Facts:

The appellant was the Municipal Corporation, Ujjain & Anr, while BVG India Limited and others were respondents.

After the pronouncement of the judgment, it was noticed that there was a typographical mistake regarding the dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 3332 of 2018 filed by BVG India Limited.

Issues:

The issue pertained to rectifying a typographical error in the operative portion of the judgment.

The error involved the omission of mentioning the dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 3332 of 2018 filed by BVG India Limited.

Held:

The bench, upon verification and considering the submission by the appellant's counsel, found the typographical error to be justified.

Paragraph 52 of the judgment (operative portion) was corrected to reflect the accurate decision.

As per the corrected paragraph, it was clarified that Civil Appeal Nos. 3330 of 2018 and 3331 of 2018 were allowed, while Civil Appeal No. 3332 of 2018 filed by BVG India Limited stood dismissed.

The clarification was instructed to be noted by the Registry in the main judgment, and necessary corrections were to be made accordingly.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over a Gift Deed regarding ancestral immovable property, originally filed by the appellant seeking to declare the gift deed void. After disposal of the initial suit through compromise, the appellant filed a fresh suit for possession. The respondents contested, claiming the suit was barred by limitation.

Issues:

The interpretation of the limitation period under the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 and the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in this context.

Held:

The Court interpreted the provisions of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, specifically Art.2(b) of the Schedule, which determines the limitation period for suits relating to ancestral immovable property.

The term "obtained" in Art.2(b) was defined to include the drawing up or preparation of the decree, not merely the passing of judgment.

It was established that the right to sue for possession arose only after certain conditions, such as the death of 'U', were met.

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was deemed applicable, allowing exclusion of time spent in execution proceedings.

The Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that the suit for possession was not barred by limitation.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the Court ruled in favor of the original appellant, rejecting the objection regarding the suit being barred by limitation.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), concerning the jurisdiction of High Courts and the power to grant stays in criminal matters. The appellants challenged the framing of charges against them under the PC Act.

Issues:

Whether an order framing charges under the provisions of the PC Act constitutes an interlocutory order, thereby invoking Section 19(3)(c) and barring the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

Whether the bar on revision under Section 19(3)(c) also extends to the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC or Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Held:

The order framing charges may not be purely interlocutory but can, in certain circumstances, be interfered with under Section 397(2) of the CrPC, Section 482 of the CrPC, or Article 227 of the Constitution. Such interference, however, should be limited to exceptional situations. [(Para 26, 27)]

The intention of the legislature in cases under the PC Act is the expeditious conclusion of trials without impediment through stays of proceedings. The High Court's jurisdiction to entertain challenges against orders framing charges and to grant stays should be exercised sparingly and only in rare and extreme circumstances, considering the societal interest and the accused's rights. [(Para 28, 29)]

Challenges to orders framing charges should be entertained only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction, and decisions on such challenges should be expedited. Stays, if granted, should be conditional and not of indefinite duration. Matters should be decided on a day-to-day basis, and the duration of stay should not exceed two to three months. If proceedings remain pending longer, the stay should automatically lapse after six months, unless extended by a speaking order. [(Para 30-32)]

The law declares that the order framing charges is neither purely interlocutory nor final. The jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred, but its exercise should align with the legislative policy for expeditious trial disposal. Stays should not operate for an unduly long period, and the mandate of speedy justice applies to cases under the PC Act and other civil or criminal cases. [(Para 36, 37)]

Facts:

The term of the Chairperson of the National Green Tribunal had ended, necessitating the appointment of an acting Chairperson by the Central Government.

The Attorney General provided a comparative chart detailing the relevant details of two senior judicial members of the NGT, Justice Jawad Rahim and Justice Raghuvendra S. Rathore.

Issues:

The determine who should act as the Chairperson of the NGT until a new appointment was made, in accordance with Section 11 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.

Held:

The Court held that Justice Jawad Rahim would act as the Chairperson of the NGT until a regular appointment was made, based on his seniority in terms of his appointment as a High Court Judge and his subsequent appointment to the NGT.

This decision was made to ensure the smooth functioning of the NGT and to allow Justice Rahim to participate in the selection process for filling vacancies of members in the NGT.

The appointment of Justice Rahim as the acting Chairperson was deemed purely interim and did not constitute a final determination of seniority between him and Justice Rathore.

The decision was made in accordance with the seniority indicated in an office order dated March 15, 2016, which outlined the seniority among judicial and expert members of the NGT.

Facts:

The Municipal Corporation of Ujjain issued a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) for the appointment of an agency for Municipal Solid Waste Door to Door Collection and Transportation. The tender process involved a technical bid and a financial bid, and Global Waste Management Cell Private Limited (GWMC) emerged as the highest scorer and was awarded the contract. An unsuccessful bidder (respondent no.1) challenged the contract award in court, alleging irregularities in the evaluation process.

Issues:

Whether the High Court could question the technical qualifications judgment of the expert consultant without evidence of unreasonableness, irrationality, or bias.

Whether a bidder can rely on the technical qualifications of a third party if it submits a bid independently.

Whether the High Court can independently evaluate technical and financial bids without clear indications of bias, arbitrariness, or irrationality.

Whether the public interest was adequately considered in the tender evaluation process.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision of the expert consultant, as there was no evidence of bias or malafide. The decision was taken based on public interest and the qualifications of the successful bidder.

The Court ruled that a bidder cannot rely on the technical qualifications of a third party if it submits a bid independently. The High Court erred in considering such reliance.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court should not independently evaluate technical and financial bids unless there are clear indications of bias, arbitrariness, or irrationality. Courts should exercise judicial restraint unless serious procedural irregularities exist.

The Court emphasized that the authority has the discretion to choose the best bidder considering public interest and the quality of work. The High Court should not compel the authority to select an undeserving bidder and must not ignore public interest while reviewing tender decisions.

Facts:

The case involved allegations of corruption against public servants, triggering a legal question regarding the requirement of prior sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (P.C. Act), before initiating an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.).

Issues:

Whether the requirement of prior sanction for prosecution under Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act applies to the initiation of an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., even before taking cognizance of the offense.

Whether the interplay between the P.C. Act offenses and the provisions of the Cr.P.C. necessitates a different interpretation regarding the initiation of investigations involving public servants.

Held:

The court acknowledged that a Magistrate must apply their mind even at the stage of directing an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Acting mechanically is not acceptable.( Para 33)

The court raised the question of whether the requirement of prior sanction under Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act should influence the initiation of an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., especially considering the different provisions and purposes of the two statutes.( Para 34)

Referring to the case law, the court emphasized the Magistrate's authority to direct the registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. based on the complaint's disclosure of a cognizable offense.( Para 35)

Given the complexity arising from the interplay between offenses under the P.C. Act and the provisions of the Cr.P.C., the court referred the matter to a larger Bench for resolution.( Para 36)

The court addressed the specific issue of one respondent seeking deletion from the array of parties, emphasizing that mere inclusion in a complaint does not automatically justify inclusion as an accused. The respondent was struck off unless further investigation revealed material warranting their inclusion.( Para 38-47)

It was clarified that if further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. revealed material warranting the inclusion of the respondent as an accused, the order would not prevent such inclusion.( Para 48)

Facts:

Mackintosh Burn Limited, a public company majority-owned by the Government of West Bengal, refused to register the transfer of 100 shares purchased by Sarkar and Chowdhury Enterprises Private Limited.

The dispute arose when the respondent sought registration of shares, which would increase its holding to 39.77%.

The appellant argued that the respondent was controlled by a competitor and thus refused registration.

Issues:

Whether the Company Law Board's decision to direct registration of shares was justified.

Whether the High Court properly addressed the legal questions raised in the appeal.

Whether the Supreme Court should uphold the decisions of the lower courts or remit the case for fresh consideration.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court and the Company Law Board erred in their interpretations of the law and application of principles. The Court set aside all previous orders and remitted the case to the Company Law Board (now the National Company Law Tribunal) for fresh consideration. The Court directed the Tribunal to decide the appeal without being influenced by previous findings and observations. Additionally, the Tribunal was instructed to expedite the process due to the case's age.

The Supreme Court emphasized that refusal of registration of shares on sufficient cause is a question of law, and the Company Law Board must consider all relevant factors, including potential competition issues. The Court highlighted that the appellant had raised various legal questions beyond the issue of limitation in the appeal, which the High Court failed to adequately address. Therefore, a fresh consideration by the Tribunal was deemed necessary.

This decision was made to ensure fair and impartial judgment in accordance with the Companies Act and relevant regulations.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute arising from the marriage between Muthulakshmi (Accused No. 4) and Murugan. Due to strained relations between the families, the accused attacked Murugan, resulting in his death, and later attacked Poomari, leading to her death as well.

Issues:

The defense argued that the witnesses, who were family members of the deceased, were interested witnesses and their testimonies should not be given undue weight.

Additionally, the defense presented evidence to challenge the presence of one witness at the school during the time of the incident.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that being related to the deceased does not automatically make a witness interested. It emphasized that related witnesses cannot per se be discarded and that their evidence should be evaluated carefully. The court found that the testimonies of the family members provided consistent and credible evidence, which was corroborated by medical evidence (Paragraphs 9-15).

The court also considered the defense evidence but found it unconvincing, noting discrepancies in the attendance records presented. Therefore, the High Court's judgment was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed, thereby confirming the conviction and sentence of the appellants (Paragraphs 16-18).

Facts:

B.N. Firos, proprietor of Comtech IT Solutions, challenged a notification declaring certain computer systems as "protected systems" under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Firos developed software for the "FRIENDS" project initiated by the State of Kerala.

Disputes arose over the ownership of copyright for the software developed for the project.

Issues:

The ownership of copyright in the software developed for the government project.

The validity of the notification under the Information Technology Act, 2000, was also questioned.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that Firos did not have valid copyright ownership in the software developed for the government project.

The court held that Firos, by virtue of his agreement with Microsoft, did not own the copyright, as Microsoft was the first owner under Section 17(a) of the Copyright Act, having paid Firos for the software development.

Additionally, the Memorandum of Understanding stated that intellectual property rights in software developed for government projects vested in the government, further supporting the rejection of Firos's copyright claim.

The court dismissed Firos's appeal, directing each party to bear its own costs.