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by sayum
14 July 2026 8:57 AM
"Ext. PW6/C certificate is obviously inadmissible as it is a certificate given by the school authority to the investigating officer (IO) during the course of investigation. The same can only be treated as a statement given in writing by a witness to the IO... and hence, a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Therefore, it is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. and so is not admissible in evidence." Delhi High Court, in a significant judgment dated July 13, 2026, has held that certificates issued by school authorities to an Investigating Officer (IO) during a criminal probe are deemed statements made to the police under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
A Single Bench of Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha observed that such documents are hit by the exclusionary rule of Section 162 CrPC, rendering them inadmissible as substantive evidence. The Court emphasized that these certificates cannot be used to prove a victim's age in POCSO cases if they lack independent corroboration from primary records.
The case arose from an appeal filed by an accused, Shambhu, who was convicted by a Trial Court under Section 376(2) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act for the alleged sexual assault of a minor. The prosecution relied on a school certificate issued to the IO to establish that the victim was approximately 12 years old at the time of the incident. However, the accused contended that the victim was a major and that their relationship was consensual, leading to the challenge before the High Court.
The primary question before the court was whether a certificate issued by a school principal to the police during an investigation can be admitted as evidence to prove a victim’s age. The court was also called upon to determine the reliability of school admission registers that are based solely on the oral statements of parents without any supporting birth documents.
Admissibility Of Certificates Issued To Police During Investigation
The Court meticulously examined the nature of the document marked as Ext. PW6/C, which was a certificate regarding the prosecutrix's date of birth issued by the school principal to the IO. The Bench noted that any document or certificate prepared and handed over to the police during the course of an investigation must be treated as a statement in writing to a police officer.
Under the statutory framework of the CrPC, such statements are governed by Section 161 and are strictly hit by the bar contained in Section 162 CrPC. The Court clarified that because the certificate was generated specifically for the investigating agency, it cannot be treated as an independent public document or a substantive piece of evidence to prove the facts mentioned therein.
Court Explains Statutory Bar Under Section 162 CrPC
Justice Sudha reiterated that the purpose of Section 162 CrPC is to protect the accused from manufactured evidence and to ensure that statements made during investigation are not used as substantive proof. The Court observed that the certificate in question was essentially a written version of a witness's statement to the IO, which is liable to be discarded in terms of admissibility.
The Bench relied on several precedents, including the Supreme Court's rulings in Kali Ram v. State of H.P. and Sasi v. State of Kerala, to underscore that statements hit by Section 162 CrPC cannot form the basis of a conviction. Consequently, the Court held that the Trial Court erred in relying on the school certificate to determine the age of the victim.
Reliability Of School Records Based On Oral Statements
Turning to the primary admission register (Ext. PW6/B), the Court found that the date of birth recorded therein was based solely on the oral version provided by the victim's mother (PW4). The Principal (PW6) admitted during cross-examination that no birth certificate or supporting documents were produced at the time of admission.
The Court noted that the mother herself had undermined the reliability of these records by testifying that the victim was actually 18 years old at the time of admission and that a lower age was recorded only to secure school entry. This created a serious doubt regarding the actual age of the prosecutrix, which the prosecution failed to resolve with cogent material like municipal or hospital records.
"The school records are not based on any certificate or document. Ext. PW6/C certificate is obviously inadmissible as it is a certificate given by the school authority to the investigating officer (IO) during the course of investigation."
Prosecution Fails To Prove Minority In POCSO Case
The Court observed that in the absence of a verified date of birth, the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was a minor at the time of the incident. Since the minority of the prosecutrix is the sine qua non for an offence under the POCSO Act, the conviction under Section 6 of the said Act was found to be unsustainable.
Furthermore, the Court took into account the testimony of the prosecutrix (PW1), who repeatedly stated before the court that she was a major and that her sexual relationship with the accused was consensual. She also admitted that her initial allegations of force and threats were made under pressure from her sister.
Failure To Establish Offence Of Rape Under Section 375 IPC
Regarding the conviction under Section 376 IPC, the Bench noted that once the victim was not proven to be a minor, the element of consent became paramount. Given the victim's consistent stand that the relationship was consensual and her denial of any threats or criminal intimidation, the Court held that the ingredients of rape as defined under Section 375 IPC were not satisfied.
The Court concluded that the Trial Court had failed to properly appreciate the evidentiary gaps regarding the victim's age and the impact of her hostile testimony. By discarding the inadmissible school certificate and noting the lack of corroboration for the school register, the High Court found the prosecution's case to be fundamentally flawed.
The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court are set aside. The Court acquitted the accused of all charges, directed his immediate release from custody, and ordered the discharge of his sureties.
Date of Decision: July 13, 2026