Facts:

The state initiated acquisition proceedings in 1981, which subsequently lapsed due to various reasons including the failure to pass an award within the required timeframe.

Subsequent attempts by the state to acquire the land were made in 1995-96, leading to legal challenges by the landowner based on the argument that the 1981 acquisition had lapsed.

Issues:

Whether the 1981 acquisition had lapsed due to procedural irregularities and failure to comply with legal requirements.

Held:

The court held that the 1981 acquisition had indeed lapsed due to the failure to pass an award within the stipulated time frame.

Subsequent attempts by the state to acquire the land were deemed invalid as well.

The court analyzed provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, particularly Section 24 of the latter, which deals with the lapse of land acquisition proceedings.

It was concluded that the acquisition proceedings regarding the subject lands had lapsed, and the state was directed to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings or take any other lawful action within a specified timeframe.

Facts:

The case involved the termination of a contract entrusted by a government department to a contractor. The contractor challenged the termination through a writ petition. A single judge of the High Court refused to interfere with the termination order. In appeal, the Division Bench appointed advocates as Commissioners. Based on their report, the Bench concluded that the termination order was erroneous due to factual inaccuracies and quashed it.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's exercise of power under Article 226 in a contractual matter was appropriate.

Whether the appointment of Commissioners without allowing objections from the State and reliance on their report without following proper procedure was valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that a writ court should generally refrain from entertaining writ petitions involving disputed questions of fact, especially in contractual matters. The respondent had a history of invoking the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 on various issues related to the contract, leading to a disturbing labyrinth of litigation. The Court criticized the High Court's decision to appoint Commissioners without giving the State an opportunity to object and without following proper procedure, stating that such a roving enquiry was impermissible and did not serve any public interest. It emphasized the need for restraint and adherence to legal procedures in such cases.

Decision: The Court set aside the judgment and order passed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Stantech Project Engg. Pvt. Ltd. filed winding-up petitions against Nicco Corporation Ltd. due to outstanding debts.

Despite receiving a statutory notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, Nicco Corporation Ltd. failed to pay the debts.

The respondent sought to avoid winding-up by proposing to pay the debts in installments.

Issues:

Whether the concessions made by the respondent's counsel should be recognized by the court.

Whether the Division Bench's decision to set aside the original order was justified.

Held:

The Division Bench's decision to set aside the original order was unjustified. The concessions made by the respondent's counsel were legal tactics to avoid winding-up, which the Company Judge rightly acknowledged.

The respondent abused the judicial process to delay the discharge of an acknowledged debt for almost a quarter of a century.

The original order of the Company Judge is upheld. The respondent is directed to pay the admitted dues, interest, costs, and any sums withheld for tax purposes within 45 days. Failure to comply empowers the appellant to re-initiate winding-up proceedings.

Facts:

Sampath was allegedly beaten to death while in custody by the State police.

Sampath's brother filed a petition seeking CBI investigation due to dissatisfaction with the State police's investigation.

Haridath, the Chief Investigating Officer, committed suicide and left behind a note implicating certain individuals, including the Respondents.

Criminal proceedings were initiated against the Respondents based on the suicide note.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR against the Respondents for abetment of suicide.

Held:

The Court analyzed the suicide note and surrounding circumstances, finding it lacking in specificity regarding the alleged abetment by the Respondents. The note accused the Respondents of compelling actions that led to the author's distress, but lacked concrete details or evidence of continuous harassment. The Court referenced previous judgments to clarify the requirements for establishing abetment of suicide, emphasizing the need for a clear mens rea (intention) and a direct act leading to suicide. The Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash the criminal proceedings against the Respondents due to the lack of evidence establishing abetment of suicide.

Facts:

The appellant, VEDICAPROCON PRIVATE LIMITED, made the highest bid for a property being auctioned by a company under liquidation. The bid was accepted by the Company Court.

Subsequently, an unsuccessful bidder sought to revoke the acceptance of the bid, claiming willingness to offer a higher price.

Issues:

Whether the acceptance of the appellant's bid was legally justified.

Whether subsequent developments, such as changes in property value or shareholding patterns, could invalidate the initial bid acceptance.

Held:

The Company Court's acceptance of the appellant's bid was justified. It is a well-settled principle that once the Court determines that the bid price is adequate, subsequent higher offers cannot invalidate the initial acceptance.

The High Court erred in recalling the order accepting the bid. The acceptance was made after due consideration, and stakeholders, including the unsuccessful bidder, did not object to the bid's adequacy. Subsequent changes in property value are not relevant to the legality of the bid acceptance.

Arguments regarding the absence of a specific format confirming the sale in the order were rejected. The circumstances surrounding the acceptance indicate confirmation, including the absence of objections from stakeholders and the acceptance of payment by the official liquidator and the Company Court.

Challenges based on subsequent developments, such as changes in shareholding patterns, were dismissed as they were not part of the original grounds for challenging the bid acceptance.

Facts:

D.R. Enterprises Ltd. imported a Web Printing Machine and claimed a concessional rate of custom duty under Notification No. 114/80-CUS.

Discrepancies arose regarding the machine's output capacity, with the Appellant claiming 36,000 copies per hour and customs authorities determining it as 25,000 copies per hour.

A writ petition was filed in 1988, seeking clearance of the machine, which was granted interim relief by the Bombay High Court.

The main petition remained pending until 2002 when the Appellant insisted on the High Court deciding the matter on its merits.

The High Court ruled against the Appellant, finding discrepancies in the evidence presented regarding the machine's output capacity.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to decide the issue on merits.

Whether the matter was time-barred.

Whether the Appellant could establish the machine's output capacity to avail the concessional rate of duty.

Held:

The Court rejected the Appellant's arguments regarding jurisdiction and limitation, emphasizing that the Appellant had invited the High Court to decide the matter on merits. The burden of proof rested on the Appellant, which failed to establish the machine's output capacity as required by the notification.

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision.

Facts:

Kalyan Chemicals, the appellant, contested the legality of the levy of an Administrative Fee imposed by the Government of A.P. on industrial alcohol obtained from a distillery.

The appellant argued that the fee was illegal and arbitrary, especially considering it was imposed retrospectively.

Issues:

Whether the imposition of the Administrative Fee on industrial alcohol was legal.

Whether the retrospective effect of the amendment to the rules was proper.

Whether the fee amount was justified.

Held:

The court upheld the legality of the Administrative Fee, citing previous judgments and the state's authority to regulate and impose fees on industrial alcohol.

It rejected the appellant's arguments against retrospective effect and the fee amount, emphasizing that regulatory fees need not strictly adhere to a quid pro quo principle as long as they are not excessive.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals of Kalyan Chemicals, affirming the legality of the Administrative Fee and rejecting their arguments against retrospective effect and the fee amount.

Facts:

K.K. Gohil joined service as a peon in the Social Welfare Department, later promoted as a Junior Clerk. He completed nine years of service and was granted a higher grade scale. However, this grant was withdrawn due to his failure to pass the departmental examination.

Issues:

The entitlement of government servants to a higher grade scale after completing nine years of service, particularly when they haven't passed the departmental examination.

Held:

The Court held that the withdrawal of the higher grade scale solely based on the 1994 circular was incorrect. The subsequent circular of 2004 modified the conditions, stating that if the departmental examination necessary for higher pay scales is not organized during the eligibility period, then the higher pay scale benefit cannot be denied. Therefore, the withdrawal of the higher grade scale based solely on the outdated circular was unjustified. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the entitlement of the appellant to the higher pay scale was reinstated.

Facts:

The appellants challenged the legality of Andhra Pradesh Rectified Spirits Rules, 1971, particularly Rule 15, which imposed requirements for obtaining a license and payment of excise duty and pass fee for exporting rectified spirit. The appellants contended that the rules imposed a tax rather than a fee and exceeded the state government's legislative competence.

Issues:

Whether the rules in question impose a tax or a fee.

Whether the state government has the legislative competence to enact these rules.

Held:

In deciding the vires of Rule 15, the court examined the distinguishing features between a fee and a tax. It noted that a fee is payment for services rendered, whereas a tax is a common exaction. The court found that the export permit fee under Rule 15 did not constitute a fee for services rendered, as the state government had not demonstrated any supervisory activity justifying the fee.

The court upheld the legality of the 1971 Rules but struck down Rule 15, as it imposed a tax on the appellants and was outside the state government's legislative competence. The court found that the purpose of the rule was not to prevent diversion of industrial alcohol but rather to regulate and control its export, which falls under the purview of the Union Government.