Facts:

The appellant's truck, insured with Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd., was stolen.

The appellant filed an insurance claim, which was rejected by the company citing delay in reporting the theft.

The appellant appealed through various consumer dispute redressal forums, culminating in an appeal before the Supreme Court of India.

Issues:

Whether the delay in reporting the theft justified the rejection of the insurance claim.

Whether rejection of insurance claims on purely technical grounds is permissible under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the rejection of the insurance claim based solely on the delay in reporting the theft was not justified. The delay of 8 days was reasonable under the circumstances, as the appellant had actively cooperated with the police in attempting to locate the stolen vehicle. The Court emphasized the need for insurers to consider genuine claims and not use technicalities to avoid payment. The judgment highlighted that rejection of claims solely on technical grounds could erode confidence in the insurance industry. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal and directed Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd. to pay the appellant Rs. 8,35,000 with interest at 8% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition till the date of payment. The payment was to be made within 8 weeks from the date of the judgment.

Facts:

The appellants sought the quashing of a FIR registered against them for offenses under various sections of the IPC, relating to a land transaction.

Allegations included extortion, forgery, and conspiracy in transferring valuable land based on forged documents.

High Court declined the application for quashing considering the seriousness of the allegations and criminal antecedents of the appellants.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to decline quashing of the FIR under Section 482 of CrPC was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court to decline quashing the FIR. The court reiterated the principles laid down in previous cases regarding the quashing of FIRs. Considering the nature and gravity of the offenses alleged, which have a significant impact on society, the court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it.

The court emphasized that economic offenses, forgery, and fraud, which have implications beyond private disputes and affect the societal interest, should not be quashed merely on the ground of settlement between the parties.

The decision was based on the observations made in the judgments of State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi and Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh, which highlighted the societal impact of economic offenses and the importance of prosecuting serious crimes for the public interest.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was justified, and accordingly, the criminal appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

M/s Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd., the respondent, established a cement manufacturing unit in Himachal Pradesh and was entitled to incentives under the Revised Rules Regarding Grant of Incentive to Industrial Units in Himachal Pradesh, 1991.

The incentives included a power tariff freeze for four years from the date of commencement of commercial production.

The State Electricity Board imposed Peak Load Exemption Charge (PLEC) for providing power during peak load hours.

The respondent sought reimbursement of PLEC under the power tariff freeze incentive scheme.

Issues:

Whether PLEC is covered under the reimbursement scheme of the power tariff freeze incentive.

Interpretation of the nature of PLEC in relation to the regular electricity tariff.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the respondents were not entitled to reimbursement towards PLEC paid during the period of four years commencing from the date of commercial production. The Court analyzed the sequence of events, including notifications and communications from the State Electricity Board, to determine the nature of PLEC and its relation to the power tariff freeze incentive.

The Court concluded that PLEC was an additional charge for special dispensation during peak load hours, distinct from the regular electricity tariff. Therefore, the reimbursement under the incentive scheme did not cover PLEC.

The Court ordered that any reimbursement made for PLEC be returned by the respondents to the appellants with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case originated from an incident where the de facto complainant, a tenant in the appellants' premises, alleged armed intrusion, threat to staff, property damage, and theft. The police filed a charge sheet under relevant sections of the IPC and the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992, without naming the appellants.

Issues:

Whether sufficient evidence existed to invoke Section 319 of the CrPC against the appellants.

The significance of the statements recorded under Section 161 of CrPC in determining the invocation of Section 319.

The absence of specific attribution against the appellant-bailiff in the FIR or depositions.

Held:

The Court held that Section 319 of the CrPC allows summoning individuals not named in the charge sheet if sufficient evidence arises during trial. The trial court dismissed the application under Section 319 due to insufficient evidence against the appellants. The police had filed the charge sheet without implicating the appellants, and the complainant did not file a protest petition at that stage. The High Court erred in summoning the appellants without strong and cogent evidence.( Paragraphs 27, 30, 33)

The Court emphasized that evidence under Section 319 must surface during the trial. Statements under Section 161 of CrPC were considered corroborative and insufficient to implicate the appellants. No conspiracy allegation was made against them, and they were not present during the incident. Therefore, they couldn't be summoned under Section 319.( Paragraphs 34, 35)

Regarding the appellant-bailiff, there was no specific attribution in the FIR or depositions. The police investigation and departmental inquiry found no evidence against him. During trial, no strong evidence emerged to summon the appellant-bailiff under Section 319.( Paragraph 36)

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the application under Section 319. It stressed the need for strong evidence before summoning individuals not named in the charge sheet.

FACTS:

The appellant filed a suit seeking to set aside a sale deed executed in March 1995, but defendant no. 7, the purchaser mentioned in the deed, was already deceased at the time of filing the suit.

Initially, the appellant filed an application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased defendant no. 7, which was rejected by the trial court.

Subsequently, the appellant filed an application for impleading the legal representatives of the deceased defendant no. 7 on record, under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code. This application was also dismissed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the legal representatives of a deceased defendant, who passed away prior to the filing of the suit, can be impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC?

Whether the dismissal of the earlier application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the CPC operates as res judicata for entertaining a subsequent application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC?

HELD:

The Court held that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4 of the CPC apply only when the death of a party occurs during the pendency of the suit. Since the defendant had expired prior to the filing of the suit, the legal representatives cannot be brought on record under Order 22 Rule 4.

The trial court could have treated the initial application under Order 22 Rule 4 as one under Order 1 Rule 10 in the interest of justice, but the failure to do so does not preclude the filing of a subsequent application under Order 1 Rule 10.

Order 1 Rule 10 empowers the court to add any person as a party at any stage of the proceedings if their presence is necessary to effectively adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit.

The principle of res judicata does not apply as the earlier dismissal was on grounds of maintainability under a different provision.

Facts:

The appellant's tender for a railway project was accepted, and an agreement was signed between the appellant and the respondent.

Disputes arose during the project, leading to its abandonment by the appellant.

The appellant initiated arbitration proceedings in 1996.

The Arbitral Tribunal passed an award in 2006.

The respondent sought to set aside the award, leading to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench erred in considering the arbitrability of the dispute for the first time on appeal.

Whether the appellant's issuance of a 'No Claims Certificate' affected the maintainability of their claim.

Whether the Arbitrator was justified in awarding interest on the disputed amount.

Held:

The Court held that the Division Bench erred in considering the arbitrability of the dispute for the first time on appeal, especially since the issue had not been raised earlier in the proceedings .

Regarding the 'No Claims Certificate,' the Court stated that the issue should have been raised earlier, and since it was not, the appellant's claim was maintainable .

However, the Court held that the Arbitrator was not justified in awarding interest on the disputed amount due to the contractual prohibition on interest payment .

Therefore, the Court partly allowed the appeals, directing the respondent not to recover the excess amount withdrawn by the appellant .

Facts:

The case revolves around a complaint wherein the Collector held that the property in possession of the appellant-Trust vested in the State Government under Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, due to the absence of heirs following the death of the owner ('M'). The Trust challenged this order before the High Court via writ petition, which was dismissed, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued a limited notice initially, but subsequently granted leave to appeal.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the Collector in adjudicating matters under Section 29, the scope of Article 142 in rendering justice, the principles underlying escheat, the burden of proof in cases of escheat, and the powers of the Administrator General in adjudicating property disputes.

Held:

The constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as per Article 142, is based on the advancement of justice. The Court's power to render justice should not be restricted by a narrow interpretation of its mandate. The scope of an appeal, whether initially limited or not, does not raise a matter of jurisdiction but one of judicial discretion. The guiding principle in such cases should be the advancement of substantial justice. This principle allows the Court to consider the entire controversy at the final hearing without being inhibited by previous observations or orders.

Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 embodies the principle of escheat, which applies in cases of intestacy where there is a total absence of a qualified heir. The state does not take the property as a rival or preferential heir but as the lord paramount of the whole soil of the country. However, the government takes the property subject to all its obligations and liabilities. Escheat comes into operation only in the event of a failure of heirs.

The onus of proof lies heavily on the party asserting the absence of a qualified heir in cases of escheat. The law does not readily accept a claim for escheat without clear evidence of a failure of heirs. This principle is based on the norm that private titles are not overridden in favor of the state without a clear case being made out based on statutory provisions. The Collector acted in excess of jurisdiction by adjudicating a matter involving civil disputes which should have been addressed by a civil court.

Administrative authorities, including the Collector, do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate matters of title involving civil disputes. Such adjudications must follow the ordinary civil jurisdiction of a court. The powers of the Collector under Section 167 of the Uttar Pradesh Zaminidari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 are limited and did not apply in this case.

The Administrator General, while entrusted with duties to safeguard the administration of estates left behind by deceased individuals, does not have adjudicatory powers. Such powers are reserved for the High Court. The Administrator General's role is to protect estates in circumstances where no person to whom a court would have jurisdiction has come forth. Adjudication of property disputes falls within the purview of the High Court.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the order of the Collector is set aside.

Facts:

The petitioner, Ponnaiyah Ramajayam Institute of Medical Sciences, sought Letter of Permission (LOP) for establishing a new medical college for the academic years 2016-17 and 2017-18. Although conditional permission was granted for the academic year 2016-17, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare later debarred the petitioner from admitting students for the subsequent two academic years due to deficiencies in infrastructure and clinical materials. The Medical Council of India (MCI) was authorized to encash the petitioner's bank guarantee. The petitioner challenged this decision, leading to judicial intervention.

Issues:

The adequacy of the petitioner's infrastructure and clinical materials for establishing a new medical college. Additionally, the scope of judicial review concerning administrative decisions regarding medical education is addressed.

Held:

The Court analyzed successive inspections conducted by the MCI, which revealed significant deficiencies in faculty, residents, OPD attendance, and bed occupancy. The Court noted the statutory obligation of the MCI to ensure the required standard of medical education. Given these findings, the Court emphasized its limited role in judicially reviewing administrative decisions concerning medical education. The Court upheld the decision of the Central government to deny the petitioner's request for LOP for the academic year 2017-18.

The Court directed the MCI to conduct a fresh inspection within three months and provide the petitioner with an opportunity to rectify any deficiencies. Subsequently, the Central government was instructed to make a final decision based on the findings of the fresh inspection. Students admitted to the petitioner's college for the academic year 2016-17 were permitted to continue their studies until completion of the course.

Facts:

Shantanu married Supriya, and they had a daughter.

On 23.12.2000, Shantanu took Supriya and their daughter for a ride in his car. They did not return home for a long time.

Supriya's father made inquiries and found Supriya lying unconscious in the car at a certain location.

Supriya was pronounced dead, and Shantanu, along with two others, was arrested by the police.

The accused were charged and convicted under various sections of the IPC based on evidence presented during the trial.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC could be upheld despite the acquittal under Section 120B IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the submissions of the parties and perusing the records, affirmed the findings of the lower courts and dismissed the appeals. The Court held:

The trial court and the High Court thoroughly examined the oral and medical evidence on record, which conclusively established the guilt of the accused.

The defense's theory, including the appellant's claim of being innocent and falsely implicated, was disbelieved by the lower courts based on the evidence presented.

The failure to prove the charge under Section 120B IPC did not affect the validity of the conviction under Section 302 IPC, as the evidence supported it.

Therefore, the appeals were dismissed, and the appellant, who was on bail, was directed to be taken into custody forthwith.