Facts:

The case involved a situation of political rivalry leading to a mob assault where sharp and pointed weapons were used. This resulted in the death of five individuals and severe injuries to several others. The prosecution alleged that the offender party broke into houses, destroyed property, stole valuables, set houses on fire, and subsequently assaulted members of the complainant party.

Issues:

The trial court acquitted the accused, citing the benefit of doubt, a decision upheld by the High Court. The main issues revolved around the adequacy of evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the oversight of vital aspects of the case.

Held:

The Court found the reasoning of the lower courts, suggesting that injuries might have occurred in a stampede, unconvincing. This was because there was no plausible explanation for only one group to sustain injuries in such a scenario.

Minor contradictions and embellishments in witness testimonies were deemed natural, especially in cases involving large gatherings. The presence of 24 injured eyewitnesses was considered credible, despite some inconsistencies.

The Court emphasized the importance of considering evidence related to charges other than murder, such as burning houses and unlawful assembly. The oversight of vital issues by the High Court led to an unjust decision, warranting remand for rehearing.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the High Court for rehearing, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive consideration of all evidence and issues to ensure justice.

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit seeking a declaration of their exclusive right to conduct religious services in St. Mary’s Church and cemetery, based on Ext A3, an assignment-cum-gift deed. The trial court ruled in favor of the appellants, but a Division Bench of the High Court overturned this decision, holding that the control and management of the properties were still with the parishioners despite the title being vested with the Quilon Diocese.

Issues:

Whether the appellants have the exclusive right to manage St. Mary’s Church and its properties.

Whether the Division Bench erred in holding that the control and management of the properties remained with the parishioners.

Held:

The disputes between the appellant Patriarch and the respondents Malankara were settled in the K.S. Varghese case, affirming the validity and binding nature of the 1934 Constitution upon the Parishioners. The Parish Church must be managed according to the powers conferred under the 1934 Constitution. The Malankara Metropolitan enjoys all temporal, ecclesiastical, and spiritual administrative powers.

Ext.-A3-Sale-cum-Gift Deed was executed in favor of the Metropolitan of Quilon Diocese, indicating that the properties were gifted subject to the control of the Metropolitan in appointing Vicar, Priests, etc. The recitals in Ext.-A3 confirm that St. Mary’s Church and the properties were gifted to the Metropolitan of Malankara, thus coming under his spiritual and temporal control.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, affirming the appellants' right to manage the church and its properties in accordance with the 1934 Constitution and the provisions of Ext.-A3.

Facts:

The appellant, Krishan Kumar, appealed against the High Court of Rajasthan's decision to set aside his acquittal and remit the case to the trial court. The High Court's decision was based on the non-examination of the prosecutrix before the trial court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the appellant's acquittal without affording him an opportunity of hearing.

Whether the matter should be remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court's decision to set aside the appellant's acquittal without giving him an opportunity of hearing was erroneous.

The Court also noted that the prosecutrix had filed an appeal against the appellant's acquittal, which was pending before the High Court.

Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

The High Court was instructed to afford sufficient opportunity to both the appellant and the prosecutrix during the reconsideration of the case.

The Court urged the High Court to decide the matter expeditiously and in accordance with the law.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The State Government of West Bengal initiated the Panchayat election process through a notification.

Legal disputes arose, including the acceptance of nominations submitted electronically by the State Election Commission.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's directions regarding the acceptance of nominations in electronic form were legally valid.

Whether the electoral process had been appropriately followed.

Held:

The Division Bench of the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction under Article 226 by directing the acceptance of nominations electronically (Para 16-19).

The Panchayat Elections Act and rules provide a comprehensive framework for elections, which doesn't include electronic nominations. Legislative amendment would be required for such a change (Para 16-19).

The electoral process had already commenced, and the deadline for nominations had passed, making the High Court's directions inappropriate (Para 16-19).

Disputes regarding elections should be addressed through procedures outlined in the Panchayat Elections Act, primarily through election petitions (Para 25-27).

The Court extended the period for filing election petitions for uncontested seats using its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, considering the seriousness of allegations and pending proceedings (Para 30-32).

Decision: The Court set aside the High Court's direction regarding electronic filing of nominations and emphasized adherence to established electoral procedures and legal remedies for dispute resolution. It extended the period for filing election petitions for uncontested seats.

Facts:

Mr. Anurag Mittal filed an appeal against a decree of divorce obtained by him.

During the pendency of the appeal, a settlement was reached between Mr. Anurag Mittal and his former spouse, indicating his acceptance of the divorce decree.

Mr. Anurag Mittal filed an application for withdrawal of his appeal before the date of his second marriage to Mrs. Shaily Mishra Mittal.

Issues:

Whether the second marriage between Mr. Anurag Mittal and Mrs. Shaily Mishra Mittal during the pendency of the appeal against the decree of divorce was valid.

Interpretation of Sections 5(i) and 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Held

The validity of the second marriage hinges on the interpretation of Sections 5(i) and 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Mr. Anurag Mittal's application for withdrawal of the appeal effectively ended the appeal process and was deemed to have been withdrawn on the date of its filing.

The intentions of Mr. Anurag Mittal, evidenced by his acceptance of the divorce decree through the settlement and withdrawal of the appeal, played a crucial role in determining the validity of the second marriage.

The court concluded that the restriction placed on a second marriage under Section 15 did not apply in this case, given the circumstances and the principles of purposive construction.

The marriage between Mr. Anurag Mittal and Mrs. Shaily Mishra Mittal was held valid as the former spouse of Mr. Anurag Mittal could not be considered a living spouse at the time of the second marriage.

Decision: The court upheld the validity of the second marriage based on the withdrawal of the appeal and the intentions of the parties involved, as per the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute arising from the construction of a building. Respondent no. 1 was appointed as the developer for the property and later transferred the development rights to respondent no. 2. The appellant entered into an agreement with respondent no. 2, entitling the appellant to a share of the property. Disputes arose during construction, leading to a suit for specific performance by respondent no. 1 against the appellant and respondent no. 2.

Issues:

The validity and appropriateness of the interlocutory mandatory injunction issued by the High Court and the application of the principle of moulding relief.

Held:

The Court held that the order of mandatory interlocutory injunction issued by the High Court directing the appellant to hand over eight flats and sixteen parking spaces to respondent no. 1 was in excess of jurisdiction. Such an order can only be passed when circumstances clearly justify restoring the status quo ante.

The Court emphasized that the principle of moulding relief can only be applied at the time of considering final relief in the main suit, not at an interlocutory stage.

The High Court erred in applying the principle of moulding relief and granting a mandatory order at an interlocutory stage. The appellant could only be bound by the agreement executed with respondent no. 2 and not by agreements between the respondents. An interim mandatory injunction should only be granted when circumstances clearly demand it.

Decision: The Court set aside the order passed by the High Court and revived the ad-interim order until the final disposal of the suit or until modified by the High Court due to subsequent developments.

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for eviction of the respondent from the premises for non-payment of rent.

The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the High Court overturned this decision, emphasizing the mandatory nature of Section 13(3) of the Rent Act.

Issues:

Whether compliance with Section 13(3) of the Act is mandatory in a suit for eviction based on default in rent payment.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing the mandatory nature of Section 13(3).

The court noted that the use of the word "shall" in the section imposes an obligation on the court to determine provisional rent, irrespective of any application.

Failure to comply with Section 13(3) would result in the loss of the tenant's valuable right.

Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's ruling.

Facts:

The case involved a writ petition brought by Kudrat Sandhu against the Union of India.

The Supreme Court had issued a clarification on 20 March 2018 regarding the tenure of Members and Chairpersons of Tribunals.

There was confusion regarding the age of superannuation of Members of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT).

Issues:

The interpretation of the Supreme Court's clarification regarding the tenure and age of superannuation of Members and Chairpersons of various Tribunals.

Held:

The Court clarified that Members of the ITAT would continue until the age of 62 years, and Presidents until the age of 65 years.

Similarly, Members of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) would continue until the age of 62 years, and Presidents until the age of 65 years.

Members of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) would hold office until the age of 65 years, while former Judges of the Supreme Court serving as Chairpersons would hold office until the age of 70 years.

The old rules/provisions would continue to apply in the case of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT).

The Union government was directed to provide a status report within two weeks regarding the position of each Tribunal, including vacancies and the stage of the selection process.

Facts: An arbitral proceeding took place between Kohinoor Transporters (Appellant) and the State of Uttar Pradesh (Respondent) under the Arbitration Act 1940, originating from a contract dating back to 1980 for civil works. The arbitral award, dated 20 July 1984, was made a Rule of the Court on 30 August 1986 by the Civil Judge, Dehradun. During execution proceedings, the respondent deposited a portion of the decretal debt. Subsequently, the Executing Court directed the respondent to deposit a further amount, which was contested. The High Court, during the course of the proceedings, ordered the appointment of a Chartered Accountant to review the financial details.

Issues:

Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the appointment of a Chartered Accountant in the execution proceedings?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had indeed exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the appointment of a Chartered Accountant. It emphasized that questions regarding the discharge or satisfaction of a decree must be determined by the Executing Court under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

The Court ruled that the High Court's directive for the appointment of a Chartered Accountant was inappropriate at that stage of the proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order.

It directed the High Court to dispose of the Civil Revision expeditiously, within three months from the date of the Supreme Court's order. No costs were awarded in the matter.