Facts:

The Tamil Nadu Housing Board initiated land acquisition proceedings for the Ambattur Neighborhood Housing Scheme.

Various legal challenges were raised, including objections to compensation and procedural irregularities.

A.S. Naidu challenged the acquisition, leading to court decisions partially quashing the declaration under Section 6 but leaving the notification under Section 4 intact.

Subsequent legal battles arose, including challenges from land purchasers after the completion of acquisition and utilization of acquired land by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.

Issues:

Interpretation of court orders regarding land acquisition proceedings.

Rights of parties involved in land acquisition disputes, including landowners and purchasers.

Application of legal principles in determining the validity of land acquisition proceedings and subsequent transactions.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that unless the declaration under Section 6 or the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is explicitly quashed entirely by the court, the relief granted by the court would only apply to the parties involved in the specific case.

Parties who did not challenge acquisition proceedings timely could not later benefit from favorable court orders obtained by others.

Purchasers of land after acquisition completion could not acquire rights against the state, except for seeking enhanced compensation.

The court allowed the Tamil Nadu Housing Board's appeal, dismissing the respondents' writ petitions as devoid of merit and setting aside the High Court judgments.

Facts:

The appeals seek to challenge the decision of the Guwahati High Court in a batch of Writ Appeals filed by the Respondents, aggrieved by the dismissal of their respective writ petitions questioning the refusal of the Appellants to sanction financial assistance under the 'Scheme of Promotion of Industries in North East' (SPINE) due to delay and laches.

Issues:

Whether the Respondents were entitled to the benefit of adjudication in earlier litigation despite delay and inaction on their part.

Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies in this case.

Held:

The Respondents' deliberate delay and inaction disentitled them to the benefit of adjudication in the earlier lis. The Court found it iniquitous and repugnant to entertain their belated claim based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

The Court held that the withdrawal and closure of SPINE with effect from 23-02-2007 were established through official notifications and media coverage, and the Respondents were aware of these developments.

The Court emphasized that delay must be explained by cogent and persuasive reasons to justify its condonation. As the Respondents failed to provide such reasons, their claims were rightly rejected.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel was held inapplicable in this case, considering the deliberate delay and the overriding public interest against enforcing such promises.

Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and allowed the appeals.

Facts:

The victim, a female worker, was raped and murdered while commuting in a cab hired by her company during a night shift. The accused driver, along with another individual, perpetrated the crime. The conviction rested on circumstantial evidence, and the court sentenced the accused to death.

Issues:

The severity of the crime, the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, adherence to the rule of proportionality in sentencing, and the applicability of the "rarest of the rare" doctrine.

Held:

The court upheld the death sentence for the accused individuals, considering the extreme depravity of the crime, the lack of remorse shown by the accused, and the need for deterrence in cases of violent crimes against women.

The court emphasized the importance of proportionality in sentencing and stated that punishment should be commensurate with the culpability of the criminal act.

The absence of mitigating circumstances, such as age, family background, or lack of criminal antecedents, did not warrant a reduction in the sentence due to the heinous nature of the offense.

The crime fell within the category of "rarest of the rare" cases, as it shocked the collective conscience of the court and community, justifying the imposition of the death penalty.

Decision: Dismissing the appeal, the court affirmed the death penalty for the accused individuals, noting the gravity of the offense and the necessity of ensuring justice for the victim and society. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

Facts:

The appellants challenged the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The incident involved a confrontation near a college campus, resulting in the death of one individual and injuries to others.

The prosecution relied on eyewitness testimonies, medical reports, and circumstantial evidence to establish the guilt of the appellants.

Issues:

Discrepancies in the place of occurrence of the incident.

Consistency of prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

Alleged improvements in the statements of witnesses.

Presence of unlawful assembly and common intention.

Held:

The discrepancies regarding the place of occurrence were deemed immaterial as they did not affect the prosecution's case.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were found consistent overall, with minor discrepancies deemed insignificant.

Any alleged improvements in the statements of witnesses were considered understandable given the traumatic nature of the incident.

The presence of an unlawful assembly and common intention was established based on the evidence of the accused persons' presence, armed with deadly weapons, and their shared objective of preventing the deceased from contesting elections.

Even if there was no initial common intention to kill, the court held that it could have arisen spur of the moment, given the circumstances.

Therefore, the judgment of the High Court confirming the conviction of the appellants was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

Maan Aluminium Ltd., engaged in manufacturing aluminium products, was accused by the Central Excise Department of clandestinely removing quantities of finished goods without paying excise duty.

The Department's allegations were based on discrepancies found between physical stock and recorded stock during an inspection. A show cause notice was issued to Maan Aluminium Ltd. and its managing director, alleging evasion of excise duty and suppression of facts.

Issues:

Whether Maan Aluminium Ltd. had engaged in clandestine removal of goods and evasion of excise duty, as alleged by the Central Excise Department.

The case also questioned the validity of the findings of the lower authorities, specifically regarding the interpretation of statements made by company employees.

Held:

The Court found that the findings of the lower authorities were flawed due to the misinterpretation of statements made by employees Mr. Deepak Das and Mr. J.C. Mansukhani. These statements did not contain admissions as claimed by the authorities. Additionally, the Court noted that the appellant's explanations regarding variations in die hole sizes were not adequately considered by the authorities. Consequently, the Court ruled in favor of the appellant, quashing the demands raised by the authorities due to the lack of proper scrutiny and misinterpretation of statements. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and quash the demands raised by the authorities.

Facts:

The respondent, Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd., declared an income for assessment year 1990-1991 but didn't pay the vend fee of Rs. 22,87,512 before the end of the relevant previous year.

The assessing officer disallowed the vend fee, but the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) deleted the disallowance. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's decision.

Issues:

Whether the vend fee should be disallowed under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

Held:

On facts in the present case, it is clear that the amendment made to Section 43B is attracted. Even if the vend fee that is paid by the Respondent to the State does not directly fall within the expression 'fee' contained in Section 43B(a), it would be a 'fee' by 'whatever name called', that is even if the vend fee is called 'privilege' as has been held by the High Court in the judgment under appeal. This being the case, we find that question No. 2 which was answered in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue by the High Court was not answered correctly.

Therefore, the court set aside the previous judgment and allowed the appeal in favor of the revenue.

Facts:

The case involves an accident caused by the combined wrongful acts of joint tort-feasors.

The claimant sought compensation for injuries sustained as a result of this accident.

Issues:

• Clarification on the liability of joint tort-feasors in cases of composite negligence.

• Determination of whether apportionment of compensation between tort-feasors is permissible.

• Differentiation between contributory and composite negligence.

Held:

The liability of joint tort-feasors in cases of composite negligence is joint and several.

Apportionment of compensation between tort-feasors is not permissible; the claimant has the right to recover the entire amount from any or all of the liable parties.

Determination of the extent of negligence between joint tort-feasors is only for the purpose of their inter-se liability.

If all joint tort-feasors are impleaded and sufficient evidence is available, the court can determine their composite negligence.

It may not be appropriate for the court to determine the composite negligence of unimpleaded tort-feasors; the impleaded tort-feasor can pursue independent proceedings against them after the decree or award.

The difference between contributory and composite negligence lies in whether the person suffering contributed to the accident; contributory negligence reduces entitlement to compensation, while composite negligence involves suffering due to the combined negligence of others.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the principles outlined above are upheld.

Facts:

Asahi India Safety Glass Ltd., engaged in manufacturing Toughened (Tempered) and Laminated Safety Glass for Automobiles, avails MODVAT credit on duty paid for its raw material, float glass.

Department issued show cause notices alleging MODVAT credit availed on inherently defective inputs.

Respondent approached Settlement Commission, admitting to certain defects in float glass and agreeing to pay back a certain sum.

Settlement Commission extended demand beyond respondent's admission, prompting respondent to challenge the order in High Court.

High Court found Settlement Commission's approach legally erroneous and remanded the case for reconsideration.

Issues:

Whether High Court exceeded jurisdiction in reviewing Settlement Commission's order?

Held:

The Court, in its judgment, upheld the decision of the High Court. It noted that the High Court had not interfered with the factual findings of the Settlement Commission but had corrected its legal interpretation. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court had merely applied the correct legal principle to the undisputed facts of the case. Therefore, it found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it, directing the Settlement Commission to reconsider the case in accordance with the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

The appellant, MIS. SERVO-MED INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD., was engaged in purchasing syringes and needles in bulk from the open market. The appellant then sterilized these syringes and needles, assembling them in an unassembled form in pouches bearing their brand name, and subsequently sold them.

Issues:

Whether the process of sterilization constituted "manufacture" under the Central Excise Act, 1944, thereby attracting excise duty.

Held:

The court delineated four categories concerning the manufacture of goods, as discussed in paragraph 27 and 28 of the judgment. The instant case was found to fall within the first category, where goods remain exactly the same even after a particular process, indicating no manufacture involved.

The court emphasized in paragraph 30 that the added process of sterilization did not transform the disposable syringes and needles into new marketable goods. Instead, sterilization was deemed a process for the convenient use of the product, removing bacteria from its surface without altering its essential character or end use.

Paragraph 34 concluded that the cryptic judgment, which imposed excise duty on the appellant, did not apply the law correctly and was set aside. It reiterated that sterilization did not lead to any value addition in the product and did not bring about a transformation of the original articles into something new and different.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the previous order that excise duty was applicable. It held that sterilization of disposable syringes and needles did not amount to manufacture under the law.