Facts:

The case revolves around the challenge to the constitutional validity of regulations imposed by the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC). These regulations require captive power plants to purchase a minimum amount of energy from renewable sources.

Issues:

Whether the regulations framed by RERC are constitutionally valid.

Whether the regulatory jurisdiction extends to captive power plants.

Whether the penalties imposed for non-compliance with the regulations are justified.

Held:

The regulations are framed with the objective of protecting the environment and preventing pollution, aligning with the Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Duties enshrined in the Constitution.

The regulatory jurisdiction extends to captive power plants, as they are connected to the distribution network of distribution licensees.

Penalties for non-compliance are not considered taxes but surcharges aimed at ensuring compliance and achieving the objectives of the regulations.

Decision: The Court upheld the validity of the regulations, emphasizing their importance in promoting renewable energy and protecting the environment.

Facts:

Block assessment of the respondent-assessee for certain assessment years was sought to be initiated following a search conducted under the Income Tax Act.

The High Court interfered with the warrant of authorization issued under Section 132 of the Act, which authorized the search, based on the sufficiency and adequacy of the reasons recorded by the authorities.

Issues:

Scope of High Court's power to interfere with the warrant of authorization under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Compliance with procedural requirements and necessity of a reasonable belief justifying the search action under the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interference with the warrant of authorization was not justified. It emphasized the importance of adherence to procedural requirements and the necessity of a reasonable belief justifying the search action under the Income Tax Act. The Court outlined the principles deduced from previous decisions, emphasizing the need for an honest and bona fide formation of opinion by the authorized official. It rejected the High Court's findings regarding manipulation of records and emphasized that suspicion should not be the basis of judicial orders.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the proceedings against the assessee to continue from the stage where they were interdicted.

Facts:

The case involved Common Cause and the Centre for Public Interest Litigation seeking a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution to restrain the Union of India and all State Governments from using public funds on government advertisements aimed at projecting individual functionaries of the government or a political party.

Issues:

Whether the use of public funds for government advertisements that primarily aimed to project individual functionaries was constitutional.

Held:

The Court emphasized the need to avoid patronizing any particular media house or newspaper group when awarding advertisements, suggesting equal distribution among newspapers based on circulation. Furthermore, it ruled that the legitimate objectives of advertisements could be achieved without featuring the photograph of any particular functionary.

In departing from the views of the Committee, the Court suggested that only the President, Prime Minister, and Chief Justice of the country should have an exception regarding the publication of photographs, allowing them to decide the matter themselves. Advertisements commemorating the anniversaries of acknowledged personalities, such as the father of the nation, were deemed an exception, carrying the photograph of the departed leader.

Decision: The Court granted the writ sought by the appellants, restraining the Union of India and all State Governments from using public funds on government advertisements aimed at projecting individual functionaries of the government or a political party.

Facts:

The appellants commenced construction of a multiplex in accordance with the New Package Scheme of Incentives for Tourism Projects, 1995-2000, and applied for Temporary Registration Certification (TRC).

The progress of the appellants' project was impeded by a major earthquake in the State on January 26, 2001, and large-scale communal riots in February 2002.

The State Level Committee initially granted an extension to the appellants but rejected their subsequent request for further extension.

The High Court held that the operative period of the scheme ended on November 30, 2000, and denied the appellants' entitlement to benefits under the scheme.

Issues:

Whether the appellants are entitled to benefits and incentives under the New Package Scheme of Incentives for Tourism Projects, 1995-2000, despite the curtailment of the scheme's period.

Whether the principle of promissory estoppel applies to bind the State Government to the promises made in the scheme.

Held:

The Scheme promised incentives, including tax holidays, and provided for extensions subject to satisfactory progress, forming the core of the Scheme.

The State Government is estopped from going back on the promise made in the Scheme, and the curtailment of the scheme's period by subsequent government resolutions is ineffective.

The Scheme's core components had acquired statutory status, and subsequent government resolutions could not detract from its effect.

The appellants' project progress was significantly hindered by external factors like the earthquake and communal riots, justifying their request for extension.

The High Court's order that the operative period of the scheme ended on November 30, 2000, is set aside, and the State Level Committee is directed to reassess the appellants' eligibility for extension under the Scheme.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the appellants are entitled to have their eligibility for incentives and benefits under the New Package Scheme of Incentives for Tourism Projects, 1995-2000, reassessed by the State Level Committee.

Facts:

On 3.2.2006, a police team received secret information about Ganja being stored in the house of the accused. A raid was conducted, during which the male accused managed to escape while the female accused, Asha Devi, was apprehended. Ganja was recovered from her possession, and she was charged under the NDPS Act. The trial court acquitted the accused due to various reasons, including doubts about the possession of the seal used to seal the contraband.

Issues:

Whether the lower courts erred in their assessment regarding the absence of independent witnesses and the accused's flight.

Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the movement and integrity of the seized samples, despite doubts raised about the possession of the seal.

Held:

The High Court and Trial Court both relied on three main points to decide the matter against the State-(i) no independent witness; (ii) doubts about the accused fleeing the scene; and (iii) discrepancies regarding the possession of the seal used to seal the contraband. The Supreme Court found errors in the lower courts' reasoning concerning these points. It disagreed with their assessment regarding the absence of independent witnesses and the accused's flight. There was sufficient evidence to support that the accused fled upon seeing the police party.

Regarding the possession of the seal, while there were doubts about its movement from one person to another, the prosecution sufficiently proved the movement and integrity of the seized samples. The samples were properly handled throughout, and there was no evidence of tampering.

Citing the case of Allauddin Mian and Others Vs. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of following procedural requirements, particularly in sentencing. The accused were convicted under Section 20 of the NDPS Act and sentenced to five years of simple imprisonment. The court considered mitigating factors, including the accused's conduct after the incident.

Facts:

Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Limited (IPCL) and Indian Oil Corporation were involved in the manufacture of various petrochemical products.

IPCL claimed partial exemption from excise duty under Notification No. 6/2000 for its product C4 Raffinate, while Indian Oil Corporation was manufacturing propylene.

The dispute arose over the interpretation of the notification regarding the classification and taxation of these products.

Issues:

• The interpretation of the phrase "Liquefied Petroleum Gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons other than natural gas, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene" in Notification No. 6/2000.

• The secondary issue pertained to whether the interpretation should be based on the plain meaning of the words in the notification or on the intention of the legislature.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the phrase "other than" in the notification only qualifies "natural gas," not the entire list of hydrocarbons mentioned. Therefore, the exemption includes LPG and all other hydrocarbons except natural gas, ethylene, propylene, butylene, and butadiene. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that the interpretation should be based on the intention of the legislature rather than the plain meaning of the words in the notification.

Decision: The appeals by the Department were dismissed, affirming IPCL's entitlement to partial exemption from excise duty under the notification.

Facts:

The respondent, Manjeet Singh, joined the Army service on April 6, 1999, after being adjudged fully fit. However, soon after joining, he fell ill and was diagnosed with "Generalised Tonic Clonic Seizure" and "Neurotic Depression." He was hospitalized multiple times during his short tenure, which lasted until January 1, 2002, when he was invalided from service. Despite actively serving for about a year, he spent most of his tenure under medical treatment.

Issues:

Whether Manjeet Singh was wrongfully denied disability pension despite developing disabilities during his Army service.

Held:

The Court held that there is a statutory presumption, as per Regulation 173, that any disease or disability contracted by a member of the Army service during their tenure is presumed to have been acquired during their service, unless there are compelling reasons recorded by the Medical Board to the contrary.

It emphasized that the burden to disprove the correlation of the disability with Army service lies with the authorities, and any decision to deny disability pension must be supported by cogent reasons.

The Court noted that the Medical Board's conclusion that Manjeet Singh's disabilities were constitutional or genetic in nature and not related to Army service lacked adequate reasoning and justification. It highlighted the importance of thorough assessment and documentation by the Medical Board.

Emphasizing the necessity for stringent adherence to statutory provisions and the presumption in favor of the member of the Army service, the Court held that the denial of disability pension to Manjeet Singh was unjustified and repugnant to relevant statutory provisions.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals and ruled in favor of Manjeet Singh, holding that he was wrongly denied the benefit of disability pension.

Facts:

The incident involved the accused luring a minor girl into his house and attempting to rape her.

The victim's cries alerted a passerby, leading to the accused fleeing the scene.

Legal proceedings ensued, resulting in the trial court's acquittal of the accused and the subsequent appeal by the State of Rajasthan.

Issues:

Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish attempted rape beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the accused should be granted the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Held:

The Court found discrepancies and shortcomings in the prosecution's case, including a delay in filing the FIR, lack of medical examination of the victim, and absence of crucial witnesses.

Despite the victim's consistent testimony, the Court concluded that it was insufficient to establish attempted rape beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused's actions, fleeing when confronted, did not conclusively prove his intent to commit rape.

The Court referred to legal precedents highlighting the requirement of penetration for the offense of rape or attempted rape.

Considering the gravity of the offense and the vulnerability of the victim, the Court disagreed with the trial court's decision to grant the accused probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code for outraging the modesty of a woman and sentenced the accused to rigorous imprisonment for two years.

Facts:

The case revolves around the promotion process initiated in 1999 for constables and head constables to be promoted to the rank of sub-inspectors in Uttar Pradesh.

There were disputes concerning the number of candidates to be called for interviews and the procedures followed during the interview process.

Various government orders were issued, including those dated 23.01.1999, 03.02.1999, and 27.02.1999, which altered the promotion process.

Issues:

The conflict between Regulation 445 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, 1976, and the Government Order dated 27.02.1999 regarding the number of candidates to be called for interviews.

Other issues involved the fairness of the interview process, the use of consolidated marks, and the failure of candidates to challenge the process immediately after participating.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Regulation 445 could not prevail over the Government Order dated 27.02.1999 in determining the number of candidates to be called for interviews.

Candidates who participated in the interview process without raising objections could not challenge the process at a later stage.

The sealed cover procedure and the use of consolidated marks in interviews were found to be acceptable, and there was no evidence of prejudice or miscarriage of justice.

The Court dismissed the appeals and the writ petition, as there was no evidence of oblique motives or miscarriage of justice warranting interference.