Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the accused, residing in the neighborhood of the prosecutrix, raped her on July 28, 1997, around 9:00 PM.

Issues:

The reliability of the prosecutrix's testimony and the corroboration of evidence.

The validity of the High Court's directive to lodge complaints against police officials.

The proper application of Sections 391 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Held:

The testimony of the prosecutrix is corroborated by medical evidence and the FSL report, indicating the presence of human semen on her clothing.

The prosecutrix had no motive to falsely implicate the accused. The accused failed to provide evidence to support their claim that they had lodged complaints against the prosecutrix, justifying their implication.

The power under Section 391 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with caution, and additional evidence should be considered only if it was recorded as provided by law.

Even if the prosecutrix had a promiscuous reputation, it did not justify sexual assault. The High Court's reliance on complaints against the prosecutrix introduced during the appeal was deemed erroneous.

The trial court's assessment of the prosecutrix's testimony, corroborated by various pieces of evidence, was deemed reliable. The High Court's reliance on complaints against the prosecutrix was criticized.

The High Court's reliance on complaints against the prosecutrix and its directive to lodge complaints against police officials were considered inappropriate.

The High Court's disparaging remarks against police officials, without affording them a hearing, were deemed unjust. The directive to initiate proceedings under Sections 193 and 195 IPC against the police officials was set aside.

Initiating proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. must be done with care and caution, with findings of expedience in the interest of justice. The High Court's directive to lodge complaints against police officials without proper consideration was criticized.

Prosecution for perjury should only be sanctioned in cases where it appears deliberate and expedient in the interest of justice. The High Court's directive without affording a hearing to police officials was deemed improper.

Decision: The Court affirmed the conviction of the respondents and emphasized the importance of meticulous consideration of evidence and due process in legal proceedings. The appeal preferred by them is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services Interconnection (Addressable Systems) Regulations, 2017, and the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Eighth) (Addressable Systems) Tariff Order, 2017.

Issues:

Whether the regulations and tariff order are within the jurisdiction of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI).

Whether the regulations infringe upon the rights of broadcasters under the Copyright Act.

How the TRAI Act and the Copyright Act should be harmonized in case of any conflict.

Held:

The provisions of the TRAI Act must be interpreted in the light of protecting the interests of both service providers and consumers. Section 11(1)(a)(iv) of the TRAI Act empowers the Authority to facilitate competition and promote efficiency in telecommunication services. The fixing of rates under Section 11(2) of the TRAI Act includes rates for broadcasting services.

The regulations and tariff order aim to strike a balance between the rights of broadcasters and the interests of consumers. They do not seek to regulate the content of TV channels but focus on regulating pricing to ensure fair competition.

The regulations were formulated after extensive consultations with stakeholders and aim to provide a level playing field for both broadcasters and consumers. While TRAI regulates broadcasting services, it does not impinge upon the rights of broadcasters under the Copyright Act.

Both the TRAI Act and the Copyright Act are central enactments, and in case of any clash, they should be harmonized to give effect to both. TRAI's regulatory functions prevail over the Copyright Act to the extent of any inconsistency, particularly concerning compensation payable to broadcasters.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, affirming the validity of the regulations and tariff orders under the TRAI Act.

Facts:

Ghanshyam Sharma claimed to have worked as a casual helper for Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. from June 10, 1976, to July 30, 1977.

He alleged that his services were orally terminated on July 31, 1977.

The dispute led to a reference to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Labour Court ruled in Sharma's favor, ordering his reinstatement with continuity of service.

Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. challenged this decision in the High Court, leading to conflicting judgments at the Single Judge and Division Bench levels.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in reinstating the Labour Court's award.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the facts and circumstances, modified the Labour Court's award.

It found that reinstating Sharma with back wages and continuity of service was not appropriate due to the short duration of his employment and lack of evidence regarding his subsequent employment status.

Instead, the Court directed Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. to pay Sharma a lump sum compensation of Rs. 50,000 under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

This compensation was deemed reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case, including the monthly salary paid to Sharma during the legal proceedings.

The company was instructed to pay the compensation within three months from the date of the Supreme Court's order.

Facts:

The case involved the allotment of land by the State to a private educational institution to facilitate its relocation from a Waqf property, following an eviction order by the Waqf Authority.

Out of the total 4 kanals of land allotted, the State charged the institution for 2 kanals at a specified rate, while granting the remaining 2 kanals free of cost.

Writ petitions challenging this allotment were initially dismissed by a Single Judge but were later quashed by a Division Bench of the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the State's allocation of land to the educational institution was in line with constitutional principles, particularly Article 14 and Article 39(b).

Whether the free allotment of 2 kanals of land by the State was justified.

Held:

The Court held that while the usual practice involves auctioning or tendering for land allocation, deviations from this practice may be warranted in certain circumstances, especially when public interest and welfare are at stake.

An executive action is not deemed arbitrary solely due to a lack of explicit reasoning, as long as a reasonable underlying principle is discernible.

The Court emphasized that the State's action was backed by a welfare purpose, evident from the urgent need to ensure continuity of education for children and maintain peace in the locality.

Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution emphasize the State's obligation to promote the welfare of its people, including aspects like education.

The Court acknowledged the importance of education as a fundamental aspect of democratic governance, underscoring the need for state support in this realm.

While the Court upheld the overall allocation of land, it found the free allotment of 2 kanals unjustified, causing a loss to the public exchequer.

Consequently, the appellant was directed to compensate for the free allotment by paying for the two kanals at the prevailing auction price, along with interest.

Facts:

LT. GEN. Manomoy Ganguly, VSM, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and became eligible for the post of DGMS (Army). Despite being the senior-most person in the feeder rank, another Lieutenant General 'S' was recommended for the post by the Director General, Armed Forces (Medical) Services (DGAFMS). LT. GEN. Ganguly approached the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), which ruled in his favor. However, the Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court directed the matter to be placed before the Raksha Mantri for consideration. The Raksha Mantri decided against appointing LT. GEN. Ganguly to the post. Subsequently, a Miscellaneous Application was filed by LT. GEN. Ganguly, but before its listing, DGMS (Air) was recommended and appointed to the post of DGMS (Army).

Issues:

Whether the lateral shifting of DGMS (Air) and considering his candidature for the post of DGMS (Army) was justified.

Whether the decision-making process followed the guidelines dated July 10, 1992.

Whether the criteria of 'inter se suitability' were appropriately applied in the decision-making process.

Whether fair and objective consideration was given to LT. GEN. Ganguly's suitability for the post of DGMS (Army).

Whether the appointment of DGMS (Air) as DGMS (Army) should be set aside.

Held:

The court found that the lateral shifting of DGMS (Air) and considering his candidature for the post of DGMS (Army) was contrary to the policy guidelines dated July 10, 1992. Such lateral shifting is permitted only in exceptional circumstances, which were not demonstrated in this case.

It was observed that DGAFMS/COAS had previously not included DGMS (Air) in the panel for the post of DGMS (Army) due to his assumption of the DGMS (Air) post at that time. No exceptional circumstances were presented to justify his inclusion later.

The court emphasized that 'inter se suitability' should be judged based on the attributes, skills, and experience of the eligible persons. The criteria of 'comparative merit' should not be used, and seniority should be given due weightage.

The decision-making process was criticized for not objectively considering LT. GEN. Ganguly's suitability for the post of DGMS (Army). Extraneous reasons were cited, and the norm of Overall Assessment Purpose (OAP) was applied, which was inconsistent with the guidelines.

Consequently, the appointment of DGMS (Air) as DGMS (Army) did not stand judicial scrutiny. The court set aside this appointment and directed the respondents to appoint LT. GEN. Ganguly as DGMS (Army).

Facts:

Respondents were appointed as Adult Education Supervisors under the Non-Formal Education Scheme.

The scheme was abolished, resulting in the termination of respondents' employment.

A policy decision was made by the State Government on May 20, 2005, to adjust all retrenched employees.

Respondents were appointed pursuant to a letter dated March 16, 2007.

The respondents filed a writ petition in 2013 seeking payment of salary for the period from October 1, 2001, to July 3, 2007, and continuity of past services.

Issues:

Whether the respondents are entitled to back wages following the abolition of the Non-Formal Education Scheme.

Whether the delay in filing the writ petition constitutes laches.

Held:

The respondents neither challenged their termination nor the policy decisions regarding their employment until 2013. This delay in seeking legal remedy constitutes laches.

The appointment

letter dated March 16, 2007, clearly stated that the appointment was fresh and that past services would only be considered for pension benefits, not for reinstatement or back wages.

Without reinstatement, the question of awarding back wages did not arise. Back wages could only be linked to reinstatement, not awarded in isolation.

Since the respondents did not work during the period for which they claimed back wages and because the scheme they were employed under had been abolished, they are not entitled to back wages.

The principle of 'no work, no pay' disentitles the respondents from back wages.

The decision in Smt. Ram Laxmi Mishra case, which might have granted similar relief, is distinguishable on facts.

Finally, the respondents are not entitled to the reliefs they claimed based on the terms and conditions of their appointment.

Facts:

The Medical Council of India (MCI) inspected certain medical colleges and found deficiencies. The Government of India directed the MCI to review the recommendations and consider compliance reported. The MCI declined to review its recommendation, leading to the denial of renewal/recognition. Writ petitions were filed challenging this denial. The High Court quashed the denial orders and directed admissions for the academic year 2018-19.

Issues:

The interpretation of regulations governing medical colleges, the binding nature of MCI recommendations, and the legality of the High Court's intervention in denying admissions.

Held:

The MCI is established to maintain the standard of medical education and has the authority to supervise qualifications and eligibility standards for medical institutions.

Regulations, particularly the Establishment of Medical Colleges Regulations 1999, are binding concerning teaching faculty, infrastructure, and other facilities. Compliance becomes more stringent with each subsequent batch.

Specific thresholds for deficiencies are outlined in the regulations. If deficiencies exceed these thresholds, colleges cannot be given an opportunity for compliance in the same academic year.

Recommendations made by the Hearing Committee to review and consider compliance are not binding. Instead, regulations 8(3)(1)(a) and (b) are binding on the Hearing Committee, Government of India, and MCI.

Interference with decisions based on expert recommendations is only permissible in cases of jurisdictional errors, perversity, or mala fide intentions.

The High Court erred in quashing the Government's order and allowing admissions without the necessary permissions and recommendations from the MCI.

Both the MCI and Government of India are urged to make decisions earlier in the year to allow for judicial review before the start of the academic session.

Compliance submitted by colleges should be considered separately for recognition purposes, apart from admission permissions.

Facts:

Kalpana Vyas, the landlady, filed an eviction petition against Raj Kumar Rangwani, the tenant, under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001.

Vyas claimed eviction for her personal bona fide need to construct additional space for her children and for accommodating guests.

The Rent Tribunal initially dismissed Vyas's petition, stating that her need could be met with alternative accommodation available to her in the city.

Vyas appealed this decision to the Appellate Tribunal, which ruled in her favor and granted the eviction decree against the tenant.

Dissatisfied with this decision, the tenant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Rajasthan, which set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and reinstated the decision of the Rent Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the tenant's writ petition and setting aside the appellate order of the Rent Appellate Tribunal.

Whether the High Court properly considered the factual and legal aspects of the case in its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in not examining the issue on merits and simply reinstating the Rent Tribunal's decision without proper consideration. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, could not delve into factual details like an Appellate Court.

The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court had two options: either to remand the case to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for fresh consideration on merits in accordance with the law, or to decide the matter itself on merits. Since the High Court didn't choose either option and merely restored the Rent Tribunal's order, the Supreme Court deemed it necessary to remand the case to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for a fresh decision on merits.

The Supreme Court directed the Rent Appellate Tribunal to decide the appeal within six months strictly in accordance with the law and without being influenced by any observations made by the Supreme Court or the High Court. The appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for fresh consideration.

Facts:

The respondent college applied to the appellant university for the grant of a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to commence the D.Pharma course during the academic year 2018-2019. The university declined the NOC, citing the government's policy and perspective plan, which discouraged the establishment of new institutions or courses. The respondent challenged this decision, leading to litigation. The High Court initially ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that the university was obligated to issue the NOC.

Issues:

Whether the refusal to grant NOC by the university was justified under Section 20 of the Telangana Education Act, 1982.

Whether the university's regulations regarding NOC were consistent with relevant Acts and regulations.

Whether the policy decision of the State Government regarding the establishment of new educational institutions was legal and rational.

Held:

The provisions of Section 20 of the Telangana Education Act, 1982 aim to identify educational needs and prevent the mushroom growth of institutions and courses. The competent authority is tasked with conducting a survey to ascertain the educational requirements of the locality and may decline NOC if there is already a significant number of institutions offering similar courses.

The regulations of the university concerning NOC, as outlined in Jawaharlal Nehru Affiliation Procedure and Regulations, 2017, are in line with the provisions of the Act. The High Court erred in holding otherwise.

The State Government's policy decision, supported by surveys and data indicating vacancies in existing courses, was deemed legal and rational. It aimed to prevent the proliferation of educational institutions and maintain educational standards.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the decision of the High Court. It upheld the University's refusal to grant NOC and affirmed the legality of the State Government's policy decision regarding the establishment of new educational institutions.