Consent Is No Defence When Victim Is Under 16: Delhi High Court Upholds Rape Conviction

“It stands proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed rape on the prosecutrix. Therefore, the conviction recorded by the trial Court does not call for any interference and is affirmed.” – Delhi High Court affirming the conviction of a man under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code for raping a 14-year-old girl. While the Court found no merit in the appeal challenging the trial court’s findings on guilt, it exercised judicial discretion to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone—about 5 years and 5 months—citing the long passage of time since the incident, the appellant’s satisfactory conduct, and his family responsibilities.

“A Conviction Can Rest Solely on the Prosecutrix’s Testimony If It Inspires Confidence”

At the heart of the case was the appellant's argument that the prosecutrix had falsely implicated him due to alleged animosity and that their relationship was consensual. He further sought acquittal on the ground that her testimony was unreliable and inconsistent. However, the Court strongly rejected these contentions.

Justice Rajneesh Kumar Gupta began by affirming a well-settled principle in sexual offence cases: “It is a well-settled law that the appellant can be convicted on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence, and no corroboration is required unless there are compelling reasons.”

Citing Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1610, the Court observed: “The conviction can be based solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to insist for corroboration... Minor contradictions or small discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the prosecutrix.”

The prosecutrix’s testimony was found to be consistent in her FIR statement, Section 164 CrPC statement, and her deposition during trial. She narrated how the accused entered the bathroom at night, threatened to kill her if she raised an alarm, and raped her. Her brother, PW-4 Praveen Kumar, arrived on hearing her cries and caught the accused at the spot—further lending credence to her account.

Consent Legally Irrelevant When Victim Below 16: Court Rejects Defence Argument

One of the key issues in the appeal was the defence’s claim that the prosecutrix was above 18 years and had consented. The Court decisively rejected this argument.

Birth records (Ex. PW-2/A and PW-2/B) issued by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the testimony of the mother (PW-3) established that the girl was born on 12th October 1994, making her 14 years old at the time of the incident in September 2009. The Court found no evidence to doubt the genuineness of these documents.

Justice Gupta held: “From these evidences on record, it is proved that prosecutrix was aged below 16 years on the date of the alleged incident. Therefore, the consent of the prosecutrix is immaterial as she was below 16 years of age on the date of alleged incident.”

Medical and Forensic Evidence Corroborated Ocular Testimony

The Court also placed significant reliance on the medical evidence. The MLC of the prosecutrix, Ex. PW-7/A, indicated a torn hymen, and the FSL report confirmed the presence of human semen on the vaginal and perineal swabs. While the defence pointed to the absence of external injuries as a ground to question the occurrence of rape, the Court relied on precedent to hold that injury is not a sine qua non for proving rape.

Citing Lalliram & Anr. v. State of M.P., (2008) 10 SCC 69, the Court stated:

“It is true that injury is not a sine qua non for deciding whether rape has been committed. But it has to be decided on the factual matrix of each case… if the prosecutrix’s version is credible, then no corroboration is necessary.”

Sentence Modified Considering Long Passage of Time and Family Circumstances

While the conviction was affirmed, the Court partly allowed the appeal by modifying the sentence. The appellant had undergone approximately five years and five months of imprisonment and had exhibited good conduct during incarceration. The judgment noted that the offence occurred over 16 years ago and the conviction itself was more than 14 years old. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant did not misuse his liberty and had already deposited the imposed fine.

Referring to Mohammad Giasuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1977) 3 SCC 287, and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190, the Court highlighted the shift towards reformative justice in sentencing policy.

Quoting from Mohammad Giasuddin: “Crime is a pathological aberration, that the criminal can ordinarily be redeemed, that the State has to rehabilitate rather than avenge... brutal incarceration of the person merely produces laceration of his mind.”

The Court concluded: “While maintaining the conviction of the appellant, the substantive sentence of imprisonment of the appellant is modified to the period already undergone by him in jail. This modification of sentence is on account of the mitigating circumstances… and does not, in any manner, impact the seriousness of the offence for which the appellant.

Date of Decision: 04/12/2025