Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking specific performance of a contract dated 04.01.1987, alleging that defendant No. 2, as the power of attorney holder for defendant No. 1, entered into an agreement to sell a plot of land to the plaintiff.

The defendants denied the existence of the agreement and claimed they were not the owners of the property.

The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, but the appellate court dismissed it, a decision later affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the defendants had the right and authority to enter into the agreement for the sale of the property.

Whether the plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence to prove the validity of the agreement and the defendants' authority to act on behalf of the property owner.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the decree of specific performance was rightly set aside by the appellate court due to the lack of evidence establishing the defendants' entitlement to the property and the validity of the agreement. The court emphasized that specific performance of a contract can only be ordered when it is proved that the person executing the agreement has the right to transfer the property. Since the defendants denied their entitlement and ownership of the property, it was necessary to establish their right before decreeing the suit. The court found no evidence to prove the defendants' ownership or the validity of the power of attorney, leading to the dismissal of the suit. The High Court's decision to dismiss the Regular Second Appeal was upheld, as no substantial question of law was found.

Facts:

The respondent filed a complaint against the appellants alleging dishonor of a cheque issued in discharge of a legal liability.

The appellants sought compounding of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, which was declined by the High Court.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 138 of the NI Act regarding the regulation of proceedings when the accused is willing to deposit the cheque amount.

The court also considered the applicability of summary trial procedures and the use of technology in expediting legal proceedings.

Held:

The court emphasized the compensatory nature of the offence under Section 138 and the need to balance the rights of the complainant and the accused. The court held that even in the absence of consent from both parties, the court, in the interests of justice, can close the proceedings if the complainant has been duly compensated.

The court reiterated the summary trial procedure for cases under Chapter XVII of the NI Act, with an emphasis on expeditious disposal. The court provided specific directions for trial courts to follow, including the issuance of summons, examination of witnesses, and completion of trials within six months.

The court encouraged the use of modern technology to streamline legal procedures and expedite adjudication, suggesting the possibility of conducting proceedings partly or entirely online.

The court empowered High Courts to issue updated directions for dealing with Section 138 cases based on evolving legal landscape and technological advancements.

Facts:

The case revolves around the interpretation of a commercial contract, specifically a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) regarding energy charges and coal procurement for a power project. The procurer, Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL), specified the site location for the project and arranged for the supply of coal. The energy charges were designed to vary according to the actual cost and quality of coal.

Issues:

The interpretation of the Energy Charge Formula, determination of the quality and pricing of coal, transportation costs, and the measurement of Calorific Value at the project site.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of interpreting the contract based on its explicit terms. It stated that normally, a contract should be understood as it reads, without implying additional terms unless absolutely necessary.

The court reiterated that the explicit terms of the contract are paramount in understanding the intentions of the parties involved.

Any interpretation should not contradict the express terms of the contract.

The Energy Charge Formula provided in the contract should be understood based on its natural grammatical meaning.

Any costs related to purchasing, transporting, and unloading coal should be included in the calculation.

References to "coal" in the formula specifically meant "washed coal" as clarified by the procurer . Therefore, the cost of washing the coal should be considered in the pricing.

Transportation costs to the project site must be compensated, regardless of the method of transfer (rail or road), especially if there were complications like land acquisition affecting the transportation route .

The Calorific Value of coal should be determined at the project site, not the mine site, as it is essential for accurate energy charge calculation .

Claims for additional costs beyond those specified in the formula were rejected unless expressly provided for in the contract .

The court acknowledged that the appellant might be entitled to compensation for certain costs not previously claimed, as long as they align with the contract terms.

Facts:

The appellants, including Ravi Sinha (RS), challenged the attachment of certain properties under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944. The properties were attached in connection with criminal cases involving defrauding the State Government. RS's father (referred to as SB) was a public servant involved in criminal cases, and RS himself was convicted in a fodder scam case and facing trial in another case.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution against SB could continue after his death.

Whether the properties attached could be made absolute in the hands of RS.

Interpretation of Sections 12 and 13 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944.

Whether the properties acquired in 1955 could be attached.

Held:

The prosecution against SB could not continue after his death, and no guilt could be pronounced on him posthumously .

Properties already under attachment, coming into the hands of RS, who was convicted in a fodder scam case and facing trial in another, could be made absolute .

Section 12(1) requires the court, in a criminal trial with an order of attachment of property, to record a finding on the amount procured by the accused through the offense .

Section 13 gives power to deal with attached properties after termination of criminal proceedings .

The power to attach properties is not confined to those acquired with ill-gotten money but can include misappropriated properties.

The issues regarding the extent of misappropriated amount and attached properties could be raised in Section 13 proceedings or during the judgment in the pending trial.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals and upheld the attachment orders made by the lower courts, citing the availability of legal avenues to contest the extent of attachment.

Facts:

The case involved members of a Cooperative Housing Society who entered into a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) with developers. The developers were supposed to make payments in installments and develop the land. However, due to legal issues, the project was interdicted, and full payments were not made.

Issues:

Whether the members of the Cooperative Housing Society were liable to pay capital gains tax on the remaining land under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the nature of the JDA and emphasized that it was essentially an agreement to facilitate development. No approvals were obtained due to legal issues, which affected the completion of the project. (Para 16)

The court clarified the nature of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, stating that its protection is only a shield and not an affirmative right. (Para 18, 19)

Amendments made in 2001 required agreements to be registered to be enforceable under Section 53A. (Para 19)

Since the JDA was never registered, it had no legal effect, and therefore, no "transfer" could be said to have taken place under it. (Para 20)

While Section 2(47)(vi) could potentially apply to transactions enabling the enjoyment of immovable property, the court found that the JDA did not transfer rights akin to ownership to the developers. (Para 21)

The court ruled that since no income actually arose from the failed transaction, no capital gains tax was applicable under Sections 45 and 48 of the Income Tax Act. (Para 24, 27)

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court's decision in favor of the assessees.

Facts:

The case involves appeals against a High Court order allowing writ petitions filed by Assessees challenging orders rejecting their applications under the Amnesty Scheme. The primary contention is the jurisdiction of the Designated Authority to issue a show cause notice under clause 8 of the Amnesty Scheme.

Issues:

Whether the Designated Authority has the jurisdiction to issue a notice under clause 8 of the Amnesty Scheme.

Whether the time limitation prescribed under clause 8(3) applies in this case.

Held:The Designated Authority does not possess the power under clause 8 of the Amnesty Scheme. The power to issue such notices is specifically vested in the Commissioner. The Designated Authority's power under clause 4 does not include the power to reopen decided matters as envisaged in clause 8. (Para 14)

The limitation prescribed by clause 8(3) does not apply in this situation. The respondent cannot take advantage of its failure to contest the notice earlier. Had the issue been raised timely, there would have been an opportunity for the Revenue to rectify the error. Therefore, the limitation prescribed by clause 8(3) does not apply in this situation. (Para 19)

Decision:The appeals are allowed, setting aside the High Court's order. The Revenue is directed to issue a fresh notice to the assessee under clause 8 of the Amnesty Scheme, if deemed necessary. (Para 20)

Facts:

The case involves Dushyant N. Dalal and Another v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Civil Appeal No. 5677 of 2017). The appellants challenged the imposition of penalties and disgorgement of unlawful gains by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). The issue pertained to the recovery of interest on these orders.

Issues:

Whether interest can be recovered on penalties and disgorgement orders under the SEBI Act.

Whether interest can have retrospective operation.

The applicability of Section 28A of the SEBI Act.

Correctness of findings by the Securities Appellate Tribunal regarding interest obligations.

Held:

The Interest Act of 1978 empowers tribunals like the Securities Appellate Tribunal to award interest in equity from the date the cause of action arose until the commencement of proceedings for recovery of such interest.

Interest belongs to substantive law and cannot have retrospective operation.

While Section 28A of the SEBI Act may ordinarily be retrospective as it pertains to procedural law, interest, being a part of substantive law, is chargeable only prospectively under this section.

The Securities Appellate Tribunal's finding that no interest could be charged from the date the penalty became due is set aside as it did not consider the Interest Act of 1978 (para 28). However, no future interest is payable if there is a default in payment within the stipulated time.

The SAT was incorrect in stating that an order contained an obligation to pay interest on the unlawful gain until payment, as a more severe penalty of being debarred from the market for 7 years was imposed instead.

Facts:

The appellant, along with 203 others, claimed to be legal heirs of the owner of the property in question based on a historical court order.

Various orders and memos were issued by the Revenue Department and other authorities, culminating in the rejection of their claim.

The Urban and Development Authority issued tenders regarding the disputed land.

The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the tenders and seeking a declaration of their rights.

Issues:

The appropriateness of the legal remedy pursued by the appellant.

Authorization and basis of representation for the appellant and other claimants.

The scope of challenge and adjudication of issues by the courts below.

The maintainability of the writ petition filed by the petitioners.

Held:

The appellant, having withdrawn the previous writ petition, could not resort to another writ petition on the same grounds. Doing so would constitute an abuse of the court process. (Para 20)

The appellant failed to establish authorization to represent the case of the 203 legal heirs, and other claimants did not establish the basis of their claims. Therefore, their appeals were not maintainable. (Para 21-22)

The judgment of the Single Judge was not challenged by the appellants, and hence, they cannot raise new issues not decided by the courts below. (Para 23)

The writ petition filed by the petitioners was also not maintainable, as the impugned memo did not create rights in their favor, and they were not communicated the relevant memos. (Para 24)

The appeals are dismissed. (Para 25)

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition challenging his exclusion from the select list for promotion to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police for the years 2000 and 2001.

The High Court allowed the respondent's inclusion in the select list for 2001 through an order dated April 8, 2010.

The appellant filed separate writ appeals contesting the earlier order dated June 23, 2004 (directing consideration of respondent No. 1 for inclusion in the select list) and the subsequent order dated April 8, 2010 (inclusion of respondent No. 1 in the select list for 2001).

Issues:

Whether the decision to promote respondent No. 1 against the vacancy in 2001 was legal.

The impact of the punishment awarded to respondent No. 1 in 1997 on his promotion.

Held:

The judgment dated June 23, 2004, merely directed the State authorities to consider respondent No. 1's case in accordance with the law without mandating any specific action beyond this.

The punishment awarded to respondent No. 1 in 1997, with its operational timeline extending beyond two years from the date of award, was considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) while deciding his inclusion in the select list. This was a valid consideration.

The subsequent decision on April 8, 2010, to include respondent No. 1 in the select list for 2001 was erroneous, as it ignored the valid considerations regarding his punishment and eligibility.

The appellant was justified in challenging the decision dated April 8, 2010, as it directly impacted his seniority.

Consequently, the order dated November 20, 2004, allocating respondent No. 1's notional promotion date as January 14, 2005, was revived, and all subsequent orders related to his promotion and seniority were declared null and void.

The authorities were directed to reassess respondent No. 1's promotion and seniority, allotting him the appropriate dates based on the revived order of November 20, 2004.