Section 256 CrPC Cannot Be A Shield For An Accused Who Never Faced Trial: Allahabad High Court Restores 8 Cheque Bounce Complaints

“Acquittal Of An Accused Who Never Faced Trial Is Patently Illegal”, In a strongly worded judgment reinforcing procedural discipline in cheque dishonour cases, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad held that Section 256 CrPC cannot be invoked to acquit an accused who never appeared before the court.

Justice Avnish Saxena decided a batch of nine applications arising out of eight complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Court dismissed all applications filed by the accused under Section 482 CrPC and upheld the revisional court’s order restoring complaints that had been dismissed in 2014.

The central issue before the Court was whether a Magistrate could dismiss a complaint and record “acquittal” under Section 256 CrPC when the accused had never appeared and the trial had not even commenced. The High Court answered in the negative, holding that such an order was “patently illegal” and contrary to the very scheme of summons trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court also clarified that in such peculiar circumstances, the appropriate remedy against such an order was revision under Sections 397–401 CrPC and not an appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC.

“Section 256 CrPC Contemplates Acquittal Of An Accused Who Is Before The Court — Not One Who Is Evading Trial”

The complaints dated back to 2012 and arose out of dishonour of eight cheques issued towards repayment of Rs. 30,00,000/- allegedly advanced by the complainant. Cognizance was taken on 25.02.2012 and summons were repeatedly issued. For nearly two years, the accused did not appear despite issuance of summons and bailable warrants.

On 29.09.2014, when neither the complainant nor the accused was present, the Magistrate dismissed all eight complaints and recorded acquittal under Section 256 CrPC.

The High Court scrutinised the scope of Section 256 CrPC, which provides that if the complainant does not appear on the day fixed for appearance or hearing, the Magistrate shall acquit the accused unless he thinks it proper to adjourn.

Relying upon Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, the Court reiterated that the provision is meant to protect an accused from harassment by a complainant who sets the law in motion but fails to prosecute it diligently. However, the Court emphasised that this protection is not automatic and the discretion must be exercised judicially.

The High Court observed in categorical terms:

“Section 256 CrPC contemplates acquittal of accused, who is before the court and not when he is absconding the trial.”

The Court further noted that in the present case the accused never appeared, the substance of accusation was never stated under Section 251 CrPC, and no post-cognizance evidence was recorded. Therefore, the so-called acquittal was not the result of judicial adjudication but a mechanical order passed in absence of both parties.

The Court concluded that:

“Acquittal of accused under Section 256 CrPC is an abuse of process of law and exercise of discretion which is not applicable to the Magistrate.”

“Presence Of Accused Is Foundational To Summons Trial Under Sections 251–255 CrPC”

The judgment carefully examined the statutory scheme governing summons trials. Under Section 251 CrPC, when the accused appears, the substance of accusation must be stated to him. Only thereafter does the trial proceed under Sections 254 and 255.

Without appearance of the accused, the trial cannot even begin.

The Court observed that no evidence could be recorded at the post-cognizance stage because the case remained fixed for securing the accused’s presence. In such a situation, there was no evidentiary basis upon which an acquittal under Section 255 CrPC could ever be recorded.

The High Court held that dismissal under Section 256 must logically follow from absence of complainant on a date fixed for appearance or hearing of the accused. It cannot operate in vacuum where the accused never subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court.

“Revision Was The Correct Remedy — Not Appeal Under Section 378(4) CrPC”

A significant legal issue raised by the accused was that once the Magistrate recorded “acquittal”, the complainant’s only remedy was to seek special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC. It was argued that revision was barred under Section 401(4) CrPC.

The High Court rejected this contention.

The Court reasoned that an appeal against acquittal presupposes adjudication on merits based on evidence. In the present case, there was:

“No evidence on record at post-cognizance stage… which could warrant acquittal of the accused.”

The Court posed a practical question: if special leave to appeal were granted, what material would the appellate court examine, when no trial had ever commenced?

Thus, the order dated 29.09.2014 was not a true acquittal on merits but a patently illegal order passed in disregard of statutory requirements. Such an order was amenable to correction in revision under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC.

The Court reaffirmed that revisional jurisdiction can be exercised where an order is “grossly erroneous” or where judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily.

Accordingly, the revisional court’s decision restoring the complaints was upheld.

“Section 141 NI Act Not Attracted — Complaint Disclosed Personal Transaction”

The accused further argued that the cheques were issued by a company and without impleading the company, prosecution under Section 138 was not maintainable in light of Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels Pvt. Ltd.

The High Court rejected this submission, observing that a plain reading of the complaint did not disclose that the account was maintained in the name of any company. The transaction was alleged to be personal and no material was placed to show that Section 141 NI Act was attracted.

The summoning order dated 25.02.2012 was therefore upheld.

“Accused Is An Unscrupulous Litigant Ignoring Court Process”

The Court took serious note of the accused’s conduct. Even after restoration of the complaints in 2018, summons, bailable warrants and non-bailable warrants were continuously issued till January 2024.

The Court observed that the conduct demonstrated a deliberate attempt to evade proceedings and delay adjudication for over a decade.

Applications Dismissed With Costs And Direction For Speedy Trial

All eight applications filed by the accused under Section 482 CrPC were dismissed with cumulative costs of Rs. 50,000/- payable to the complainant within 30 days.

The complainant’s application seeking expeditious disposal was allowed. The Trial Court was directed to speed up the trial in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directions in In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 NI Act, 1881.

The judgment stands as a clear reminder that procedural safeguards cannot be converted into instruments of abuse. Section 256 CrPC is a shield against harassment, not a technical shortcut to escape trial. An accused who never appears cannot claim the benefit of acquittal merely because the complainant missed a date.

Date of Decision: 11 February 2026