Not a Standalone Ground for Bail Refusal When Present Case Is Weak”
The State placed reliance on the fact that the petitioner had two other FIRs against him. However, the Court held that while antecedents are a relevant factor, they cannot override the weakness of the present prosecution case.
“This factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case is made out for grant of regular bail qua the FIR in question by ratiocinating upon the facts/circumstances of the said FIR.” [Para 6.6]
Reliance was placed on Maulana Mohd. Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and Sridhar Das v. State, among others.
Court Issues Stringent Bail Conditions; Warns State Can Move for Cancellation on Breach
Granting bail, the Court issued detailed and stringent conditions to prevent misuse of liberty. These included:
The Court also preserved the State’s liberty to seek cancellation of bail in case of violation, with the reminder that:
“The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit… that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved… the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail.” [Para 7(viii)]
Bail Granted, Liberty Restored — But Accountability Ensured
Justice Goel’s verdict stands as a comprehensive reaffirmation of the principle that liberty cannot be sacrificed at the altar of procedural delays, and that bail jurisprudence must be guided by fairness, proportionality, and constitutional values.
“Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.” [Para 6.6]
Date of Decision: 2nd December 2025
