Facts:

The appellant was involved in a motorcycle accident with a mini lorry belonging to the Second and Third respondents.

The appellant suffered grievous injuries, including spinal injuries, and filed a compensation claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

The tribunal assessed the appellant's disability, income, and awarded compensation, deducting 40% for contributory negligence.

On appeal, the High Court enhanced the compensation but affirmed the finding of contributory negligence based on conjecture.

The appellant challenged the finding of contributory negligence.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was rightly held to be guilty of contributory negligence.

Whether the absence of a driving license automatically implies contributory negligence.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that:

The finding of contributory negligence was without basis and unjustified.

The absence of a driving license alone does not establish contributory negligence unless it is proven that it led to rash and negligent driving causing the accident.

The deduction of 40% for contributory negligence was set aside, and the appellant was entitled to additional compensation.

The respondent was ordered to pay an additional amount of Rs. 4,60,000 to the appellant, along with interest at 8% per annum from the date of the petition until realization.

The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The Court constituted a committee to examine various aspects related to consumer fora's functioning, including infrastructural requirements, vacancy positions, administrative powers, service conditions, and other relevant factors.

Various directions were issued to the Union Government regarding framing model rules, regulations by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, and addressing the vacancy in the post of Registrar.

The Union government was directed to file a comprehensive status report on compliance with the Court's directions.

Issues:

The infrastructural deficiencies in consumer fora, vacancy positions, administrative powers, service conditions, and the need for regulatory frameworks.

Held and Decision:

The Court held that proper infrastructure is essential for the effective functioning of consumer fora across the country. It directed the Union Government to frame model rules and regulations to address various aspects such as vacancy positions, administrative control, and service conditions.

The Court emphasized the importance of timely appointments and ensuring proper administrative control to streamline the functioning of consumer fora.

It directed the Union Government to file a comprehensive status report on compliance with the Court's directions within a specified period.

The Court's decision aimed to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of consumer dispute resolution mechanisms, ensuring access to justice for consumers.

The Committee's work was concluded, and the Court sought assistance from the Additional Solicitor General to formulate appropriate directions for ensuring proper infrastructure in consumer fora.

Facts:

TISCO, an industrial company operating in Jamshedpur, Bihar (now Jharkhand), received a demand notice from the State of Bihar for payment for water drawn from the Subarnrekha River, which was being used for industrial and domestic purposes.

TISCO filed a writ petition challenging the demand notice, arguing that it had riparian rights over the river and that the demand was illegal and unconstitutional.

The High Court declined to examine TISCO's claims of riparian rights and prescriptive rights, stating that such questions should be decided in a civil court and not in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the demand made by the State for payment for water drawn from the Subarnrekha River is legal and constitutional.

Whether TISCO has riparian rights over the river, and if so, whether such rights are enforceable against the State's demand.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the matter back to the High Court for further examination. The Court held that the demand made by the State could be construed as a fee, and therefore, it required legislative authorization under Article 265 of the Constitution. The Court refused to entertain arguments regarding the applicability of specific Acts, as they were not properly pleaded or argued before the High Court. Additionally, the Court noted ambiguity regarding the existence of a concluded agreement between TISCO and the State regarding the payment for water usage. Therefore, the matter was sent back to the High Court for further examination, allowing the parties to file proper pleadings and argue their case.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that two trusts, including one run by the private appellants, collected funds under the guise of providing legal assistance to the victims of the 2002 Gujarat riots. However, these funds were not disbursed to the intended recipients. Substantial irregularities were found in the bank accounts and financial records of the appellants' trusts. The investigating agency seized the bank accounts under Section 102 of the CrPC.

Issues:

The legitimacy of the seizure of the bank accounts, adherence to procedural requirements, and the ongoing investigation into the alleged offenses.

Held:

The Court addressed the scope and applicability of Section 102 of the CrPC, emphasizing that the decision to seize bank accounts must be based on circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of an offense. The Court cited precedent to support the view that bank accounts are considered 'property' under Section 102, and seizure can be justified if there are direct links between the assets and the alleged offense.

Despite the appellant-CJP Trust not being named as an accused in the FIR, the Court acknowledged that investigations revealed active association of certain appellants with the trusts under scrutiny. The investigating officer had sufficient grounds to suspect offenses based on transactions associated with these bank accounts.

Regarding procedural matters, the Court affirmed that the procedure for freezing bank accounts under Section 102 of the CrPC had been correctly followed. Intimations were provided to the concerned magistrate as required by law, and there was no requirement for prior notice to account holders before seizure.

The Court reiterated that the investigating officer had exercised powers under Section 102 of the CrPC legitimately, having possessed materials indicating suspicious circumstances related to the alleged offenses. The officer had followed the prescribed procedure for seizure.

As the investigation was ongoing, the appellants were required to cooperate and explain their positions. Once the investigation concluded and a police report was submitted, the appellants could apply for the release of their bank accounts. The concerned court would consider such requests after hearing both sides and could impose conditions as necessary.

The Court clarified that at an appropriate stage or upon completion of the investigation, if the investigating officer was satisfied with the appellants' explanations, they could issue instructions to unfreeze the bank accounts.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation and application of Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, regarding the powers of the Central Government to regulate, restrict, or prohibit the manufacture, sale, or distribution of drugs or cosmetics in the interest of public health and safety.

Issues:

Whether consultation with the Drugs Technical Advisory Board (DTAB) under Section 5 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, is mandatory before exercising the powers under Section 26A.

The role and significance of the DTAB in the decision-making process under Section 26A.

Legislative intent and the scope of Section 26A in relation to other provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

Held:

The Court held that Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, is an additional power granted to the Central Government, which must be exercised based on its own terms .

Consultation with the DTAB under Section 5 is not explicitly mandated by Section 26A, and the absence of such requirement does not invalidate the exercise of power by the Central Government .

While consultation with the DTAB is desirable for technical advice, it is not mandatory for the exercise of power under Section 26A. The Central Government's satisfaction can be based on various factors, not solely on the advice of the DTAB .

The legislative history and intent behind Section 26A indicate that the omission of explicit consultation requirements with the DTAB was deliberate .

Section 26A must be interpreted on its own terms without importing requirements from other sections of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

A DTAB/Sub-Committee should be established to review specific drug combinations based on the criteria outlined in Section 26A. The review process should consider risks, therapeutic value, and the necessity for regulatory action in the public interest.

The Court set aside certain notifications banning drugs manufactured before September 21, 1988, and directed further inquiry by the Central Government. The status quo of cases pending regulatory action was maintained until fresh notifications were issued. we accept the report, and accordingly dispose of these petitions in accordance therewith.

Facts:

The appellants claim the temple as their private place of worship, while the respondents argue it is a public shrine.

Various legal proceedings have ensued, including an application under Section 77 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966.

Issues:

Whether the temple is a private or public institution.

The validity and significance of document Exh.B6, which suggests an endowment of the temple for public/charitable purposes by the father of the appellants.

Held:

The court granted both parties an opportunity to present all evidence to conclusively determine the temple's status. The appellants were directed to file a representation supporting their claim within four weeks. The adjudicating authority would then review the evidence, hear both sides, and make a determination within six months. The status quo of the temple property was to be maintained during this period. The decision did not express any final opinion on the merits of the case, leaving it to the adjudicating authority to decide impartially. The appeal is thus, allowed.

Facts:

The case involves an incident where an unlawful assembly attacked individuals, resulting in the death of one person, Kennedy, and injuries to others.

Issues:

The prosecution alleged that the accused were part of the unlawful assembly and acted with common intention, resulting in Kennedy's death.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the evidence and found that the prosecution failed to establish the common object among the accused or their knowledge of the likely commission of murder. Accordingly, the convictions of some accused under Section 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC were set aside, and they were acquitted of those charges. The court modified the convictions and sentences of some accused based on their individual acts and involvement. Specific modifications and dispositions were made for each accused based on their role in the incident.

Facts:

The appellant, Madan Mohan, filed an application under Section 193 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a Sessions Trial, seeking the summoning of two additional accused persons. The Sessions Judge allowed the application and issued non-bailable warrants against the additional accused. The accused filed a Criminal Revision Petition in the High Court, challenging the order of the Sessions Judge. The High Court partly allowed the revision, setting aside the issuance of non-bailable warrants and directing the accused to surrender before the Trial Court and move for regular bail. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the complainant should have been impleaded as a party to the criminal revision?

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to direct the Sessions Judge to "allow" the bail application of the accused?

What is the discretion of the Sessions Judge in deciding bail applications?

Held:

The Single Judge seemed to have passed the impugned order without application of judicial mind... Therefore, he should have been impleaded as respondent along with the State in the revision.

The High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Sessions Judge to 'allow' the application for grant of bail.

It is the sole discretion of the Sessions Judge to find out while hearing the bail application as to whether any case on facts is made out for grant of bail by the accused or not.

We are, therefore, constrained to set aside the direction given by the High Court to the Sessions Judge to 'consider and allow' the bail application made by respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in Sessions Trial Case No.44/2016 on the same day on which it was moved.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside to the extent indicated. The Sessions Judge would now decide any bail application made by Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 on its merits and in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The Institute of Nano Science and Technology, Mohali, issued a notice inviting tenders (NIT) for the construction of its campus.

The NIT specified eligibility criteria for bidders, including completion of similar works meeting certain cost and structure requirements.

Respondent No.1 submitted its bid but was deemed ineligible by expert committees due to non-compliance with the eligibility criteria.

The High Court allowed Respondent No.1's appeal, overturning the decision of the learned Single Judge.

Issues:

Whether the interpretation of tender documents by the tendering authority should be deferred to by the courts, barring evidence of malafides or perversity?

What is the scope of judicial review in tender matters, particularly regarding the interpretation of eligibility criteria in tender documents?

Held:

The Supreme Court, upon review, upheld the importance of deferring to the interpretation of tender documents by the tendering authority, unless evidence of malafides or perversity is present. The Court reinstated the judgment of the learned Single Judge, setting aside the High Court's decision, as it found no malafides or perversity in the expert committee reports.

The Court directed that the tender awarded to Respondent No.1 be set aside, and the tender be awarded to the Appellant, subject to the Appellant matching the offer of Respondent No.1.

The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.