Facts:

The appellant and the respondents had entered into a Partnership Agreement dated 09.11.2005, which included Clause 15 stating that disputes would be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. When a dispute arose, the appellant sought to refer the matter to arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("1996 Act"). The trial court and the High Court rejected the application, citing the reference to the 1940 Act in the partnership agreement.

Issues:

Whether an arbitration clause referring to the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, in a partnership agreement executed after the enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, would be governed by the 1996 Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that if arbitral proceedings had not commenced before the enactment of the 1996 Act, the 1996 Act would govern the arbitration proceedings, regardless of any reference to the 1940 Act in the arbitration agreement. The court emphasized the importance of the parties' agreement to refer disputes to arbitration and held that incorrect references to previous arbitration acts would not invalidate the arbitration agreement.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the lower courts and allowed the appeal, directing the matter to be dealt with by the trial court under the provisions of the 1996 Act. The parties were directed to appear before the trial court for effectuating the arbitration agreement.

Facts:

M/S Narbheram Power and Steel Pvt. Ltd. had an insurance policy with Oriental Insurance Company Limited for their factory in Odisha. Following damages from a cyclone named "Phailin," they claimed damages from the insurer. The insurer repudiated the claim entirely.

Issues:

Whether the dispute arising from the repudiation of the claim falls within the scope of the arbitration clause in the insurance policy?

Whether the High Court's interpretation of the arbitration clause was correct?

Held:

The Court held that the communication from Oriental Insurance Company Limited, denying the claim entirely, amounted to a dispute on liability, not just quantum. Thus, as per Clause 13 of the policy, disputes over liability couldn't be referred to arbitration. The Court rejected the High Court's interpretation and ruled that the only remedy available to Narbheram Power and Steel Pvt. Ltd. was to file a civil suit.

In view of the above, the appeal was allowed, and the order passed by the High Court was set aside. The Court directed Narbheram Power and Steel Pvt. Ltd. to pursue their grievances through a civil suit if they wished. If a civil suit is filed within two months hence, the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, will enure to its benefit.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by the accused, Murugan, against his conviction for offenses under Sections 364 and 302/34 of the IPC.

Murugan and another individual named Kumar were accused of kidnapping and murdering Murugan's uncle.

Kumar died before the trial, and thus, only Murugan's case proceeded.

The prosecution presented circumstantial evidence linking Murugan to the crime, including his presence with Kumar and the victim on the night of the incident.

Issues:

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to uphold Murugan's conviction.

Whether Murugan's denial of involvement without offering any explanation for the circumstances against him affects the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after reviewing the evidence and legal arguments, upheld Murugan's conviction. The Court emphasized the importance of circumstantial evidence and the theory of "accused last seen in the company of the deceased" as strong circumstances against the accused.

The Court found that Murugan's presence with Kumar and the victim, along with other circumstantial evidence, established a chain of events leading to a strong conclusion against him. Murugan's failure to explain the circumstances against him further supported his conviction.

Therefore, the Court dismissed Murugan's appeal, affirming his conviction for the offenses charged.

Facts:

The case involved a search conducted by the Income Tax Department at the premises of the assessee and a related business entity, M/s. ECIL. During the search, evidence was found indicating that the assessee had made a cash payment of Rs. 95.16 lakhs to M/s. ECIL, which was not accounted for.

Issues:

Whether the cash payment discovered during the search should be included in the block assessment as undisclosed income.

Held:

The court analyzed relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, particularly Section 158BB, which governs the computation of undisclosed income for block assessments. It was emphasized that undisclosed income for the block period should be based solely on evidence found during the search or related proceedings. The power of survey under Section 133A allows for the collection of evidence at connected premises, which can be utilized in block assessments. The court referred to precedents, including the decision in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Hotel Blue Moon, to highlight the purpose and scope of block assessments.

The court concluded that the cash payment discovered during the search could be included in the block assessment. It was noted that evidence found during a search or survey, even if conducted at related premises, can be used in block assessments. The decision was based on a strict interpretation of relevant provisions and precedents.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeals filed by the Revenue, setting aside the orders of the High Court and restoring the orders passed by the Assessing Officer for block assessment. However, it was mentioned that the parties would bear their own costs.

Facts:

The Telangana Housing Board acquired around a thousand acres of land for a housing scheme, which included land from Survey No. 1009. The respondents, represented by Azamunnisa Begum and others, contended that 11 acres and odd had not been acquired. Conversely, the revenue authorities argued that the entire area of Survey No. 1009 was 687.03 acres, with 20.18 acres left unacquired.

Issues:

Whether there was a clerical error in the measurement of Survey No. 1009?

Whether the claim made by the respondents under Section 87 of the Act was valid after a significant delay?

What is the role of the Telangana Housing Board in protecting the interests of the beneficiaries of the housing scheme?

Held:

The court held that there was no clerical error in the measurement of Survey No. 1009. The entire land in Survey No. 1009 was acquired for the housing scheme. Compensation was paid for the acquisition of the entire Survey No. 1009. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in concluding that 20.18 acres of land in Survey No. 1009 had not been acquired.

The court criticized the delay in the respondent's claim under Section 87 of the Act, emphasizing that they should have been more vigilant in pursuing their claim. The delay of 25 years was deemed unreasonable, especially considering the creation of third-party rights through the housing scheme.

The Telangana Housing Board had the locus standi to participate in the proceedings to protect the interests of the beneficiaries of the housing scheme. The court emphasized that the Housing Board was directly and primarily affected by the claim made by the respondents under Section 87 of the Act.

Facts:

The case involves the appellant, Dilawar, who was accused in a case related to mob violence during a 'jat agitation'.

The investigation was initially conducted by the state police but later transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

The appellant applied for bail, which was denied by the High Court.

The Supreme Court, while not granting bail, directed that the trial be concluded within six months.

The CBI filed an application for modification of the previous order, stating that the investigation was transferred to them and required time.

Issues:

The delay in completing the investigation by the CBI and its impact on the appellant's fundamental rights.

The court also considers the need for timelines for completing investigations and proposes an in-house oversight mechanism to address delays.

Held:

The court observed that speedy investigation is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. It set a deadline for the CBI to complete the investigation within the next two months, allowing the trial to commence by July 10, 2018, and conclude by the end of the year. The appellant was given the option to file a bail application before the trial court.

The court recognized the need for timelines for completing investigations and proposed an in-house oversight mechanism to ensure accountability and prevent undue delays. The Union of India was impleaded as a party, and the Ministry of Home Affairs was directed to interact with all Central and State investigating agencies to formulate an action plan for completing pending investigations within a proposed timeframe. The matter was scheduled for further consideration on 3rd July 2018.

Facts:

Satyawati, the wife of Tribhuwan Singh, died due to gunshot injuries at her in-laws' house.

Allegations of dowry harassment were made against Chandra Bhawan Singh and others.

Chandra Bhawan Singh, along with others, was convicted by the trial court.

The High Court upheld Chandra Bhawan Singh's conviction while acquitting others.

Chandra Bhawan Singh appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging his conviction.

Issues:

Whether the conviction of Chandra Bhawan Singh is legally sustainable.

Whether the circumstances indicate suicide or murder.

Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the chain of events leading to the murder.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld Chandra Bhawan Singh's conviction. The Court found that the lower courts had properly evaluated the evidence and concluded that Chandra Bhawan Singh was involved in the murder. The Court emphasized that when both lower courts have recorded concurrent findings based on evidence, the Supreme Court would be reluctant to interfere unless there are glaring errors or perversities in the findings.

The Court further stated that the evidence of dowry demands and harassment was credible. The suicide theory was deemed improbable based on the nature of injuries and circumstances. Additionally, Chandra Bhawan Singh's failure to provide a satisfactory explanation further incriminated him.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals failed and were accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The case initially involved concerns regarding the treatment of an eight-month-old female child who had become a victim of a crime under the POCSO Act. Additionally, the petitioner raised the issue of the need for speedy trials and child-friendly court procedures under the Act.

Issues:

Treatment of the child victim of sexual assault under the POCSO Act.

Speedy trial and monitoring of cases under the POCSO Act, ensuring child-friendly court procedures.

Held:

The Court examined the medical condition of the child victim and ensured appropriate treatment. It also addressed the compensation awarded to the victim's family and provided legal aid. Regarding speedy trials and monitoring, the Court emphasized the legislative intent behind the POCSO Act, highlighting the need for child protection and speedy disposal of cases.

The Court issued several directives to ensure effective implementation of the POCSO Act. This included sensitizing presiding officers of Special Courts, establishing Special Courts if not already done, fast-tracking trials, constituting monitoring committees, and forming Special Task Forces in state police departments. High Courts were instructed to provide a child-friendly atmosphere in Special Courts. The directives were aimed at protecting child victims and expediting trials in cases of sexual offences against children.

Facts:

Chennai Port Trust had a canteen run by a Cooperative Society named "Chennai Port Trust Industrial Employees Co-operative Canteen Limited" since 1964.

Workers in the canteen formed an association and filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking recognition as regular employees of Chennai Port Trust and associated benefits.

The Chennai Port Trust contested, stating they had no control over the canteen's operations, and the employment status was a factual matter for an Industrial Tribunal.

The Single Judge allowed the writ petition, and the Division Bench affirmed the decision on appeal.

Issues:

Whether the canteen workers should be considered regular employees of Chennai Port Trust and entitled to benefits.

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to decide the matter or if it should have been referred to an Industrial Tribunal.

Held:

The Division Bench upheld the decisions of the lower courts, affirming the employment status and benefits of the canteen workers. The Court found that the Chennai Port Trust exercised significant control over the canteen operations, similar to precedents established in previous cases, notably Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. v. Shramik Sena.

The Court rejected the argument that the dispute should have been referred to an Industrial Tribunal, as the writ petition had already been decided on its merits and no disputed facts requiring trial existed. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.