Facts:

The respondent college applied to the appellant university for the grant of a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to commence the D.Pharma course during the academic year 2018-2019. The university declined the NOC, citing the government's policy and perspective plan, which discouraged the establishment of new institutions or courses. The respondent challenged this decision, leading to litigation. The High Court initially ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that the university was obligated to issue the NOC.

Issues:

Whether the refusal to grant NOC by the university was justified under Section 20 of the Telangana Education Act, 1982.

Whether the university's regulations regarding NOC were consistent with relevant Acts and regulations.

Whether the policy decision of the State Government regarding the establishment of new educational institutions was legal and rational.

Held:

The provisions of Section 20 of the Telangana Education Act, 1982 aim to identify educational needs and prevent the mushroom growth of institutions and courses. The competent authority is tasked with conducting a survey to ascertain the educational requirements of the locality and may decline NOC if there is already a significant number of institutions offering similar courses.

The regulations of the university concerning NOC, as outlined in Jawaharlal Nehru Affiliation Procedure and Regulations, 2017, are in line with the provisions of the Act. The High Court erred in holding otherwise.

The State Government's policy decision, supported by surveys and data indicating vacancies in existing courses, was deemed legal and rational. It aimed to prevent the proliferation of educational institutions and maintain educational standards.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the decision of the High Court. It upheld the University's refusal to grant NOC and affirmed the legality of the State Government's policy decision regarding the establishment of new educational institutions.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a document titled "Multimodal Transport Document/Bill of Lading" dated 25.10.2008, where Premier Sea Foods Exim Pvt Ltd was the shipper and Caravel Shipping Services Pvt Ltd acted as the agent facilitating transport. Caravel Shipping Services Pvt Ltd (the appellant) filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, stating that an arbitration clause was included in the printed terms annexed to the Bill of Lading. The Sub-Judge's Court in Kochi dismissed the application, and the High Court also dismissed the Original Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, affirming the lower court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the arbitration clause contained in the Bill of Lading, even though it was a printed condition annexed to the document and not signed by the respondent, should be enforced.

Held:

The Court held that the arbitration clause contained in the Bill of Lading should be enforced, despite the respondent's argument that it was not signed by them.

The Court emphasized that the Bill of Lading explicitly mentioned that the Merchant (which included the respondent) agreed to be bound by all the terms, conditions, clauses, and exceptions on both sides, whether typed, printed, or otherwise. The Court clarified that an arbitration agreement need not necessarily be signed but must be in writing, as specified in Section 7(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments of the High Court, and upheld the arbitration clause contained in the Bill of Lading.

Facts:

The appellant, S. Sarojini Amma, executed a document styled as a gift deed in favor of the respondent, Velayudhan Pillai Sreekumar, with conditions attached, including that the gift would take effect only after the death of the appellant and her husband. Subsequently, the appellant executed a cancellation deed to revoke the purported gift. Legal proceedings ensued, initiated by the respondent, contesting the cancellation and seeking to establish his rights over the property mentioned in the purported gift deed.

Issues:

Whether a document labeled as a gift deed, but executed for consideration and with conditions attached, could be considered a formal instrument of gift.

Whether a document reserving possession and enjoyment rights for the donor, enforceable after the donor's death, constituted a gift or a will.

Held:

The Court, after examining the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, concluded that the purported gift deed did not fulfill the requirements of a completed gift.

The Court emphasized that a conditional gift only becomes complete upon compliance with the conditions outlined in the deed. Since the document was executed for consideration and was conditional upon the donor's death, it did not meet the statutory conditions for a valid gift.

Therefore, the appellant was justified in canceling the deed. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside.

Facts:

Siya Ram and his son Kripal were attacked and Siyaram was killed by the appellant (Ramvir) and five others.

The appellant was acquitted by the Sessions Judge of charges under Section 148/149 IPC but was convicted under Section 302 IPC.

The High Court upheld the conviction under Section 302 IPC and additionally convicted the appellant under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against these convictions.

Issues:

• Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the appellant's conviction under Section 302 IPC.

• Whether the High Court was justified in convicting the appellant under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC.

Held:

The appellant's conviction under Section 148/149 IPC was not legally sustainable as it had attained finality after acquittal by the Sessions Judge and the State did not appeal against it.

Since all accused, including the appellant, were acquitted of charges under Section 148/149 IPC, there was no basis for convicting the appellant under these sections.

The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the one who fired the shot that killed Siyaram. Evidence and the ballistic report did not support this claim.

Based on these reasons, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC, and acquitted the appellant of all charges.

Facts:

The appellants, ex-employees of insurance companies, retired under the General Insurance Employees' Special Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2004 (SVRS-2004 Scheme). They contended that they were entitled to additional benefits under the earlier General Insurance (Employees) Pension Scheme, 1995 (1995 Scheme), which included the addition of five years to the qualifying service for pension calculation purposes. However, the SVRS-2004 Scheme explicitly excluded this benefit.

Issues:

Whether the appellants are entitled to the additional benefits under the 1995 Scheme despite the clear exclusion in the SVRS-2004 Scheme?

Whether observations made in previous judgments, seemingly granting benefits contrary to the terms of the SVRS-2004 Scheme, are binding in the present case?

Held:

The court held that the appellants were not entitled to the additional five years of service for pension calculation under the SVRS-2004 Scheme. The terms of the SVRS-2004 Scheme, being statutory, must be strictly adhered to, and no concessions contrary to the explicit terms of the scheme are permissible.

The court clarified that any observations made in previous judgments, which might seem to grant benefits contrary to the terms of the SVRS-2004 Scheme, should not be construed as binding, especially if those observations were not directly related to the issue at hand.

Therefore, the appeals of the ex-employees seeking additional pension benefits under the SVRS-2004 Scheme were dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant and respondent No.1 were married and had two children. They agreed for a divorce by mutual consent, with custody of the children granted to the appellant. Dispute arose when the appellant was transferred, and respondent No.1 filed for custody, alleging coercion and fraud in the divorce decree.

Issues:

The custody of the children and whether the appellant's second marriage affected his custody rights.

Held:

In our view, it clearly emerges that the decision to give custody to the appellant, of the two children, was a conscious decision taken by the parties at the relevant stage and can hardly be categorised as a decision under force, pressure or fraud.

The second marriage of the appellant cannot be put against him, nor can the factum of the child of his second wife residing with him deprive him of the custody rights of his two children, which has been specifically conferred on him with the consent of respondent No.1.

The appeal is accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The appellant-accused was tried for offenses under two FIRs and convicted by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the accused to rigorous life imprisonment in both cases. The first case imposed a condition that the accused would not be considered for remission until serving 30 years, while the second case directed that the life sentence would begin after completing the sentence in the first case. During the appeal before the High Court, the appellant's counsel indicated that they did not intend to challenge the conviction but only the sentence. The High Court upheld the conviction but modified the sentences.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's counsel's statement before the High Court regarding not challenging the conviction was made with instructions from the appellant.

Whether the modification of sentences by the High Court was within its jurisdiction.

Whether consecutive sentences were permissible in this case.

Whether the High Court erred in removing the cap of 30 years imposed by the trial court.

Whether the appellant would be eligible for remission.

Held:

The Court found that the appellant's counsel's statement before the High Court regarding not challenging the conviction was made with instructions from the appellant, as recorded in the High Court's records. Therefore, the Court proceeded on the premise that the statement was made on the appellant's instructions.

The modification of sentences by the High Court, initially reducing them to the period already undergone, was beyond its jurisdiction, as it was not a typographical error but a deliberate decision .

The High Court correctly concluded that consecutive sentences were not permissible in this case, and the sentences should run concurrently, as provided under Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

However, the High Court erred in removing the cap of 30 years imposed by the trial court. The appellant would not be eligible for remission until completing 30 years of rigorous imprisonment.

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the accused, upholding the conviction but modifying the sentences to run concurrently. The appellant would not be eligible for remission until completing 30 years of imprisonment.

Facts:

The Supreme Court invited applications for the allotment of Lawyers’ chambers on October 31, 2017, and May 16, 2018, setting various eligibility criteria. Petitioners, who were practicing advocates, some of whom were Advocates on Record (AOR), challenged the fixation of the block period and other eligibility criteria.

Issues:

Validity of the block period fixed for eligibility criteria.

Validity of Rule 3 of the Allotment Rules requiring membership of Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) for chamber allotment.

Requirement of residency in Delhi or New Delhi for chamber allotment.

Held:

The Court held that the suggestion to count the eligibility criteria from the last cut-off date in 2004 till September 30, 2018, was unacceptable as it might allot chambers to non-active advocates. Instead, the block period was modified to be from October 1, 2013, to September 30, 2018.

The Court upheld the requirement of SCBA membership for chamber allotment, as there is no fundamental or statutory right for chamber allotment, and SCBA membership is a reasonable criterion.

The Court suggested a review of the residency requirement for chamber allotment, considering changing circumstances and commuting patterns of advocates from neighboring states. The Judges’ Allotment Committee was tasked with reviewing this requirement.

Decision: The writ petitions were disposed of, upholding the validity of the Allotment Rules with modifications to the block period and suggesting a review of the residency requirement for chamber allotment.

Facts:

An industrial plot was allotted to the original allottee in 1984.

The allottee failed to commence production within the stipulated time.

Despite several opportunities and notices, the production was not initiated.

The plot was subsequently resumed by the authorities.

Issues:

Whether the resumption of the plot was justified under the provisions of the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977?

Whether the delay in commencing production can be justified on grounds of health issues faced by the allottee and subsequent legal heirs?

Held:

The Court upheld the decisions of the lower authorities and the High Court, stating that the resumption of the plot was in accordance with the terms of the allotment. The appellants failed to provide satisfactory reasons for the delay in commencing production.

The Court noted that the allotment of industrial plots was governed by the industrial policy of the State of Haryana, and failure to fulfill the terms of allotment defeated the purpose of such allotments aimed at economic development and employment generation.

The Court rejected the appellants' argument regarding health issues faced by the allottee and held that sympathy cannot be a ground for non-compliance with the terms of allotment. Additionally, the Court ruled out the appellants' request to pay the current market value of the plot, as the allotment process was governed by existing regulations. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.