Facts:

The Nashik Workers Union filed a complaint under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, against Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) seeking reinstatement of trainees with continuity of services and back wages. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the appropriate government for the purpose of the 1947 Act is the Central Government in relation to HAL, rendering the complaints filed by the Union against the company not maintainable.

Issues:

The determination of the appropriate government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for making a reference in the dispute between the Nashik Workers Union and HAL.

Held:

HAL 2 did not appropriately consider the earlier decision in HAL 1, where it was clearly held that, considering the dictionary clause of the ID Act, it is the State Government that has the authority to make the reference in the case of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The analysis in HAL 2, citing the decision in SAIL's case, is deemed to run counter to HAL 1 and is not considered a binding precedent.

The High Court did not delve into the merits of the case and dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds. Given that HAL 2 did not correctly apply the ratio in SAIL's case and HAL 1 still holds as the correct law, the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh adjudication on merits.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh adjudication on merits, considering the correct determination of the appropriate government in relation to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.

Referred Cases:

Air India Statutory Corpn. Vs. United Labour Union, (1997) 9 SCC 377

Food Corpn. of India Vs. Transport & Dock Workers Union, (1999) 7 SCC 59

Food Corpn. of India Workers' Union Vs. Food Corpn. of India, (1985) 2 SCC 294

Graham Vs. Public Works Commissioners, (1901) 2 KB 781 : 70 LJ KB 860 : 17 TLR 540

Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. The State of Bihar, (1969) 1 SCC 765

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited Vs. Hindustan Aeronautical Canteen Kamgar Sangh, (2007) 15 SCC 51

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited Vs. Workmen, (1975) 4 SCC 679

London County Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Association Vs. Nichols, (1948) 2 All ER 432

Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corpn. Vs. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, (1980) 3 SCC 459

Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489

Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh Vs. Model Mills, (1984) Sup SCC 443

State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Visakhapatnam, AIR 1963 SC 1811

Steel Authority of India Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1

Tamlin Vs. Hannaford, (1950) 1 KB 18, 25, 26

Tata Memorial Hospital Workers Union Vs. Tata Memorial Centre, (2010) 8 SCC 480

Facts:

The case involves the appeal of Sadhu Saran Singh against the State of Uttar Pradesh and others.

Charges under various sections of the IPC, including 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, and 504.

Trial court convicted all accused; three were sentenced to life imprisonment, and two received the death penalty.

High Court acquitted all accused.

Issues:

The appeal questions the reasoning behind the High Court's acquittal.

Whether the appellate court has the power to review evidence in appeals against acquittal.

Held:

The appellate court can review and relook at the entire evidence.

Proper reasoning in judgments is crucial, and if the decision is based on erroneous views against settled law, the appellate court must interfere.

Non-examination of an injured witness is not fatal to the prosecution's case in the specific circumstances.

Lack of independent witnesses does not derail the prosecution's case if the evidence of eyewitnesses is trustworthy.

The High Court's reasons for acquitting the accused are deemed flimsy and untenable.

The consistency of evidence provided by eyewitnesses is emphasized.

Medical evidence presented by the High Court is criticized for inappropriate use.

Place of occurrence, motive, and alibi considerations are discussed.

Death sentences awarded by the trial court are modified to life imprisonment for all accused respondents under Section 302/149 IPC.

Referred Cases:

Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415

Darbara Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 476

Rajan Rai Vs. State of Bihar, (2006) 1 SCC 191

Sambasivan Vs. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412

FACTS:

Respondent-Deep Jyoti Company, an 'A' class contractor, was awarded a construction contract by the Government of Rajasthan.

Circular dated 06.10.2008 mandated contractors to obtain a short-term permit and pay the cost of rawanna book before starting work, with royalty deducted from bills.

High Court quashed the circular, stating it was unreasonable to compel contractors to pay royalty in advance and seek a refund later.

State Government appealed, arguing the circular aimed to ensure royalty payment for legally mined minerals in government construction work.

ISSUES:

Validity of the circular dated 06.10.2008 requiring contractors to obtain a short-term permit and pay royalty in advance.

Whether the circular is a reasonable condition for government contracts.

HELD:

The circular's condition to obtain a short-term permit was for contractors registered as 'A' class contractors with the government. It aimed to ensure royalty payment for minerals used in government construction work. The court emphasized the reasonableness of the condition for awarding government contracts.( Para 9)

The court rejected the contention that the circular imposed compulsion, clarifying that it aimed to prevent the use of illegally mined minerals in construction work. The court highlighted the laudable objective of preventing illegal mining and revenue loss.( Para 10)

The court stated that the circular's purpose was to check illegal mining and ensure that only royalty-paid minerals were used. It emphasized that the condition was not unreasonable or arbitrary, as contractors would be refunded the royalty if evidence of payment was produced.( Para 11)

The court dismissed the argument that the circular amounted to a levy of royalty, stating that it provided a procedure for royalty collection and payment by contractors. The court criticized the High Court for not considering the object of the circular and erred in quashing it.( Para 12)

The impugned orders of the High Court were set aside, and the appeals were allowed. The writ petitions filed by the respondents were dismissed. The parties were directed to bear their respective costs.( Para 13)

Facts:

Partap, son of Anand Singh PW5, died in an incident on 4.7.2003.

Anand Singh lodged the FIR on 5.7.2003, stating that Partap was beaten by the accused appellants.

Accused claimed false implication, asserting that Partap had tried to outrage the modesty of a woman.

The FIR mentioned a beating due to an alleged evil eye on the family of the accused.

Issues:

Whether the accused were falsely implicated.

Validity of the delay in lodging the FIR.

Credibility of the complainant's (Anand Singh PW5) version.

Impact of related incidents, such as the setting ablaze of the accused's house.

Held:

The court, after thorough consideration, held that:

The complainant's version was reliable, with no inherent improbabilities.

Medical evidence corroborated eyewitness accounts of injuries caused by sharp-edged weapons and lathi blows.

The delay in lodging the FIR was satisfactorily explained by the complainant's temporary illness.

The setting ablaze of the accused's house was considered a repercussion of the murder.

The accused received a fair trial, and there were no irregularities prejudicing the trial.

The appeals were dismissed as devoid of merit, upholding the conviction of the accused.

Referred Cases:

Bahal Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 2032

The State of U.P. Vs. Jaggo alias Jagdish, AIR 1971 SC 1586

Facts:

The case involves a dispute related to the repealing provisions of Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, impacting Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125. The jurisdiction and powers of the High Court, encompassing civil, criminal, and other matters, are central to the dispute.

Issues:

The effect of the repealing provisions on Section 23, the nature of Section 23 compared to Section 98(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the uniform application of rules to different types of appeals before the High Court.

Held:

The court holds that Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act remains unaffected by the repealing provision of Section 9 of the Kerala High Court Act, emphasizing its special nature compared to Section 98(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Para 51)

The court analyzes the scope and jurisdiction of the Travancore-Cochin Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, highlighting the distinct purposes and subjects covered by each. (Paras 8, 14)

The court interprets Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the "specific provision to the contrary" requirement and clarifying that it must be contained within the Code itself. (Para 17)

The court considers the legislative scheme, including Section 98(3), and holds that the specific provision must be within the Code of Civil Procedure itself. (Paras 18, 20, 21)

The court rejects the respondent's argument regarding a specific exclusion, relying on precedent and stating that the High Court Act is a special law for the concerned High Court. (Paras 34, 35)

The court emphasizes the particular perspective regarding differences of opinion in appeals before the High Court of Kerala, asserting the applicability of a uniform rule provided by Section 23. (Para 37)

The court discusses anomalies that would arise if the respondent's argument is accepted and highlights the importance of a uniform rule for all types of appeals. (Paras 48, 50)

Kurian Joseph, J

Alarified the lack of uniformity and clarity in determining judge strength in cases of a difference of opinion, affecting the intended purpose of multiple judges hearing a matter.( Paragraph 7 )

Addressed the absence of provisions in the CPC and Cr.PC, emphasizing the reliance on High Court Acts and expressing concerns about treating appeals as decisions of a Single Judge.( Paragraph 10)

Stressed the need for comprehensive legislation to handle situations where a bench is equally divided, advocating for larger bench strength to resolve differences of opinion effectively.( Paragraph 11)

Decision: The court concludes that Section 23 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act alone is to be applied in cases of differences of opinion between two judges of the Kerala High Court in any appeal, irrespective of its nature - civil, criminal, or otherwise. Appeal disposed of accordingly.

Referred Cases:

A.B. Abdulkadir Vs. State of Kerala, (1962) Suppl. 2 SCR 741

Anwari Basavaraj Patil Vs. Siddaramaiah, (1993) 1 SCC 636

Becharam Vs. Purna Chandra, AIR 1925 Cal 845 FB

Bhaidas Shivdas Vs. Bai Gulab, 23 Bom LR 623 : 48 Ind App 181 : AIR 1921 PC 6

Bhuta Vs. Lakadu Dhansing, AIR 1919 Bom 1 FB

Biram Sardar Vs. Emperor, AIR 1941 Bom 146 : AIR 1939 PC 47 : 1939 IA 66 : 40 Cri LJ 364

Bokaro and Bangur Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 Pat 154

Debi Prasad Vs. Gaudham Rai, AIR 1933 Pat 67

Dhanaraju Vs. Motilal, AIR 1929 Mad 641 FB

Gopal Sardar Vs. Karuna Sardar, (2004) 4 SCC 252

Gurbinder Singh Vs. Lal Singh, AIR 1959 P&H 123

Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133

Immidisetti Dhanaraju Vs. Motilal Daga, AIR 1929 MAD 641

Jelejar Hormosji Gotla Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 AP 288

Krishan Prasad Gupta Vs. Controller, Printing & Stationery, (1996) 1 SCC 69

Kulwant Kaur Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann dead by LRS, (2001) 4 SCC 262

Lachman Singh Vs. Ram Lagan Singh, (1904) ILR 26 All 10

Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315

Maru Ram Vs. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107

Mati Lal Saha Vs. Chandra Kanta Sarkar, AIR 1947 Cal 1

Mt. Sardar Bibi Vs. Haq Nawaz Khan, AIR 1934 Lah 371

Muhammad Ishaq Khan Vs. Muhammad Rustam Ali Khan, ILR 40 All 292 : AIR 1918 All 412

Nundeepat Mahta Vs. Urquhart, (1870) 4 Beng LR 181

P.S. Sathappan Vs. Andhra Bank Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 672

P.V. Hemalatha Vs. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda, (2002) 5 SCC 548

Prafulla Kamini Vs. Bhabani Nath, AIR 1926 Cal 121

Rajnarain Vs. Saligram, (1948) ILR 27 Pat 332

Roop Lal Vs. Lakshmi Doss, (1906) ILR 29 Mad 1

Shushila Kesarbhai Vs. Bai Lilavati, AIR 1975 Guj 39 FB

Suraj Mal Vs. Horniman, 20 Bom LR 185 : AIR 1917 Bom 62 SB

Suresh Chandra Vs. Shiti Kanta, AIR 1924 Cal 855

Tej Kaur Vs. Kirpal Singh, (1995) 5 SCC 119

Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bangalore Vs. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor, etc., (1961) 3 SCR 855

Thomas Challoner Vs. Henry WF Bolikow, (1878) 3 AC 933

Veeraraghava Reddy Vs. Subba Reddy, ILR 43 Mad 37 : AIR 1920 Mad 391

Venkatasubbiah Vs. Venkatasubbamma, AIR 1925 Mad 1032

Vinita Khanolkar case, (1998) 1 SCC 500

Sharda Devi case, (2002) 3 SCC 705

Shah Babulal Khimji case, (1981) 4 SCC 8

Final Result : Disposed off

Facts:

The respondent, Hamdard (Waqf) Laboratories, engaged in the manufacture and sale of various items, including Rooh Afza, a sweetened non-alcoholic beverage. A dispute arose regarding the classification of Rooh Afza under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1986.

Issues:

The classification of Rooh Afza, with the respondent claiming sub-heading 2201.90 and the Revenue advocating for sub-heading 2107.91.

Held:

The Respondent, facing a classification dispute, initiated steps for the recovery of the differential duty as demanded by the Revenue. The respondent, in compliance, began paying the duty.

The case involves the liability to pay interest in the context of a granted refund. It differs from cases claiming automatic refund, focusing on the delineation by the competent authority in a procrastinated manner.

The court refers to the principles established in Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, emphasizing the obligation on the Revenue to inform the Assessee of deficiencies in the refund application within two days. Adjudication, if necessary, must conclude within three months.

The adjudicatory process should not extend beyond three months, as per the decision in Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited.

The appeal, being sans substratum, stands dismissed.

Referred Cases:

CCE, Meerut Vs. Citurgia Biochemical Ltd., (1998) 101 568 SC

Hamdard Wakf Laboratories Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Meerut, (1999) 6 SCC 617

Mafatlal Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536

Parle Exports P Ltd. Northern Industries Vs. CCE, (1988) 37 ELT 229 Tribunal

Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited Vs. Union of India, (2011) 10 SCC 292

Facts:

The case involves individuals associated with GTE private bank accused of offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The question revolves around whether the accused, specifically the Chairman/Managing Director and Executive Director, are deemed public servants as per Section 46A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

Issues:

The primary issue is the determination of the status of Chairman, Directors, and Officers of GTE private bank as public servants for the purpose of prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Additionally, the relevance of Section 46A post the repeal of Sections 161 to 165A of the IPC is under consideration.

Held:

Interpretation of Public Servant Definition: The court held that the Chairman/Managing Director and Executive Director of GTE bank are indeed public servants for the purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, based on Section 46A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The court emphasized the importance of this specific definition for offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Legislative Intent and Omission: The court addressed the legislative intent behind the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which aimed to widen the definition of 'public servant.' The omission in Section 46A, post the repeal of certain IPC sections, was considered an unintended legislative gap that the court could fill through interpretation.

Cognizance of Offense: The Special Judge (CBI) was criticized for not taking cognizance of the offense punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The court highlighted the error in not considering Section 46A and emphasized the need for a harmonious construction of the law.

Accused Status and Trial Court Discretion: While the accused were deemed public servants for the purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the court clarified that they may not qualify as public servants under Section 21 IPC. The trial court was granted discretion to consider other offenses under the Penal Code, if applicable.

Decision: The court set aside the orders of the lower courts, emphasizing that the accused, as Chairman/Managing Director and Executive Director, were indeed public servants for the purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Referred Cases:

Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213

Dadi Jagannadham Vs. Jammulu Ramulu, (2001) 7 SCC 71

Federal Bank Ltd. Vs. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733

Govt. of Andhra Pradesh Vs. P.Venku Reddy, (2002) 7 SCC 631

Housing Board of Haryana Vs. Haryana Housing Board Employees' Union, (1996) 1 SCC 95

Lord Atkin in McMillan Vs. Guest, (1942) AC 561

Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. Vs. Asher, (1949) 2 AllER 155 164

M. Pentiah Vs. Muddala Veeramallappa, (1961) 2 SCR 295

Magor & St. Mellons Rural District Council Vs. Newport Corporation, (1950) 2 AllER 1226

Mahadeo Vs. Shantibhai, (1969) 2 SCR 422

Manish Trivedi Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 14 SCC 420

McMillan Vs. Guest, (1942) AC 561

P.V. Narasimha Rao Vs. State CBI/SPE, (1998) 4 SCC 626

Seaford Court Estates Ltd. Vs. Asher, (1949) 2 ALL ER 155, 164

State of M.P. Vs. Shri Ram Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 88

State of Maharashtra Vs. Brijlal Sadasukh Modani, (2015) SCC Online SC 1403

Statesman P Ltd. Vs. H.R. Deb, AIR 1968 SC 1495

Facts:

The case involves a civil appeal arising out of a suit for specific performance. The Trial Court had framed issues, and the High Court, in its impugned judgment, reversed the Trial Court's decree for specific performance based on its finding on the genuineness of Exhibit P-1.

Issues:

The appeal was the correctness of the High Court's decision to decree the suit for specific performance solely based on the genuineness of Exhibit P-1.

The Supreme Court noted that the suit involved several other aspects, including readiness and willingness, which the High Court did not adequately consider.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment, and remitted the case to the High Court for a fresh hearing. The Court emphasized that the High Court erred in focusing solely on the genuineness of Exhibit P-1 and failed to consider other crucial aspects of the matter, including readiness and willingness. The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the case and directed the High Court to consider all relevant aspects during the fresh hearing.

Facts:

The appellant, HINA, applied for the allotment of a retail outlet of petroleum/diesel dealership at a specific location in Maharashtra.

The rejection of the application by the second Respondent-Corporation was based on the argument that the age proof submitted was from a Higher Secondary School, not a Secondary School as per the norms.

The appellant submitted an attested copy of the School Leaving Certificate from Shri Shanti Vidya Mandir Higher Secondary School.

Issues:

whether the rejection of the appellant's application was justified based on the type of School Leaving Certificate submitted.

Held:

The Eligibility Criteria mentioned that an attested copy of either Matriculation or Secondary School Leaving Certificate could be submitted as proof of age.

The court questioned the justification of rejecting the application solely based on the type of School Leaving Certificate (Higher Secondary) submitted.

The court clarified that if a copy of the Higher Secondary School Leaving Certificate, duly attested, meets the requirement of proof of age, it should be accepted.

The High Court's approach was deemed incorrect, and its judgment was set aside.

The appeal was allowed, directing the second Respondent-Corporation to conduct the selection afresh, allowing the appellant's participation along with others considered eligible by the Corporation.

The needful was to be done within a period of two months from the decision date.