Facts:

The appellant-wife, Usha Uday Khiwansara, and the respondent-husband, Uday Kumar Jethmal Khiwansara, got married on 07.02.1992.

The husband filed for divorce in 2004 citing cruelty and desertion as grounds.

The trial court dismissed the divorce petition, but the High Court allowed the husband's appeal and granted a decree of divorce based on desertion, without hearing the wife's side.

The wife appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to grant divorce without hearing the wife's side was fair and just.

Whether a settlement between the parties could be reached to dissolve the marriage amicably.

Held:

The Court observed that the High Court's decision to grant divorce without hearing the wife's side caused prejudice to her rights.

The Court acknowledged the willingness of both parties to settle the matter mutually, considering the long separation, absence of any chance of reconciliation, and the wife's health condition and financial dependency.

Referring to previous judgments, the Court emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution in cases of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

The Court accepted the terms of settlement proposed by both parties. The husband was directed to pay Rs. 30 lakhs as permanent alimony to the wife within one month, with an additional Rs. 5 lakhs towards medical expenses. All allegations and pending cases were quashed.

The appeal was disposed of based on the settlement terms, with no costs imposed on either party.

Facts:

The case revolved around the interpretation of provisions in the Homoeopathy Central Council Act, 1973, particularly regarding the power to appoint a team of Medical Inspectors for the purpose of inspecting homoeopathy colleges.

Issues:

Whether the power to appoint Medical Inspectors for inspection lies with the Central Government or the Central Council of Homoeopathy (CCH)?

Whether Regulation 3(5) of the Homoeopathy Central Council (Minimum Standards Requirement of Homoeopathy Colleges and attached Hospitals) Regulations, 2013, empowers the Central Government to appoint inspectors?

Held:

The Court held that the power to appoint Medical Inspectors for inspection lies with the Central Council of Homoeopathy (CCH), not with the Central Government. It emphasized that the Act does not confer upon the Central Government the power to appoint a team of inspectors or visitors at examinations. The interpretation of Regulation 3(5) of the Regulations, 2013, must be made in harmony with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act, which exclusively vests the power to appoint inspectors with the CCH. The Court concluded that any other interpretation would go against the legislative mandate.

The appeals were allowed, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench was set aside, and the judgment of the Single Bench was restored.

Facts:

The writ petition (Civil) No. 754 of 2016 was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking immediate and necessary action against cow protection groups engaging in violence. The petitioner raised concerns about incidents of lynching and mob violence perpetrated by such groups.

Issues:

The court was to determine the legality of lynching and mob violence and to establish the obligations of the state authorities in preventing and addressing such acts.

Held:

The court unequivocally states that lynching is unlawful and violates fundamental rights and human dignity protected by the Constitution.

The state authorities have the primary obligation to maintain law and order and prevent vigilantism of any form, including cow vigilantism. Vigilantism undermines the legal institutions of the state and leads to chaos and disorder.

The court lays down guidelines for preventive measures, including the designation of nodal officers in each district to prevent incidents of mob violence and lynching.

In case of incidents, immediate lodging of FIRs is mandated, with personal monitoring of investigations by the designated nodal officers. Additionally, a victim compensation scheme is to be prepared by state governments.

Disciplinary action is to be taken against officials who fail to prevent incidents or promptly apprehend the culprits. The court recommends the creation of a separate offense for lynching with adequate punishment.

Decision: The court emphasizes the importance of timely implementation of the prescribed measures by both central and state governments to curb mob violence and lynching and to protect the rights and dignity of citizens.

Facts:

The case involved allegations against the respondents, who were public servants, of demanding and accepting illegal gratification for expediting certain permissions related to a business venture. The prosecution relied on evidence provided by witnesses, particularly PWs 1 and 3, who testified regarding the demand and acceptance of bribe money. Additionally, the presence of anthracene powder, used in trap operations, was found on the accused and the bribe money.

Issues:

Whether the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification were adequately proven by the prosecution,

Whether the accused provided satisfactory explanations to rebut the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Held:

The Court observed that the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification were proved by the consistent testimony of PWs 1 and 3, corroborated by the presence of anthracene powder on the accused and the bribe money. The High Court's decision to acquit the accused was deemed incorrect, as it disregarded the evidence provided by the prosecution. The Court noted that the accused failed to provide any explanation to rebut the presumption under Section 20. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and affirmed the conviction of the accused under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. However, considering the long passage of time since the occurrence of the incident, the Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment from two years to one year.

Facts:

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOC) terminated T. Natarajan's dealership agreement due to alleged breaches.

Natarajan invoked arbitration, which upheld the termination but granted him the liberty to seek reconsideration.

The High Court Division Bench directed the restoration of Natarajan's dealership, but the Supreme Court was approached by the IOC challenging this decision.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench was correct in overturning the Single Judge's decision and directing restoration of the dealership.

Whether the arbitration award entitled Natarajan to automatic restoration of the dealership.

Held:

The held that the Division Bench erred in assuming that the arbitration award automatically entitled Natarajan to restoration without considering the nature of the breaches and the IOC's discretion.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Division Bench's order and reinstating the Single Judge's decision. It emphasized the importance of contractual terms, administrative discretion, and the limited scope of judicial review in such matters.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) and Gwalior Jhansi Expressway Limited regarding the widening of a highway project.

The NHAI alleged breaches by the respondent and sought permission to complete the balance work of the project due to loss to the public. Both parties filed applications under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before an Arbitral Tribunal. NHAI issued a tender for the balance work, and technical and financial bids were opened.

The respondent also filed an application seeking permission to complete the balance work at its risk and cost.

Issues:

Whether the respondent, despite not participating in the tender process, has the right to match the lowest bid or exercise ROFR.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of the tender process for transparency and competition.

The respondent was required to participate in the tender process by submitting sealed bids, as per the explicit terms of the tender documents.

Since the respondent failed to participate in the tender process despite the explicit terms, it couldn't claim any right, including ROFR.

The Tribunal's decision to allow the respondent to complete the balance work without participating in the bidding process was not in line with Indian law's fundamental policy.

The High Court's decision, which upheld the Tribunal's ruling, was also deemed erroneous.

The court allowed NHAI's appeal, emphasizing the necessity for all parties to abide by the terms of the tender documents and participate in the bidding process to claim any rights. The respondent's failure to do so invalidated its claims, and the Tribunal's decision favoring the respondent was overturned.

Facts:

Annamalai University, established under the Annamalai University Act, 1928, faced financial difficulties despite receiving grants.

The Tamil Nadu Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1992, was enacted to regulate tuition fees, with an amendment in 2007 introducing sub-section (2-A) empowering a Committee on Fixation of Fee.

Issues:

The challenge raised by students regarding the high fees charged by Annamalai University for professional courses.

The applicability of the Fee Fixation Committee's decisions and statutory provisions.

Held:

The university cannot independently fix fees for professional courses without the intervention of the Fee Fixation Committee.

The concept of estoppel cannot justify actions contrary to statutory provisions.

The university was directed to submit all relevant documents to the Fee Fixation Committee for review.

The Committee was tasked with fixing appropriate fees for specific academic sessions.

The appeals were allowed, and the university was directed to comply with the Committee's decisions.

Facts:

The appellant claimed to have been using the mark 'MALABAR' for selling Biryani Rice since 2001.

A suit was filed for infringement and passing off against the respondent.

Initially, an interim injunction was granted in favor of the appellant, restraining the respondent from using the label mark 'MALABAR'.

Subsequently, modifications were made to the interim order, allowing the respondent to use the word 'MALABAR' in conjunction with 'BAROMA' with certain conditions regarding font size.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had exclusive rights over the use of the word 'MALABAR'?

Whether there was similarity between the label marks of the appellant and the respondent?

Whether the High Court's decision to allow the respondent to use 'MALABAR' in conjunction with 'BAROMA' was justified?

Held:

The appellant, despite being the registered owner of the label mark, had a disclaimer attached to the exclusive use of the word 'MALABAR', indicating that exclusive rights over the word were not granted.

Other registered marks containing the word 'MALABAR' with similar disclaimers were cited, further supporting the conclusion that exclusive rights over the word were not granted.

The label marks of the appellant and the respondent were found to be substantially different and not deceptively similar.

Considering the interests of both parties and the substantial turnover in their respective businesses, the High Court's decision to allow the respondent to use 'MALABAR' in conjunction with 'BAROMA' with the approved modifications was upheld.

The respondent was allowed to pursue their application for registration of their label, with the outcome of the suit determining the final resolution of the matter.

The appeal was dismissed, and all contentious issues were left to be resolved in the pending suit, with no costs imposed.

Facts:

The appellants, retired sailors who served in the Submarine Arm of the Indian Navy, sought inclusion of Submarine Pay in the computation of their Service Pension.

Appellants argued that Submarine Pay should be considered part of their basic pay due to its inclusion in their Last Pay Drawn Certificate and its specific grant to submariners for hazardous duties.

Respondents contended that Submarine Pay was categorized as an allowance and therefore should not be included in the calculation of pension.

Issues:

Whether Submarine Pay should be included in the computation of Service Pension for retired sailors of the Indian Navy.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Submarine Pay should be included in the computation of Service Pension for sailors who served in the Submarine Arm of the Indian Navy. The Court reached this conclusion based on several observations and legal analyses:

The Court noted that Submarine Pay was introduced for submariners through official instructions, which specified it to be treated as "pay for all purposes".

It was observed that Navy Instruction No. 2/S/74 dated August 17, 1974, which governed the appellants' cases, did not exclude Submarine Pay from the computation of "pay" for pension purposes.

The Court highlighted that Submarine Pay and Submarine Allowance were listed separately in the instructions, indicating they were distinct components.

The Court rejected the respondents' reliance on subsequent instructions that excluded Submarine Pay from basic pay, as these were issued after the appellants' retirement and were not applicable to their cases. As a result, the Civil Appeal was allowed, setting aside the order of the Armed Forces Tribunal that had denied inclusion of Submarine Pay in the pension calculation.