Facts:

The respondent manufactures "bitumen emulsion".

The respondent sought clarification about the rate of tax applicable to sales of bitumen emulsion under the VAT Act.

The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes classified bitumen emulsion as an unclassified commodity, subject to tax at 12.5%.

The respondent appealed, contending that bitumen emulsion should be taxed at the rate prescribed for bitumen under Serial no. 22 Part A of Schedule II to the VAT Act.

The tribunal dismissed the revision, prompting the respondent to approach the High Court.

The High Court, after examining technical materials, held that bitumen and bitumen emulsion are the same commodity and allowed the revision.

Issues:

Whether bitumen emulsion should be classified under the specific Entry 22 of Schedule II of the VAT Act or taxed as an unclassified commodity.

Whether the High Court's decision was correct in interpreting the classification of bitumen emulsion.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming the classification of bitumen emulsion under Entry 22 of Schedule II of the VAT Act. The Court reasoned that bitumen emulsion retains the essential characteristics of bitumen and serves the same purpose, thus qualifying it for classification under the specific entry. The legislative intent was to include all types and varieties of bitumen under the said entry. The Court also emphasized that the end use test supported the classification of bitumen emulsion under Entry 22. The decision of the High Court was found to be flawless and in accordance with the law.

Facts:

Dhariwal Industries Ltd. filed a complaint under various sections of the IPC.

The case proceeded to be registered as C.C. No. 927/PW/2007.

During the stage of framing charges, the appellant sought permission to be heard, which was granted by the trial magistrate.

The accused-respondents approached the High Court via a criminal writ petition, challenging the trial court's decision.

The High Court modified the trial court's order, limiting the role of the appellant to that outlined in Section 301 of the CrPC.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court erred in disregarding the provisions of Section 302 CrPC.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in relying solely on Section 301 CrPC and disregarding Section 302 CrPC.

What is the extent of the complainant's role in criminal proceedings, particularly in relation to Sections 301 and 302 of the CrPC?

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of Sections 301 and 302 of the CrPC and upheld the distinction between them. The Court clarified that while Section 301 applies to all courts of criminal jurisdiction and requires the complainant to act under the directions of the public prosecutor, Section 302 allows the magistrate to permit the complainant to conduct the prosecution independently.

The Court directed that if the complainant wishes to conduct the prosecution independently, they must file a written application under Section 302 CrPC for the magistrate's consideration. The previous orders of the trial court and the High Court would not hinder the consideration of such an application. The criminal appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.

Facts:

Respondent No. 3, as Proprietor of M/s Gable Builders, obtained a loan from the Goa State Cooperative Bank Ltd.

Recovery proceedings were initiated against the borrowers under Sections 74 and 76 of the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 1984.

Despite several attempts, including auction and tender notices, the mortgaged property remained unsold.

Appellant emerged as the highest bidder in the sealed tender process and obtained a Sale Certificate.

Respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court to quash the award and the certificate of sale.

Issues:

Whether execution proceedings initiated under the 1984 Act can continue under the 2002 Act.

Whether the judgment of the High Court was correct in setting aside the auction proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that execution proceedings initiated under Section 85(c) of the 1984 Act and pending before authorities prior to 19th August, 2002, would continue unhindered by the repeal of the 1984 Act by the 2002 Act. The Court emphasized Section 126(6) of the 2002 Act, which allows for the continuation of legal proceedings initiated before the commencement of the new Act. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court was incorrect and set aside.

Furthermore, the Court ordered the bank to pay the appellant the balance amount of Rs. 74,688.25, along with interest at the rate of 19% compounded per annum from 1st April, 2007, within four weeks.

The Court also rejected the plea to remand the remaining grounds of the Writ Petition to the High Court for consideration, as they lacked merit and circumvented statutory provisions.

Facts:

The case of L. Narayana Swamy v. State of Karnataka & Ors. involved allegations against public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused were alleged to have abused their official positions, leading to charges under the Act.

Issues:

Interpretation of Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Clarification on the distinction between pre-cognizance and post-cognizance stages in criminal proceedings.

Whether prior government sanction is necessary for directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Held:

The Court clarified the scope of Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offenses against public servants without prior government sanction. This provision applies to both pre-cognizance and post-cognizance stages of criminal proceedings .

Referring a case for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is considered a pre-cognizance stage. Therefore, prior government sanction is necessary before directing further investigation against a public servant .

The requirement of prior government sanction under Section 19(1) does not apply if the alleged misconduct occurred in a capacity different from the one held at the time of taking cognizance. In such cases, there is no necessity for obtaining sanction .

The High Court's decision to rely on precedent and hold that accused public servants, who abused a different office than the one they held at the time of taking cognizance, did not require sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was affirmed .

Allegations of abuse of official position and commission of offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act require scrutiny based on evidence. Therefore, proceedings should not be quashed at the initial stage, and the culpability of the accused should be determined based on evidence presented .

Facts:

Larsen & Toubro Limited (L&T) was engaged in engineering and contracting projects, including works contracts with various entities.

L&T assigned part of its works contract to sub-contractors, who were registered under the Karnataka Act and paid taxes for the execution of the works contracts.

The question arose whether the value of the work assigned to sub-contractors should be included in L&T's total turnover for the purpose of taxation under Section 6-B of the Karnataka Act.

The High Court had ruled against L&T, holding that such payments should indeed be included in L&T's total turnover.

Issues:

Whether payments made to sub-contractors should be included in the total turnover for taxation purposes under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957?

Held:

The Supreme Court disagreed with the interpretation of the High Court and held that unless there is a transfer of property in goods, the amount paid should not be included in the total turnover. It analyzed the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act, including definitions of terms such as "sale," "turnover," and "taxable turnover." The Court highlighted that the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules specifically stated that only payments made for the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contracts should be considered in the total turnover calculation.

The Court referenced its earlier judgment in a similar case concerning the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, where it was held that only the transfer of property in goods constituted a taxable event. Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that payments made to sub-contractors, where there was no transfer of property in goods, should not be included in L&T's total turnover for taxation purposes. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeals filed by L&T and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

Facts:

The appeals arose from an order of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur, which dismissed petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.).

The central issue was the maintainability of petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when an alternative remedy under Section 397 (revisional jurisdiction) was available.

There was a conflict in interpretations between different judgments regarding the relationship between the availability of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and the invocation of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Issues:

Whether the availability of an alternative remedy under Section 397 Cr.P.C. would restrict the invocation of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

How to interpret and reconcile conflicting judgments on this issue.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not limited by the availability of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C.

The court emphasized the non-obstante clause in Section 482, indicating its overriding nature over other provisions in the Cr.P.C.

The impugned order of the High Court was set aside, and the matters were remanded back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits within the scope of inherent powers available under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The High Court was directed to decide the matters expeditiously, preferably within six months.

Facts:

Hindustan Lever Ltd. (appellant) operated a tea manufacturing unit in Dharwad and other units producing various types of tea.

Appellant claimed exemption from entry tax on packing materials for its Dharwad unit and a lower tax rate for other units under notifications issued by the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979.

Dispute arose regarding whether packing materials used in the manufacture of tea could be considered as raw materials, component parts, or inputs eligible for tax exemptions or lower rates.

Issues:

Whether packing materials used in tea manufacturing qualify for tax exemptions or lower rates under Karnataka entry tax laws.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that packing materials used in the manufacture of tea cannot be considered as raw materials, component parts, or inputs eligible for tax exemptions or lower rates under Karnataka entry tax laws. The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979, and the notifications issued thereunder made a clear distinction between packing materials and materials used in the manufacture of finished products.

The Court observed that while packing materials are separately defined and taxed, raw materials, component parts, and inputs used in manufacturing are treated differently. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that Explanation II of a notification issued in 1998 altered this interpretation, emphasizing that packing materials cannot be construed as inputs for the manufacturing process. The Court dismissed the appellant's appeal, affirming the decision of the High Court.

Facts:

Chandrasekaran, an employee of TNSTC (Coimbatore) Ltd., was dismissed from service following a fatal accident involving the bus he was driving.

The disciplinary inquiry found him guilty of rash and negligent driving based on evidence presented, including damage caused by the accident and injuries sustained by passengers.

The Commissioner, however, refused to approve the dismissal, citing lack of independent witnesses and questioning the sufficiency of evidence.

Both parties filed writ petitions in the High Court, which upheld the Commissioner's decision.

The management appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that there was sufficient evidence to support the dismissal.

Issues:

Whether the Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in evaluating the evidence and refusing approval to the dismissal.

Whether the absence of independent witnesses invalidated the evidence presented during the disciplinary inquiry.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner had exceeded his jurisdiction by re-evaluating the evidence and substituting his judgment. Despite the absence of independent witnesses, the evidence presented during the disciplinary inquiry was deemed sufficient to support the dismissal. Therefore, the Court allowed the management's appeal and granted approval to the order of dismissal against Chandrasekaran, with the liberty for him to challenge the dismissal through appropriate legal avenues.

The Court emphasized the limited jurisdiction of the Commissioner under Section 33(2)(b) and reiterated that he cannot substitute his judgment for that of the Disciplinary Authority.

The Court found that there was sufficient evidence presented during the inquiry to suggest that Chandrasekaran was driving negligently, considering the extensive damage caused by the accident and the fatal injuries sustained by passengers. The absence of independent witnesses did not invalidate the evidence presented by the management. The appeals are allowed.

Facts:

Kidwai Nagar East was earmarked for re-development under the Master Plan of 2021 by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).

National Building Construction Corporation (NBCC) was tasked with executing the re-development project.

Dispute arose over the closure of Veer Chandra Singh Garhwali Marg, a road within the re-development area, leading to writ petitions in the Delhi High Court.

NBCC contended that the road was not a public street and had been incorporated into the re-development plan.

The High Court ruled in favor of the residents, directing NBCC to maintain the road as per the approved plan.

Issues:

Whether the closure of Veer Chandra Singh Garhwali Marg by NBCC was justified during the re-development project.

Whether NBCC was bound by the sanctioned layout plan for the area, which retained the road.

Held:

The Supreme Court accepted NBCC's assurance that the road closure was temporary until December 2018, to facilitate construction work. NBCC undertook to restore the road to its original form after completion of construction. The Court held that the project could proceed unhindered but remitted the matter to the High Court to consider if additional safeguards were necessary to address residents' concerns. The Civil Appeals shall accordingly stand disposed of.